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
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THE  
REFORMED  
CHURCH REVIEW.

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YE SHALL KNOW THE TRUTH, AND THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE.

FOURTH SERIES. VOLUME I.

PUBLISHED BY  
THE REFORMED CHURCH PUBLICATION BOARD,  
PHILADELPHIA, PA.







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# THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW.

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NO. 1.—JANUARY, 1897.

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## I.

### THE PURPOSE OF THE REVIEW.

BY THE EDITOR.

IN changing its name this REVIEW does not propose to change its character, but merely to assume a title which shall be expressive of what has all along been its relation to the Church in whose interest it has been published. As the *Mercersburg Review* and as the REFORMED QUARTERLY, it has during the almost fifty years of its existence been intimately related to the history and development of the Reformed Church in the United States. It has, indeed, been itself an important factor of this development. It has served as an agency for the creation of a distinct denominational consciousness within the Church, and as an organ of communication with the theological world on the outside. It has thus been a factor in making the Reformed Church what she is to-day, and in securing her position among the religious denominations of the country.

Standing in the confessional system of the Heidelberg Catechism, and reflecting the historical genius of that branch of the Reformed Church in which the Catechism had its origin, the REVIEW has served as an organ for the development and publication of a peculiar system of theology—a system of theology in some fundamental respects different from the theological systems

of other Christian denominations. This fact has been often made a cause of reproach, not only against the REVIEW, but also against the Church which published and supported it. "Mercersburg theology," which was the name usually given to the method of theological thinking peculiar to the writers of the REVIEW, was regarded as a sign that must be spoken against; and this often for no better reason than just because it was different from the theological thinking of the representatives of other denominations, who could not easily reconcile it with their own peculiar systems. Rightly considered, however, this should have been no cause of objection. For what reason or right of existence has any Church, if there is nothing peculiar in its theology to differentiate it from the theology of other Churches? Theology, indeed, is not the end for which a Church exists; but the theology of a Church may after all be regarded as the exponent of its general Christian character, upon which its right of separate existence must be judged to depend. If, then, the Reformed Church in the United States were just like the Presbyterian Church, for instance, and if there were no difference at all in their respective systems of theology, to what purpose, we may ask, would be their separate existence? They should, then, in all reason flow together and be one. They would have no separate missions. But the REVIEW has believed that the Reformed Church has a mission among the Churches of this land, and that that mission consists, in part at least, in the maintenance and propagation of its peculiar system of theology, together with the peculiar form of Church life which this implies. This opinion has been its apology for its own existence in the past. And this opinion it continues to hold still. It believes that the theology for which it has stood in the past has merits which entitle it to the respectful consideration of the theological public; and it believes, further, that this theology is destined to exercise an important influence in the final formulation of the religious thought of this country. In this belief, moreover, it is strengthened by the consideration that the reigning systems of theology of the larger denominations have not thus far commended them-



selves to the favorable regard of the people of this country generally, of whom consequently a very large proportion have at present no connection at all with any branch of the Christian Church. If the theological and ecclesiastical systems which have heretofore prevailed in the leading denominations of the country have not been able to win the general religious mind of the population, that may be taken as evidence that these systems are not finalities, and that there is room at least for other constructions of Christianity, of a different character, which may perhaps be more successful in winning and holding the masses of mankind.

Now the theology which has been connected with this REVIEW may be characterized briefly as *Christological, historical, and positive or churchly*. These characteristics have distinguished the theology of the REVIEW from much of the theology that has been current in other Christian denominations. By claiming for it the quality of being Christological we mean that it has taken Christ as the illuminative centre of divine or revealed truth. It is not merely a theology that has Christ in it as a subordinate element, but a theology which contains Him as its central, organizing principle. While some, for instance, have construed the system of divine truth in the light of divine sovereignty, or of the divine decree of election, and others in the light of human autonomy or freedom, the REVIEW has taken its position in the idea of Christ, and has viewed every truth in the light of that idea. Christ has revealed God, nay, is revealing him now in and through the Christian consciousness of the Church; and whatever is in harmony with the revelation of the Christ that is divine truth, and whatever contradicts that revelation is error and falsehood.

By affirming, secondly, that the theology of the REVIEW has been historical we mean that it has apprehended Christianity as an historical reality in the world, subject to the general laws of development and progress which characterize all earthly existence. Christianity was historical in its origin. The coming of Christ in the flesh was mediated by an historical process of evolution in the life of the world in general, but particularly in the life



of the chosen people. Christ came not abruptly or suddenly, not without forewarning or premonition. He came in the fulness of the time; and since His coming, Christianity has been an historical life in the world, evolving itself continuously under the conditions which pertain to the development of all earthly life. And this conception applies to theology itself as well as to every other interest belonging to Christianity. Theology is an historical science in the sense that it is progressive, and that no age or party can ever boast of having finished it. To suppose that the theology of any period of time or of any section of the Church can be absolute and final is to give up the historical character of Christianity and, consequently, to make it unreal. This idea of historical development was advocated in the pages of this REVIEW long before the names of Darwin and Spencer had ever been heard of on this side of the Atlantic.

The third leading characteristic of the theology of the REVIEW we have denominated *positiveness* or *churchliness*. By this we mean that in the apprehension of this theology Christianity is a positive or objective reality continuously existing in the form of the Church. The truth with which theology deals is not the product of the reason either as intuitive or discursive; but it is a gift of revelation, something *given* or *laid down*—*positum*. The source of this revelation is in Christ; but the medium through which it comes to the individual mind is the Christian Church as the continuous embodiment of the life and spirit of Christ. The REVIEW has always made account of the Church as an objective divine constitution or reality in the world—in the world, we say, not above it, nor apart from it, but in it—as the organ by which Christ imparts to the world His saving life and power, and by which He appropriates the world to Himself as the material of His kingdom. With St. Paul, the REVIEW regards the Church as in some real sense the body of Christ—an organism which, though human in its outward appearance and form, has within it the Spirit of Christ as its animating soul. This conception of the Church implies two practical consequences, upon which the REVIEW has always insisted. The first of these is



that the ordinances and sacraments of the Church are real divine institutions, and have a real bearing upon the development of the divine life in men. They are, indeed, not efficacious without the coöperation of the faith of the recipient; and yet it is not the faith of the recipient that invests them with their power, for that is in them in consequence of their divine appointment. The second consequence of the conception of the Church as an objective divine constitution is that the collective Christian consciousness which belongs to the Church is a source of authority in faith and doctrine for the individual Christian mind. As the general is before the particular, so the Church is before the individual Christian believer; and the faith of the latter must be determined largely by the authority and influence of the former. The REVIEW has ever contended against that theory of Christian life and faith which represents these as originating either in an abstract activity of the Holy Spirit in the individual soul or in mere private study and interpretation of the Bible, apart from any influence of the Church. The individual gets his faith in the first instance through the mediation of the Church, and the influence of the latter must ever exercise an important office in relation to the development of the former. There is exercised in the Church the function of a formal tradition of dogmatic and moral truth, which is a continual source of light and knowledge for the individual Christian soul, not equal to the Bible and co-ordinate with it, and yet of immense account doubtless for the right ordering of Christian faith and life.

In making prominent these characteristics of its theology, the REVIEW has been guided by the conviction that it was following the teaching of the Bible, and especially the spirit and logic of the Apostles' Creed, in which the teaching of the Bible is supposed to be most purely reflected in the direct form of faith. The Creed is the most primitive reflection of the objective constitution of Christianity in the mirror of faith, having become permanently fixed in words. Now the central figure of the Creed, certainly, is Christ; and from the person of Christ, the incarnate Son, the light is thrown back upon God, the Father



Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, and forward upon the Holy Ghost and His work. The manifestation of God in Christ, moreover, according to the sense of the Creed, was a permanent and abiding revelation. It was not merely a momentary flashing forth of light from the supernatural or heavenly world, and then leaving *this* world in profounder darkness than it was before, or at most only leaving an uncertain reflection of itself in the pages of the Bible, about the meaning of which men now may justly dispute; but it was a new moral and spiritual creation within the bosom of the old, or the establishment of a new order of moral and spiritual life within the order of the present world, and ever continuing itself by the mediation of the Holy Spirit in the form of the Holy Catholic Church. The REVIEW has accepted this spiritual logic of the Creed as the logic of all sound Christian faith, and this has caused its theology to be at once Christological, historical and churchly.

On this platform of the Creed, now, the REVIEW still stands, and proposes hereafter to stand. And in maintaining this position it does not apprehend that it will be called to meet the same contradiction and reproach which fell to its lot in the past; for these ideas are now no longer new to the theological world, but have in fact been adopted as guiding principles by many of the foremost theological thinkers whom the country possesses at the present time. The theological world has moved since 1849, when the REVIEW first began to publish its peculiar theology; and in this very movement there has been an essential vindication of its fundamental conception of historical development. In the theological world, certainly, things have not remained as they were from the beginning of the creation. Theological principles which half a century ago were of unquestioned authority have since become obsolete; and principles which were then frowned upon as at least suspicious, if not plainly heretical, have since been accepted as fundamental Christian truths. Thus the Apostles' Creed itself is now no longer ridiculed as a "relic of popery," but is coming into general honor and use again in the Churches to which it was once an entire stranger. Of this as



well as of some other changes in the beliefs and practices of modern Christendom, the Sunday-school, with its demand for a more substantial order of worship than that previously existing, has doubtless been a potent factor. Again, no respectable theologian would now sneer at the Christological principle in theology as a "Christo-centric conceit," unworthy altogether of any sober consideration or regard. In fact, this principle has been accepted by a large number of leading theological scholars as the only correct principle of a system of Christian theology. What is at present called "the new theology," which has created a powerful school of thinkers, whose representatives are found in all the Evangelical churches, is indeed nothing more than a peculiar version of the Christological and historical theology heretofore advocated by this REVIEW. We do not claim that this REVIEW is the source from which the new theology has been derived. To make such a claim might be considered a species of vanity of which we would not like to be thought guilty. But we do claim that the new theology in its fundamental principles has been derived from the same sources from which the writers of the REVIEW in earlier years drew their inspiration. Those sources are to be looked for in the regenerated Evangelical theology of the German Fatherland, which dates from the time of Schleiermacher and Neander, and was first taught at Mercersburg by Rauch, Nevin and Schaff. We sympathize with the new theology because we recognize in it familiar ideas, ideas which we learned from the writers of the REVIEW in its earlier years. And while we rejoice in this recognition, we are thereby encouraged to stand by the doctrine maintained by the REVIEW, and to support and defend it. And this we propose to do according to our ability, not boastfully or offensively, of course, but positively and firmly. The results achieved by the discussions in which the REVIEW has been engaged must not be thrown away. These discussions can not be repeated, old battles can not be fought over again ; but neither can the results of those battles now be ignored. The present time, when we see so many of the peculiar ideas of the theology once taught in this REVIEW



being accepted by the general theological public, would be an inopportune time for us to cease or grow cold in our devotion to that theology. The REVIEW under its present management does not propose to make itself liable to the charge of such inconsistency. It proposes to stand by its past record.

The REVIEW, then, will continue to serve as an organ for the cultivation and advancement of Christological theology. It is the science of God and of divine things *Christianized* or, to use an expression of Dr. Henry B. Smith's, *Christologized*, which the REVIEW will seek to promote. It is not theology according to Augustine, or Luther, or Calvin, or Wesley, but theology according to Christ—that is to say, theological truth as determined by the principles of the teaching of the historical Christ and by the principles of the most developed Christian reason and conscience—that the REVIEW will ever favor. And such Christianized theology the enlightened mind of this age will not refuse to accept. This age is not atheistic, nor anti-Christian. With all its faults it is a deeply serious age, and it is pervaded by a strong religious tendency; but the religion which it shall accept must be truly Christian and consonant with the highest principles of reason. The age, for example, will no longer accept the idea of a God whose fundamental essence is mere arbitrary and omnipotent will, and whose actions are determined only by motives of self-glorification. The whole notion of *absolutism*, which once made such an idea possible, has been dissipated. The idea of a selfish God violating the moral principles which are innate in the ethical nature of man can no longer commend itself to the modern mind. But this is a pagan, not the Christian idea of God. And it is none the less pagan for the fact that at an early time it stole into the Christian Church and dominated her theology for centuries afterwards. The God revealed in the person and consciousness of Christ is not a God of mere arbitrary power, without reason or affection, who sends to life and sends to death simply because He has the ability to do it, and because there is none able to resist Him. The Christian God is our Father in heaven—a being of infinite reason and infinite love. The relation existing between



Him and His rational creatures is not the relation between an artificer and his works, but the relation between a father and his children. It is a relation of love and of equity. "God is love," writes the apostle who was nearest to the heart of Jesus and caught most clearly His idea of the eternal Father. God, in the representation of Christ, is not a being who sacrifices His children to His own glory, but a Father of infinite love who Himself makes the highest sacrifice in their behalf. Neither is He a being for whom the ideas of right and wrong have no reality, or a reality different from that which they have for the ethical mind of man. God is good, and there is no evil in Him at all; and for that reason He requires His offspring to be good. God is, moreover, a rational, a righteous, and a holy God, who will treat all His children impartially according to the law of righteous love, and who will not suffer iniquity and wrong to go with impunity. Such a conception of God as is here presented, we believe, will commend itself everywhere to the human soul, which, according to Tertullian, is not by nature atheistic but Christian; and the Gospel which presents God in this light will not fail of recognition in this age. The age wants, above all things, a Christian idea of God; and such an idea will be for it an inspiration and a power for good.

And the conception of man which the Christian idea of God implies will be received with equal favor. If God is our Father, then men are His children, and all are brethren. They all belong to one divine Father, with whom there is no respect of persons; and are members therefore of one divine family, with equal rights to happiness. There is no divinely constituted aristocracy among men, making some means only for the gratification of others' desires. The only divine election of which the Christian idea of God permits us to think is an election of some to privileges and functions for the benefit of all. Christ Himself, the Elect One, the choicest of all the children of men, came not to be ministered unto, but to minister and to give His life a ransom for all. That is the divine law of humanity. Those who possess more talents than their fellows may not use them for their own



aggrandizement and profit. The Christian idea of manhood is the idea of universal brotherhood and of equal right in respect of the enjoyment of life, liberty and happiness. The Christian idea has no room for any form of slavery, that is, for the reduction of one person to the capacity of means only for the profit or gratification of another, whether it be under color of involuntary servitude or of voluntary contract. We do not forget now that St. Paul once admonished Christian persons who were born in a condition of slavery to be content with their lot; and that he sent back to his master the run-away slave Onesimus. But that, we hold, was in accommodation to the spirit of the times rather than in agreement with the Christian idea of humanity. This idea requires that men should treat each other, not as mere chattels, or means of profit, but as brethren with equal rights to happiness. And the right to happiness is not a mere counsel of prudence—*evangelical counsel*—which the great and powerful may respect or not as they please; it is a right which belongs to men in virtue of their nature as men, and which God will not suffer to be violated with impunity. It is sometimes said that love is not an affair of law; that whether a man will love his neighbor as himself and treat him as a brother depends entirely upon his own will, which can not be forced by any law of right. There is truth in this representation, but it is true also that in the judgment the unloving soul will be sent into the fire of eternal punishment. The right to brotherly love and fair treatment is as irrefragable as any right of law. And the existence of this right is now generally recognized. There was a time when the common mass of men were not supposed to have any rights which the great and powerful were bound to respect. The latter were the favorites of fortune and of Deity, and they might do in the earth pretty much as they pleased. If they loved their inferiors and showed them any favors they did more than they were under obligation to do; and if they were arbitrary and tyrannical they were only more or less like the Deity who gave them their power, and were not to be blamed. Now that superstition is exploded, and the Gospel which preaches the duty of



universal love and of equal right will be heard and gladly accepted by the masses of mankind. Nor will the favored classes be as much averse to it as may be imagined by some weak and truckling preachers. And this is the only kind of Gospel, too, that is capable of saving our modern world. Into this modern world of selfishness, of greed, of passion, of wrong and of suffering no peace or order can ever be brought except by the Gospel of universal love and righteousness. "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," and "whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do you even so unto them:" these are fundamental principles of the Gospel of Christ, and these principles only can preserve our modern society from lapsing into a state of anarchy and dissolution. Hence this REVIEW will ever sympathize with any efforts to Christologize theology, not only theoretically, but also practically, that is, to introduce the Christian idea into the actual life of the world, and to make the mind of Christ the law for all human activity.

But any form of thinking which accepts the Christological principle as an ideal to be realized in the theology and in the moral and religious life of the future must, in the nature of the case, accept the principle of progressive development as one of the fundamental laws of history. The law of history is not eternal sameness, but variety and change, working out an ideal conception and plan. And this law applies to religion and theology as well as to every other human interest. This law of progressive development in theology, our REVIEW will ever recognize, together with all its legitimate consequences. It will, therefore, look for its theological ideal, not in the past, but in the future. It will not ignore the results of past historical development; and it will, therefore, be Protestant and not Roman Catholic, Reformed not Lutheran, for example, or Methodist. But while accepting the confessional system of the Reformed Church, and especially of the Heidelberg Catechism, the REVIEW also believes in the principle of historical development, and can, therefore, not regard any theological system, like those of the sixteenth or seventeenth century, as a finality. No dogmatic system, no creed



or confession, can ever have the force of absolute authority for the Christian mind. This quality can only belong to the Sacred Scriptures; and to claim it for any system of theology, like that of Calvin, for instance, or of Luther, or for any catechism or confession, would be a new species of Romanism, or stiff ecclesiasticism, to which we should not give way for a moment. The Roman Catholic Church claims that her creed is infallible, and, therefore, unchangeable, because the Church is infallible. Whoever changes a letter of the creed is worthy of condemnation, because the creed is the product of the infallible Church, and, therefore, clothed with the very authority of God Himself. Of course, this is a monstrous claim, and can not for a moment endure the light of modern historical and critical scholarship. But it possesses, at least, the merit of self-consistency; which could not be said of any similar claim in behalf of any Protestant confession. Protestants, in order to secure their own standing outside of Rome, must deny the doctrine of the infallibility of the Church in its present empirical state. And this is not inconsistent with what we have already said in regard to the authority of the collective Christian consciousness of the Church for the individual Christian mind. The Church is the pillar and ground of the truth as St. Paul tells us; which means, doubtless, that she is in possession of the truth, as the depositary of the original Christian revelation, and that it is her function to teach the truth to her children, and thus bring them to the knowledge of it. But the performance of this teaching function does not require the Church to be infallible. No teacher needs to be infallible in order to teach important and valuable truth, in the understanding of which the pupil may in time go far beyond the teacher. Hence, the Protestant is not inconsistent when, recognizing the pedagogic function of the Church, he, nevertheless, denies to her the attribute of infallibility. But, if he denies infallibility to the Church, and yet claims virtual infallibility for her creeds or confessions, by claiming for them unchangeability, then he becomes inconsistent. And this claim is not made to be the less inconsistent and absurd by the representation that theological



systems and confessions, while not absolutely infallible, must yet be treated as if they were infallible until they are changed by public authority. That is, confessions are changeable, but nobody may advocate any change until they have been changed! How long would the Reformation have had to wait if the Reformers had been governed by this principle? And yet, this absurdity underlies every Protestant heresy trial that has ever been conducted.

Creeds and confessions, and systems of theology, are important as marking the highest stage to which the Christian faith of any age or section of the Church may have risen; and they are valuable as guides and aids to faith in future generations; but they cannot serve as absolute standards beyond which the faith of Christians may never rise. And their value as helps to faith depends largely upon the compass of their original purpose and aim. All the statements of a confession are not alike in this respect, and are not clothed with equal authority. Manifestly those are most weighty which approach nearest to the heart of a confession, or nearest to the central question for the settlement of which it was composed. For instance, the teaching of the Heidelberg Catechism in regard to the sacraments and in regard to the Christological questions involved in the doctrine of the Sacraments, is not only more complete, but also more authoritative, than is its teaching in regard to points of doctrine which were not at all in controversy at the time of its composition. The Catechism was prepared to settle the Sacramental doctrines; and for us at least its utterances on those doctrines possess more weight than do, for instance, its utterances on the doctrine of predestination or of the Atonement, which were not special subjects of consideration or study at the time when the Catechism was formed. Matters which are touched only incidentally are not settled in the same sense in which are those which are treated expressly, and these latter are settled only in the relations in which they were apprehended at the time, and not in any other relations. But on no subject can any ecclesiastical confession or dogmatic system possess absolute or final



authority. If any Reformation symbol, like the Augsburg Confession, for instance, could have served as a final settlement of theological questions, to what purpose, then, would be the history of theological thought since the Reformation? These four centuries of thought would in that case have accomplished nothing at all, and might as well not have existed. To the Hyper-Protestantism of a former period, which could see no religious sense or value in the Middle Ages, this REVIEW used to say that it was incredible that those ages should have been mere devil's play, and that they should have accomplished nothing for the general progress of Christianity. And so we now say to the notion that the Reformation settled everything for us—that in doctrine and practice, in creed and cultus, there remains nothing for us to do but simply to copy the Reformation models—it is incredible that the work of the Reformation should have left no room for any future work. It is wholly incredible that these last four hundred years, with the mighty changes which they have wrought in every other view, should have been totally barren in relation to religious and theological thought, and that the end of all wisdom for us now should simply consist in going back to the theological determinations of the sixteenth century. That Romanists should be disposed to reduce the history of Protestant thought since the Reformation to a mere zero is intelligible enough, but that Protestants should fall in with this judgment is at least surprising. To those who insist that, in order to be Reformed, we must hold on blindly to sixteenth century statements of doctrine and to sixteenth century practices in cultus and Church life, we would say that this would imply that the Reformed Church is a dead and not a living Church. Only dead things never change. But such an assumption implies no honor to the Reformed Church. A living dog even is better than a dead lion. We honor the past and we glory in its achievements. We hold, moreover, that the present must stand in organic union with the past, and must take up the past into its own products. But we also maintain that the products of the present should be larger and richer than those of the past. And we hold, with Ebrard,



that to be Reformed especially is to be ready to receive the truth from whatever source it may come, so long as it is in harmony with the Word of God. It is not Reformed to refuse any truth or any good because it was not known to our Reformed fathers ; nor is it Reformed to sacrifice the freedom of the present to the honor of the past. But it is Reformed to value very highly both freedom of thought and of action, and to contend with might and main for the preservation of this priceless boon which our Reformed fathers have bequeathed to us. And this is what the REVIEW will be ever ready to do.

Freedom of theological thought is an indispensable condition of progress in theological science. And it is a condition of theological knowledge in general. There can be no true knowledge without freedom of thought. We know only that which we have ourselves thought out, and only the product of our own thinking can be really our intellectual possession. No one can save us the trouble of doing our own religious thinking, if we would be in possession really of any religious truth ; nor can any one absolve us from the responsibility which such thinking involves. Hence also God has not seen fit to provide for us any infallible teacher, whose words might be for us the end of all questionings. "If only we could have an infallible Church, an unerring guide," it was once said in the hearing of Thomas Erskine. "O no," said he, "such a thing, if it could be, would destroy all God's real purpose with man, *which is to educate him*, and to make him feel that he is being educated—to awaken perception in the man himself—a growing perception of what is true and right, which is the very essence of all spiritual discipline. Any infallible authority would destroy this, and so take away the meaning of a Church altogether." But, it may be asked, is there not danger in freedom ? Is it not perilous for an individual mind in matters of religion to assume an attitude of ultimate independence of external authority ? Is there not danger of falling into error and heresy ? Yes, there is ; but that danger is no greater than would be the danger of sinking into spiritual bondage and death, in case there were some infallible outward tribunal to regulate



the religious thinking of men. But the danger may easily be over-estimated. Freedom of religious thought is not licentiousness or lawlessness in religious thinking. That is its abuse, as crime is the abuse of the liberty of action. Freedom of thought is not permission to think contrary to truth, but to think according to the truth; only the authority which enforces conformity to truth is inward and moral, and not connected with any external tribunal. Let it be remembered that the mind is naturally constituted for knowing the truth, that the truth is capable of being known, and that the means of knowing it is thought; and it will, then, be apparent that the exercise of free thought need not at all necessarily lead one into lawlessness and error. Indeed, the very opposite is the case. Freedom is a condition of knowing the truth, and the knowledge of the truth again contributes to the enlargement of freedom. Error is not freedom, but bondage. Our Lord says, "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." The knowledge of the truth is ever a moral process. The truth can only be known by an act of will; and when the truth is *willed*, or *loved*, it becomes a means of deliverance from the bondage of falsehood and error; while, on the other hand, the love of a party or a sect more than truth is not a condition of freedom, but of bondage.

Freedom of theological thought is the condition also of the reunion of Christendom, for which so many earnest Christians are now working and praying. The Church can never become one again by the repression of the freedom of thought, but only by its widest extension. The union of the Church cannot be the product of any external force, but only of internal free choice and love. Unity is, in fact, one of the essential attributes of the Church, resulting from its organic relation to the one Lord, who is its Head, and to the one God and Father, who is over all, and through all, and in all. It is not sameness of doctrine, nor sameness of liturgical practices, nor sameness of polity and organization, that constitutes the true unity of the Church, but oneness of spirit and the equal presence of Christ in the hearts of all believers. The Church is one because Christians are all members



of Christ. And this unity does not depend upon external unity of organization. Unity of organization can neither create it nor destroy it; although, where the inward spirit of unity exists, unity of organization also must be regarded as a good. We are fully aware of the disadvantages connected with the formal division of the Church existing at the present time in this country. The fact that there are in the United States one hundred and forty-three Christian denominations and sects involves a waste of Christian energy that is enormous and makes unity of effort in behalf of missionary, educational and reformatory work exceedingly difficult, if not altogether impossible. And yet we cannot sympathize with the morbid feelings and the lugubrious mental states of those who are always bewailing the divisions of Zion; and would be willing to accept any form of captivity for the sake of outward uniformity. We are very ready to concede that our denominational form of Christianity is not ideal or final; but we believe that it is providential, and intended to accomplish important results for Christianity. When these results shall have been accomplished, then, in the Lord's own time, there will doubtless come an outward unification of Christendom; but premature efforts to manufacture union can only result in confusion and failure. Nevertheless, something can meanwhile be done to prepare the way for such unification by cultivating a sense for that union which already exists between Christians in virtue of their common relation to Christ, and by so broadening and liberalizing thought as to make easy and natural the mutual recognition of Christian character among the members of different denominations. When Christian denominations, holding different theological systems, practicing different ceremonies and maintaining different polities, shall be ready to acknowledge and own the full and equal Christian character of each other, then the main difficulties in the way of union will have been removed; and until that condition shall have been reached, the offering of apostolic succession, or of sound doctrine, by one denomination to others, as a means of healing the breaches of Zion, can be regarded as but little better than the performance of a solemn farce. In such



performances this REVIEW will not care to have any part; but while loyally serving the Reformed Church, for whose sake it is published, it will ever be ready to lend its influence to the work of so liberalizing Christian and theological thought, that a true union of the Church may be hoped for as one of the events of the future.

Meanwhile the REVIEW will consider it to be a part of its specific task to cultivate a sense for the reality of the Church as a divine organism among men, enshrining divine and heavenly powers which are exercised for the salvation of humanity through her ministrations. Here the REVIEW will try to be true also to its past record. It has emphasized the idea of the Church, and has sometimes incurred the charge of Romanizing for so doing. That charge will not be made again, at least not by persons who have respect for their own reputation. We have entered upon a new stadium of theological development, in which many of the old things have passed away. And among the things which have passed away is the notion that faith in the Church as an essential and necessary form of Christianity, is somehow a betrayal of the cause of Protestantism. The state of the Protestant mind in regard to this subject is not now what it was half a century ago. And yet there is still reason in the attitude of the theological mind of to-day to emphasize the idea of the Church, and to insist upon its importance in the economy of salvation. For the doctrine has been preached so long and widely that there is no especial benefit in churchmembership, and that sacraments have nothing whatever to do with the life of religion in the soul, that large masses of men for this reason own no fellowship with the Church at all. They have been taught that religion is merely a private affair between the soul and God, an experience, indeed, which should precede any serious thought of connection with the Church; and true to this teaching there are now multitudes standing without and swelling the number of the estranged masses. This teaching has been the result of a one-sided reaction against the false and unspiritual ecclesiasticism of a former time. From the notion that to have been baptized, to have felt a bish-



op's hands on one's head in confirmation, and to go to communion at Easter, is all that is necessary in order to salvation, the mind has swung over to the notion that salvation is merely a matter of conversion with which the Church can have nothing to do, and that one may be as good a Christian outside of the Church as within it. But the latter notion is as perilous to Christianity as the former; and to it is due, in large part at least, the sad fact that the Church has lost multitudes of her children, who are now entirely beyond her influence. What is needed now to reach these masses is a *churchly* Gospel, a Gospel that makes account of the Church and her ordinances as being of some consequence in the economy of salvation. The old-fashioned revival scheme will no longer reach and move the masses outside of the Church. It is a well known fact that the Roman Catholic Church is gathering into her communion multitudes whom the Protestant Churches have lost by preaching to them the *unchurchly* Gospel which has so long been popular. And in this there is an intimation of what is needed in order to the evangelization of the unchurched masses of this country.

Here, then, there is a demand for the kind of theology with which this REVIEW has been connected in the past; not a theology which deifies the Church, transforms her ministers into lords of faith, and turns her sacraments into instruments or channels of grace working magically; but a theology which treats the Church as in some true sense the spiritual mother of God's children, and the sacraments as real helps to faith and aids to the divine life in men. At this point the "new theology," as commonly represented in this country, we think, comes short. It does not do justice to the idea of the Church as a divine constitution in the world, derived by necessary consequence from the fact of the incarnation of God in Christ. Professor Bruce, for example, in his interesting work on the *Kingdom of God*, suggests that in certain circumstances the visible Church might entirely pass away, "leaving the Spirit of Christ free room to make a new experiment, under happier auspices, at self-realization." Pres. E. B. Andrews, in *Christianity Practically Applied*, expresses similar



views. If this were intended merely to mean that any or all existing forms of Church organization might pass away and make room for new ones, we could readily agree with it; but it means more than that—it means that the very fact of the Church is something accidental in the economy of Christianity, and that the latter might persist even if the former were to perish. On this point we think the “new theology” generally is weak. We recognize the merits of this theology, and we rejoice in the measure of truth which it has attained. We confess, moreover, that we have learned not a little from the discussions in which its prominent representatives have been engaged. In the prominence which it gives to Christ, and in the position which it assigns to Him in the centre of Christianity, we believe that it is thoroughly right. It has come to see rightly that the essence of Christianity is not a book, but a life, not the Bible, but Christ. And hence it feels itself free to engage in a critical study of the Bible, fearless of consequences because it feels the foundations of Christianity secure in the ever living and ever present person of Christ. With all this we can find no fault, but on the contrary are bound to agree. And we cannot be alarmed even when we are told that the Bible, in spite of its inspiration, is not inerrant in regard to matters which are not religious. On the contrary, this is just what we should expect in view of the fact that the Bible, just like the Church, has its human side. And all this does not disturb us, because we hold, not the Bible, but Christ to be the basis of Christianity. But now we contend that, in order consistently to hold the conception of Christianity as an objective reality having its principle in Christ, it is necessary to go on to the conception of the Church as the necessary form in which that reality embodies itself.

A Christological theology must, therefore, necessarily be also positive and churchly. We do not forget that there is a sense in which Christ may be said to be immanent in humanity as such, namely, as the principle of its moral reason, the light proceeding from the eternal Logos; and that there are, therefore, Christian influences outside of the Church, and Christian ten-



dencies in the lives of all men ; but *Christianity*, we hold, exists only in the Church ; and we are, therefore, prepared still to subscribe to the old proposition *extra ecclesiam, nulla salus*, observing only that Church here is not to be taken in the sense of any particular ecclesiastical organization rather than another. In this respect, then, we feel that it is necessary to complement, for ourselves at least, much of what our friends of the "new theology" have written and spoken ; and just along this line we believe that our REVIEW will be able to render important services to the cause of true theology and true religion in our land.

From what has now been said it will be evident that the REVIEW proposes to itself more than merely to serve the cause of scientific or theoretical theology. Its special aim will be to be helpful in the sphere of practical theology, and to advance the interests of practical religion and morality ; and in due time it will bring out articles along this line. This is a practical age. It has not much patience with any system of thought, whether in science or theology, that cannot be made to yield practical results. Mere speculation or contemplation, without any practical aim, whether in sermon, book, or lecture, will not make much impression upon the men and women of this generation. This has not always been so. There are fashions in religion as well as in other things ; and these may be regarded as special modes of the revelation of the Christian Spirit. There was a time, for example, when the *religiosi* were the people who retired from the world into the quiet recesses of the cloister, and there spent their life in silent meditation and prayer. Now the fashion has changed ; and to be religious now means to work—to do something for God and humanity—to feed the hungry, to heal the sick, to raise the dead, to preach the Gospel to the poor, to gather in the perishing—to do something to make the condition of the world better and happier. It might be easy to criticize this restless, busy, practical spirit of the time—to laugh at this anxious running to and fro, and this eagerness to do something in order to prove the reality of religion. It would be easy enough to show that it is something one-sided, and that if not



guided by sound knowledge, and sustained by quiet reflection and contemplation, it may run out into mere empty bustle and ado, without accomplishing any valuable results. Yet as compared with mere quietistic contemplation and impracticable speculation and thought, the practical temper must be regarded as the more excellent. In fact, however, practice and contemplation, action and thought, work and prayer belong together in the completeness of a Christian life. Martha and Mary, the one a type of the practical, the other of the contemplative temper, belonged together in the unity of one household, and the Lord loved them both. Both characters belong to the Kingdom of God; and the most complete Christian personality would be one in which both tempers should be evenly balanced. And so the best theology would be a theology in which the theoretical and the practical elements should receive equal attention.

But the tendency of the age is most decidedly in the direction of the practical. This is shown, for instance, in the phenomenal success which has attended the movement of the Salvation Army, which has thrown all scientific theology overboard and devoted itself simply to the work of saving men. It is shown also by what is taking place at the present time in the once so idealistic and contemplative German fatherland. The reigning school of theology in Germany at the present moment is that of Albrecht Ritschl, which lays chief stress upon the practical element in religion, and formally eschews all speculation and all metaphysics in theology. It claims to be the theology of the Christian consciousness, or of feeling, *par excellence*. The only criteria of truth which it admits are practical feelings, and the only judgments which it allows to be valid in religion are judgments of value. Theoretical judgments are inapplicable to religious truth, because these would take us out of the world of mere phenomena into the realm of reality, about which the human mind can know nothing. We can know only phenomena, not things-in-themselves. Under the application of these principles to the doctrines of Christianity, much that has heretofore been regarded as essential to the Christian system, must disappear. The idea of anything supernatural or mi-



raculous in the origin of Christianity must be given up, because such an idea implies at least some knowledge of the metaphenomenal. Most of the dogmas of Christianity, like those of the Trinity and of the Incarnation, are illegitimate because they transcend the limits of knowledge; and they came into Christianity under the influence of Greek philosophical ideas. They are a foreign intrusion, not an original element in Christianity. This theology has become dominant in Germany, the land of high thinking and of lofty ideas; and the chairs of such men as Neander and Dorner are now occupied by theologians of this school. And this theology is at the present moment finding its way, by hundreds of channels, into the religious thought of America, and will no doubt, at no distant day, exercise a powerful influence here. What gives it its hold upon the mind of the age is its freedom from all dogmatizing and its thoroughly practical tendency, in which it agrees so well with the reigning habit of the age.

Now Ritschlianism is doubtless wrong in denouncing all dogmas, and in rejecting the application of all philosophy in theological thinking. Theology and philosophy are inseparable. We cannot think on religious problems at all without employing philosophical forms and categories. Reason too contains a revelation of divine truth. Its categories and necessary ideas are reflections in the finite mind of the operations of the infinite mind. Hence reason and revelation cannot be antagonistic; and in religion the reason must be satisfied as well as the feelings. And as there is room for the employment of reason in religion, so there must be room also for dogmas. Dogmas are reflections of the facts and truths of divine revelation in the scientific consciousness of the Church. As a religion of revelation, existing in a definite community which it has itself created, Christianity must necessarily be dogmatic. But the dogmatic tendency may easily be indulged to excess. The teachers of the Church may mistake their speculations for established doctrines, and their guesses for assured knowledge. Thus we may have dogmas on subjects in regard to which no positive knowledge is



possible. It is believed, for example, that much that is taught for dogma in regard to the mysteries of the divine nature, and much that is taught for dogma in regard to the subject of the last things, must necessarily be of this uncertain character. Or we may have dogmas which the Christian reason and conscience of the age reject as being no longer true. Much of what has been taught for dogma on such themes as original sin, predestination and atonement, is thus discredited. Now the consequence of undue dogmatizing and of false dogmatizing may easily be the rejection of all dogmas. We believe that much of the current prejudice against dogmatic or doctrinal preaching has its ground in this very circumstance.

The doctrines which are preached may either be felt to be untrue, contradicting the best modern reason and sentiment, or so remote from all that really interests the human soul, that they may be set down as being of no consequence whatever; and afterwards people come to feel that all doctrines are either untrue or uninteresting and ought to be banished altogether from the pulpit. For a time it may be felt that while all doctrines are either untrue or useless, Christianity itself, as a matter of feeling or sentiment and practice, may still be true and useful. This seems to be the position of Ritschlianism and also of that large class of American preachers as well as church members, who believe that the only thing fit for the pulpit, the only thing on which congregations can be fed and nourished is sensationalism and froth. But how long may this state of things be expected to endure? How long will people believe in Christianity when they no longer care for its doctrines? How long will they accept the phenomena of Christianity when they are in doubt as to the underlying reality? Here, manifestly, there is a danger threatening the Church which thoughtful persons ought carefully to consider. And for this purpose there is need for such an organ of interchange of thought as our REVIEW proposes to be. The problems which the Ritschlian movement has thrust upon the Churches, to say nothing of the questions which are rife in every department of social and moral life, are sufficient to keep



such a publication busy with discussion for a long time to come. And these problems could not be discussed in the pulpit, nor in the Church papers intended for the people generally. They belong especially to the REVIEW and may be expected hereafter to receive due attention. What the age needs is a body of Christian doctrine that is true and practical—a body of doctrine that can be preached and believed; and if the REVIEW can be in any degree instrumental in helping its readers to formulate for themselves such a body of doctrine it will not be laboring in vain.

Ritschlianism is doubtless a message to the modern Church which she ought well to consider and lay rightly to heart. It is an admonition that after all life and not doctrine is the substance of Christianity. This is a truth which the Church has often forgotten. "Sound doctrine" has been made an end instead of a means; and the Church has often acted as if her whole existence had for its purpose merely the maintenance of the doctrinal system. In controversies over metaphysical doctrines it has often been forgotten that the Church, according to the intention of her divine Lord, is to be the salt of the earth as well as the light of the world. She is to preach the Gospel to the poor, she is to raise up the fallen, she is to bring the life and the power of the Christ into the life and activity of this world—into society, into government, into politics, into science and literature, and art, into trade and commerce and industry—she is to be the organ of Christ for transforming this world into the Kingdom of Heaven. This practical mission she has often forgotten; and while her Lord went about doing good, making men's lives easier and happier and better, she has too often been content to be a school of disputing rabbis, or a conclave of cruel inquisitors. In this view the careless indifference to doctrine of the Salvation Army and the impatience with doctrine on the part of great masses of people both inside and outside of the Church, may be regarded as significant facts. They signify that the reign of the rabbis and the power of the inquisitors is ended and that henceforth another spirit and another power must prevail in the Church. In this view also Ritschlianism may be regarded as a divine call addressed



to the Church and intended to arouse her to a higher and better form of action; and in this view we can sympathize with it. But we cannot sympathize with that tendency which disparages high thinking and correct doctrine in favor of mere sentimentalism and blind impulsiveness in action. This tendency will be found at last to lead to disastrous consequences for Christianity. Christianity does not consist in mere sentiment or action any more than in mere knowledge or doctrine. Christianity rests upon objective divine facts and truths; and these must necessarily give rise to doctrines or dogmas, without which Christianity could not long maintain itself as a system of life and practice. What our age needs and what the cry for the practical in fact means, is not less thought, not less theory, but profounder thought and correcter theory and then corresponding activity and practice. The REVIEW, accordingly, will not lend its influence to that tendency of the times which depreciates thought and doctrine in favor of so-called practical interests. On the contrary, it will stand for high thought and pure truth, as we believe that without these Christianity itself could not long endure. But it will stand also for the union of thought and action. And it will insist that the presentation of Christianity, while doctrinal, must be practical too, and that the Gospel which shall do men any good must make them better and happier here and now. The REVIEW believes that godliness is profitable unto all things, having promise of the world which now is as well as of that which is to come.



## II.

### THE PRINCIPLE OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

BY REV. E. V. GERHART, D. D.

There is a wide difference between Christianity and Christian theology. Christianity is the communion of the Father in His incarnate Son through the Holy Spirit with the believer, the communion of the new life of love in which the law of sin and death is abolished. Of this communion, which is referable to the love of God as its ultimate ground (Jno. 3 : 16), the incarnate Son is the Author; from Him all the facts in which Christianity consists derive their existence and their quality. Jesus Christ, whether we view Him in the history of His humiliation or in His state of exaltation, is the divine-human Reality, addressing spiritual perception; so are all the facts of His mediatorship, not opinions, not doctrines, but realities, not propositions, but substantive truth. Christianity addresses us primarily from without, challenging our confidence and devotion. The obedience of personal faith is indeed necessary that Christianity may accomplish its end, which is the triumph and perfection of the Kingdom of God; but what Christianity is in itself as regards its origin, its constituents and qualities, its resources and destiny, that it is, independently of the human will or of human knowledge. Men do not condition the beginning or the existence of Christianity, but Christianity conditions the eternal life and salvation of men.

Christian theology, on the contrary, is not a reality, but it is knowledge, a systematic order of knowledge, respecting Jesus Christ and the facts of His mediatorship. Theology is not an existence objective to spiritual perception. It does not, like Jesus Christ and the facts of His mediatorship, command faith and devotion. Theology, as the word imports, is a science. True, a



science it is than which none is more profound, or more important, or more influential for the Church; yet theology is not Christianity, but only the rational endeavor to form adequate conceptions of objective Christian truth and organize our conceptions into logical order. As such, theological science is subject to the same conditions, and it is governed by the same laws, as any other science. Theology belongs to the sphere of consciousness and thought; Christianity to the sphere of existence.

Of Christianity the central fact is the divine-human personality of Jesus Christ. Foreshadowed and typified by the Abrahamic covenant and the Mosaic economy, the Messiah, in the process of His coming, imparts the fundamental tone and distinguishing character to all the canonical books of the Old Testament. The books of the New Testament are characterized by similar Messianic unity; but here the unity is real and concrete. The Messianic promises and types of the Old Testament, are fulfilled and realized by the person, the life and death, the resurrection and glorification of Jesus of Nazareth. He constitutes the one grand theme of the gospels and epistles. Holy Scripture from Genesis to Revelation represents but one all-controlling truth; under the form of hope and prophecy in the pre-Christian dispensation, under the form of reality and fulfillment in the Christian dispensation. The Seed of the woman as set forth under this two-fold form is the keynote of the entire Bible.

Need I raise the question whether these propositions respecting the seed of the woman and the central truth of Messianic revelation are valid? or whether Christianity, as reflected in the Scripture, has a central truth? Is there a truth from which, as from a germ, all parts of the pre-Christian economy grow forth? Is there a truth, a fact, an historical personality that is the vitalizing centre of the entire Christian economy? In other words, is the history of Messianic revelation, as mirrored by the canonical books of the Old and New Testaments, a unity?

These questions express only different phases of one and the same question; and to a thoughtful mind it should suggest its own answer. I may assume that no intelligent Christian will



assert that Christianity is a disconnected mass of natural and supernatural events, events and teachings wanting in order and self-consistency. That certainly would be an unworthy conception and would reduce the religion of Christ, in this respect, to the low level of ethnic religions. Even Mohammedanism is based on an hypothesis which has unifying force in the structure and worship of the religion of the false prophet. Argument on the question whether Messianic revelation has a central truth which imparts unity to the pre-Christian and Christian economies may accordingly with propriety be waived. It is requisite only to fix attention on the central Truth itself.

As Christian theology is the science of Christianity, the central truth of Christianity furnishes the idea which becomes the principle of thought in the sphere of theology. In so far as any science is valid it must correspond to the kingdom which it investigates or on which it reflects. Such necessity is self-evident. It is the primary law that governs the progress of the natural sciences, no less than mental and moral science. For botany, the science of the vegetable kingdom, the central principle is the idea of insensate life; for astronomy, if we accept the Copernican theory of the heavenly bodies, the ruling principle of judgment is the heliocentric idea; for ethics, the science of the moral order of the world, the central principle that governs an ethical system is the idea of right. Corresponding to this law, Christian theology claims for itself a principle of inquiry and judgment. And as ethics derives its dominant idea from that realm of ethical truth which it studies, so Christian theology, being the science of the Christian religion, derives its principle, not from the natural world, nor from the philosophy of Plato or Aristotle, nor from any mental process, but from that objective domain of unique spiritual realities that addresses spiritual perception through the written Word. To ascertain and determine what that principle is, theology raises the question respecting the controlling fact of Christianity. No other question arises. If we know that controlling fact, or if we possess an adequate idea of that fact, the Person of Christ, we have in this idea the principle that governs



a valid system of theological thought. That idea, in so far as we think logically, will have determinative force in the development of all the conceptions which we form of the spiritual mysteries which enter into Christianity.

In the discussion of this question respecting the principle of Christian doctrine, emphasis is to be put on the Person of Christ, in distinction from His words, or on the Master Himself in distinction from the mind of the Master. Several considerations serve to sustain this important distinction.

Neither the words spoken nor the deeds done by our Lord during His personal history on earth are the full equivalent of Himself. The Son of God incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth is a divine-human mystery, richer and mightier than His teaching, whether addressed to unbelieving Jews or to His confiding disciples. He infolds possibilities relatively to His spiritual kingdom and to the heavens and the earth, the profound import of which was unutterable by Him no less than by inspired disciples; for human speech lacks the capacity of giving adequate expression to the deep things of God.

His words as they are recorded by the Evangelists, though they have a wealth of meaning greater than any exegete has yet brought to light, derive their wealth from that which Jesus Christ is and was, potentially no less than actually. His teaching in part reveals, and in part indicates, a hidden wealth of Messianic truth which His words fail to declare; a wealth hidden not only from the disciples for lack of the adequate capacity of spiritual insight, but also measurably hidden from His own clear consciousness.

As regards the unbelieving Jews, there is evidence almost at every turn that they both misapprehended and misapplied His teaching. As regards His disciples it is equally evident that they did not understand the Master when He taught them that the Son of Man must suffer many things, and be rejected by the elders and the chief priests and the scribes, and be killed, and after three days rise again. Even Peter, who is especially distinguished for the confession: Thou art the Christ, took Jesus



to task and began to rebuke Him for predicting His rejection and execution by the elders and chief priests. There is no evidence that the other disciples, either when with them He was on His way to Jerusalem, or during the week of His passion, had any better insight into the necessity and wisdom of His atoning sacrifice and His resurrection from the dead, mysteries that enter essentially into the constitution of Christianity. The betrayal by Judas, the denial by Peter and the desertion of Jesus by all the disciples but one, during His threefold trial, evidence the fact that the disappointment of their hopes enveloped them in the thick darkness of despair.

It may seem unwarranted, with the inimitable, profound and original teaching of Jesus set before us in the gospels, to suggest that His consciousness of Himself and of His kingdom was, while on earth, lacking in completeness. Yet, if we study the gospels without dogmatic pre-judgment we shall find that they justify the suggestion; and I may add that the suggestion is sustained by the constitution of Christianity as reflected by the entire New Testament.

The gospels and epistles alike proclaim a wide difference between Jesus Christ living on earth and the risen Christ glorified in heaven. His mediatorship on earth proceeds according to the law of humiliation and suffering. With His work done before the resurrection, His work being done now and in process of completion in heaven is in striking contrast. There His mediatorship proceeds according to the law of triumph, of exaltation and glory. Enthroned at God's right hand the eye of faith may see the incarnate Son realizing and fulfilling all the types and prophecies concerning Himself in their final form. That final form of fulfillment was before not seen, not seen because it was not. The unique possibilities of wisdom, of power and of revelation were latent in the Son of Man; partly disclosed by His words and deeds when in the natural body, they are developed and manifested when He attains to the higher stage of His Messianic mission in the glory of the Father.

In His earthly history we discover some limitations of knowl-



edge. Speaking of the time when heaven and earth shall pass away He says: Of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father.\* Efforts have been made by exegetes to explain away the obvious limitation of the mind of the Master as taught by Himself. The motive of the fruitless effort seems to be that any limitation of knowledge would be in conflict with His divine Sonship. So far, however, from working prejudice to the fundamental truth that Jesus is the Son of God, such limitation as comes to view in Mk. 13:32, and in some other places, is in full harmony with the opposite fundamental truth that Jesus was the Son of the Virgin Mary, and like herself a sharer in flesh and blood, being made in all things like unto His brethren. We have to predicate of the incarnate Son the attributes and qualities that distinguish genuine manhood, and maintain that no genuine human attribute contradicts the faith that Jesus is the proper Son of God. Any curtailment of the genuineness of His humanity, as it obtains in the process of development prior to final glorification, is no less incompatible with the constitution of Christ, as portrayed by the New Testament, than an infringement of His proper Deity.

A limitation somewhat similar, but more remarkable, appears from the mysterious scene in Gethsemane on the night of the betrayal, as recorded by Matthew, Mark and Luke. Taking with Him Peter and James and John into the garden, Jesus began to be greatly amazed, and sore troubled, and He saith unto them, my soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death: abide ye here, and watch. Then He went forward a little, and fell on His face, and prayed, saying, Oh my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass away from Me. Three times, being in agony, He offered this prayer, using the same words. But in every instance He ended His agonizing petition with words of resignation and submission: nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt. According to Matthew, when Jesus went away the second time and prayed, He said, Oh my Father, if this can not pass away, except I drink it, Thy will be done.†

\* Mk. 13 : 32 ; Mt. 24: 36.

† Mt. 26 : 38 ; Mk. 14 : 33 ; Lk. 22 : 42.



Without controversy, though it is difficult, perhaps impossible to analyze or describe the anguish of Gethsemane, there is in that awful experience of Jesus, agonizing in the garden, a sense of the limitation of strength, of knowledge, and, I may add, of character. When the impending mystery of the cross confronted Him, His soul was exceeding sorrowful, even unto death. He had an intense desire to be spared the physical and spiritual horrors of the impending oblation. "Remove this cup from Me," was the importunate prayer, thrice repeated, that was wrung from His soul, a prayer addressed with "strong crying and tears unto Him that was able to save Him from death." Whether He would have the moral strength to fulfill His mission by enduring the shame of His trials and the passion of His crucifixion was a problem the solution of which He did not clearly foresee. Hence He was greatly amazed and sore troubled. The problem could not in advance be solved theoretically: it could be solved only by His willingness to drink the cup which His Father put to His lips; and His sinless spiritual heroism comes to view in the purpose which He expresses: Not what I will, but what Thou wilt. He had a baptism to be baptized with, and He says: How am I straitened till it be accomplished. An ordeal, terrible in the extreme, confronted Him. Potentially He was equal to the solemn hour; but whether He would, in fact, prove Himself equal was the problem, a real problem of which no solution was possible except by free acquiescence in the will of His Father.

The matter, however, of chief significance in its bearing on the question before us is the manner in which our Lord represented His exaltation in contrast with the life He was living and the work He was doing on earth.

So superior was His expectant exaltation to the right hand of the Father that He represented it as the ripe fruitage of His entire mediatorial work. When certain Greeks came to Philip, saying, Sir, we would see Jesus, and Philip had told Jesus of them, His answer was: "The hour is come that the Son of Man should be glorified." A change, a transformation, He was about to experience analogous to the transformation which a grain of wheat



undergoes when it falls into the earth. "Except a grain of wheat fall into the earth and die," He says, "it abideth by itself alone; but if it die, it beareth much fruit." \* Two things He teaches by this analogy: the necessity of His death as an epoch in the progress of His mission, and the transcendent status of His personality to which He should rise by the transformation through which He was about to pass. As a grain of wheat dying in the ground becomes the golden harvest, so He by the passion of the cross would pass into the full perfection of life. The glory of the grain of wheat is the golden harvest. The mysterious potencies hidden in the grain are developed, realized and set forth in beauty and richness before the eye in the field white unto the harvest. As the golden harvest is the glory of the grain, so are the resurrection, ascension and enthronement of Christ the final realization of that divine-human life, respecting which He says: "I lay it down of Myself: I have power to lay it down and I have power to take it again." †

Consider also His great sacerdotal prayer. There are in it three leading topics: first, Himself; secondly, His chosen disciples who had been with Him from the beginning; and thirdly, those that would believe on Him through their word.

He prays, first of all, for Himself; and what is the burden of His prayer? "Glorify Thy Son that the Son may glorify Thee." Though Jesus had manifested forth somewhat of His love and power in the mighty works which He had performed and somewhat of His wisdom in the wonderful words He had spoken, yet those mighty works and wonderful words were but feeble exponents of divine-human resources latent in His personality. Until then they were in large measure undeveloped and unrealized. He looked forward to an order of dignity far higher than He had hitherto possessed, and to results of His mission far greater than He had hitherto achieved.

His aspirations advance in loftiness and His yearnings grow in intensity as the sacerdotal prayer proceeds. Words of profoundest

\* John 12: 24.

† John 10: 18.



meaning rise to His lips from the depths of His soul: "Oh Father, glorify Thou Me with Thine own Self, with the glory which I had with Thee before the world was." Not, glorify Thy Son; but glorify Thou *Me*; with what? with Thine own Self. There was in reserve a communication from the Father to the incarnate Son which He had not yet received, for which He had not before been fitted, to which before He had not been entitled. There was also a consummation of the blessedness of perfect life in reserve for Him of which the righteousness, wisdom and strength of His mediatorship on earth were the prophecy. He, the Son of Man, was awaiting the glory which He, the Son of God, had with the Father before the world was. For Him there was in prospect an enthronement, an investiture with the authority of righteous love, which on the one hand was the goal of His incarnate history, and on the other would be the final communication of absolute love to Him from the bosom of the Father. That ultimate realization on the throne of His potential fullness, reigning over all worlds, when all things that the Father hath would, in their final form, be His possession, when He would be able to reveal His perfected mediatorship by the outpouring of the Holy Ghost—that was the glory after which He was aspiring, and with which He prayed the Father to glorify Him.

Then would follow a revelation of Himself, of His life of love, to His disciples, and in Him a revelation of the Father's love, such as the disciples during His three years' ministry had not seen nor anticipated. Then they were to be made partakers of an order of strength and wisdom, derived from the communion of Himself with them, transcending all their former experiences. Accordingly He tells them, "it is expedient for you that I go away." His departure, His going to the Father, will be to them a greater good, a gain in point of authority and wisdom, of courageous endurance and of transforming influence upon the world—benefits and gifts flowing from Him to them through the agency of the Holy Spirit. By the power of the Spirit they will be able to convict the world in respect of sin and of righteousness and of judgment.



The ground on which the promise of such authority and power rests is the new truth that Jesus will "go to the Father." His mediatorship perfected by His enthronement, "all authority in heaven and on earth" being in His hand, is the consummation which, through the gift of the Holy Spirit, conditions the extraordinary change which was wrought in the faith, the character and the conduct of the chosen disciples.

This great moral and spiritual change manifested by the life and faith of the disciples, brought about by the pentecostal gift of the Spirit, is the measure of the transformation wrought by His enthronement in the personality and mediatorship of Jesus Christ. The perfected Christ, perfected in divine knowledge as in divine authority, in revelation as in might, is not seen during His ministry as pictured by the gospels, but may be seen only in the greater deeds of His glorification as by the gospels foretold, but as declared and taught by the Acts and epistles. The gospels anticipate and prophesy, the epistles presuppose and describe the dignity and grace of the glorification, the former being in this respect prospective, the latter retrospective.

To the advanced status of the Master answers the mind of the Master. Great as He was in word and deed during His sinless history on earth, He is greater, greater far, in the glory of the Father. His consciousness is responsive to Himself. As He glorified, differs from Himself unglorified, so does His knowledge, on the throne, exceed in profundity and compass His knowledge during the period of His humiliation. Not that there is any contradiction between His mind as revealed by the Spirit of His glorification and His mind as revealing itself in His state of humiliation, nor that there is any lack of complete harmony and self-consistency. But all limitation of His knowledge and power is superseded and transcended, transcended inasmuch as He has Himself passed from the abnormal plane of human life on earth to the divine plane of absolute life in heaven. There His humanity in contradistinction from every other medium of Messianic revelation, has become the perfect organ of the manifestation of the Father in Himself by the Spirit.



As a consequence of the absolute perfection of the Master and the transcendent order of His mind as manifested by the perpetual miracle of Pentecost, it became possible for chosen men, anointed with His Holy Spirit, to write the gospels. The glorification conditions the possibility of the evangelical records no less than the Acts and the epistles. The evangelical records are due indeed agreeably to the economy of natural human life, to the traditions living in the community of believers, who naturally treasured up in their memory the words and doings of Jesus of Nazareth and handed them down through a series of years, but not due to traditions solely nor chiefly. They are due chiefly to the fact that He had ascended from earth to heaven and was seated on the throne in the glory of the Father. The Spirit sent by Him from the Father qualified chosen men not only to put on record the words He had spoken and the works He had done, but also to discern the deep meaning of His words, to set forth the spiritual import of His personal history, and to unveil the momentous significance of His glorification as this is directly and perpetually related in the Spirit to the Church and the world.

Accepting this idea of the Master as conditioning His mind, in other words, the idea respecting the personality of Christ as conditioning the quality of His teaching, Christian theology is fully justified in putting chief emphasis, not on His teaching, but on Himself; and it follows that the fundamental principle of Christian doctrine is neither the teaching of Christ in contrast with the teaching of the apostles, nor the teaching of the apostles in contrast with the teaching of Christ. The antithesis must be superseded. The principle of Christian thought is the whole idea respecting Jesus Christ Himself. That idea we may form from reflection on His personal history as He passes through all the epochs and stages of His incarnate life, from conception and birth, through baptism and temptation, through His ministry and crucifixion and resurrection, to the throne of authority in the glory of the Father. That idea is derived, in part, from the gospels; under one view from the synoptists,



under another view from the apostle John. In part the idea is derived from the Acts and the epistles, under one aspect from Peter and James, under another from Paul, under another from John, under another from the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. A manifold historical and didactic representation of the Mediator addresses faith and thought from the New Testament. No part may be overlooked or undervalued, if theology would form a just conception of the central truth of the Christian religion. Each author fulfills a function at his time, in his place and relations; and every book draws some definite lines of the sublime picture.

The truth that the glorified Person of the incarnate Son is the central fact of Christianity has in its relation to the Bible a still broader significance for theological thought. From the point of view of His personality all parts of Holy Scripture may be seen to be of essential value, each in its own order.

Great as in many respects is the difference between the books of the Old Testament and the books of the New Testament, yet when we consider each volume in relation to the office which it was appointed to fulfill in the Messianic economy of revelation, there is in point of importance no difference. The Hebrew Scriptures were just as necessary for the chosen nation in order that the chosen nation might fulfill its Messianic vocation as the Christian Scriptures were for the apostolic churches. Further, if we study the Scriptures of the New Testament in their dependence on the central fact of Christianity, it will be seen that there is no reason for subordinating the epistles to the gospels, nor an occasion for raising the question as to which class of New Testament books or which particular book is the most important. These issues are superseded by the recognition of the one great truth that reigns under different forms in all. Like Christianity and the Christian Church, or like the vegetable kingdom, the written Word, inasmuch as it mirrors Christianity, is itself also an organic structure, every member of which, as in every organism, performs a function essential to the unity and integrity of the whole.



Widely the gospels and the epistles differ; but the gospels are not more important than the epistles, nor the epistles more important than the gospels. It is the wide difference that makes each class of books a necessity. The absence of either class would give the Church an incomplete, and so far forth an unsatisfying, representation of Christianity. The same judgment is valid in relation to any gospel in comparison with the other gospels, or in relation to any epistle in comparison with the other epistles. The Church needs all the gospels, and each as really as the others. She needs all the epistles, and each epistle as really as the others.

And the Church needs all the New Testament books for the reason that, whilst the central idea reigning in all is the same, each presents one or more phases peculiar to itself, wanting in others. Hence when theological science accepts and consistently emphasizes this central idea as the principle of enquiry and thought, not only may the subordinate relation of all the books to Christ glorified be appreciated, but each book may also be called into service to furnish "living stones" for the ideal temple of Christian theology.



### III.

## THE HISTORIC PURPOSE OF THE DIVINE ELECTION; THE DOCTRINE VIEWED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ISAIAH.

BY REV. WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER, PH.D.

That the doctrine of election is anew challenging the thoughtful attention of the Church seems evident. This may be due largely to the increased attention recently given to Biblical theology; but it is due, in part at least, also to the fact that the question of the divine sovereignty has been thrust upon the thoughtful from new and unexpected quarters.

The almost universal acceptance of the doctrine of evolution in the scientific world has raised the question of chance or Providence as few things have ever done. The world, as we find it, is either the result of the blind play of chance, or else over all there is a mind that, with infinite wisdom and power, has controlled and guided the entire movement. Faith is compelled to throw itself back upon the latter alternative; but that implies the assertion of a divine control, grander by far than any that was ever thought of under the older conception of creation. Unseen, apparently unfelt, as if all things were of themselves taking their form and place in the mighty process of evolution, the divine hand yet guided the smallest atoms in their combinations as well as the mightiest suns in their course. It implies that amid the myriad forms of natural selection, there was going forward all the time a divine election, by which the infinite mind chose the instruments best suited for its purposes. So that, if the doctrine of evolution is to be accepted in any form by theological science, these other questions of the divine sovereignty and election must be taken up anew.

A somewhat similar necessity is laid upon us by the compli-



cated problems, raised by our modern social conditions. Our lot seems to be cast in an age, in which the very foundations of civilization are being moved. Old things are passing away. New conditions have arisen. We are drifting out upon a strange and unknown sea. Ominous clouds hang portentiously upon the social horizon, while all about the waves have a portentous look. Where is the hand that is strong enough to hold the rudder, where the eye that is far sighted enough to choose our pathway amid the gathering storms? Shall the red hand of anarchy guide the future course of history? Or is there a God in heaven, who can still make the wrath of man to praise Him, and who can still bring order out of confusion and chaos? Again, as we look into the face of the difficulties which are gathering about us, faith is compelled to throw itself back upon the divine sovereignty as our only refuge. Though we can not see the way, we believe that a glad day of peace and rest is coming, because we believe that God rules in the affairs of men, as He does in nature. But that at once compels us to fall back upon the thought that, amid the ceaseless contentions of history, He is moving majestically toward His own chosen end, and that He is wisely choosing the instruments for the accomplishment of His purposes.

In the restatement of the doctrine, which the necessities of the case evidently demand, there is a manifest advantage in approaching the subject from the Old Testament standpoint. Not that the Old Testament here is superior to the New; not yet that we can formulate the doctrine without the study and help of the New: but there is need for studying the doctrine of election from the standpoint of its historic purpose; and of that we have the divine illustration in the history of God's chosen people.

This historic purpose of the divine election is perhaps nowhere more clearly taught than in the passages on the servant of Jehovah, which are found in the second part of Isaiah. Woven, as they are, into the very texture of that book of comfort, which, more than any other of the Old Testament writings, sets forth God's grand intention to save mankind, they teach with unmistakable clearness the part which His people were intended to play



in the plan of redemption. To realize the significance of these passages we must bear in mind the argument of the book as a whole, as well as who is meant by the servant of Jehovah.

As is well known, the last half of Isaiah, from the fortieth chapter to the end, forms a connected series of prophecies, referring primarily to the deliverance of the children of Israel from the Babylonian captivity, and through that to the larger deliverance of all men from the bondage of sin. The prophecy revolves around three main ideas. First, the prophet points to Jehovah, as the author of the salvation which he preaches, contrasting Him with the idols of the nations round about, holding Him up as the almighty ruler of heaven and earth, and representing Him as having Himself entered with infinite zeal and pain and passion into the great work of deliverance. Then, he points to an extraordinary human personality, whom Jehovah has formed, chosen and called as His servant, and through whose instrumentality the promised deliverance is to be accomplished. And, finally, he describes the deliverance itself, giving a glowing picture of the glories of Zion, which began to be realized in the restoration of the children of Israel to Jerusalem, which has been gradually unveiled upon the scroll of Christian history, but which will be finally revealed only in the beauties of that city, whose "gates are made of orient pearl."

Now, the servant of Jehovah is that remarkable human personality, through whom the great deliverance is to be accomplished; for although Jehovah is represented as having bared His almighty arm for the great task, He does not accomplish it immediately in His own person, but through a human personality, whom He has formed and chosen and called as His servant, and to whom He has committed the great and glorious task.

The figure of this servant is made to pass before us in a series of dissolving views, so that he is clearly something different in the last of these passages from what he is in the first. In the first he is evidently none other than Israel as a nation. "But thou, Israel, my servant, Jacob whom I have chosen, the seed of Abraham my friend" (41: 8). In the last of the series he is just as



clearly an individual, whose portrait we at once recognize in Him, whose "visage was so marred more than any other man," who "was despised and rejected of men, a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief," who "was wounded for our transgressions and bruised for our iniquities," and with whose "stripes we are healed" (52 : 13, 53 : 12). But in the intervening passages he appears not always as the entire nation, nor yet distinctly as a single individual, but as that true Israel, which in the midst of the apostate nation has remained faithful, that which Isaiah is so fond of calling "the remnant." And, if we were to follow the prophecy to its fulfillment in the New Testament, we should find the servant first in his ideal realization in Jesus Christ our Lord ; then we should again see the idea expand so as to include His immediate disciples ; and beyond that we should find it to include all who are called to be laborers in the vineyard, the entire Church of Jesus Christ.\*

I. Now, the first thing to claim our attention is the fact that this servant is spoken of as formed from the womb for this specific purpose and work. The prophet iterates and reiterates that he is chosen, that he has been called, that he is God's elect. The idea is put into the forefront in the very first passage concerning the servant. "But thou, Israel, my servant, Jacob *whom I have chosen*, the seed of Abraham my friend ; thou whom I have *taken hold of from the ends of the earth*, and *called thee from the corners thereof*, and I said unto thee, Thou art my servant, *I have chosen thee* and not cast thee away" (41 : 8, 9). After that the idea is repeated again and again. The servant did not choose the work for himself ; he did not enter upon it of his own motion ; the work itself is a part of the great work, which Jehovah has Himself undertaken ; He formed the servant for it, and called him from the ends of the earth to its accomplishment.

It is important to keep this order of the prophet's thought clearly in mind. Sometimes the thought has been presented in such a way as to imply that God in His sovereign good pleasure

\*For a very full and satisfactory discussion of this whole subject see Expositor's Bible, Isaiah, 40-66, Book III., by Geo. Adam Smith, D. D.



had elected a certain definite number of individuals out of the whole mass of mankind and then determined to provide salvation for them, thus exalting the idea of election to the place of first importance and making the entire work of redemption subordinate to that. Our prophet, at least, presents the ideas in the reverse order. First comes the idea of redemption. "Comfort ye, comfort ye my people, saith your God. Speak ye comfortably to Jerusalem, and cry unto her that her warfare is accomplished, that her iniquity is pardoned; that she hath received of the Lord's hand double for all her sins" (40:1, 2). It is, indeed, first of all a redemption for His people; but, as we follow the prophet's argument, we soon perceive that it is to be for the Gentiles also. That idea of redemption is the thought out of which the entire book grows. For the accomplishment of that Jehovah has bared His almighty arm, and for the realization of that purpose He has chosen and called a servant. The redemption is the end; the election is simply the method for the attainment of the end, which is both prior to and broader than itself.

Now this election of the servant is represented as going back to his very creation. Back of the specific task, which he was called to accomplish, lies the fact that he was formed from the womb for it (44: 2). Not only does his election imply that God called him to his task, but also that He had by creation endowed and qualified him for it. This general fact, it is true, is generally admitted, as when it is acknowledged that great men are providentially raised up for great crises; but its significance is seldom recognized. It implies that every man is an original thought of God, that in the great plan of history there is a place divinely appointed for each one to fill, and that God has given to each one the talent necessary for his particular station. Who that has carefully studied the history of the chosen people can for a moment doubt that they were peculiarly endowed to be the servants of Jehovah, for the accomplishment of His great work of redemption? Whatever else they did not have, they had a genius for religion. Above all the other nations of antiquity, they had natural qualifications for the important work to which



they were called. They had the faith, the patience, the perseverance and the power of endurance that were needed for the performance of the mighty task.

After his creation, with powers specifically adapted to the task for which he was intended, the servant is represented as historically called to the specific work. He is "taken hold of from the ends of the earth and called from the corners thereof" (41: 9). The rest of mankind are passed by; he is chosen. At the opportune time in history he enters upon the stage. He is born "in the fullness of time," and amid circumstances best adapted to the accomplishment of his task.

Now this entire election, including the servant's formation from the womb, his call to the specific work, and his entrance upon it at the appointed time, was without question an act of divine sovereignty. In His own sovereign good pleasure, God chose him and not another; and He likewise endowed him with the needed talents and qualifications. To that neither the servant nor those for whom he was called to labor had anything whatever to say. It was solely an act of divine sovereignty. But when we say that, our conception of the act will necessarily be determined by our conception of the character of the Sovereign. Is He primarily a lawgiver, whose chief concern is the honor and vindication of the law? Or is He above all a Father, whose first concern is the salvation and well-being of His children? Unfortunately, in the development of the doctrine of election, the former conception to a large extent prevailed. In an age, when the civilization of Europe had fallen into chaos through the moral decay of the Roman Empire, and when the irruption of the barbarians from the North made the re-establishment of law and order the supreme necessity, it was natural for men to look up to God as the great lawgiver of the universe, to import into the Christian system the idea of a Roman Emperor, and to conceive of God as exalted high upon His throne, owing nothing to the miserable wretches who had rebelled against His authority, and therefore capable of issuing a decree to save some for the glory of His grace and leaving others to perish as monuments of His wrath. Our prophet spoke from



a different environment. Back of him lay the patriarchal system, in which his nation had been cradled ; and for him the Sovereign was a Parent, who was travailing in unutterable pain for the redemption of His children. Hence in describing His part in the work he represents Him as having entered upon it with a zeal which implied infinite pain and passion. “I have long time holden my peace ; I have been still and refrained myself ; now will I cry out like a travailing woman ; I will gasp and pant together ” (42 : 14). And the conception which led him to speak thus of Jehovah forbade him to think of Him as one who could elect some to salvation, while He left others to perish. It led him to speak of Jehovah as having bared His mighty arm for salvation—a work which concerned the Jew first, but which at once expanded so as to take in the Gentiles also ; and then on the basis of that broader conception he introduced the thought of election—an election which becomes a part of the method for the accomplishment of the greater purpose of redemption ; not an election which is made first, and which then requires the work of redemption for its realization.

II. The second main thought in the prophet’s doctrine on election is implied in the name which is everywhere given to the one who is chosen and called. He is throughout called a servant ; and nowhere is he represented simply as a favorite. God did not elect him primarily to become the recipient of His mercy, but that he might become the instrument through whom that mercy might be diffused and extended to the rest of mankind.

To realize the force of this, it is well to go back for a moment to the first instance in which the divine election is clearly illustrated in history. God called Abraham out of his father’s house and out of his native land. It was a clear case of divine election as well as of divine preterition ; for God chose Abraham and passed by the rest of mankind. But we have the purpose both of the election and of the preterition clearly stated by the Lord Himself. “Now the Lord said unto Abram, get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and from thy father’s house, unto a land that I will show thee ; and I will make of thee a great



nation, and I will bless thee and make thy name great; and be thou a blessing; and I will bless them that bless thee, and him that curseth thee will I curse; and in thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed" (Gen. 12: 1-3). The purpose with regard to Abraham was twofold. He was *to be* blessed; and he was *to become* a blessing. With regard to the nations we notice that, while God passed them by in the election which was then made, he did so, not that he might abandon them to perdition, but in order that he might the more surely bless them.

The election does not show God to be partial; it only proves him to be supremely practical. When a man wishes to kindle a fire, he does not take two lumps of anthracite and rub them together, awaiting ignition from that. A savage might do so; but one who is civilized has more wisdom. In the sovereign council of his own will he holds an election. Out of the whole mass of fuel at his command, he chooses the most inflammable. He applies the match to that; when it is ablaze, he lays on the coarser wood; and when that has caught the fire, he puts on the large, hard coal.

Now God is just as wise and just as practical. When in His infinite wisdom He started to kindle the fire of His love in a cold and fallen world, He first called one man, whom He had formed from the womb for this very purpose, and who had shown himself capable by his faith and obedience; and when his soul was lighted, the light was communicated to his family and to the nation, whom He raised up out of his loins. Abraham was of necessity first blessed himself; but that blessing, as history proved, remained in the family only as it became a source of blessing to mankind. Israel, as a nation, inherited the blessing of faithful Abraham; but it retained the blessing only as it proved itself the servant of Jehovah for the communication of the blessing to mankind. Too often did Israel forget this; too often did the Jews imagine that they had been chosen as God's favorites; and because, in that vain imagination, they failed to be servants, they forfeited the blessing, which was involved for them in their election.



III. This brings us to speak more specifically of the historic purpose of the divine election. And here we must first of all distinguish between a historic or temporal purpose and an eternal purpose, lying back of the election.

Clearly there is an eternal purpose in all God's ways. Being Himself from everlasting to everlasting, all His thoughts and all His ways with reference to man come from beyond time, and they reach out beyond time. St. John speaks of the Lamb as slain from the foundation of the world; and our prophet, in speaking of the end appointed for the suffering servant, says, "He shall be exalted and lifted up, and shall be very high." As His election goes back of time to the very foundation of the world, so does His destiny reach out into the heavens, even to the everlasting throne. The same is true of the servant, when viewed under any other aspect, either as Israel the nation, or Israel the remnant, or the Church under the new dispensation. God has "no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live." To save fallen man from death was the mighty task, into which our prophet represents Jehovah as having entered with infinite zeal and pain and passion. That is the eternal purpose; and in that those who are chosen as servants are, of course, called to share. God called his servant first of all unto life. As He called Abraham to inherit a blessing, so He here says to Israel, the servant, "Fear not, for I *have redeemed thee*, I have called thee by thy name, thou art mine" (43: 1). The servant is first of all called to share in the glorious redemption which God has purposed. It is the very condition on which he may become the instrument for the communication of its blessings unto mankind. Only after his own soul was lighted could he become a light unto the Gentiles. So that in his very election, the servant became included in that eternal purpose, in accordance with which God purposed redemption.

But there is very clearly another, a historical or temporal purpose, lying between the call and the full realization of the eternal purpose. As we saw before, God formed and called His servant for the realization of this purpose of redemption. The servant



hence appears with a mission. This he is to realize and fulfill in his relation to the Gentiles, and in his relation to those who are in darkness and distress. He is to "bring forth judgment to the Gentiles" (42: 1). He is to be "for a covenant of the people, for a light of the Gentiles; to open blind eyes, to bring out the prisoners from the dungeon, and them that sit in darkness out of the prison house" (42: 6, 7).

Now it is worthy of notice that Jesus found in this very prophecy the outline of His temporal mission; and when John the Baptist sent two of his disciples to ask, "Art Thou He that should come, or look we for another?" He pointed to the fulfillment of this very passage as the evidence of his Messiahship. He fulfilled the high calling of the servant by being a light unto the Gentiles, by healing the sick, by binding up the broken-hearted, and by bringing life and salvation to all who believe in His name. And that was likewise the mission of the Jewish people from the beginning. As Abraham was called and blessed in order that in him all the nations of the earth might be blessed, so were the Jews chosen and blessed that they might become a blessing unto mankind. Salvation is of the Jew. The same is still the mission of the Church of our Lord under the new dispensation. Called out of the world (*ἐκκλησία*), and called to sit with Christ in heavenly places, she too is called to be a light to them that sit in darkness. "Ye are the light of the world \* \* \* \* Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven." Her mission still is to carry the glad tidings to the uttermost parts of the earth, to bring relief to the suffering and the distressed, and to lift up them that are fallen.

Will the realization of the eternal purpose, which lies back of the election, and out of which it grew, be in any way dependent on the fulfillment of this temporal purpose? If we have not mistaken the order of the prophet's thought, that must clearly be his meaning. Had the servant, in every aspect, proved as blind and unfaithful as he did when looked upon as Israel the nation, the divine purpose of redemption would have failed, unless God



had adopted some other method for its accomplishment. Historically, the Jew forfeited the blessing, which was involved in his election, because he failed to realize his mission as a servant. To this the prophet seems to refer when he speaks of the blindness and disobedience of the servant, evidently now meaning Israel as a nation, and when he speaks of the people as robbed and spoiled (42: 18–25). Because they failed to be a blessing, they ceased to be blessed; because they failed to be a light to the Gentiles, they themselves ceased to be a light; because they failed to open the blind eyes, they themselves were smitten with blindness; and because they failed to open the prison house to them that sat in dungeons, they themselves became prisoners. And if ever they are brought to the enjoyment of the blessing which God had intended for them in their election, it must be in some other way than through the election itself.

What is thus true of the Jews, is true of the elect everywhere. St. Peter exhorts, “Wherefore, brethren, give the more diligence to make your calling and election sure.” Though as Christians we are called, though God has passed by the Chinese, the Turk, and the Hottentot, and chosen us to sit in heavenly places in Christ Jesus, our calling and election are sure only as we make them so. And how can we make them sure? Evidently only by recognizing the temporal purpose of our election, and by setting ourselves to the accomplishment of the service which it sets before us.

The fatal mistake which the Jew made was that he imagined that God had called him as a favorite upon whom to bestow certain blessings. In that vain imagination, he repudiated the service to which he was called. The Church of Christ has not unfrequently made the same mistake. Wherever men have made earnest with the doctrine of election, it was to emphasize its eternal purpose, to imagine that, because they had been called out of darkness into light, they were Heaven’s favorites, and thus completely to forget the historic purpose of their preferment over others. Hence they could sit down in the midst of comfort and luxury and sing of the glories of heaven, while the heathen perished in countless thousands. Hence, too, when God in His



providence sent the heathen into their very midst, casting them like Lazarus at the very doors of rich and magnificent churches, as in the large cities he has been doing for decades, these elect could pull up churches and all and move into "more desirable" localities, leaving the blind in their darkness and sin's prisoners in its awful dungeons. It is high time for a revival of Isaiah's doctrine of election, which, recognizing the wideness of God's mercy, emphasizes the historic purpose of the election. The Church of Christ can live only as a missionary Church; and the only hope of her future lies in the reviving missionary interest which she has come to manifest in these latter days. The indications are not wanting that, unless she does come up to this high calling of the servant of Jehovah in bringing light to those that sit in darkness, both at home and in heathen lands, we shall, like the Jew, be compelled to see the whole fabric of our civilization crumble to dust in our hands and our glorious heritage forever taken from us.

One more thought may be mentioned in conclusion. These passages on the servant of Jehovah illustrate the practical value of the doctrine of election. As it presents the true motive for Christian service, so it furnishes also the courage and strength for its accomplishment. Because the servant is called of God, therefore he is not to fear. "I the Lord thy God will hold thy right hand, saying unto thee, fear not; I will help thee." (41: 13). "I the Lord have called thee in righteousness, and will hold thine hand and will keep thee" (42: 6). It has often been remarked that the Calvinism of the Swiss, the Dutch and the Scotch made them to be strong men. When Cromwell's Ironsides started upon a campaign, they began to sing pæans of victory, because, believing themselves to be God's elect, they never dreamed of the possibility of defeat. Even with the difficulties with which Calvin's presentation of the doctrine was beset, it produced such wholesome fruit. What may we not expect, when in a proper restatement of the doctrine those difficulties shall be removed, and when the Church, realizing to the full extent the historic purpose of her election, shall go forth in the full consciousness that in every dark and trying hour, in every difficulty, God is indeed holding her hand and helping her?



#### IV.

### THE CONDITIONS OF NATIONAL PROSPERITY.

BY REV. JOHN S. STAHR, D. D.

It is evident even to the superficial observer that the complete development of man is possible only in the bosom of society. The organization of society in some outward form is regarded, therefore, as the means by which alone a state of culture and civilization can be reached. It might be supposed, however, that when this condition has once been attained, the outward organization, like the scaffold, by means of which a house has been erected, could be taken away; or that, in fact, it would be a useless encumbrance, a positive hindrance in the free enjoyment of man's highest powers. There are not wanting those who are so afraid of restrictions or restraints of all kinds, that they include government itself and all the instrumentalities by which law is maintained and enforced among men, in the category of things that must ultimately be abolished in order that there may be absolutely no distinction between man and man, and human conduct be purely spontaneous and free. An easy answer to this supposition is found in the fact that there has never yet existed, whether for a long or a short period of time, a condition of human society in which the realization of such a scheme would have been in the remotest degree possible, or in which the attempt to realize it would not have been subversive of the most sacred interests of humanity. On the contrary, the profoundest thinkers the world has produced have not only discerned the necessity of organization and government in the present order of human existence, but they have also seen that the principle of organization is equally fundamental and necessary in any future state to which man may attain either in the present world or in the world to come. That is to say, the idea of organic union between all the



individual members of the human race, so that they constitute one body, having a common life and the same course of development is essential to a true conception of humanity. This is the profound significance of the Swedenborgian conception that heaven is the GRAND MAN.

It is not without reason, therefore, that in the consummation of the ages the perfect development of human life is made to assume an organized form. The sublime visions of Isaiah and Micah\* are not of promiscuous multitudes, of aggregations of happy men and women living in a state of individual enjoyment. The descriptions which these prophets give of the ideal state to be reached in the fullness of time imply organized society, national existence, social action and reaction intense in degree and perfect in form, not because the external aspect of government has disappeared, but because that which it represents has so fully pervaded the internal structure of the whole body, that obedience has become wholly spontaneous and free. The prophecies in question are aptly said to describe the "Messianic Kingdom"—a phrase which is pregnant with meaning in both members. The condition of human society is called a kingdom not by habit or in the use of an anthromorphism, but rather to express the ideas of organization and government on the basis of law; and it is said to be Messianic, because it represents the fulfillment of prophecy and the realization of the scheme of vital union between God and man, on which the whole movement of history turns from the beginning of the creation. These prophecies, accordingly, do not represent something entirely new. Although the things to which they refer "shall come to pass in the last days," and the specification is the establishment of "the mountain of the Lord's house in the tops of the mountains," the whole movement represents only the completion and perfection of the twofold economy now in process of unfolding, the flowing together of the two streams of development, the divine and the human, in perfect union in such a way that all the possibilities of human life shall be fully realized.

\* Isa. 2 : 2-5. Micah 4 : 1-5.

From this point of view it makes little difference whether the ultimate form into which human life shall develop be regarded as the ideal Church or the ideal state. From the theological standpoint it would seem to be the former; from the philosophical standpoint, according to Rothe, it is the latter. At this point the distinction vanishes because the two streams will have flowed together so as to be indistinguishable, and henceforth they move with silent majesty in the channel of a common life, the life of our Lord Jesus Christ, which will then include to the full extent all that is involved in the possibility of human development. The so-called "New Theology" lays special stress upon the fatherhood of God as involving the brotherhood of man. Forty years ago it was thought dangerous doctrine to hold that the incarnation could have any deeper significance than the assumption of our human nature for the purpose of redeeming it from the condemnation of sin. To-day it has become a common-place idea among the best thinkers that the incarnation lies at the basis of all development, natural, moral, and religious, and that not a single step in the whole great movement can be thoroughly understood except in the light of this idea.\* Certain it is that Christianity is now seen to bear a relation to the development of our secular life that was unsuspected and unfelt in the earlier ages of the Church.

Christianity is said to introduce a new order of life into the world; and in one sense of the word this is true. But this order of life is not new in the sense that it is foreign to or altogether different from the life that was in the world from the time when man's life upon earth began. The new order is only that which the old was intended to be from the beginning, and it lies in the true line of the world's development. The Messianic kingdom, accordingly, and the Christian Church are not remote from the natural life of man, and their realization (although its perfect form lies in the future) is not to be looked for only a part from and in opposition to the present order of development. In this respect the early Church was in error so far as it looked for the

\* Washington Gladden's "Ruling Ideas of the Present Age," p. 277, et seq.



immediate coming of Christ and the fulfillment of the Messianic prophecies. The early Church bears the same relation to its subsequent development that the germ does to the organism which grows from it. The early Church was undifferentiated in doctrine, cultus and organization. For this reason, although it contains in possibility all that its future development brings to light, it cannot be taken as the explicit type of any future stage. There are working in it, however, all the great forces and principles which lie at the basis of our Christian civilization and which determine the form into which human life, in its progressive development, must necessarily expand.

If these general principles are correct, it follows that an *a priori* determination of the conditions of national prosperity is not possible. Neither the conditions which prevailed in the primitive Church, nor the proleptic visions of prophecy can give an adequate representation of ideal human existence in its historical realization. History is its own interpreter; and both the type of civilization which slumbered in the primitive Church, and that which is presented in the prophecies of its future glory, need to be considered in the light of historical development.

Sociological studies have in recent years received a remarkable degree of attention. In addition to this fact the questions raised during the late presidential election have elicited a degree of interest in matters pertaining to social economy surpassing that of any previous period of our national history. Feeling on the slavery question may have been more intense; but it is safe to say that the fundamental questions of our national life have never been pressing upon the public mind at any former period as they do to-day. It may, therefore, not be amiss to inquire into the nature of our social organization and the conditions which are necessary to secure national prosperity.

The expression "national prosperity" assumes or presupposes the existence of the nation. The nation is the collective body of those who have been born or otherwise brought into the same environment so as to possess a common heritage, to be imbued with the same life and spirit, and to have a common destiny. Under-

lying this idea is the thought that human life for its full development requires not only the social relation, but also a crystallization, so to speak, into a definite outward form. This definite form, which we call the nation, is the necessary outcome of human personality; but it is also just as truly again the necessary condition without which there can be no fully developed personality, no complete individuality. That is to say, national life and human personality are both reciprocally cause and effect, each in turn being produced, and reacting upon the other in a higher form and more perfect development. Taking the existence of the nation as an established fact, there are two ways of accounting for it, neither of which will do full justice to the conception. The one starts out with the individual, and the end of the movement is the perfection of individual existence. Every man is personally responsible for the results in his own case; but he comes in contact, perhaps in collision, with others who are equally responsible for their own individuality. The only way to get on comfortably and amicably is to agree upon certain limitations to their personal freedom and establish social intercourse upon the basis of a social contract. The other proceeds upon the assumption that although society may be ultimately resolved into the individuals that compose it as its constitutive factors, these do not coexist in society in their individual capacity, but only as parts of the composite whole in which the purpose and significance of their existence is embodied. As atoms unite to form molecules which determine the nature of any given substance, so individuals can find their real significance only in the social organization which expresses the essential nature of humanity. From this point of view the state is everything and men live only for the state.

It is easy to see that neither the individualistic nor the socialistic idea of the state makes room for true human development. In the one case there can be no true state, no sound basis of law, no genuine interaction between society and the individual so as to make room for the normal development of both. In the other, the individual suffers and personality loses its significance. The



true view requires that man should develop in the state as the organic union of all its members. This does not mean that the analogy of the human body can be carried in detail into the conception of the state so as to get the idea of a head and arms, hands and feet. That would be absurd. But it does mean that the state is an organism according to Prof. Mackenzie's definition: "An organism is a whole whose parts are intrinsically related." The state is dependent upon the individual and the individual upon the state. The two in their mutual interaction develop together, and the individual comes to clearer self-consciousness, a higher stage of personal freedom, and a more perfect individuality precisely as the state itself becomes enlarged and free. We have the best example of all this in the case of our own nation. Here is a whole the parts of which are intrinsically related. Not a part can be removed without destroying the whole. Not a part can be touched without affecting the whole. There is no room for distinguishing between "the masses and the classes." To make such a distinction is to lay violent hands upon the sacred body of which all are living parts. To hold them in their right relation is to make room for the fullest development of human life both in the general and in the individual aspect.

Such a state of human society is of slow growth and presuppose a long historical process, during which one characteristic of civilized life after another appeared as the result of social interaction on the one hand, and as the condition of higher attainment on the other. These are indicated in a general way in the passage from the prophet Micah already referred to: "For they shall sit every man under his vine and under his fig tree, and none shall make them afraid, for the mouth of the Lord of hosts hath spoken it." Here we have the elements of national prosperity, and it may be worth while to enumerate them.

1. The first thought suggested by this picture is that of security. As the plant requires for its healthy, vigorous growth that it should be firmly fixed in the ground, and that the delicate fibers which are continually springing from its roots should be

undisturbed, so human life requires a condition of stability, of freedom from disturbing influences, in order that it may bud and blossom and bring its fruit to perfection. The strong may entrench themselves in their castles and prey upon the weak; the mighty may enrich themselves and maintain a regal splendor by lording it over their less fortunate neighbors, so that there may be oases of prosperity in deserts of desolation and want; but there can be no healthy industry, no general advance in prosperity, no peace and plenty where there is no security of person and personal rights. The record of the world's development proves that although human progress is marked by wars and bloodshed, men have ever striven after a state of security, and that comforts have multiplied and prosperity increased among men in direct proportion to the security which they have enjoyed from external encroachment and internal oppression. The individual man may live from hand to mouth and, like Wilhelm Tell, "trust in God and his own subtle strength;" but he can be a law unto himself only if he is strong enough to make his own way, and resist encroachment. What can he accomplish in such a condition? He cannot fairly enjoy the fruits of his own industry nor enter upon a career of intellectual and moral development. He has neither time nor opportunity to study the mysteries of nature, or to learn to know himself and his relation to the larger world of which he is a part. He cannot advance a step in real development, except as he reaches a condition of settled life, which affords him peace and security; and this condition, practically secured in the earlier stages of society, must increase until it guarantees to rich and poor alike, the undisturbed prosecution of every human interest in art and science, trade and commerce. The interruption of free communication among men, the blocking of the avenues of business, and the violent stoppage of the wheels of industry on any pretext, except the dire necessities of war in national self-defense, are, therefore, not only detrimental to the welfare of the individual, but also subversive of social progress and inimical to the life of the nation.

2. In the train of security follows the acquisition and holding



of property. The idea of property, growing out of an ethical relation, may indeed be said to originate in a stage of social development in which human rights are as yet by no means secure. But it is very evident that it must, under such conditions, be very limited. If "possession is nine-tenths of the law," property rights which are limited to actual possession can yet have but little significance for the industrial and social development of man. The moment, however, that law and order are firmly established and the right of property is secure, there is an incentive to human industry, and an increase of productive power sufficient to change the whole aspect of life. In this way the institution of property is essential to a prosperous condition of society.

Aside from the personal relation upon which the idea of property depends (from *proprius*, that which is near, one's own, that has the stamp of one's personality upon it) there are two points of view from which the subject may be regarded, and consequently, two different definitions of property. The one is purely ethical the other, ethico-religious. From the ethical point of view, property is something external to man that belongs to him and serves as a means to express his personality. If I wish to reach an object placed at some distance before or above me and my arm is too short to touch it, I may take a rod in my hand and thus touch or move the object in the desired way. With the rod I can do what would be impossible to me without it. This illustrates the meaning of property in human development. It is the product of human labor enjoyed and used by the individual for the purpose of giving expression to his personality and impressing himself upon society as he could not do without such a means. This idea, we think, is fundamental in our civilization. There can be no advanced state of society capable of affording room for human effort on a large scale where property is not understood and respected. Whatever of truth there may be in socialism or communism, these theories are detrimental to the best interests of society in so far as they hamper and limit the individual in the free use of that which is rightfully his own. And yet this idea of property may become one-sided and lead to

abuse ; it does so, undoubtedly, as soon as property comes to be regarded as a purely selfish interest. What a host of evils has sprung from such a conception. How often has the welfare of society been threatened from this aspect of life and industry. How imminent the danger, at this very time, that wealth which ought to be for the advancement of every human interest, may become in the hands of selfish, unscrupulous men or corporations, the means of oppression and the instrument of injustice to large bodies of men !

The correction of such evils must come from the other side, from a higher conception of property as this is given in the other definition which we have designated the ethico-religious. Dr. Brownson says : " Property is communion with God through material things." It may not be easy at first to grasp the full significance of this definition. Communion with God and material things are so far apart in our ordinary thinking, that they seem to have absolutely nothing in common. But there is a fallacy lurking in such thinking. Communion does not necessarily mean prayer or spiritual intercourse ; nor is God excluded from the realm of material things. The material world, too, is the theater of God's activity, and the whole process of development from the lowest forms of natural existence up to the highest stages of human life, is, as we have already remarked, included in the fundamental scheme of the incarnation. Communion is only another name for fellowship or partnership, and Dr. Brownson's thought is that in the creation and use of what we call property, man does not stand alone nor labor alone. Whence is the smiling green of the meadows or the majestic grandeur of the forests that grow upon the mountains ? Because both are fed by the roots that penetrate the soil and the leaves that take in the nutritive elements of the atmosphere, shall they refuse to recognize the influence exerted by the rays of the sun, apparently so far away, by which alone their growth and vigor are made possible ? And is it not equally true that in every productive effort, in every industrial process, in the creation and use of property as the means for human advancement, there is a coöperation of two factors,



the divine and the human, the working out of a divine plan and purpose through human agency? Property is, therefore, not wholly selfish. It is created in partnership with the Almighty, and it is used as a means of "communion with God through material things."

Unfortunately, the voice of the "Silent Partner" is not always recognized in the management and use of property. The natural selfishness of man is but slow to yield to the genial influences which a higher culture brings with it; and the great advantages which property confers upon its owner, together with the intense competition of advanced civilization, serve to increase the tendency to press it into the service of individual aggrandizement. And yet signs are not wanting to show a growing realization of the true state of the case. The large-hearted benevolence of noble men and women, and the spirit of genuine philanthropy manifest in so many different directions, indicate that the leaven is working on human society by which it is hoped it will be, at length, wholly permeated. Washington Gladden in the little volume already referred to, calls attention to the fact that under the old dispensation, a process of training was instituted by which this broader conception of property was inculcated. He refers to the system of tithes and offerings required by the Jewish law. "It was precisely in this way that the doctrine of property was taught in those early times. The consecration of their possessions to God was, as the Hebrews understood it, a very partial consecration. One-tenth of what they had rightfully belonged to God, the other nine-tenths belonged to themselves. That was the provision of their law. Doubtless, it was a wise provision. The thin end of the wedge must be used in riving the covetousness of the human heart. If men could be trained to regard one tenth of their gain as belonging to their Maker and set apart for holy uses, that was as much, probably, as they would willingly yield. The principle was established that their property was not all their own; that other motives than those of self-interest must control the disposition of a portion of it. As they learned the doctrine of the divine omnipresence by the consecration of sacred places; as their first



lessons in keeping fast days led them on toward the virtue of self-control; as the restrictive regulations about homicide taught them the sacredness of human life; so these very rudimentary lessons in the consecration of property prepared the way for that larger conception which Christianity was to introduce, under which the man who gives himself to God no longer considers that any portion of his estate, be it nine-tenths or one-tenth, is left out of the transaction.”\*

Training of this kind was, no doubt, of great value to the Hebrew nation, and the lesson which it inculcates is of equal importance in modern times. It is to be observed, however, that the application of this principle must not be confined to the religious use of property. It must apply to all kinds of property under all kinds of conditions, in secular as well as in religious affairs. In this way only does property become free from the selfish stain which men are apt to put upon it, and lend itself as a pure instrument for the promotion of human well-being and happiness. Viewed in this light, it is one of the essential conditions of national prosperity and social progress.

3. With property comes power. Property is an instrument by which great results are accomplished. As property accumulates, the individual gains in strength and fertility of resources, so that industry becomes more productive and social achievement greater. The effect upon society is equally great if not greater whenever the distribution of property is fairly equitable and the use of it normal. As a result there is a rapid increase of prosperity and the accumulation of the means by which human wants are met and supplied. In other words, the right use of property leads to the accumulation of wealth. This is a condition that is generally regarded as desirable in every way; wealth and prosperity are, in the estimation of most men, synonymous terms. But here there is a parting of the ways, and the development of life may proceed in two very different directions. Wealth may lead to enjoyment, luxury, enervation, inequality, social dissolution and death.

\* “Ruling Ideas of the Present Age,” pp. 143, 144.



“There is a moral of all human tales,  
’Tis but the same rehearsal of the past.  
First freedom and then glory; when that fails,  
Wealth, vice, corruption, barbarism at last.”

On the other hand, the acquisition of wealth, that is to say, the increase of property and the control of larger means for the exercise of human effort, makes room for a fuller life in the triumph of man over natural forces, the increase of comfort, greater intensity of social interaction, and a higher stage of intellectual and moral development. This makes room for national greatness and power. These are attributes which the moralist is sometimes disposed to undervalue or even despise; and it must be admitted that they are often unduly exalted. And yet a nation that does not have power is but poorly prepared to fulfill its mission among the nations of the earth. For, in the first place, if social organization is what it ought to be, the increase of power in the hands of the individual, must, in the nature of the case, produce power in the whole organism to which the individual belongs. National weakness is, therefore, incompatible with a healthy social condition. And, again, the nation as a whole needs power; because without power it would fail to exert its proper influence upon other nations. “Power,” J. G. Holland says, “in its quality and degree, is the measure of manhood,” and if it measures the manhood of the individual, it measures to the same extent the manhood of a nation. But the possession of power by a nation is not at all the same thing as the manifestation of power in the equipment of large fleets and mighty armies, or the waging of successful wars. The power required is of the kind to which Bailey refers: “He hath no power that hath not power to use.” It is that form of power which is manifest in self-contained strength, which works out in law and animates every human institution, and which protects by the maintenance of every legal right even the humblest citizen wherever he may be on the face of the earth.

4. The inner side, the soul of power, is courage. This, as an attribute of national life, is essential to the idea of the state and

a necessary condition of its prosperity. Here, again, we are confronted with the possibility of an unhealthy national development. The accumulation of wealth and the enjoyment of the comforts and luxuries of life may react in such a way as to beget a craven spirit. How often does it happen that commercial interests and the love of wealth make men afraid to assert themselves, or courageously to stand or fall in defense of their most precious interests! This is the mark of a nation of slaves, and the spirit which it indicates, whether it take refuge behind the plea of tender affection for wives and children, reluctance to shed fraternal blood, concern for the fruits of peaceful industry, regard for the interests of culture and religion, or whatever other pretext it may advance, is the certain precursor of corruption and death. Much better, however, is that heroic spirit manifested by Gertrud, the wife of Stauffacher in *Wilhelm Tell*, who, when her husband points out that resistance to the tyranny of the Austrian ruler may mean the destruction of the beautiful house of which she is so proud, says :

“ Wüsst ich mein Herz an zeitlich Gut gefesselt,  
Den Brand wärff’ ich hinein mit eigner Hand.”

And this is the spirit which must go hand in hand with national power and greatness. But as real power is not the power of the tyrant, so genuine courage is not the blustering courage of the bully, the courage that only lives by going about to challenge the power and greatness of other nations. True courage is that calm and self-reliant spirit which, confident of the right, is willing to sacrifice every lower interest for the sake of honor and freedom.

The events of the year which is just coming to a close, afford a remarkable example of this kind of courage manifested by the two nations that stand foremost as champions of liberty in the world, the United States and England. The chief magistrate of this nation has been blamed for using undiplomatic language in his message on the Venezuela question, and accused of indulging in a threat of war against England, in a manner that precipitated



a panic on exchange and severely strained the relations between the two countries. Perhaps the language used was undiplomatic, and, from one point of view, impolitic; but no one acquainted with the character of President Cleveland will doubt for a moment the honesty and purity of his motives, or the calm and steadfast courage of his utterance. Equally courageous was the manifestation of sympathy and support on the part of the whole country in the face of possible pecuniary loss and serious injury to public and private interest in case of war. And what was the result? Two nations, among the wealthiest and most powerful nations of the world, with almost unlimited resources at their command, have had the courage to stand still and think, instead of rushing to arms, and to settle by friendly diplomacy their disputes and difficulties, to adjust in this way questions which in other ages or between weaker nations would have cost millions of treasures and rivers of blood before the voice of reason could have made itself heard. This is a victory for civilization and humanity, creditable alike to both nations, and an example that will have its effect in due time upon other nations. Men and nations who have to show their courage by violent talking and bluster do not have much to boast of; but those who can confidently rely upon the power which they have, may possess their souls in patience even in the face of a taunt or menace. That is true courage, and as such it is an essential characteristic of a prosperous and happy nation.

5. The crowning characteristic of national life is the spirit of fraternity. This is perhaps the last to be realized; but it is at the same time the first in importance, and its influence underlies the whole process of national development. Security, property, power and courage find their true significance only as they are baptized in the spirit of fraternity. The social philosophy of the present day lays a great deal of stress upon the principle of altruism, and civilization is said to advance in proportion as altruism gains the victory over selfishness. The principle for which the word stands is a good one; but, presented as it usually is, it seems like a house without a foundation. There

must be something upon which the spirit of altruism rests, or from which it proceeds. Why should man not live for himself alone but also for others? The only sufficient answer to this question is found in the idea of fraternity. All men in their endowments, their longings and their destination are brothers, because they are included in the same divine economy that leads them onward toward the full fruition of the glorious liberty of the children of God. Accepting the doctrine of the incarnation as of fundamental significance in the whole scheme of human development, the necessary corollary of the doctrine must also be accepted, that all men by divine appointment stand upon the same plane and are together subject to a similar process of training in human society, by a mutual giving and receiving in the complementary relation of a real brotherhood. This makes human dependence and human assistance a very different thing from the estimate which we put upon them in the common meaning of the word charity. This word, in the sense in which we use it, is said to be of purely Christian origin; but it must be confessed that the thing which it represents often embodies a very unchristian spirit. To bestow a charity and to render assistance in a genuinely fraternal spirit have come to mean in modern speech two very different things. "Charity has been mainly alms-giving. The assumption upon which it almost universally proceeds is the superiority of the giver and the inferiority of the recipient. It is a gracious act, originating in the benignity of the bestower, and putting the beneficiary under obligation. If the giver is not proud and arrogant, he is at least complacent; if the receiver is not humiliated, he is certainly disposed to be very deferential. The act of charity itself, as ordinarily conceived, puts a difference between him who gives and him who takes; it raises the one to a plane somewhat above the other. It is probably the truth to say that a great many who give are influenced to their bounty, in considerable degree, by the consciousness of superiority which is thus awakened. The tip, which is a kind of alms, is more willingly bestowed because it emphasizes the social contrast between the giver and the receiver. It is pleasant to have the power to confer favors and to make others realize this power." \* \* \* \*



“It is easy to see that the kind of brotherhood which is counoted by this subtle assumption of class distinctions is far removed from that true fraternity which springs from the clear recognition of every man as a child of God. When we have once comprehended the true character of the human beings whom we are trying to befriend, we cannot any longer indulge ourselves in such an undervaluation of them as is often signified in the looks and the words by which our alms are accompanied.” \*

The clear and definite realization of the spirit of fraternity which is the very key-note of true Christianity may be regarded as the best and safest remedy for the social ills of the present day. There is no relation of life, whether of employer and employee, of master and servant, or of intercourse between rich and poor, learned and ignorant, that is not exalted and glorified by it. There is no state of tension or friction that is not alleviated or remedied by it. A nation is great and strong in proportion as this spirit of fraternity prevails; and the moment you draw artificial lines of distinction or raise class-barriers, you weaken the bonds of cohesion and diminish the industrial and moral power of the community. A system of caste violates the idea of a common humanity, and to array the masses against the classes is to infuse poison into the vitals of a nation. In fact there is no room for a distinction between classes and masses in a country where all are free citizens and partake alike of the privileges of education, morality and religion. In this respect our own country has a great advantage over the democracies of the ancient world. Greece is a good example of a democracy in which equality was only for equals. The citizens were free; but they were a class by themselves and the large majority of the people were slaves. Here, on the contrary, no man on account of social position, race, color, or previous condition of servitude is to be excluded from the brotherhood of citizens.

Theoretically this brotherhood is generally recognized and the idea which underlies it has been working silently, not in this country only, but in European nations also, extending the right

\* “Ruling Ideas,” pp. 37, 38.

of suffrage, raising serfs to a state of freedom, and ameliorating the condition of the lower classes by admitting them to an ever-increasing share of political privileges and social advantages. And it may be said without fear of contradiction, that every step taken in the direction of broader fellowship has resulted in the development of a truer manhood and greater national strength and prosperity. Unfortunately, the practical application of the principle falls far short of its theoretical acceptance. In the state, in society, yea, even in the Christian Church, class distinctions not only still prevail, but in many cases the tendency seems to be even to draw the lines more sharply in the making of coteries and cliques, whose self-importance and vanity feeds upon the efforts which they make to keep aloof from those who, as they think, stand lower in the social scale. There may be some excuse for those whose ancestors have for generations held places of rank and respectability, and who may therefore have some claim to hereditary pride and virtue; but even in such cases, there is no valid reason why the ties of brotherhood should be disregarded on account of artificial distinctions, which have left little but a memory and a name behind them. Much more reprehensible is that form of snobbery which feels so insecure in its own social position, that it can maintain its self-respect only by violent self-assertion and cold disdain towards others just as good or better, who have not, however, the privilege of their acquaintance. If the spirit of fraternity is the spirit of the Gospel working in the whole social order, it follows that the violation of this spirit, the want of social cohesion is a source of weakness which seriously interferes with free human development and national strength. It often comes to pass in critical junctures of national affairs, that a strong sentiment like the enthusiasm of the crusades or the outburst of patriotism in the Franco-Prussian war will obliterate all distinctions and bind in closest union rich and poor, high and low, in one common brotherhood. In such union there is strength. But the idea of Christian brotherhood ought to be sufficient, at all times, to give tone and character to the relations which hold between man and man in the work



shop or the counting-house, at school or in church. It has often seemed to us that the Roman Catholic Church deserves much credit for one thing, namely, that it makes no distinction between rich and poor. In the largest cathedral or the smallest chapel, all have equal privileges as children of the same Father and of the same church. In Protestantism, alas, there are churches for the rich and churches for the poor ; and often, if different classes come together in the same church there is no hand of fellowship extended, no recognition of a common brotherhood. There is room, therefore, for a deeper apprehension of the profound significance of the incarnation, and the manifestation of a broader fellowship in the life of Christian men and women.

What now are the means by which these conditions of national prosperity may be secured ? First of all, the spirit of Christianity which underlies all the relations between man and man is to be applied in organized society in the most real and concrete way. We call our civilization a Christian civilization ; and it may be freely admitted that without Christianity our civilization could not be what it is. Our ideals are Christian ideals and they have been working as silent forces in the bosom of society. But these ideals are far from being realized. It is still true that for many men the conditions of life are hard, and that for many they seem to grow harder. What shall we say of the painful facts with which we are confronted ? “ Here again, and in connection with the sorest troubles and deepest interests of the race, the supreme divinity of Jesus discloses its significance. There are these maddening contrasts of life in the heart of society. They are reflected upon and discussed popularly, only as effects of an industrial order ; they are not traced to their source in man’s inhumanity to man. Christianity meets the social difficulty at this point. It brings a revelation of the true order for human beings, and through the Person of the Revealer it introduces the moral power of the Infinite. \* \* \* The question comes, where are human beings to look for the power to realize these ideals ? Mr. Kidd writes eloquently of the stock of altruistic feeling with which the race was endowed some two thousand years ago, and

which is still unspent. What one wants to know is, Who thus stocked our Western civilization? Is Christ's scheme a chimera, or the true and ultimate interpretation of human life? and is the infinite in whom lies the whole menace or hope of man's existence for or against the Christian programme? The old faith in the deity of Christ is of the utmost significance for the purified ideal of socialism. \* \* \* The City of God must descend out of heaven. The socialistic ideal is doomed if it has the universe against it. Ethics that mean nothing beyond time and space, proposals for human improvement that are vetoed by the Absolute, decrees for man's amelioration that collide with the decrees of the Eternal, can have but one issue. The Christian thinker of to-day surveys with the Socialist the outrages that result from the operation of the present form of social arrangements. He looks with the deepest sympathy upon the whole sad condition of the vast majority of mankind. He believes in the advent of a new earth wherein righteousness is to dwell, and for the coming of the kingdom of love he counts it a privilege to labor and live. But the magnitude of the task, and the difficulties besetting it, would overwhelm him in despair if he did not possess Luther's faith.

“ Did we in our own strength confide,  
Our striving would be losing,  
Were not the right man on our side,  
The man of God's own choosing.  
Dost ask who that may be?  
Christ Jesus, it is he;  
Lord Sabbaoth is his name,  
From age to age the same,  
And he must win the battle.”

The hope of the reconstruction of human society, apart from the support of the Infinite Life, is the emptiest dream. Out into this Infinite, up into the aboriginal fellowship in the Godhead, the belief in the deity of Christ leads. It beholds in the Godhead the plan of human society; it links the human world to the divine by a cord that cannot be broken; and it supports the grand historic movement upon the ever brightening social ideal with the sympathy, the decree, the nature of the Absolute.\* ”

\* Gordon's "The Christ of To-Day," pp. 224-226.



It is an encouraging sign of the times that social questions are beginning to be studied from a positively Christian standpoint, and that the forces of Christianity are working toward a social organization in which the vital power of the Gospel of Christ shall have full sway. This, we are persuaded, is the only way in which social life can be purified and freed from the abuses which now prevail in it, and by which the ideal of the Christian state can be fully realized.

Another means for the realization of these conditions is the better organization of industry. Labor is, in the social economy, a means of grace. Labor conquers nature and makes her give willing tribute to human industry; labor creates wealth; labor opens the way for the advancement of every human interest, material and spiritual. But labor also exerts a reflex influence and makes the laborer, under normal conditions, both stronger and better. Idleness is the bane of virtue and honor. Leisure, indeed, is desirable. Men bound down to grinding toil do not, as a rule, have high aspirations or achieve a high degree of mental and moral development. But leisure, properly speaking, means only time for rest, or for a change of employment from a state of drudgery to one of keen enjoyment, so that a man may do his best and have an opportunity to advance in general efficiency and social culture. It is to the interest of society that every man should be a worker, not spasmodically but constantly. The only way in which this is possible is by the curbing of greed and the cultivation of a public opinion which will not tolerate strikes and lockouts and offensive class legislation. As things now are the wheels of industry are frequently blocked to such an extent that the most serious results follow from pecuniary loss to both employers and employees, and, what is still worse, the efficiency of laboring men is impaired by enforced idleness, and their moral quality is lowered by the indulgence of propensities, and the formation of habits which eat into the soul like a canker and destroy what is best and holiest in life. On the other hand, individual and corporate wealth, by the power which it possesses to secure favor and purchase influence, has entrenched itself behind legislative

enactment until it has learned to depend upon its ability to secure from favoring legislation what it ought to get from the intelligent and enterprising management of organized industry. Impartial arbitration and a scientific tariff by experts, capable of imposing rates of duty equitable and just to the whole community would greatly assist, not only in the maintenance of prosperous industry, but also in the development of a higher manhood and the establishment of justice and good will among men.

A third means toward the end we have in view is found in better education. It is acknowledged on all sides that a free country must educate its citizens for its own sake as a means of self-preservation. We find no fault with this view of the case; but it seems to us that the education looked for and required by the state in this way is insufficient. Ability to read and write, a knowledge of our form of government and of the constitution of the United States might fairly be required as a qualification for citizenship. But even a fair degree of intelligence universally diffused would not necessarily give rise to the social conditions which are sure to result in the highest degree of comfort and happiness throughout the land. Education is necessary for the sake of the citizen as well as for the sake of the state. For the real problem with which society has to deal, after all, is the development of a healthy personal life—that is to say a sound individuality in a sound state. The individual, accordingly, needs to receive such training as will not only make him a good citizen, but also a perfectly developed man. Indeed the quality of his citizenship will improve with the quality of his manhood. If, therefore, Christianity lies at the foundation of true culture and civilization, Christian nurture must be an essential part of every adequate scheme of education. The acquisition of knowledge, technical skill, habits of industry, reverence for law and submission to rightful authority are all involved in the training and discipline of the school room, at least of the school room as it ought to be. But underlying and permeating the whole process, there must be the influence of Christianity in its most concrete and living form as mediated by the Church and the Christian family. For in this



way only can those principles of action be instilled which furnish the motives of right conduct. But beyond this, the case requires a training of the man as such, liberal training, to insure a well-rounded development which will bring to perfection every power of the individual mind after the type of the Perfect Man, in whose image and likeness humanity was originally created.

## V.

### THE EVER-LIVING CHRIST.\*

BY CALVIN S. GERHARD, D. D.

Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, to-day and forever. But this does not prevent Him from unfolding Himself. Because His relation to humanity is a life relation, the Christ of to-day is different from the Christ of yesterday and from the Christ of to-morrow. Life means movement, activity, progress. Monotony and permanence are very different conceptions. Jesus is the perennial Christ. There is in Him such richness of life that He is capable of bringing a special message to every age. In *The Christ of To-Day*, Dr. George A. Gordon places before his readers the historic Christ as He reveals Himself in the struggles and hopes of the present generation.

The last number of this periodical contained a brief notice of this remarkable volume. The editor has requested us to prepare a more extended notice. This we are very willing to do, since we regard the work as deserving of careful study. It is a book for the times. It discusses the new problems which have arisen in connection with theology, and shows whence they have come. The author feels and sees that we live in a larger world than our forefathers did.

The first great expansion of the human mind in modern times, he tells us, began with the Copernican astronomy, which made possible the marvelous discoveries in the starry heavens, which have revealed to us a universe of immeasurable magnitude. These discoveries have exerted a powerful influence on human thought. "For the intelligent modern man, living in the sense of a measureless universe, triviality of concep-

\* *The Christ of To-Day*, by George A. Gordon, Minister of the Old South Church, Boston; Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston and New York, 1896.



tion has well nigh become an impossibility. Among the greatest educators of our time, a foremost place must be given to the consciousness of living under an infinite outward order. It has put the imagination under a fresh and diviner spell. \* \* \* It has taxed the mind with a new object, and imparted to it an amplitude that has told for much. This large-mindedness has affected the interpretation of man's relations to God and the significance of the career of Christ." It has introduced "a new and large way of treating our whole human problem and the parallel mission of Christ. An immense library of theological literature has thus been quietly outgrown." \*

From the thought of indefinite, immeasurable extension in space, the author passes on to a consideration of the enormous extension in time which the world has witnessed. Here again he finds that the same problem confronts us. We have to do with a humanity even, not of a few thousand years, but with a humanity of perhaps a hundred thousand years. "The countless silent centuries that lie behind recorded history are to-day one of the most touching, fascinating and bewildering objects of thought. They have at last risen from their long sleep; they have finally found recognition; their labor and sorrow in preparing the way for historic man is no longer ignored; the tears and the blood by which they wrought out the physical forms from which our better life has come, and the beginnings of civilization that they were able to hand on to their more fortunate successors, are becoming part of the sympathetic and grateful recollection of mankind. \* \* \* Here, then, is the second call for the new habit of thought. Here is the second cause of the revolution that has already taken place in the nobler mind of the Church. The problem is our problem and the old mental mood is totally inadequate to cope with it. The Hebrew form of the problem, the Apostolic form of the problem, the Mediæval and Puritan forms of it, are not large enough for that which confronts the believer to-day. \* \* \* The Church is on trial. The humanity that she must include in her faith and prayer and sym-

\* Pages 9 and 10.

pathy has multiplied itself like the sand of the sea, and crowds the expanded spaces of time with hosts that no man can number.”\*

After referring to what he calls the sense of contemporaneous humanity, and to several other points of minor importance, the author closes his introductory chapter by telling us that for the most part “the persons addressed in his discussion are those who have not broken with historic Christianity, who stand in the consciousness of its grandeur and finality, but who desire a better understanding of that which holds them with a grasp so beneficent.”

In the three chapters which follow and which constitute the remainder of the volume the author deals with Christ in the faith, in the theology and in the pulpit of to-day. He belongs to the school of thinkers of which Maurice, Phillips Brooks, Fairbairn, Lyman Abbott, James M. Whiton and A. H. Bradford are prominent representatives. Their theology is not only Christocentric, but Christocentric in a new sense. For it is ever to be remembered that there are three different ideas, any one of which we may have in mind when we speak of Christocentric theology. We may think of the theology which recognizes the Person of Jesus Christ as the source and center of Christian life and salvation. Secondly, we may have under contemplation the theology which makes the Christ idea the point of departure from which our theological system is developed. Thirdly, we may have in mind the theology which regards the consciousness of Jesus Christ as the formal source of all true theological knowledge. Dr. Gordon adopts the third conception and holds to it very tenaciously. It is not our purpose to sit in judgment on his work. We will not endeavor to decide between him and his critics, but hope to set his opinions clearly before the readers of the REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW. His book has awakened much attention. He has been accused of various heresies, and, on the other hand, highly commended for his fidelity to the great fundamental doctrines of the Gospel and for the service which he has

\* Pages 13-16.



rendered in helping forward the cause of truth and righteousness. Whether we can agree with him or not, we cannot help but admire the evident sincerity, the profound learning and the telling vigor which everywhere manifest themselves in his discussions.

Jesus Christ is to him the historic Christ—the Christ of the New Testament and of Christian history. He does not speak of the glorified Christ, enthroned in heaven and immanent in the lives of His people, but of the Christ as He lived and still lives on earth, through the life, words and acts of His earthly sojourn. He believes in a once crucified, but now risen and exalted Christ, living in the hearts of His followers, whom we, however, in our present state can properly know only through the terrestrial history which He has made for Himself. During His earthly sojourn, we are told, an outside view of Christ was possible among those who were not closely associated with Him, but He already had such an influence in moulding the life of His disciples that He expected from them an approximately adequate judgment in regard to Himself when He said to them: “But whom say ye that I am?” Since then for nearly two thousand years He has had “standing in the life of the race.” His thoughts, His ideals and His example have had such a commanding influence that “to abstract Christ from our civilization would be to take the sun out of the heavens, the soul out of the body.” The same thing is true with regard to the Epistles, which constitute so large a part of the New Testament. “The writers are flooded with Christ.” “Christ has once for all fixed the attention of the world upon Himself.” He meets the wants of man’s ethical nature, but also the wants of his rational being. He satisfies the demands both of life and of philosophy. Three great advances, we are told, have been made in the intellectual appreciation of the Person of Christ. He is the acknowledged representative of humanity, the accepted revelation of the essential kinship of the divine and the human, and the guide to the ultimate meaning of nature.

But, as the representative of humanity, it is no longer only what He did for us in suffering, dying and rising from the dead,

but also very particularly what He has disclosed to us for our imitation, that has awakened the attention of the Christian thinkers of the school of thought to which Dr. Gordon belongs. He lays great stress on "the mind of Christ." He sees that Jesus has given us a new standpoint of observation. As Jesus Christ looked at God, the world and humanity, so we are to regard them. His consciousness is to be our guide. "What God signified," says Fairbairn, "to Jesus Christ, He ought to signify to all Christian Churches; and here all can find a point from which to study themselves and their systems. Theology, as well as astronomy may be Ptolemaic; it is so when the interpreter's Church, with its creeds and traditions, is made the fixed point from which he observes and conceives the truth and the kingdom of God. But theology may also be Copernican; and it is so when the standpoint of the interpreter is, as it were, the consciousness of Jesus Christ, and this consciousness where it is clearest and most defined, in the belief as to God's Fatherhood and His own Sonship. Theology in the former case is geocentric, in the latter heliocentric." Our thinking is heliocentric when we conceive God as Jesus Christ conceived Him, when His consciousness becomes the point of observation from which we view all objects in heaven and on earth. This is the attitude which our author takes towards the theological problems which he discusses.

He lays great stress on the fact that Jesus Christ always speaks of God as His Father and as our Father, and believes that He does this, not because He desires to make use of a pleasing metaphor, but because He thereby gives expression to "the deepest reality in the universe." In God we find eternally existing the Paternal, the Filial and the union of the two. In Jesus Christ the Filial became manifest in time and fully actualized the relation which every human being sustains more or less remotely to the Father. Jesus is the representative man, because He brings into full, actual existence the ideal sonship in which every child of man is created. What Jesus Christ is that all men can approximately become through Him because of man's aboriginal



endowment. "There is eternally in the Godhead a rational, *creative* humanity and in that divine humanity our race is constituted. In the Eternal Word, which became flesh in Jesus, men live and move and have their being. The Eternal ideal humanity and the historic fact meet in the prophet of Nazareth. The Eternal thus manifests himself through the divinely human career, and, after the history is made which forever renders impossible the denial that the ideal is the real, the Eternal returns to His pre-incarnate fullness and universality. The historic Jesus is the revelation, the attestation, the demonstration of the Divine Sonship in which men were chosen before the foundation of the world."\*

What Dr. Gordon means by saying that "the Eternal returns to His pre-incarnate fullness and universality" we do not understand. The historic Jesus passed into the heavens, was exalted to the right hand of God. The Eternal did not *return* to His pre-incarnate fullness and universality, but Jesus Christ ascended far above all heavens that He might fill all things (Eph. 4: 10). The limitations of time and space were thus completely overcome in Him. Henceforth He cannot be known after the flesh, but only after the spirit. The finite in Him has passed into the infinite, and the local has become the universal. Nevertheless He is still the Incarnate Son, whose earthly life has fully demonstrated what that Divine Sonship can be in which all men are constituted. Because all men are by creation sons of God, prodigals can be reclaimed and aliens can be brought into the commonwealth of Israel. As Phillips Brooks has so happily expressed it, man's sonship to God includes the notions of a common nature between the Father and the son, of a spontaneous affection of the Father, of an essential obligation of the son and of a possibility of the son's unlimited growth into the Father's likeness.

What then is regeneration? It cannot mean the infusion of new life into men—new in the sense of being something prepared for man in the person of Christ and then conveyed from Him to them. "It must mean," says Dr. Gordon, "the victorious asser-

\* Page 235.

tion, through the power of the Holy Spirit, of the aboriginal moral endowment of man. \* \* \* The fundamental trouble with man is that he is not consistent with himself; he is not living in accord with the plan of his being. \* \* \* His problem is the victorious assertion of the aboriginal spiritual principle. Regeneration is not a new creation in the sense of a new endowment; it is the reënthronement of the moral ideal, invested with the meaning of Christ's life, and clothed with the authority of the Holy Spirit."\* Regeneration may be so conceived without robbing it of its reality. It is still a divine life begotten through the presence of Jesus Christ and the special activity of the Holy Ghost in the soul of the believer. It is the biblical conception of the supernatural within the natural, though transcending it; of Jesus Christ vivifying humanity from within rather than from without.

In reference to the process of salvation he takes the broadest ground possible. He tells us that "the Christian thinker of to-day has won his freedom to regard God as the Father of all men, to conceive of Him as eternally interested in the whole race; and to remove all limits of place and time from the redemptive scheme of Christ. He has the right to affirm, if he solemnly believes it, that, on this side of death and on that, God and Christ and the moral universe are unchangeably the same; that all the divine punishments are chastisements; that God's final purpose in scourging His children is to bring them back to Himself: and that even in hell the worm must gnaw and the fire burn in the service of the Eternal Grace. \* \* \* The consciousness of Christ as the creative principle in theology yields a God for humanity. It covers the entire race with the purpose of the Infinite; it interprets the moral idealism that is inseparable from mankind into the universal presence of the Holy Spirit; it finds among all peoples traces of that revelation of God which becomes absolute in Christ; it looks upon history as but another name for the redemptive process; and it removes from this process all limits of place and time, because it sees that salvation is a principle utterly independent."†

\* Pages 192 and 193.

† Pages 203 and 205.



His position, therefore, in regard to the mooted question of the possibility of repentance after death is no longer "the larger hope," but has become the larger necessity. And in this he is undoubtedly correct. For, the most devout Christian thought of to-day simply *cannot* believe in a God who shows partiality. Salvation is offered, in good faith, to all, and the offer is never withdrawn any more than a true mother ever withdraws her love from an erring son. "The loss of the lost soul is not all the soul's—it is God's as well; and where He feels loss He can never be satisfied without attempting to regain. \* \* \* The love of God, as eternal and universal, will not surrender its object to sin; to it the effort after recovery is necessary. To accept the loss were to cancel the love. He who created, because a Father, must even in the face of sin, because of His Fatherhood, seek to save the lost."\*

But there is no salvation without righteousness. And no man can get righteousness, in this or any other world "without an agony and a bloody sweat." He must repent of, and forsake his sins and grow into the likeness of Jesus Christ. He must come into the possession of the mind, the heart and the character of His Saviour. This is difficult in any world, because, if true to the laws of moral being, God can only save men as men, and not as machines. Not only must they give their consent to their own salvation, but they must believe in Christ, and, through the power of faith, freely *choose* and *love* Him as their Saviour, and in this way grow into His likeness, by acquiring a holy character. Salvation is actually accomplished only when it has entered into, and taken possession of, the will, so that the individual persistently, positively and decidedly, determines to be on the side of God and of humanity, and, therefore, on the side of right and of goodness. So long as he resists, even though it be for hundreds, or thousands or even millions of years, he must suffer the penalty. Repentance, loving surrender, holiness alone bring blessedness and felicity.

Dr. Gordon has no sympathy with the doctrine of conditional

\* *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology*, by Principal Fairbairn, p. 464.

immortality. "If one believes in a Christian God," he says, "one must find a Christian interpretation of human history. \* \* \* It is incapacity or unwillingness to face the immemorial past, with its countless multitudes of suffering men and women, that is tempting Christian thinkers to revive the old doctrine of a restricted election under the scientific formula of the survival of the fittest and to add to it the new paganism of conditional immortality."\* He believes that man as man, created in the image of God, is immortal. Constitutional sonship to God, he tells us, is the basis of human immortality, and that when this becomes moral sonship, that is, when there is actual sympathy with God's purpose on man's part, assurance becomes much greater.

Other kindred subjects are discussed with remarkable boldness and ability. The author has deliberately chosen his determining principle of thought and fearlessly applies it. "The consciousness of Christ," he says, "as the authentic revelation of the character of the Infinite is the great beginning of theology. The present imperative call is the fearless, logical use of this fundamental ideal. Whatever revisions it may require in Old Testament teaching, or if need be in Apostolic deduction; above all, whatever surrenders are necessary in the traditional theology, should be cheerfully made, the supremacy of Christ is at stake, and nothing must be allowed to stand in the way of that."†

He rightly holds that the consciousness of Christ as the creative principle in theology is diametrically opposed to every partialistic scheme. God, as revealed in the consciousness of Jesus Christ, does not contemplate the selection of a number. He does not include simply a remnant, but He is on the side of humanity. The purpose of salvation is as broad as the race. The Spirit of God was with men before the advent of Christ. But if in the Hebrew civilization, why not in the Persian, Assyrian, Egyptian and Indian? He was undoubtedly more fully in the Hebrew civilization than in any other and yet He certainly

\* Page 194.

† Page 182.



did not leave Himself without witness in the rest. This opens the great subject of the higher criticism, how, when and by whom the books of the Bible, as we now have them, were written. On this subject he claims the victory has been won. Scholars have gained their freedom to study the Bible as literature. They are at liberty to subject the sacred writings to the most searching historical and literary criticism. The problem now is in reference to the wise use of the liberty which has been gained. For the Bible has a double character. It can be studied by the historian and the critic, and so far as it consists of outward fact it falls within their domain, but as a body of ethical and spiritual truth it belongs to humanity and speaks to the heart. This side of the Bible is the greater and therefore deserves and requires full recognition. It can be properly appreciated only as we learn to look at the truth as it stands revealed in the consciousness of Jesus Christ. "And it is one of the better signs of the times that everywhere in the Church of to-day the representative and leading minds are returning to Christ. Behind the critical activity concentrated upon the New Testament is the deep-seated desire to move through apostolic opinion and idiosyncrasy, through evangelistic prepossession and habit, through every likely or possible accidental accretion as close as can be to the pure and august word of the Lord."\* So also it is continually "felt more and more that there can be no substitutes in creeds, in Church authority, in patristic tradition, in apostolic interpretation, for the creative mind of Jesus Christ, and that without Him there can be no solution of our human problem."†

In this review we have endeavored as much as possible to let the author speak for himself. We will close with a few sentences from the last chapter, "The Place of Christ in the Pulpit of To-day." "The Christian pulpit is the creation of Christ, and its power will last only so long as His spirit controls and inspires it." "When the Word became flesh, the life of man became master, and the imagination of genius sank to its place of due subordina-

\* Page 247.

† Page 248.

tion as servant." "The study of the Gospels as literature has resulted in a keener appreciation both of the thought and the art in the teaching of Jesus. He is the standard for morality and for art, the consummate expression of both, the immortality of His teaching is sure, because the thought is final and the form surpassing, because the life eternal is there in a body that cannot even grow old." "This is the great principle underlying the strange conceit of apostolical succession, that life comes only from life, and that the moral and spiritual power of the present generation is largely derived from the holy succession that goes back to the creative soul of Christ for its endowment." "To the religious mind this universe is not merely a system of laws, and an infinite force acting in accordance with them; nor is it an impersonal idea evolving its hidden richness into the explicitness of concrete existence: it is the personal life of God our Father in progressive expression and realization."

"If life can alone lead to life, if personality can alone reveal personality, the place of Christ in the modern pulpit is plain. Only the supreme Person in time can give us the supreme Person above time. We reach the living God only as we find Him mediated by the sons of God, and the Leader of all the sons of God must take His place at the heart of our faith and at the centre of our educational and religious endeavor."

*Reading, Pa.*



## VI.

### AMONG THE OLD REVIEWS.

BY REV. A. R. KREMER, D. D.

The first age in the history of the REFORMED QUARTERLY REVIEW, or *Mercersburg Review*, as it was then known, extended over a period of four years. It was what may be very properly called the classic period, from the year 1849 to the end of 1852. It was the golden age of theological investigation in this country. Its fountain was within the semi-circle of mountains, in Mercersburg, whence flowed living streams in all directions, the ocean itself being no sufficient barrier to their onward flow, even into the Old World and cradle of modern civilization and learning.

The organ through which the voice from Mercersburg spoke to the world was the REVIEW; the chief spokesman and master was Dr. John W. Nevin. His connection with it was not merely as one of an able corps of contributors, or even as editor, but as the very soul of its existence. It was chiefly the instrument by which he spoke to the Christian and general public, and was created for that special purpose. There could be as possible a play of Hamlet without Hamlet as the old *Mercersburg Review* without Dr. Nevin.

There were good reasons why such a learned periodical should be started, and sent on its mission. First, because the Reformed Church, so historic and catholic, and so broadly Protestant, could not be fairly and clearly represented before the Christian public in any other way. Second, the REVIEW was necessary as the organ in which a distinctive theology taught at Mercersburg might be published for the instruction and edification of teachers and thinkers in the Reformed Church, and as a declaration of theological faith before all Christendom and the world. And,

third, it was necessary as a corrector of the reigning theology of the time, which had become stiff with post-reformation traditions and theories that had come to be accepted without investigation as the only pure gospel. The idea of theological advancement beyond the lines of accepted orthodox thinking was scarcely conceived of as possible by the evangelical Church. Romish tradition could not be tolerated for a moment, but Protestant traditions were regarded as all right and sound. The great variety of Protestant beliefs never seemed to suggest the thought that Protestant tradition might not be infallible. Orthodox Protestantism, with all its many divisions, was united on certain forms of religious thought, and especially in opposition to Romanism, in which it could see only a monster of iniquity and the very man of sin. Evangelical Protestantism, so-called, claimed to be the only apostolic form of Christianity. That pleasant conceit was doomed to perish when the *Mercersburg Review* appeared. Protestantism in America was suddenly aroused from its delectable slumbers. Some of its pretensions were unexpectedly shown to be based on loose sand.

But Dr. Nevin was not unknown to the theological and learned world until suddenly his star appeared in 1849. His remarkable early career, both at Princeton and Allegheny, and especially during nine years at Mercersburg, made him a prominent figure among the great men of the age. Within this latter period he laid a broad and deep foundation for the great theological structure that rose into view. His great work, "The Mystical Presence," was alone sufficient to sustain the fabric and make the author famous. If his "Biblical Antiquities," written between the age of 23 and 25, during his incumbency as teacher of the Hebrew language and literature, at Princeton, made him extensively known as a young man of extraordinary ability, the "Mystical Presence," a work of riper thought, brought him to the front as a theologian with scarcely a rival. So when the REVIEW made its appearance the learned public did not need to wait and see what it would amount to. Minerva-like it sprang into existence full-fledged, fully equipped, and armed for any contest.



As already noted, the current beliefs of the time, with all their many differences, which were often magnified far beyond the limits of their importance, had a harmonious common ground in the prevailing idea of religion and the Christian salvation. The anxious bench system, with all its crudities and wildness, differed but little in principle from the more decent and orderly revivalism of the period. The underlying spirit and doctrine was nearly or altogether the same in both. The sharp points of Calvinism, including its sacramental system, however vigorously maintained on occasions, cut no figure at all when souls were to be converted. Conversion was "fleeing the wrath to come," and salvation was escape from perdition. Religion was a means to an end, and not an end in itself. Religion was the best policy for men, even if it subjected them to painful inconvenience in this world. Atheism, if maintained along with outward morality, while it was regarded as extremely dangerous, and very bad in view of the awful consequences, was not regarded as equally bad in itself and for the present life. "It may do well enough to live by, but not to die by," was an assertion often made by public teachers of religion, and was a common proverb with the people generally. God was regarded chiefly as a just and exacting Ruler; and salvation through Christ a legal arrangement for the transfer of penalty from the sinner to an accepted Substitute. The everlasting benefit derived from the divine plan or scheme was secured by an energetic soul struggle, continued until the great change would be felt, and the soul's awful danger passed. Baptism was made as little of as possible, and scarcely mentioned except when the question of its mode of administration was raised. Persons were baptized with a mere drop of water, and scarcely even that, the minister touching the water with the tips of two fingers, and then with the slightly moistened finger tips gently touching the subject's forehead. The Lord's Supper fared little better. It was held to be a memorial only, or a sign of what can exist as well without it. The grand old historic Reformed Church, after feeding quite too long in such strange pastures, put into its modern ritual (such as it was) the words: "An

absent friend is soon forgotten," as showing the one great use of such a memorial service. And so on to the end.

The religious literature of the time corresponded, of course, with the ideas that prevailed in the Churches. Sunday-school and other popular religious books inculcated chiefly the religion of fear and prudence. The leading thought was the great importance of fleeing the wrath of an angry God. However diverse the denominational confessions on some points, there was general consent as to that. So accordingly, the central idea in theology was God, the invisible Divine Essence, the Creator and Law-giver, a terrible God, holding men strictly to rules and regulations, and setting before men the choice of accepting or rejecting certain hard conditions of escape from the destruction to which the human race was doomed. Of course Christ was believed to be a necessity in the work of salvation, but chiefly as an instrument in a divine plan, and not as the source and power of salvation in Himself. Christian theology, as conceived, did not center in Christ. His very existence was viewed as accidental, made possible only by the fall of man. He was made to take man's law place, in such way that by suffering in man's stead—under a purely *quid pro quo* agreement—there would be a legal ground for the possibility of the sinner's acquittal, the justice of God satisfied, His government sustained, and His honor upheld. The current literature made religion appear gloomy and forbidding, and slavish rather than free. The hymn books were of like character. Many of the hymns were merely exhortations in verse to impenitent sinners to flee from the city of destruction. The shortness of life and certainty of death, sooner or later; the danger of neglecting gracious opportunities; descriptions of subjective religious states and such like, constituted the substance of the most popular hymns.

The Church as the body of Christ, and "pillar and ground of the truth," had scarcely any place in the popular religious mind. Consequently, there was poor apprehension of the meaning of the sacraments, of the œcumenical creeds and their use in worship, of the true relation of the Holy Scriptures to Christianity and



the Church, and of Christian cultus. Church history was little thought of as having anything specially to do with Christian theology. There was no proper conception of the Church as Catholic, and even the word in the creed was an offense to many. In fact, there was a widespread defection from the ancient faith and ideas as developed from the apostolic teachings, without a corresponding real advance in theological thinking. There was a settling down on a modern theory of religion and the Church, which professed to be apostolic and Scriptural, but when properly measured and gauged was found to be neither truly modern nor truly ancient.

What has been now briefly described as the religious sentiment of half a century ago may be termed, more or less properly, Puritanism—having its proper home in New England, but spreading out in all directions it became the *ipse dixit* of American Protestantism in general. It ruled largely in the Presbyterian, Reformed and Lutheran Churches, and, of course, in the Congregational and Methodist. It was legalistic, casuistic, exacting and narrow. It made salvation depend on a definite, clean-cut and soul-racking experience called conversion ; and it seemed to make far more account of that one experience than of the succeeding Christian life, except only that it must accord with certain pious formulæ. The work of converting the soul was the one great matter ; a work which required the skill of masters, either ministers or laymen, who knew how to discern spirits and conduct anxious souls through the labyrinths of the required process up to the goal, called indiscriminately regeneration and conversion. The work being done, the soul was put into a straight jacket and let go. Whatever questionable antics it might indulge in thereafter must be within those bars of restraint—irregularities not in strict harmony with Christ's sermon on the mount, yet tacitly allowed, if only not expressed after the manner of the unregenerate world. So a man's fitness for heaven was judged of rather by his successful passing through the ordeal at the time of his conversion than by growth in Christian virtue.

All that meant that the Church of history was not the Church

of the period. There was no true development, on main lines, from original seed-thought to a clearer apprehension of divine truth, but a departure, on errant lines, from the true principles of the gospel. Scripture texts, torn from their connection, were made to do service in the interest of traditional belief. So, too, when the conversion of sinners was not on hand, and Theological discussions were indulged in, the various positions were established by convenient texts. They served the double purpose of uniting all parties on the prevailing theory of religion, as already noted, and of keeping up the denominational divisions. The unhistorical character of the prevailing Protestantism was manifest at all points. This was especially manifest in the ruling sentiment on ritual and cultus. A liturgy was simply a hand-book for the minister, containing forms and directions for his guidance in the conduct of sacramental and special functions, or a mere directory how to proceed without the use of a book. Using a prescribed form of prayer was generally considered as no praying at all, unless it was the Lord's Prayer, and in many churches even that was never uttered. Once in a long while the Creed would be said by the minister, but there was no room made for it in common worship. The word *Catholic* in it grated on the ears of men and women; and well does the writer remember how his good pastor tried to save the feelings of his congregation by making it: "We believe in one holy universal Church." Then it was the small boy's turn to be offended, for he believed *Universalists* to be the most badly doomed people on earth, and the word sounded too much in their favor. That same minister afterwards—after the great awakening of '49-'52—became a leader in the liturgical movement.

It was therefore no marvel at all that the new ideas sprung upon the Christian public so unexpectedly, raised a mighty commotion among people who imagined that the last word had long before been said on all the essentials of religion, and that it was only necessary to keep on repeating to present and coming generations the traditions of what was supposed to be the only genuine Protestantism. The self-complacency of the reigning



religious sentiment was suddenly disturbed by the voice from Mercersburg. The little town rose Phoenix like from its own obscurity. Gettysburg became known to the world at large by one of the greatest battles of history (by which we mean no disrespect toward its noble institutions of learning); Johnstown became famous through one of the most awful catastrophes of modern times; but Mercersburg rose into prominence through the operations of a master mind diving into the deep places of divine truth and bringing forth things new and old. The long traditional sleep of modern Protestantism was broken; and, *nolens volens*, it was face to face with sharp criticism of its lofty claims.

The great question in the mind of Dr. Nevin was that concerning the Church. He had seen with alarm the growing tendency to individualism, and the corresponding dying out of a true Church consciousness. The Church had come to be scarcely more than an abstraction in the general mind (except with mere formalists, who of course were in still greater error), and as visible, regarded mainly as a convenience for the individual soul, an advantageous contrivance, by means of which heaven could on the whole be reached more easily perhaps than otherwise. The Church as an object of faith had scarcely an existence in the average mind, for which the article in the Creed had but a vague meaning. The Creed as a whole fared no better, except that as a simple declaration of Christian truth the articles were believed; but the Creed as such, in its structural character, as presenting the organic all and system of Christianity in symbolic form, was a stranger to the great mass of Christian people. One of the leading Christian journals of the time mentioned the Apostles' Creed, among other things, as containing a number of important doctrines, not recognizing its central position and relation to the whole body of Christian truth, or as containing in the only possible divine order the essentials of a Christian man's belief. Therefore, the article concerning the Church was not regarded as of equal importance with some of the others. It was not felt at all that the Creed would have suffered materi

ally, much less that it would have been utterly destroyed, if that article were expunged. Thus the citadel was in danger—the foundations were being sapped, or at least the sappers, though unconsciously, were at work. And just here lay the chief cause of the general defection from apostolic catholic truth. When the rudder is broken or lost, the ship is exposed to the rocks and whirlpools of the deep.

Such in brief was the state of religion when the REVIEW was started. The first volume is a study, one that will rank long in the future with the ablest and most useful studies in sacred science. The questions discussed were such as demanded the most earnest attention, living questions, proved to be so when set in the light of Dr. Nevin's powerful presentation. False Protestantism was laid bare and shown up in all its glaring inconsistencies. The self-satisfied Puritanism, which had assumed religious leadership in America, and regarded with sublime pity whatever professed to be Christian beyond and contrary to itself, was called to account, dissected and exposed to view, in which it appeared as a departure from the ancient faith—not a true historical development, of which it had little or no conception—and out of line with the evangelical Protestantism of the 16th century, the true spirit of which it utterly failed to comprehend. Of course it seemed rather bold for a hitherto unknown village to make such demonstration against the "Hub of the Universe," but there was no law, human or divine, that did not permit truth to assert itself under any and all circumstances and conditions. The great array of Puritanism was first piously shocked, then put to the sword, and finally driven from the field; and to-day's generation of Puritanism, perhaps without being aware of it, uses Dr. Nevin's own vocabulary and the very phrases that once shocked its theological nerves.

Three articles on the Apostles' Creed appeared in this first volume, of the year 1849. These three, taken together as one, may well be regarded as a classic on that subject. It was absolutely necessary, in laying the foundation for future operations, to present the fundamental Creed in its true character, and place



it where it belongs as the corner-stone of any true system of theology. That was the place it held in the Heidelberg catechism; rather, it was the heart, from which flowed the life current through the arteries and veins of that truly Catholic Reformed symbol. Dr. Nevin's treatment of the Creed was exhaustive and profound. It met a hearty response in the Reformed and some other historical denominations. It awakened a long slumbering Christian community to a true sense of the great verities on which Christianity rested. From the truth concerning the Creed it was but a step to the central Christological principle—that Christ is Himself the source of Christianity, its first cause and contents, and not merely the instrument by which the Christian system is set up and propagated. In the same volume of the *REVIEW*, Dr. Nevin wrote on “Puritanism and the Creed,” showing most clearly that the New England idea of Christianity was far away from the faith of the early Church and the Protestantism of the 16th century. The argument on this one subject was alone sufficient to show a great falling away from some of the most vital principles of the Gospel, and how far the general religious thinking and theology had gone into a mummified state, and as if in strange ceremonies in a strange land.

It had become the fashion with both friends and detractors of Zwingli to proclaim him a radical, an iconoclast, and independent. He was regarded by many as the great anti-Churchman, and as having cut loose from the whole system of ecclesiasticism of all the ages after the first Christian century. He was called the man of the Bible (a true indictment, no doubt), rejecting even the Catholic traditions of the early fathers, or at least considering them of no special importance. For all which Puritanism was loud in his praises. But Dr. Nevin made it as plain as daylight, that Puritanism was unable to see through the mists of three centuries and arrive at a correct conclusion from the purblind investigation it could make. He proved that Zwingli was no radical, unless his work of tearing up by the roots the abominable errors of Romanism would entitle him to such designation. That he did, but at the same time conserved every particle that was

good in the existing Church. His theology, immature as it was, was of the Churchly type, and bore no resemblance to the distinctive peculiarities of modern Puritanism. So the Reformed and Lutheran Churches in the age of the Reformation had nothing of the spirit of sect and schism, nothing of Pharisaic separatism or pietistic pretension. Zwingli did not disown his relation and indebtedness to the historical Church, but, though opposed by it, he rejoiced in the relation he sustained to it; and what was said of one of the ancient line of Teucer, expelled from his country, could be said of the great reformer: *Seque ortum antiqua Teucrorum a stirpe volebat*, the application being complete by substituting, without regard to metre, *patrum* for *Teucrorum*. So a host of other popular errors were corrected by Dr. Nevin in his arraignment of modern Protestantism, much of which he proved to be far different from the early Protestant faith, and no true development of the doctrines of the evangelical Church.

Three other subjects treated in the first volume of the REVIEW deserve special attention—two articles on the “Sect System,” one on “Historical Development” and one on the “Liturgical Movement.” All these are closely related, and Dr. Nevin’s treatment of them bore with vigor against some of the current religious views of the time. The sect system was shown to be anti-Christian in spirit, principle and practice, and condemned by the Word of God. It was a denial of the doctrine of the Church as one, holy and Catholic. It had no true sense of Catholicity, or of the real nature of the Church as Christ’s mystical body. If allowed full sway, without hindrance of any kind, there would come an end of the Church as founded by Christ; infidelity would eventually take the place of faith, and all the vices in the catalogue would in time reign and riot; for sectism is in its very nature vicious, and with all its Godly pretensions it seeks only the opportunity to show its true character.

On “Historical Development,” Dr. Nevin presented what was to the American Church a new idea. Here his trenchant pen cut deep into the philosophy of religion; and again murmurs of dissent arose from all directions, while many who were not hope-



lessly bound by the fetters of a narrow traditional theology, accepted the theory as both rational and Scriptural, and as the only principle on which the Reformation could be justified. It was the article of a standing or falling Protestantism; and the principle having been shown to exist and to be correct, Protestantism stands and will stand so long as the principle is allowed to rule. Thus the Reformation was shown to be the normal evolution of the previous ages of the Church, and the fruit projected by her spiritual forces which, in spite of ecclesiastical corruption, being more powerful than their bad environments — irresistible in fact — broke through all barriers, taking on new form, in which, indeed, there was assertion of independence, but it was the independence which freed from the tyranny of Rome, and not from the blessed rule of Christ. And the principle of historical development, according to Dr. Nevin, applies not only to the mighty movement of the Reformation, but to the Church and man always; succeeding ages, or even the swiftly revolving years, showing new developments in science and religion, as the roll unfolds, as increased light pours in, according to Christ's word: "Ye shall know the truth," and "He (the Spirit) shall guide you into all the truth." On this subject, as on all others, Dr. Nevin's arguments were unanswerable.

The article on "The Liturgical Movement" was the result of much earnest thought. A movement had begun in the Reformed Church toward the securing of a better form and order of worship than what was then in use. The Reformed Church was rich enough in liturgies, but the American branch had very much lost sight of them. Public worship was conducted on the modern Puritanical free method, except on sacramental and special occasions, and even then the liturgy was very sparingly used. The Mayer liturgy, in partial use for a decade, more or less, was invisible to the laity, and was intended only for the minister. Even as such hand-book it failed to give satisfaction, and a pretty general desire arose on the part of the ministry and intelligent laity for something better. Dr. Nevin's study of the Church question in all its variety of bearings made him the

natural spokesman on this subject. Accordingly, in the latter part of the first volume of the REVIEW, appeared his first elaborate argument on Christian cultus, under the title of "The Liturgical Movement." This may be said to be the real beginning of a discussion in the Reformed Church, which forms one of the most important chapters in all ecclesiastical history. The grand result was marvellous. New life was infused into the Church; the people, as never before, were interested and instructed in what they had supposed was entirely beyond their reach and sphere. The liturgical movement awakened the Church from center to periphery; and even the disturbance caused by difference of opinion was by no means deplorable, as the final result abundantly proved. The controversy was educational in a high degree, and in the end the whole Church was greatly benefited. Through it all was Dr. Nevin's master mind leading and instructing, laying down the principles that should rule in the construction of so important a work as a book of common prayer, an order of worship for ministers and people.

Other articles by Dr. Nevin, in the year '49, are of great importance, but want of space will not permit even a reference to them. His articles in the second volume are on various subjects, all in line with the sentiments of those which preceded them. The two articles on *Brownson's Quarterly Review* have been regarded as among the most masterly and powerful arguments against Romanism ever written or spoken. That on "Bible Christianity" should be read by all theological students and ministers who earnestly desire to know what Christianity is according to the Book which is the soul's heavenly lamp and light. The one on "Doctrine of the Reformed Church on the Lord's Supper," will repay careful study to any who have never read it, and even to such as were once familiar with it. Of the eleven articles in this volume, written by Dr. Nevin, these four are mentioned as perhaps the most important.

Of the third volume, 334 pages were written by Dr. Nevin. The one on "Catholicism" treats of a subject that needs to be studied to-day as a no less living topic than it was even forty-six years



ago. Not a great many were able at the time to grasp the prophetic thought of that mighty monograph. It would be better understood now as we are nearing the end of the century—in this boiling caldron of thought and mental activity—when mind coruscates and flashes like lightning, and is keen as a Damascus blade. Passing over nearly a dozen of other very important articles, we mention the two master-pieces on “Early Christianity.” The old readers of the REVIEW need not be told of them, but this cannot be said of many of the present generation. Those remarkable productions, and another on the same subject in the fourth volume, would make fresh and instructive reading for the men of to-day.

When they first appeared they caused a veritable panic, and no wonder at all, considering the state of the American Protestant mind at the time. It is not pleasant to be aroused from delicious dreams; for that was what was done in this case. The notion that the early Church was about the same as the Congregational of New England and its copyists farther westward was deeply rooted; and to be told that it was all a dream or a myth was too much for the most Job-like patience to endure. Or, that another wing of Protestantism, the opposite of Puritanism, should be denied special relationship with the Church of the holy martyrs, it was enough to make other hairs stand on end. Those were wonderful contributions to a phase of Church history little known, but on which Dr. Nevin turned the light, to the chagrin of all whose wish was father to a pleasing thought, but to the satisfaction of those who preferred facts to dreams and truth to fiction. This is a fast and brilliant age, and history soon becomes hoary, but Dr. Nevin’s three productions on “Early Christianity” will be fresh long after the century shall have closed. We venture the assertion that any man’s theology is rather imperfect, if he has not studied them.

We come now to the last year of the classic period in the history of our REVIEW. The articles on “Early Christianity” were followed by one on the Heidelberg Catechism. In the former, Dr. Nevin seemed to yield too much to Romanism; so

it seemed to many at the time, though at the present day any Protestant could say the same things without creating a ripple of excitement or objection. But writing about the Heidelberg Catechism, almost the first thing after publishing those apparently un-Protestant polemics, was confusion to some and satisfaction to others. Dr. Nevin was peculiarly at home when discoursing on the Heidelberg Catechism; and his exalted opinion of it was full proof of his faithfulness to the true principles of Protestantism.

Now came the last act in the four years' series of surprises. The American Church was not in a frame of mind to endure it well. It was so directly in conflict with preconceived notions. Dr. Nevin had already touched unsparingly on the high Church pretensions of the other wing of American Protestantism, to which criticism Puritanism would of course not object. But now there seemed to be a sudden summersault and a wholesale landing in prelatic episcopacy. His discussion of what he called "The Anglican Crisis," in third volume, and still more, his treatment of "Catholicism," if properly studied, would have prepared the mind for the four articles on "Cyprian." These last, in his exhaustive argument on the Church question, gave more offense perhaps than anything else in his writings. His views sounded decidedly Romish to delicate Protestant ears. Not only the prelatic system, as such, but the Roman system, seemed to be defended by the Mercersburg theologian. But he did really nothing of the kind. He was engaged in historical research, and he gave to his readers just what he found, and he found what was contrary to Protestant expectation. He was not responsible for the facts which he brought to light; he did not make the history. A narrow sectarian would have colored and doctored the facts (if it may be supposed that such one were capable of getting at them) to suit prevailing notions; but Dr. Nevin, as a faithful historian, told the truth without regard to consequences. He did say that the Church and Christian doctrine and cultus in the age of Cyprian were not in full accord with Protestantism in any of its forms, and were more akin to Romanism. But what of that? According to Dr. Nevin's idea of "historical development," Protestantism



is or ought to be a better and purer form of Christianity. The Christianity of the early Church was not a procrustean bed in which the Church was doomed to lie forever; but rather, it was what it had to be in that primitive age, true Christianity, but of a type corresponding to the time and the degree of mental and religious culture. If the Romanism of to-day, when viewed in the light of Cyprian and his times appears to greater advantage than it does without such comparison, Protestantism does not need to grow red in the face nor tremble for the Ark; for it should be far in advance of the Church of the first centuries, and in advance of the Church that claims to be unalterably the same in all time and irreformable. Dr. Nevin should be held in ceaseless remembrance for bringing out into the light the facts and truths of that early age of the Church, and for presenting the profound philosophy of that history and the grand idea of historical development as the true principle underlying evangelical Protestantism.

The object in presenting this imperfect sketch is not so much to instruct as to direct attention to what is here entitled *the classic period of this REVIEW*. The greater part of our Reformed ministers have been born since that period, and it is quite certain that a large number of them never read a line of those writings of Dr. Nevin which are referred to in this article. If our young ministers and those coming on would sit at the feet of one of the most godly and learned doctors of all time, they have the privilege; for it is true of him that "though dead he yet speaketh." They will find, if they read those wonderful productions, that they have come under the power of a mind that will aid them immensely in the search after truth. They will also find what they might not expect, that Dr. Nevin's writings are as lucid as they are profound. He cannot well be misunderstood by any one at all in sympathy with the man and his teachings.

Dr. Nevin wrote a great deal more for the REVIEW after those four years, all which should be read by our young clergy. Of his own contributions there are nearly three thousand pages in all, enough to make a half dozen large volumes of Christian literature, the value of which is beyond estimate.

It is in place to inquire here whether this REVIEW has any special call *now*, as it had when first started, to combat false ideas and tendencies, as well as to hold forth, as in the past, a positive Christological Theology, in the spirit of its sacred motto, "The truth shall make you free." It cannot be believed by the faithful and observant watchmen in Christ's Church that Satan has been idle during these latter decades. On the contrary, proof is abundant of his activity on various lines. If he is not deceiving the very elect, he is surely trying to do it. The hard-shell Puritanism of the past has given way to a more Scriptural and rational conception of Christianity, and there has been steady advance in every department of Theological science ; but error in other directions has also been marching on and inviting men to follow. Its siren song captivates, and allures more souls to itself than the stern religion of half a century ago could force into submission. False views of Christianity and the Church prevail to an alarming extent, especially in certain quarters, the result being worldliness, frivolity and looseness in faith and practice—even in the very house of God. Puritanism with all its inquisitorial terrors had at least the merit of awful earnestness. If its preaching drove rather than attracted souls to Christ, it did at least not create hilarity and call forth applause as in a theatre or at a political gathering. The Puritanic idea of religion was too one-sided and narrow, and too strictly casuistic and severe ; but it has never been charged with buffoonery and levity. There has been a shifting around to what is worse a thousand times than the most objectionable features of New England Christianity. There is a tendency more or less pronounced to looseness in religious belief, the practical evil effects of which are evident. There are highly respectable Christian denominations that of late years do not seem to be shocked by the antics played in many of their churches ; where there is no sign of a pulpit, only a platform for the orator ; where there seems to be little concern about any particular kind of doctrine ; where most of the crowd go to be amused ; where laughter is provoked by the sallies of wit and vulgar slang indulged in by the preacher ; where prayer itself is part of the



vain display ; where the singing is performed by a paid quartet of worldlings ; where the priestly character of the ministry is either never thought of or is sneered at ; the kingly reduced to the personal power and magnetism of the preacher ; and the prophetic, what there is of it, holding in the display of worldly wisdom exhibited by the hireling on the stage.

On the other hand, there is in the religious movements of the day, with an appearance of genuine earnestness, great effort to effect grand religious results by all sorts of machinery of human invention. The old apostolic methods, if not discarded entirely, are at least in danger of being superseded, or decently buried by the modern devices. Catechization—that right arm of the Church—is in danger of becoming one of the lost arts. Agencies of recent origin, with noisy demonstration are seeking to drown its voice. The Sunday-school, so excellent under proper management, is becoming more and more restive under Church authority, seeks to have its own way, and in many cases assumes an independent attitude toward the only institution that has the seal of Christ's appointment. Where is the army of writers on Church catechization, and the solid results accomplished through it by those who still practice it as the one thing needful in congregational work ? The belief is wide-spread that the children of the Church and of the world receive the best of Christian instruction under the numerous methods now in use ; whereas, as a matter of fact the most important truths are not taught. To the mass of the present generation of youth the fundamentals of Christian doctrine are unknown. It is vainly supposed that skipping through the Bible is the grand modern discovery how to promote Christian knowledge, when on the contrary the catechism (if it is of the right kind) is the key and guide to the divine oracles—not the irresponsible and miscellaneous Bible drill in common practice to-day. The Church, as “the pillar and ground of the truth,” is getting farther and farther away from the public mind, for which as such it has scarcely any meaning.

There is, therefore, as much need at the present time for our clergy and intelligent laity to study the Church question as at

any time in the past ; and if there is anything better to be carefully studied and restudied than what is contained in the first four volumes of the *Mercersburg Review*, the writer of this article is not aware of it. And it is equally true that the other questions (with new ones added), with which our Gamaliel and his co-workers grappled, need attention no less now than in their time ; and that the Church of the present, the times and the tendencies, new errors, new truths and new conditions—all—demand the continuance of the REVIEW in the interest of a consistent, positive and progressive theology. This publication, with its new and comprehensive title, has scarcely a less important work before it than had the old *Mercersburg Review* in the heroic period of its existence.



## VII.

### THE MATERIAL BASIS OF INHERITANCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.—(First Part.)

BY RICHARD C. SCHIEDT.

One of the greatest discoveries of modern times is the generalization that all animals, however complex their structure, arise by the division and sub-division of a single, nucleated cell. The cell doctrine at first based upon a comparative study of adult tissues appears in a new and vastly more interesting light, when viewed from the standpoint of the embryological history of these tissues, for it leads to the establishment of more complete theories of reproduction and inheritance. It has, first of all, been proved that egg and spermatozoön are simple cells separating from the organism for the purpose of reproduction, and that the organisms themselves are but the regularly arranged combinations of numberless cells adapted for different purposes, and produced by repeated division or cleavage of the fertilized egg cell. Secondly, it is now generally accepted that the cell is in itself extremely complicated, *i. e.*, an independent elementary organism. Finally, a more profound knowledge of the details of the processes of fertilization has been obtained, including the structure of the nucleus and its cleavage phenomena, the discovery of the fusion of germ- and sperm-nucleus, the æquivalence of the male and female nuclear substances and their distribution among the resulting daughter cells, and especially a deeper insight into the complicated phenomena of germ- and sperm-maturation which cause the reduction of the original nuclear substance.

As a matter of course, a proper conception of the cell goes hand in hand with a proper understanding of the *nature of protoplasm*. For, while Schleiden and Schwann, frequently called the founders of the modern cell-theory, recognized the true rela-

tion of the cell to the various kinds of tissue, they saw in it merely an organic crystal, of which the membrane or cell-wall constitutes the most important part. It was only after years of the most painstaking research by such men as Nägeli, Alexander Braun, Leydig, Kölliker, Cohn, De Bary, etc., that opinions gradually changed, until Max Schultze, in 1860, proved that the membrane was secondary, and very often wanting in cells which then appeared as naked protoplasm, granular in constitution and capable of motion. He, therefore, defined a cell as a lump of protoplasm endowed with properties of life. The physiologist Brücke concluded from the complexity of these properties, that the lump of protoplasm must consist of a complex structure of the very highest order, and termed it an *elementary organism*. Since then a still deeper insight into the structure and properties of protoplasm, especially the study of the nucleus has led to an enlargement of the above definition into the following: "The cell is a lump of protoplasm containing a special differentiated part, the nucleus." A proper study of this elementary organism should, therefore, deal first with protoplasm as such, and, secondly, with the nucleus. The separate treatment of these two parts becomes an absolute necessity when dealing with the cell as the ultimate basis of inheritance, as will be seen later on.

Protoplasm is a *morphological concept*, signifying a substance which exhibits a number of *physical, chemical and biological properties*. It is somewhat viscous by nature, highly refractory and contains minute granules the microsomes, embedded in an homogeneous fundamental substance, the so-called hyaloplasm. It consists of numerous chemical substances arranged into a wonderfully complicated structure, which, however, cannot be changed into another chemical aggregate without at once ceasing to be protoplasm, for its essential properties are dependent upon a definite organization, as yet but little understood. Just as the chief qualities of a statue, expressed by the form which the sculptor's hand has given to the marble, cease to exist as soon as the work of art is broken into pieces, so also is the protoplasmic body no longer protoplasm as soon as its organization is de-



troyed. Chemistry may some day be able to manufacture albumen by synthesis, but to manufacture a protoplasmic body would be as futile an undertaking as the attempt of Wagner's to manufacture an homunculus in the vial. For according to all our experience, protoplasmic bodies can only arise through the reproduction of preëxisting protoplasm; its present organization is therefore the product of a development from times immemorial. It is rather difficult to determine chemically the substances peculiar to living protoplasm on account of the results of metabolic changes present at all times. The real bearers of the vital processes are the protein substances, the most complicated organic bodies, expressed by the formula  $C_{72} H_{106} N_{18} O_{22}$ , among which *plastin* is preëminent. Protoplasm is very rich in water which is just as necessary to its molecular structure as it is to that of a great many crystals which crumble into powder when the water is withdrawn. There are likewise held in solution a number of salts representing chiefly the elements chlorine, sulphur, phosphorus, potassium, sodium, magnesium, calcium and iron, the alkalies of which being so peculiarly combined with the protein as to make the whole alkaline in its reactions. As a result of metabolic changes, progressive as well as regressive, the presence of various other organic compounds has been established, viz., pepsin, myosin, sarkin, glycogen, sugar, lecithin, fats and various acids. Modern research has even attempted to penetrate the structure of the very minutest particles which play an important rôle in reproductive processes, and at least four different theories of note have been advanced, which all agree at least in the one fact that protoplasm may have a very complicated structure, even though it appears optically homogeneous. For since in every organism the vital process undergoes its own peculiar development, for which, however, protoplasm is the chief seat, we must naturally conclude that the differences of the organisms must be dependent upon differences of the material basis, *i. e.*, of the protoplasm. We must, therefore, presuppose the existence of variations in the material compositions—the protoplasm of various organisms. We naturally ask

the question: how does an egg which is a single nucleated cell and which gives rise to one animal, differ from another which gives rise to an entirely different organism. Take an egg of a starfish and that of a jelly-fish. Raise them under exactly the same conditions. Both will undergo division and subdivision, but the process will end in the production of two entirely different organisms. The difference in result cannot, therefore, be attributed to difference of conditions under which they develop, but to something inherent in the ova themselves. In other words the egg-cell of a jelly-fish must have had from the beginning the potentiality of becoming a jelly-fish and nothing else; and similarly the starfish ovum must have been a potential starfish from the beginning. To imagine, therefore, that all protoplasm is identical, because no difference is recognizable by any means at our disposal, must be an error. Deep within the two particles of protoplasm which give rise to two different organisms there must be a corresponding difference which lies at the bottom of all differences. In short, the eggs of two different animals must be supposed to differ in their elementary constitution, as much as their adult organisms differ in anatomical structure. "From general scientific principles," says Professor Sachs, "we must assume that for each visible external difference of organ there is a corresponding difference in its material substance, exactly as we regard the form of a crystal as an expression of the material properties of the crystallizing substance." And again, says the distinguished German botanist, "even the different shapes of the two sexual cells, of an antherozoöid or a pollen grain compared with the oösphere—indicate plainly, that both are constituted differently as to material, since the external form as well as the internal structure of any body is the necessary expression of its material constitution. Difference of form always indicates difference of material substance." This doctrine of "form and matter" or of "mechanism and function" as expressed in the language of physiology, is the basis of our biological inquiries. As is clearly expressed in the words of Professor Burdon Sanderson, we must assume that "every appreciable difference of struc-



ture corresponds to a difference of function ; and conversely, each endowment of a living organ must be explained, if explained at all, as springing from its structure ;" or in short, "living material acts by virtue of its structure, provided we allow the term structure to be used in a sense which carries it beyond the limits of anatomical investigations, *i. e.*, beyond the knowledge which can be attained either by the scalpel or the microscope." Given protoplasm of definite structure, and we have its definite function or property. Or conversely, we observe a certain property in a given mass of protoplasm and we regard it as springing from a definite structure.

Just as important as protoplasm in general is its specific differentiation the *nucleus*. It was first discovered in 1833 in plant-cells by Robert Brown, and became soon afterwards the chief point of discussion in the cell-doctrine of Schwann and Schleiden. During the last twenty years the nucleus has obtained a new significance, and now plays the most important rôle in the problem of inheritance. We may define it as a quantity of peculiar nuclear substances distinct and somewhat separate from protoplasm, assuming the most variable shapes both in the resting and in the active condition of cell-division. Generally speaking it may be said that a cell contains only one nucleus, conforming in size to the cell-body as such. Chemically from three to four distinguishable protein substances are present in its material composition, two are invariably found, viz.: *nuclein* or *chromatin*, and *paranuclein* or *pyrenin* ; these are mostly accompanied by *linin*, *nuclear sap* and *amphipyrenine*.

The most characteristic of all the protein substances is nuclein or chromatin distinguished by its property of absorbing staining media (*e. g.*, carmine, hæmatoxylin, aniline) from which the rest of the cell remains exempt ; it reacts with dye stuffs like a weakly alkaline substance, and is further acted upon by a great many different salt solutions and acids. Nuclein strongly refracts light and is easily recognized either in form of isolated granules or as a fine net-work or in form of threads. Miescher claims to have determined its formula as follows  $C_{29}H_{49}N_9P_3O_{22}$  ; he succeeded

in obtaining by the application of dilute acids or alkalies a decomposition of nuclein into albumen, nitrogenous bases and phosphoric acid. Paranuclein or pyrenin is likewise a protein substance, existing within the nucleus in the form of very minute globules called *nucleolus* or nuclear body; its true nature is as yet but little understood, differing very materially from nuclein in its relation to stains. But there is no doubt that both substances determine the physiological functions of the nucleus. Linin largely constitutes the substance of the nuclear net-work and strongly resembles the plastin of the cell-body, while the cell-sap or cell-lymph fills out the interstices between the structures of nuclein, linin and paranuclein. Amphipyrenin seems to constitute the substance of the nuclear membrane, which is easily recognized in the large nuclei or germinal vesicles of many eggs, *e. g.*, of Amphibia. All these substances appear like the constituents of protoplasm in different structural forms, viz.: in forms of fine granules, of threads, of larger bodies, of reticulated networks, etc., so that in the definition of a nucleus, the chief stress must be laid upon the particular substance active in it. Undoubtedly the simplest structure is exhibited by the nuclei of the mature spermatozoa, because they are comparatively free from additional material. Thus the spear-shaped head-end of the spermatozoa, provided with a long thread-like tail, consists purely of dense apparently homogeneous nuclein, while the middle piece reacts as pure paranuclein; the same is true of the nuclei of the large cell-shaped spermatozoa.

Reasoning from these simplest phenomena, we come to the conclusion that the different structures observed in vegetable as well as animal nuclei are due to the property of active nuclear substances to absorb and separate fluids together with a certain amount of dissolved material to such a degree, as to give the whole nucleus the appearance of a diminutive vesicle inclosed in protoplasm. Such a process of absorption is best observed immediately after fertilization when the sperm-nucleus begins its activity in the ovum; it, then, gradually increases to from ten to twenty times its original volume not by an increase of its active



substance but simply by the absorption of liquid, dissolved substances taken from the yolk; the nucleus appears vesicular, and the nuclein extends through it as a reticulated net-work of finer or coarser threads; besides one or two very minute globules of paranuclein are generally present. A similar process is repeated with every nuclear division during the reconstruction of the daughter cells, and in most cases the nuclear substance consists of linin and nuclein, arranged in such a way that the staining granules of nuclein are regularly attached to the linin. Not enough stress can be laid upon the importance of the chemical properties exhibited by the various structures of a cell, because these alone determine the character of the functions. Only a very short time ago a new structure has been discovered in the protoplasm of some cells; it is indeed extremely minute in size, but in function of great importance, this is the so-called *central body* or *centrosome*. It plays a very significant rôle in the process of cell division, as we shall see later on, forming that part of the cell around which all the rest is, as it were, grouped. In this connection the existence of the centrosome has been known to biologists for some time already. Materially it resembles the middle piece of the spermatozoön, to which it sustains certain genetical relations during reproductive processes. Aside from these processes it has most frequently been found in lymph cells, pigment cells and in epithelial, entothelial and connective tissue cells of certain larvæ. In lymph cells it occurs mostly singly, being recognized by the radiating structure of the surrounding protoplasm, called the sphere of attraction; in other cells two centrosomes have been observed without definite spheres of attraction, which makes the character of the centrosome as a constant organ of all cell structure somewhat doubtful.

Thus far we have endeavored to set forth, in a general way, the structure of the material basis of organic existence, maintaining that all the mysteries of life, dominant in plants and animals, are already potentially included in the simple cell. Just as the entire composite organism, so has every single cell a life of its own. Therefore, in order to penetrate still deeper into the nature

of protoplasm and nucleus, it will be necessary to become acquainted with their vital functions. But the life even of the very simplest elementary organism is an extremely composite process difficult for definition; it manifests itself, generally speaking, in constant changes of the cell produced by its own organization under the influence of the external world, in the development of forces which constantly destroy its organic substances only to build them up anew, and upon the constant interaction of organic destruction and organic construction rests, as Claude Bernard says, the whole process of life. All these numerous complicated functions may be best represented by four different groups of phenomena or fundamental functions; an organism is able to change its form and to move about; it reacts toward certain stimuli of the external world, thus manifesting itself as sensitive; it takes in food, assimilating, changing and excreting parts of it, which form substances, serving purposes of growth, formation of tissues and specific vital activities; finally, an organism can increase by reproduction. For our purposes it will suffice to confine ourselves to the phenomena of *reproduction*, which particularly set forth the *methods of inheritance* or transmission.

The reproduction of the simplest animal form, *e. g.*, of the Protamœba, consists of the separation of a part of the protoplasmic body, which fastens itself somewhere and subsequently tears loose from the main body. In the genuine Amœba, the nucleus first divides into two parts, being followed by the division of the body. This process of division is the rule throughout the organic kingdom. The nucleus plays the rôle of a center of attraction, exercising a centralizing influence upon the molecular changes in the interior of the cell. Nutrition and growth undoubtedly lead to these remarkable processes. The reception of food into the cell is purely endermatic or endosmotic and takes place without the help of especially differentiated organs; sustaining a direct relation to the resorbing surface of the cell, its proportion to the whole contents is the same as that of the surface to the mass of the sphere. The subsequent growth of the cell



changes the original relation between surface and contents in such a way that the surface varies as the square of the diameter, the contents as the cube. The cell which has doubled itself, increased its resorbing surface four times and the contents eight times, so that its receptive ability decreases by one-half. Such a lowering of receptive power soon makes its influence felt upon the contents of the cell, whose life depends upon its complete penetration by food particles. It may be that the peripheral protoplasmic masses are still sufficiently fed, while the central part, including the nucleus no longer receives any sustenance, or it may be that too large an accumulation of protoplasmic masses overcomes the central sedal power of the nucleus, there suddenly arises a remarkable change in the interior of the cell. First of all the nuclear substance undergoes an alteration comparable to the expansion of a viscous mass. It expands lengthwise, assuming the form of a *spindle* which separates into a number of very fine parallel threads, the whole gradually becoming a broad band. The two ends of this band first assume the shape of buttons and the whole figure resembles *dumb-bells*; the equatorial contents of the original spindle then flow into these spherical ends in opposite directions, the protoplasm of the cell closing around each one in a radiating fashion, one-half accompanying each new nucleus, finally, a constriction takes place through the middle of the connecting bar of the dumb-bells, the two nuclei become spherical, the peripheral protoplasm contracts perpendicularly to the long axis of the original spindle and at last two new cells are formed. Thus the most primitive reproduction by cell-division is the result of growth by means of the endosmotic reception of food, or in other words, the actual growth of the cell beyond its individuality. We observe here the constant tendency towards complete saturation, a point which is never reached because growth constantly prevents the possibility of complete saturation by means of an enlargement of the contents in their proportion to the surface, and thus forces division. In comparing the two daughter cells with the mother we find no difference between the two stages; the single individual continues to exist as a double being. This process

of cell-division is known as *karyokinesis* or *mitosis* and the structure produced as the *karyokinetic figure*, derived partly from the nucleus and partly from the surrounding cell-protoplasm or *cytoplasm*; the spindle together with the radiating star-shaped cytoplasm or *aster* at either end is designated the *achromatic figure* or *amphiaster*, while the center of each aster is known as the *centrosome* or *centrosphere* (see above). The elements constituting the equator of the spindle are derived from the nucleus and are known as the *chromatic* portion, consisting of *chromosomes*.

There are other ways of reproduction but they may all be reduced to this fundamental form. The same processes have been observed in many-celled individuals, however, with this difference that, since growth takes place along one definite axis, the resulting elements stand in a different relation to the mother, *i. e.*, the child must undergo a process of completion which in a less degree is also necessary for the mother animal at least in the form of replacement. Budding, sprouting and the formation of spores are all processes of division into two very unlike parts. Most important of all forms of reproduction, however, is that by means of eggs and spermatozoa, frequently called sexual reproduction. However the apparently unexplainable contrast between the sexual reproduction of unicellular animals and that of multicellular animals, consists in the fact that among the latter only the reproductive cells, *i. e.*, spermatozoön and egg conjugate but not the animals themselves. *Eggs and spermatozoa are therefore equivalent to unicellular individuals*, which is further explained by the fact that ovae undergo amœboid motion while spermatozoa perform the function of spores or of flagellate protozoa, there are even cases in which the spermatozoa seem in form and function exactly like eggs. They are, however, genetically different, the ovum is a modified epithelial cell of the germ epithelium, the spermatozoön the result of a metamorphosis of so-called spermatoblasts. The most fundamental difference between the two lies in their functional activities. Frequently the female product possesses the ability of developing into a new animal



without conjugation or fertilization (parthenogenesis) which is impossible in case of the sperm cell. Parthenogenesis would therefore suggest the possibility of defining the egg as an individual of a second generation reproduced asexually. But if the egg possesses the character of a living individual then the equivalent spermatozoön must belong to the same category. Spermatozoa and ova constitute the asexually reproduced generation, the one derived from the male the other from the female; it might properly be called an intrageneration. These two individuals may become one by conjugation in the form of infusion; protoplasm unites with protoplasm, nucleus with nucleus. This process has of late attracted the attention of the most profound thinkers because it throws an immense amount of light upon the problem of heredity. The following data present the various phases of the highest reproductive phenomena largely based upon personal investigation with material from sea-urchins, thread-worms and from oysters, and corroborated by the work of men who first announced these great discoveries.

The multicellular body is the result of the repeated cleavage of the ovum, which, according to geometrical progression, divides into two, four, eight, and so-forth, cells known in their earlier stages as blastomeres, until a very large number of cells are produced which ultimately differentiate into the elements of the tissues, finally again producing egg-cells which are converted into ova (*i. e.*, egg cells with a larger or smaller quantity of yolk), and thus form the point of departure for the following generation. Every egg is therefore derived by a continuous and unbroken series of cell divisions from the egg of the preceding generation, and so on backward throughout all preceding generations; it is again destined to form the first term in a series of cell divisions extending indefinitely into the future. However, in the majority of cases the egg is incapable of division until it has been fertilized, *i. e.*, acted on by the element of the opposite sex the sperm-cell or spermatozoön. This latter has been described before as being extremely minute, and in most cases provided with a long vibratile tail or flagellum, which enables it to move rapidly about; it

is likewise derived from cells preëxisting in the body. *Inheritance is therefore effected in both sexes by means of cells, and the mechanism of hereditary transmission belongs to cell-structure.*

Fertilization is universally the result of the entrance of one spermatozoön into the ovum, so that each parent contributes only one germ cell to the formation of the embryo, thus transmitting all the hereditary characteristics by means of one single cell. It is therefore of supreme importance for our purpose to set forth the mechanical changes taking place during this process. Oscar Hertwig definitely proved for the first time in 1875, that sperm nucleus and egg-nucleus unite to form the cleavage nucleus or parent of all the nuclei of the embryo, which led to the final establishment of the fact that the nuclear substance (nuclein or chromatin) is the most essential element in the germ cell and must be regarded as the physical basis of inheritance. In all cases the sperm nucleus is at first very much smaller than the egg-nucleus (see above), but during fertilization this inequality disappears and the two nuclei are morphologically very much alike. Before or during their fusion each of them is transformed into a definite number of rod-shaped bodies or chromosomes which perfectly agree in form, size and number in the two sexes of a definite species, but vary in different species; there may be as few as one and as many as twenty and more in the highest animals.

These remarkable facts would lead to the conclusion that the *chromosomes* or chromatin bodies constitute in particular *the physical basis of inheritance*, or, since we have shown that their chemical nature is so marked, *inheritance seems closely connected with the transmission of a chemical compound from parent to offspring*. There is reason to believe that this equal distribution of chromatin continues at every succeeding cell-division. In the adult body, therefore, every nucleus of all the myriad cells of which it is composed contains chromatin derived from both the parents. Thus it is easily seen from a physical point of view, how closely paternal and maternal traits may be interwoven, and in the end constitute the character of the off-



spring. Before the germ cells finally unite, each one of them passes through a series of preparatory changes known as *maturat-ion* and especially affecting the nucleus. In the egg-cell they cause the formation of the so-called *polar bodies*, taking place either before or immediately after the entrance of the spermatozoa. The polar bodies are two minute cells budding forth from the egg, simply to perish and to disappear without influencing the embryo further. It is highly probable that their disappearance prepares the way for the union between egg-nucleus and sperm-nucleus, since it involves a reduction in the number of chromosomes to one-half the number characteristic of the ordinary tissue cells of the species. Something very similar takes place in the formation of the spermatozoa, viz., a reduction of the chromosomes to one-half the usual number in the course of the last two divisions of the mother-cell or spermatogonium before final maturation. The normal number is restored by the union of the two germ-cells in fertilization.

All the numerous qualities, characteristic of the developed organism, are continued potentially in the sexual products. They are transmitted from the producer to the product and may be termed the organic estate of the former (the *idioplasm* of Nägeli). Every reproductive act is therefore a metamorphosis of a substance provided with potential forces into a developed organism which possesses the same powers as the preceding. If we, therefore, call the adult organism a macrocosm, its hereditary substance ought to be a microcosm, composed of numerous, definitely arranged particles which, although possessing a power of their own, are the bearers of the inheritable qualities. Just as every plant and animal consists of myriads of cells, so is every cell again built up of very numerous, small, hypothetical elementary particles. *What now is the character of these elementary particles or idioblasts?*

A final answer cannot yet be given to this question, it must be in the nature of the case very general. The hypothetical idioblasts are the smallest particles, into which the idioplasma or inheritable substance can be divided, and which are present in

large numbers representing different qualities. They produce by virtue of their specific physical nature, either directly or by combined efforts, the innumerable morphological and physiological characteristics perceptible in the organic world. They may be compared with the various sounds which through regular succession and simultaneous combination produce endless harmonies. De Vries compares them with the molecules and atoms of physics and chemistry; Nägeli considers them the ultimate elements of the organs and functions of the body, but neither seems to be quite correct, for on the basis of preceding discussion, we reach the conclusion that these idioblasts must possess the power, similar to the cells themselves, to multiply by division, because they are transmitted from cell to cell in the process of division. The future formation of the organs in a multicellular body presupposes that the individual potential germs develop in regular sequence. Just as words arise from letters and sentences from words, so must definite coördination and subordination likewise govern the entire structure of the idioblasts. Now the specific term of idioplasm is applied to the nuclear substances of the ovum, and spermatozoön being present in exactly the same quantities and transmitting the inheritable qualities, while the remaining protoplasm may be termed nutritive or cytoplasm, present in large quantities and performing functions of nutrition. *It has been proved that the male and female hereditary substances are the only equivalents in the whole apparatus of reproduction, they can, therefore, be the only ones transmitted by the parents upon the child.* Further, the increasing hereditary substance is equally distributed among the cells resulting from the cleavage of the fertilized egg, which is proved by the fact that every organism again produces numerous egg-cells or spermatozoa, containing the same hereditary substance in the same proportion as the original cells from which they were derived; besides, in the lower animals and in many plants, almost any small complex of cells is capable of reproducing the original, *e. g.*, the Begonia leaf, the Hydra, etc. Therefore, this hereditary mass has to double itself by growth before each



single cell-division, which is explained in the karyokinetic processes constantly repeating themselves, so that Roux calls these figures, mechanisms which make it possible to divide the nucleus not only *en masse*, but especially according to the quantity and character of its individual qualities. A third very important factor, proving that the nucleus is the bearer of hereditary substances, is the fact that thereby a summing up or accumulation of these substances is prevented. In the karyokinetic process each cell receives the same quantity of nuclein as the fertilized ovum *A*. If, therefore, two of its descendants should unite again as generic cells, the product *B* would contain double the amount of the nuclein of *A*. A new copulation in the third generation would give *C* double the amount of *B*'s nuclein and so on in geometrical progression. Such an increase ought, therefore, be prevented in some way, because the result would be that the idioblasts would increase to such a degree that they would find no longer room in a spermatozoon. The formation of the polar bodies, indicated above in the process of maturation is the necessary cure, inasmuch as it reduces the nuclear substance to half its original mass. If, then, nuclear substance and hereditary substance are one and the same thing, the formation of polar bodies would argue that this substance is divisible to a certain degree without losing its power to reproduce the whole organism. Weissmann in his theory of the germ plasm proceeds from the supposition that the paternal and maternal hereditary substances remain separate, forming units, which he calls ancestral germ plasms. He claims for them a very complicated structure consisting of innumerable biological units; with each new fertilization, new and more numerous ancestral germ plasms arise, so that in the tenth generation 1,024 ancestral plasms must have entered into the combination of the hereditary substance. Now, in order to prevent a doubling of the hereditary substance, as shown above, he claims that each ancestral plasm divides at the beginning of every new process of fertilization. However, such a reduction of the ancestral germ plasms ought finally reach its limits if all the germs are to be

retained; therefore he suggests that now half of the number of ancestral germ plasms are eliminated before each new process of fertilization, *i. e.*, for the divisibility of the individual ancestral germs he substitutes the divisibility of the number of the germs. The whole process of fertilization becomes thus extremely complex and makes Weissmann's theory rather untenable. Why not assume, as Oscar Hertwig does, that the paternal and maternal idioblasts unite in some way into one single germ fundament? A reduction of the whole mass is then easily explained after the manner of the elimination of the polar bodies.

Finally, it has been proved that any fragment of the ovum is capable of fertilization as long as it contains the nucleus, which is simply another evidence for the fact that the idioplasm is not contained in the protoplasm, but in the nucleus. But, if it is true that every resultant cell in the process of division or cleavage receives the whole idioplasmic complex, how do we explain differentiations into the various kinds of tissues? Simply by assuming that only individual idioblasts become effective, while the rest remains latent. The way in which they become active has been explained by De Vries, when he suggests that they emigrate into the surrounding protoplasm in order to continue here to grow and to increase in accordance with their specific function; he calls it the theory of *extranuclear heredity* which modifies the severe contrast which the nuclear theory has produced between nucleus and protoplasm, showing at the same time how it is possible that a cell may contain all the qualities of an entire organism in latent condition. This leads to the conclusion, that the *transmission* of character and its *development* are potentially different. The *former* is the *function* of the *nucleus*, the *latter* that of *protoplasm*. In the nucleus there are contained all the various kinds of idioblasts belonging to the respective individual; therefore is it the hereditary organ katexogen—the rest of the protoplasm contains in every cell essentially only those idioblasts which are to become active in it, and which may be correspondingly increased. We must, therefore, distinguish two kinds of idioblastic multiplications, one referring to the entire



organism and leading to nuclear division and equal distribution among the two daughter cells, and a somewhat functional increase, only extending to the specifically active idioblasts, which must necessarily involve material changes and takes place only outside of the nucleus. So far the material side of the question.

The second part of my problem I shall treat in a second paper. I may only be permitted to state here that perverse ethical tendencies can be most satisfactorily explained on the ground that reason and will, the highest factors in the process of evolution, are during the childhood of the race as well as of the individual, too much under the influence of the otherwise normal tendencies of purely physical properties, they are transmitted and frequently developed before the child has reached the age of sexual and mental maturity.

## VIII.

### EDITORIAL NOTES.

#### ANGLICAN ORDERS ABSOLUTELY NULL AND VOID.

So the pope has declared by a recent bull, and has thereby probably brought to an end certain flirtations, which have been going on for sometime looking to a “corporate reconciliation” between the Church of England and the Church of Rome. There is an influential party in the Anglican Church which has for some time been advocating a termination of the schism, as they call it, between these two Christian bodies. Underlying this movement there is doubtless a feeling of dissatisfaction with the isolated position which their Church occupies in the Christian world. The Anglican Church has no formal fellowship with any other Christian body. She refuses to be regarded as a Protestant Church, and to have any affiliation with any of the Protestant denominations; while her claim to be considered a Catholic Church, and to be recognized as such, has been persistently ignored both by the Greek and Roman Catholic communions. The latter fact, however, has not been able to prevent her from continually renewing this claim—a circumstance which has once more moved the Roman See to make a formal deliverance on the subject.

The basis of this claim of the quality of catholicity, in the narrow sense in which it is here understood, is the pretense of *Apostolic succession* of the Anglican ministry. “Our ministry,” says the Anglo-Catholic party in the English Church, “is undoubtedly derived from the apostles by an unbroken chain of episcopal hands. That, of course, makes us a part of the true Catholic and Apostolic Church—different altogether from the Protestant sects, which have no such ministry, and therefore no true and valid sacraments. But why, then, should we not be externally and formally one with those branches of the Church Catholic, which are equally fortunate with ourselves in having a



valid apostolic ministry—especially with the Church of Rome, with which our own English Church previous to the Reformation stood in a relation of dependence for a thousand years? We would be glad to renew that relation, if only the Church of Rome would recognize our present Christian quality, and not make the conditions of reconciliation too hard.”

Such sentiments seem to prevail to a very considerable extent in the bosom of the English Church, especially among the higher classes of society embracing the clergy and the aristocracy. And they are carefully fostered by Catholic influences. About a year ago, for example, the pope himself addressed a letter to the English people, telling them how dearly he loves them, for their fathers' sakes, who were shining lights in the firmament of the Catholic Church, to whose maternal bosom he affectionately bids them now to return. How this invitation was received by the body of the English people, we do not exactly know. But it doubtless had its effect among the Anglo-Catholic party among the clergy and the aristocracy, among whom the thought gradually took shape that the matter of reunion would be a comparatively easy thing to accomplish. Some concessions, of course, would be necessary on both sides. For instance, Rome would have to recognize the validity of Anglican ordination, and of the Anglican ministry for the last three hundred years; and then the Anglican Church would recognize the supremacy of the pope and accept infallibility, transubstantiation, saint-worship, and all. If the pope would but recognize the English establishment as a branch of the Catholic Church, then Catholic she would be, and the pope should never have reason to regret his liberality. In this spirit Mr. Gladstone, who, in his old age, seems to be as great a theologian as statesman, during the last year wrote a letter to the pope. Why in these negotiations the validity of Anglican orders should be so strenuously insisted upon can easily be understood. For, consider what the effect would be if it were denied. There would then have been no valid sacraments administered in England for 300 years, except in a few Roman Catholic chapels. The great mass of the people would now be unbaptized, or at

least unconfirmed—yes, and *unmarried* too, for marriage is a sacrament and can only be validly performed by a valid ministry. See the Papal Syllabus of Errors, proposition 73. Now, to rebaptize, reconfirm and remarry a whole nation at once would be too large a job to undertake, even if the people were willing to submit to it; and hence in the contract of reconciliation the validity of the Anglican ministry must by all means be insisted upon.

There is precedent for this idea of “corporate reconciliation;” and the English people are great on precedents. In fact such a “reconciliation” was once accomplished in English history. It happened in the time of Queen Mary, after the death of Edward VI., when, at the command of the sovereign, the Parliament, in the name of the nation, on bended knees, made its submission to the pope’s legate, Cardinal Pole, himself an Englishman, and received from him the papal absolution and peace. However, the recollection of the events which followed after that memorable reconciliation, and which have forever fixed upon Mary the epithet of “bloody,” might perhaps cause the English people to hesitate a long while before entering into such a movement as is recommended to them by the Anglo-Catholics. The accomplishment of such a movement, if it were possible, would make England a Catholic country; and that would mean the abolition of religious liberty in England; for the Roman Church has declared it to be an error that in Catholic countries freedom of worship may be tolerated. See Syllabus of Errors, propositions 77 and 78. But to the question of selling out religious liberty, not only idle bishops and priests, but every Englishmen would have something to say. Still there are many who consider the scheme a possible one; and they have been strengthened in their opinion even by some Catholic writers, especially outside of England. Hence the pope has once more subjected the question of English orders to a searching investigation, with the result stated at the beginning of this note.

In deciding this question the pope did not, as a Protestant unfamiliar with papal methods might have expected, simply draw upon his infallibility for the light and knowledge needed. On



the contrary, he proceeded by special investigation and discussion. In the first place a commission of learned men was appointed, to whom were referred all the papers and documents bearing upon the case. When each member of this commission had fully informed himself of the facts and principles involved, formal sessions to the number of twelve were held, in which the whole matter in all its bearings was fully discussed, and opinions concerning it formulated. These were afterwards referred to the cardinals of the "holy office," who, in the presence of the pope, took up the whole case again, most carefully considered and weighed every point, and thus helped the pope to come to his decision. Such labor, then, did it cost the pope to arrive at the infallible conclusion, promulgated in this bull, to the effect that "ordinations carried out according to the Anglican rite have been and are absolutely null and utterly void."

In reaching this conclusion the pope does not deny the tactual succession of the Anglican episcopate from the earlier episcopate of the Roman Church. There is no reference to the Nag's Head tavern story, which was doubtless the invention of a malicious Jesuit. The men who ordained Matthew Parker and thus saved the episcopate for the English Church, after the resignation of the lawful bishops in the reign of Elizabeth, may have been men who were themselves lawfully ordained. But the *rite* which they used, and which had been used since the time of Edward VI., was defective both as to *form* and *matter*, and could, therefore, lead to no valid results. It was defective in form; for to speak of nothing else, the words used in the formula for the ordination of bishops say nothing of the *office* of bishop, but run merely as follows: "Take the Holy Ghost, and remember that thou stir up the grace of God which is in thee by the imposition of hands," etc. At a later time this was changed into the following: "Receive the Holy Ghost, for the office and work of a bishop in the Church of God, now committed unto thee by the imposition of our hands." But this amendment came too late; for in consequence of the defective form in the Edwardine ordinal the episcopate had long since lapsed, and could not now be restored by changing the form.

But the Anglican rite is also, and always has been, defective in matter or *intention*. The men of the time of Edward and Elizabeth did not *intend* to ordain *bishops* and *priests* in the old Catholic sense. This is evident, for instance, from the fact that in the ordination of priests, instead of the chalice and paten, as in the Catholic rite, copies of the Bible are delivered into the hands of the candidates. That implies that the function of their office is not *supposed* to consist in the offering of sacrifice, as in the Catholic Church, but merely in preaching. That this, and only this, was the sense and intention of the English Reformers, the pope contends, is fully apparent from the character of "the abettors whom they associated with themselves from the heterodox sects."

The English reformers stood in intimate relations with the reformers on the Continent, and shared their views, and were assisted by them in their reformatory work. Thus Peter Martyr, Paul Fagius, Martin Bucer, John Alasco, and other Reformed divines labored in England and exerted an influence upon the formation of the Book of Common Prayer as well as of the Articles of Religion. Melancthon and Calvin also were frequently consulted by the English reformers. This is a fact of which the Anglo-Catholics, who make such astounding pretensions in regard to the English Church, seem to be in utter ignorance. The pope, however, knows it, and tells those pretentious Episcopalians, who have been offering "apostolic succession" to all the world, that they are themselves in no better case than those heterodox German sectaries, who helped them in the beginning to set up their establishment, and that their fancied orders are absolutely null and utterly void. From his own standpoint, as well as from that of the Anglo-Catholics themselves, we think, the pope must clearly be judged to be right. Whether the application of the same rule to the practices of the early Catholic Church would not make havoc also of the Roman Catholic ministry, is another question. But clearly under the application of the rule the Anglican episcopate is not a Catholic episcopate; and the only way, therefore, in which Anglicans can come into the Catholic Church is by individual submission. With the Angli-



can Church as such, the Roman Church never will and never can treat; and her orders she never will and never can recognize.

And now, what? Consistency, it seems, would now require the Anglo-Catholics to come out of the English establishment and make their peace with the Roman Church individually, as the pope exhorts them to do. They have said that they are willing to acknowledge the supremacy and infallibility of the pope, if the pope, on his side, is willing to take them as they are. To be sure, that is conditional; but, in fact, the case is one which admits of no conditions. The pope is either infallible or he is not; and if he is, then the question of submission cannot reasonably be made to turn upon whether or not he will acknowledge the validity of Anglican orders. And the Anglo-Catholics are either dolts, or they must understand that a willingness to submit to an acknowledged infallibility cannot be conditional. But now that infallibility, which these people have declared themselves ready, on some conditions at least, to accept, has spoken, and has said to them, "Your orders are absolutely null and void." Will they accept that decision as an infallible oracle from heaven, and act upon it; or will they in effect say that, when they declared themselves to be ready to accept the papacy, they did not mean what they said? The future will show. We predict, however, that the number going to Rome, in consequence of these transactions, is not going to be very large. We are sure that Mr. Gladstone will not go. There is a want of depth in these Anglican pretensions, any way they are taken, which does not lead us to expect that there will be many martyrs. If, however, it should turn out to be otherwise, and if a considerable number of Anglo-Catholics should now make their submission to the Roman Church, that would probably, in the circumstances, be a benefit to the English establishment rather than an injury.

But there is another way in which this "corporate union" fiasco may do the English Church no small amount of good. If that Church should be moved by this repulse from Rome to abate her pretensions and to enter into something like sympathetic fellowship with the Protestant bodies around her, speaking the



English tongue, it would be an immense benefit both to herself and to the cause of English Christianity. In earlier days, as the pope rather ungraciously reminds her, she stood in friendly and fraternal relations to the Reformed Churches of the Continent, often exchanging with them both pulpits and ministers. In those days her episcopal polity did not separate her from other Protestant Churches with different polities. Episcopacy was then not regarded as a divine institution, and as being of the essence of the Church, but only as a human though convenient form of Church organization. The English Church was then not ashamed to be known as a Protestant and Reformed Church. And if she should now go back to that earlier position—or rather forward and upward to the higher and broader plane of Christian charity, and liberality, and common sense absolutely demanded by the spirit of this modern age, then she might indeed be a power for good, which in her present condition of isolation she can not be. And to one who is not an Anglo-Catholic there appears no reason why she should not do this. That she possesses very great merits as a Church is, of course, not to be denied. But neither is it to be denied that there are proportionately as many Christian people of equally spiritual and godly character in other Christian communions as in her own. And that fact, for Christian common sense, must settle the question as to the legitimacy of the ministry in these communions. If Presbyterianism or Methodism is capable of producing the fruits of genuine Christian character, then it is mere insanity to deny to either of them the quality of being a Christian Church. Questioning the legitimacy of their ministry and consequently the validity of their sacraments, could, in these circumstances, only lead to the conclusion that the sacraments are of no real account in the economy of Christianity. If the Anglican Church and her Protestant Episcopal daughter in the United States would now quit that foolish business, and acknowledge other Christian communions as equally genuine folds of the flock of Christ with themselves, then they might accomplish far more towards a real unification of Christendom than they can ever accomplish by offering to give the “historic epis-



copate " to Christians of all other names and persuasions. And if this late affair with the papacy shall in any way contribute to this result, then all sincere Christians will have reason to rejoice.

#### THE MASSES AND THE CHURCH.

That the masses, embracing the lower and less fortunate classes of society, those upon whom the struggle for existence bears most severely, are to a large extent estranged from the Church, is a matter which is generally acknowledged. The great majority of laboring men and wage-earners of all sorts, in the larger cities and towns, are not members of the Church, nor do they at all attend her services. They are as much strangers to the Church as are the masses of China and Japan, knowing her only by report and representation often of an unfriendly and unfavorable character.

For this state of affairs there is doubtless more than one cause. But the cause which operates more largely than any other is, no doubt, the conviction, which is wide-spread among the masses, that the Church is an institution existing mainly in the interest of the rich and powerful, and that she has no sympathy with the needier portions of mankind. By this it is not meant that, in seasons of direst necessity, some wealthy members of the Church will not open their pockets and prevent the lowest of the masses from starving, but that the Church has no proper sense of appreciation of the hardness of the conditions under which the masses are living, and no sympathy with their desires and efforts to secure for themselves better circumstances. Thus it has often been said that in any conflict between capital and labor the Church, like the law, will *always* be on the side of capital.

Now, we think, this conviction, though widespread among the masses, rests upon a mistaken representation of the Church. The Church has not so utterly fallen away from the spirit of her Master as this representation would imply. He whom the Church acknowledges as her Lord and Head, was Himself, when here in the flesh, not rich, but poor in this world's goods. He often was not as well provided as the foxes and birds, having not even where to lay His head. This same Lord of the Church,



moreover, pronounced blessings upon the poor, and promised them the kingdom of God. And one of the writers of the New Testament, a book which has not yet lost its authority in the Christian Church, reprehends most severely the first signs of any spirit of truckling to the rich and despising or neglecting the poor. All this the Church has not forgotten. She has not become a synagogue of mammon worshippers. On the contrary, though she may at times fail to show it at the right moment, she is the only true friend whom the poor and oppressed really have in this world. It is only Her power, and the Gospel of love and righteousness which she preaches, that can ever help the poor and the oppressed to rise above their present condition, and to enjoy the rights and blessings of manhood. Take away the moral sanctions of Christianity as represented by the Church, and there is nothing left to stand between the rich and the poor, and to prevent the former from utterly crushing the latter. We think, then, that those leaders among the masses who throw suspicion or reproach upon the Church, as though she had become the friend of the rich and the enemy of the poor, do wrong not only to the Church, but also to themselves and to the cause which they represent.

But while this is our view, we are bound also to admit that the contrary conviction, so largely prevailing among the masses, is not wholly without any show of reason. The masses who entertain this conviction are as reasonable creatures as other people are; and any conviction or opinion that gains wide currency among them, usually rests upon some foundation. In the present case their conviction is doubtless due to a certain amount of unchristian conduct on the part of the members of the Church, and more especially to certain misrepresentations of the mind and spirit of the Church by inconsiderate or ill-disposed individuals among her representative members. It happens sometimes that the minister of some Church, or the editor of some Christian paper forgets himself and utters sentiments which are not Christian; and if these chance to bear upon questions in dispute between the classes and the masses, they are instantly taken up by



the secular press and published throughout the land as evidence of the mind and spirit of the Church. One minister among five thousand, perhaps, or one Church paper among five hundred, may give expression to unchristian sentiments in regard to the circumstances of the poor; and by these, then, the masses will be determined in their judgment concerning the character and aims of the Church.

We have a striking illustration of the case supposed in an editorial paragraph of a late religious newspaper which has come under our observation and which has, in fact, occasioned these reflections. The writer of the paragraph begins by stating what his own expressions presently prove to be true, that "much is said with conspicuous lack of judgment about the masses and the classes;" and then he observes that "in this country the classes have risen from the masses." As if this were not true of all countries! Whence could the classes have come, in any country, if they had not risen from the masses? But that does not prove that, having risen, they may not use their power harshly and selfishly and in such way as to hinder others from rising. After having made this sage remark, the writer of the paragraph under consideration goes on to lay down his social philosophy as follows: "A great part of the masses have not risen because of self-indulgence. The classes have risen through self-control. However great may be our sympathy with the masses we can not forget that, speaking plainly, *they are where they have put themselves*. There are exceptions, of course, but the great majority have expended in wasteful self-indulgence the earnings which would have put them in a condition of comparative comfort. They are to-day living from hand to mouth because they will not be diligent in business, will not be economical, will not attempt to save something out of what they receive."

Now we could scarcely imagine anything more conspicuous for lack of judgment than these flippant sentences on a problem so great and difficult as that which they concern. They are not only grossly unjust, but positively insulting to the majority of mankind. The poor are not, as a rule, less temperate and less

virtuous than the rich. Nor is there more self-denial practiced among the latter than among the former. Indeed, to any one who has the least idea of what is going on in the social world, as it may be gathered from the publications of the daily press, the very statement of such a thought suggests the suspicion of a jest rather than of sober sense. That there is vice among the poor is, of course, true; but it is true also that there is vice among the rich. There is vice in the palace as well as in the hut; and who will say how much of the vice in either case is due to surrounding conditions? If the vices of the rich—their selfishness, their pride, their luxuriousness—are largely the result of the circumstances into which they are born; so also are the vices of the poor; and it is time that there should be an end to the stale assertion, as false as it is shallow, that all the miseries of the poor are the result of their own self-indulgence or intemperance. To say that the “masses are just where they have put themselves,” and that they are poor only because they have been self-indulgent and wasteful, is to betray utter ignorance of the working of the social and economic machine in our modern world. It is not true even in the sense that the masses of to-day are merely suffering the consequences of the crimes of their ancestors two or three generations ago; for the fact that some did not *rise* as others did, may not have been their crime but their misfortune; and in any case their offspring should not be taunted with the shortcomings of which they themselves are not guilty. But to say that the masses now are *personally* responsible for not having risen to the same level with the classes, is utterly absurd. Tell a man, for instance, who has worked in the coal mine since he is ten years old, and who is now trying to support a family of seven persons on \$358.08 a year, which is all that a miner in the anthracite region can make *if he has work every day*—tell such a man that he might now be rich, the owner of a coal mine himself, in fact, if he had been temperate, economical and industrious; and if he understands you at all, he will either consider you a monster or a fool. And if you should be a Church member and ask such a man afterwards to attend church, you would not be



likely to move him very much in that direction. Is it not time that this sort of thing should cease, and that those who assume to speak on this subject should speak with more knowledge? Is it true that all the wealth which rich men possess has been obtained by honest industry? Are there not rich men who are rich either by reason of accident or by reason of unrighteousness? Is the poor widow whose one railroad bond has been swallowed up by the millionaire "promoter" of the road to be told that she is poor because of self-indulgence, and that the millionaire who has robbed her is rich because of self-control? If it were said that the masses largely fail to rise in consequence of inexperience, ignorance and weakness, there would be much truth in that; but to say that their failure is generally their crime, is not true, and could only serve to exasperate those who have the misfortune of not being rich.

The strained relation between the masses and the classes in modern life is a fact of ominous import for the future peace of society. And to increase still further the tension of this strained relation either by irritating words or acts, is neither Christian nor patriotic conduct, and could only be excused on the ground of total ignorance. It is a crime, in fact, of which at least no Christian minister or editor ought ever to be guilty. The Church occupies, indeed, a most delicate position between the classes of modern society; and only as she succeeds in holding them harmoniously together in her own bosom will the future peace of society be assured. That so large a proportion of the masses has already escaped from her fold, and lost its respect for her, is one of the worst signs of the times. These masses must be won back to her bosom and taught again to respect her teaching, in order that the future happiness of society may be secured. But in order to accomplish this end, it will not do for the ministers of the Church to tell the struggling masses that they might all have been rich, if they had not been self-indulgent and extravagant. That, they know, is untrue and unjust; and they will not respect a teacher in whose wisdom and good will they have no confidence. In order to the accomplishment of her mission in the world the

Church must establish a reputation, not only for divine wisdom, but also for absolute impartiality and good will towards all classes of the social organism. She must not be the apologist for the wrongs committed by the rich and great against the poor and helpless, nor must she be the attorney of the masses in their quarrels with the classes. Her business is to stand above the masses and the classes alike with the equanimity and calmness of a judge, being sure, however, that she has the mind of the Lord who will in the end judge all. Her attitude can not be that of an indifferent spectator of a quarrel which is going on among men beneath the sun, as though her interests were all beyond the clouds. It would be a wrong conception of the mission of the Church to suppose that she had nothing to do but to preach to men about a heaven to be enjoyed after death. That, of course, is one great part of her mission ; but she can not stand idly by and close her eyes when this world is about to be turned into a hell. She may tell the bleeding Lazarus lying at the rich man's gate that there will be rest and comfort for him in heaven ; but she owes a duty to the rich man too ; and that is to preach to him, as Paul preached to Felix, of righteousness, and temperance, and judgment to come, until he not only trembles, but is converted into a better man. It is the duty of the Church to help to convert this world itself into something like heaven by preaching to all men the Gospel of peace, and good will and righteousness. And she must know well how to do this. But to this end her ministers must be familiar, not merely with the subtleties of scholastic theology, but also and especially with the sociological and economic questions which are agitating the age, and with the matters in dispute between the different classes of society ; so that they may know both how and when to be silent, and how and when to speak on these subjects. But in no case should any Christian minister, or any servant of the Church utter sentiments as crude and heartless as those which we have here been criticising.



## NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THE OLD TESTAMENT AND MODERN LIFE. By Stopford A. Brooke. Pages, 352. Price. \$1.50. Publishers : Dodd Mead & Co., New York. 1896.

This volume consists of a collection of twenty discourses on Old Testament subjects. These are preceded by a brief critical essay, in which the author sets forth his views of the Old Testament Scriptures. In agreement with the higher critics generally he assumes that the earlier portions of the Old Testament are composite productions, in which an editor combines floating documents and traditions of earlier times for religious purposes. The narratives contained in these documents are not all literal history. In those relating to the beginning of the human race there are mythical elements, and in those relating to the patriarchs of the Israelitish nation there is much that is legendary. The patriarchs were probably historical personages ; but their history is so overlaid with legend that it would be impossible now to tell how much may be real history.

But if such is the character of the Old Testament Scriptures, what then, it may be asked, is their value for purposes of religion ? To this question the volume before us is designed to be an answer. In the discourses the author rarely refers to his critical theory ; but assuming it throughout, he shows what practical lessons for modern life may be contained in these old Hebrew stories. The religious value of the Old Testament Scriptures consists not so much in the literal representation of the history of one people as in the interpretation of the universal life of man, which they contain. The author's theory may best be given in his own words. Speaking of the lesson to be derived from the story of the deliverance from Egypt, he says : " If it were a true history, if it were an accurate statement of facts, it would not be possible to make it apply so widely. Too many specialized elements would then enter into it, and spoil its universal application. But conducted by the imagination, which, as I have said, seizes the universal and neglects the particular, it speaks to common human nature. The human soul, working slowly through centuries shaped it, and it naturally represents humanity. It is not a true history of the Hebrews, but it is a true history of a great part of human life. Therein lies its power and inspiration."

The subjects discussed in the volume are the following: The Call and Wandering of Abraham ; Abraham in Egypt and His Return ; Abraham the Warrior ; Abraham's Gloom and Conso-



lation ; The Story of Hagar ; The Character of Judah ; Freedom from Egypt ; The Death of Moses ; The Song of Deborah ; The Call of Samuel ; David, the Shepherd ; The Courage of David ; The Consecration of David ; Elijah on Carmel ; Elijah on Horeb ; The Prophet and Prophecy ; The Message to Baruch ; Ecclesiastes.

To the preacher, and to the Sunday-school teacher also, this volume is calculated to be of much value. The preacher's business is to apply the truths of the Bible to the moral and religious life of his hearers. A mere objective representation of the events and facts of Scriptural narrative would not be preaching. For instance, the life of Abraham might be so represented as to emphasize merely its contrast to every other human life, in which case there would be nothing in it to interest or edify common men and women. The preacher's business, on the contrary, is to show how the story of Abraham is an interpretation of some of the common phases in the universal life of man, and thus to convert it into spiritual food for living souls. How this can be done the volume before us illustrates by a number of well chosen examples. And these are capable of serving as models for the treatment, homiletically and practically, of other portions of the Old Testament. To young preachers especially the volume under notice is, in this view, capable of affording much help in their preparations for the pulpit.

THE MIND OF THE MASTER. By John Watson, D. D. Pages, 338. Publishers: Dodd, Mead & Co., New York. 1896.

Dr. Watson has for some time been known as a charming story writer, by the *nom de plume* of Ian Maclaren. His novels "Beside the Bonnie Brier Bush," "The Days of Auld Lang Syne," and "Kate Carnegie" have been read and enjoyed by a large number of people in this country as well as in England. The religious and theological principles embodied to some extent in those works of fiction are now given to the public in this more formal treatise on the "Mind of the Master ;" which will be read with as much interest, by ministers and theologians at least, as his other works have been read by the general public.

Dr. Watson, though a minister of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, belongs to the new school of theology which has grown up in England and America during the last half century. This school is distinguished for the change which it has made in its theological standpoint. The title of the book under notice is itself a significant expression of this change. The mind of Christ is the chief source and the illuminative centre of theological or divine truth. The Christian thinker now will not go to creeds and theological systems, nor to Reformers, or



Church fathers, or Councils, nor even to apostles and evangelists for a solution of his doubts or an answer of his questionings, but to the mind of Christ. Even apostles and evangelists may be supposed at times to have failed of an adequate apprehension of the truth as it is in Christ; and Christ Himself only can be an adequate interpretation of Christ and of God. Now the truth as thus interpreted is something different from the theological systems of former times; and in the light of this new truth the following subjects are treated in the volume before us: Jesus our Supreme Teacher; The Development of Truth; The Sovereignty of Character; Ageless Life; Sin an Act of Self-Will; The Culture of the Cross; Faith the Sixth Sense; The Law of Spiritual Gravitation; Devotion to a Person the Dynamic of Religion; Judgments according to Type; Optimism the Attitude of Faith; Fatherhood the Final Idea of God; The Foresight of Faith; The Continuity of Life; The Kingdom of God.

One peculiarity of Dr. Watson's theology consists of the emphasis which he puts upon the idea of the divine fatherhood. The Westminster theology emphasizes mainly the sovereignty of God. The most divine thing in God, according to this view, is *absolute will*, which recognizes no law or motive outside of itself. Consequently no supposed doctrine may legitimately be brought to the test of reason or conscience. It would be in vain to say, for instance, that the doctrine of a double decree of predestination is not consistent with reason and justice. The answer to this would be that God is *sovereign*, and therefore not amenable to any law of reason. He is the source of law, but, like the old Roman emperors, Himself above law. Now, according to Dr. Watson the most divine thing in God is *love*, and His relation to men resembles the relation of a father rather than that of a sovereign in the old Roman or mediæval sense. With this change of view a whole chapter of theology is radically changed. Dr. Watson expresses his conception of this change in the following sentences: "No doctrine of the former theology will be lost; all will be recarved and refaced to suit the new architecture. Sovereignty will remain, not that of a despot, but of a father; the Incarnation will not be an expedient, but a consummation; the sacrifice will not be a satisfaction, but a reconciliation; the end of grace will not be standing, but character; the object of punishment will not be retribution, but regeneration. Mercy and justice will no longer be antinomies; they will be aspects of love, and the principle of human probation will be exchanged for the principle of human education."

That may do for a specimen of the author's style as well as of his theology. We can only advert in conclusion to his view



of the Church in relation to the Kingdom of God ; which is such that one can easily be in the latter without being in the former. To us this is the least satisfactory doctrine of the book before us ; which, however, is well worthy of careful perusal.

THE MESSIAH OF THE APOSTLES. By Charles Augustus Briggs, D. D., Edward Robinson Professor of Biblical Theology in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. Publishers: Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1895. Pages, 562. Price, \$3.00.

This is the third of a series of works by the same author on the subject of the MESSIAH. The first was MESSIANIC PROPHECY, published in 1886 ; the second, THE MESSIAH OF THE GOSPELS, published in 1894. These two volumes were noticed in this REVIEW at the time of their appearance. The three volumes now published bring to an end the author's studies in Christology along the lines of Biblical Theology. His plan, however, is not yet completed ; for he states in the preface to the present volume that he proposes to continue the series with THE MESSIAH OF THE CHURCH and conclude it with the MESSIAH OF THE THEOLOGIANS. It is to be hoped that the respected author may have health and leisure speedily to finish his studies in the department of Christology, and to give to the theological public the results of these studies.

The question, what think ye of Christ, is still the most important of all questions. It is the life-question of theology. Not that the reality of Christian faith necessarily depends upon a completed metaphysical doctrine of Christ's person ; for such a doctrine was not in the minds of the earliest disciples, and is only gradually wrought out now in the scientific consciousness of the Church. One may be a sincere Christian with a deficient or an erroneous doctrine concerning Christ. We hold the ancient Arian and the modern Unitarian theories to be imperfect theories of the nature of Christ's person ; and yet who will say that Bishop Ulfilas and W. E. Channing were not Christians ? But while this is true so far as the individual is concerned, we think it is true also that a correct apprehension of the person of Christ, as well as of His office and work, must be of the utmost importance to the stability and safety of the Church. Hence we cannot but rejoice that so many men of eminent ability and scholarship are devoting themselves to the study of the problem of Christ's person. It is by the solution of this problem that the reality of Christianity will be tested. We may never, indeed, be able fully to understand the person of Christ ; but the consistency of the idea of Christ must be capable of being demonstrated ; and that will involve also the consistency and divinity of Christianity.

The apprehension of the idea of Christ, however, has itself



been progressive, and hence the formulation of the doctrine of Christ's person and work by the Church has been a work of ages and is not yet finished. Professor Briggs in the volume before us shows most clearly that there was progression and change in the conception of Christ during the Apostolic age and among the apostles themselves. The apostles did not, even after they had received the inspiration and illumination of the Holy Spirit, all have the same fixed and identical idea of Christ. On the contrary, each one formed his own idea according to his peculiar mental character and experience; so that there is room to speak of a Pauline, a Petrine and a Johannine Christology. "There can be no doubt," says Professor Briggs, "that the Christology of the Apostles, in all its types, unfolds from the Christophanies of the risen and enthroned Messiah, granted to the chief apostles, Peter and Paul and John." What Christ in His glorified state proved Himself to be to the souls of the apostles was the ground of their doctrine concerning His person.

Professor Briggs begins his treatise with a study of the Messianic idea of the Judaism of New Testament times, and then passes to the consideration of the Messiah of the Jewish Christians; as these ideas doubtless had an influence upon the formulation of the Christology of the New Testament. Coming next to the Pauline Christology, Professor Briggs distinguishes five stages of development: first, the Christology of the earliest Epistles, in which the person of Christ receives no attention; secondly, the Christology of the Epistles to the Corinthians, in which a sort of ideal pre-existence is recognized; thirdly, the Christology of the Epistles to the Galatians and Romans; fourth, the Christology of the captivity; and fifth, the Christology of the Pastoral Epistles, if these be Pauline. The personal pre-existence of Christ is first distinctly recognized in the Epistles of the captivity. Paul does not seem to have been aware of the miraculous conception of Jesus, reported in our first and third Gospels. From Paul the author passes to the Christology of the Epistle to the Hebrews; and from this to that of the Apocalypse. This book, the author, with a large number of German scholars, supposes to be a composite work, like the Pentateuch, in which a number of Jewish Apocalypses are recast and united by some Christian editor. In each of these the Messiah appears in peculiar aspects. The Christology of the Johannine Epistles, finally leads to the Christology of the Prologue of St. John's Gospel; which is, however, not regarded as an original part of the Gospel. It is in this Prologue that the New Testament teaching concerning the person of Christ comes to its culmination. And here the later Christology of the Church has its Biblical basis; though the form of this was probably influenced too by current Greek and Alexandrine ideas. "The Prologue,"



says Professor Briggs, p. 504, "attaching the conception of the Logos to the Messiah, makes the Logos personal, and so, for the first time, conceives of a personal  $\delta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ , who is a different person from  $\delta\delta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ , and these two persons are in intimate communion as Father and Son from the beginning, before all things."

We cordially commend this work of Dr. Briggs to all who are interested in the study of Christology, and who want to know the teaching of the New Testament, without getting it through the discolored medium of later creeds and theological systems. Should anyone expect, in this study of the Messiah of the Apostles, to find the doctrinal determinations of the Nicene or Chalcedonian creed, he would of course be disappointed. Were it otherwise, then this study could not be true to the New Testament. This however, does not mean that the determinations of the Creeds may not be correct. The Church's reflection on the Christological data contained in the New Testament, together with the perennial influence of the spirit of the ever-living Christ upon the mind of the Church, may lead to conclusions in Christology of which the Apostles themselves had no ideas. These conclusions may not all be correct, but the mere fact that they go beyond the New Testament does not prove that they are incorrect. For Dr. Briggs' estimate of these Christological developments we will have to wait until we shall get his volumes on the *Christ of the Church* and the *Christ of the Theologians*.

THE BIBLE, THE CHURCH AND THE REASON, THE THREE GREAT FOUNTAINS OF DIVINE AUTHORITY, by Charles Augustus Briggs, D. D., Edward Robinson, Professor of Biblical Theology in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. Second Edition. Pages, 298. Price \$1.75. Publishers, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1893.

This book contains seven lectures, the respective subjects of which are the following: The Bible and the Church; The Reason as a Great Fountain of Divine Authority; The Three Fountains of Divine Authority; Is Holy Scripture Inerrant? The Higher Criticism; Biblical History; The Messianic Ideal. Some of the points touched in the lectures are still further discussed in numerous and extensive Appendices.

The most of these lectures were occasioned by the controversy which arose upon the delivery and publication of the author's inaugural address in 1891, and bear more or less directly upon that controversy. They have lost none of their value, however, now since the storm of that controversy has blown over; but on the contrary may be read now, in the calmer atmosphere of to-day, with more profit perhaps than was possible at the time when they were first published. We should not be surprised if many who now calmly peruse these pages should wonder why



the propositions stated here should ever have given rise to so much excitement and passion. On the Church as a source of divine authority we read, page 59 : " When it is said that the Church is a source of divine authority, we mean that the divine Messiah, enthroned on the right hand of the Father as the King and head of His Church, communicates His divine presence and authority to the Church in the world, through the divine Spirit who pervades and controls the institutions of the Church and fills them with the divine presence, giving the certitude of it to the faithful." The conception of the reason as a source of divine authority is explained, page 60, to mean that " the reason when filled by the divine Wisdom with holy understanding and instruction, becomes a fountain of divine authority to the man himself and also to those whom he teaches." If these propositions are not true, then we have wholly misunderstood the teaching of the New Testament itself concerning the nature of the Christian Church and the office and work of the Holy Spirit.

Those of our readers who wish to be thoroughly posted in regard to an important movement in the Presbyterian Church, and to understand the ecclesiastical and theological interests involved in that movement, will do well to procure and study this volume of lectures. Each of these lectures may be regarded as the summing up of material to the full treatment of which volumes might be devoted.

THE DEFENCE OF PROFESSOR BRIGGS before the Presbytery of New York, December 13, 14, 15, 19, and 22, 1892. Pages, 193. Price, 50 cents. Publishers: Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

Those who read the reports of this famous trial in the daily papers at the time when it was going on, will be glad to get this full and authentic report of the defence in the case. It has often been said that the prosecution in this case was actuated largely by motives of prejudice and passion. This is doubtless true. In all such movements impure motives come to be mixed up with the springs of action in the hearts of those who are engaged in them. When, moreover, the interests of rival institutions are involved in such contests, the danger of being actuated by impure motives becomes very great. That such motives came into play in the Briggs case, sometimes blinding men to the real issues involved, is doubtless true. But it is true also that in this case two antagonistic methods of theological teaching were in conflict. It has been said, at times, that the Presbyterian Church was on trial as well as Professor Briggs. We do not think that is quite correct. But it is true that the *party* in the Presbyterian Church opposed to Professor Briggs was as much on trial as was he ; and the trial was in fact a grand debate—a battle of opposing theological systems



and tendencies, of much wider reach than the Presbyterian Church. Dr. Briggs, in fact, fought the battle of advanced theology and of freedom of theological thought in behalf of other denominations as well as in behalf of his own. As to the result of this battle we presume there is still a difference of opinion. If that result be supposed to have been determined by the number of votes recorded in the General Assembly, then it was against Dr. Briggs. If, however, the result be supposed to be determined by the theological and moral influence of the debate—by the weight of argument—then the judgment must be different. In any view this report of the defence in the case before the Presbytery is interesting reading; and those who are engaged in the study of contemporaneous Church history should not fail to read it.

ENGLISH SECULARISM, A CONFESSION OF BELIEF. By George Jacob Holyoake, The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago. 1896. Pages, 146. Price, 50 cents.

This book is a plea for no religion. Human life, the author holds, would be most happy if organized and conducted solely on the principle of secularism. That principle involves the rejection of the ideas of God, of freedom and of immortality, and devotion merely to the life which we now live. According to Mr. Holyoake the essential principles of secularism are three: 1. The improvement of this life by *material* means; 2. That science is the available providence of man; 3. That it is good to do good. Sanctions for morality must not be sought in religion, or in the idea of God. The author, though at times severe, is yet always respectful to his opponent. He suffered persecution and prosecution for the sake of his opinions, and is an earnest advocate of freedom of thought. He would not even oppose religion by violence, but only by calm and cold reason. There are two ways in which such a publication is calculated to do good. In the first place it shows how many of the people outside of the Church think about religion; and they can never be won back until their manner of thinking has come to be thoroughly understood. And in the second place it lays bare some of the weak places in Christian thought as this has stood in the past. The following sentences may be taken in the way of illustration: "When a man is assured that he can be saved when he believes, and that, having free will he can believe when he pleases, he, as a rule, never does please until he has had his fill of vice, or is about to die—either of disease or by the hangman. If by the hangman, he is told that, provided he repents before eight o'clock in the morning, he may find himself nestling in Abraham's bosom before nine." This may show to some theologians where their dogmas need to be amended.



# THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW.

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NO. 2.—MARCH, 1897.

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## I.

### THE RELATION OF THE REFORMED CHURCH TO NEW THEOLOGY.\*

BY JOHN C. BOWMAN, D. D.

It is unfortunate that the phrase "New Theology" has come to be used in popular usage in a somewhat narrow and restricted sense which falsifies its proper meaning. Apart from all prejudicial connections the terms, whether considered separately or jointly, are terms with which no fair-minded person should quarrel. Theology is a good word; equally good as new. Nor is there any cause for the debasement of either concept by their combination in New Theology.

In the name itself, therefore, in whatever light it may be regarded, there is no suggestion of evil. New year, new man, new covenant are kindred terms, and if new theology be allowed its rightful place in the same family group, it will be treated with like unprejudiced regard.

So much appears under the name of new theology at the present time that, in the discussion of the subject, it may be well at the outstart to guard oneself against possible misunderstanding and false imputation.

\*That the writer may not be regarded as assuming to represent the attitude of his denomination toward new theology, it need simply be stated that the subject of this paper, as it stands, was (unofficially) assigned to him by others.

By new theology I do not mean the "New England hypothesis," the discussion of which caused for a time quite a ripple of excitement in theological circles. That hypothesis after all is simply an ancient belief revived in new form, and was never designed nor held by its staunchest advocates as a regulative principle of theological belief.

Nor do I understand by new theology a "German importation of rationalistic philosophy," which would evolve all religious thought and institutions out of simply natural and historical forces, and which would limit the Christian's creed to the two articles: I believe in God the Father, and in the Son Jesus Christ. Nor yet can new theology be adequately defined as a phase of modern religious thought. It is not the product of the modern age, as it is not of former ages. No age can produce a theology *de novo*. Scholastic theology was new as compared with the theology of the Fathers. Reformation theology was new as compared with Mediæval theology. The theology of our own time is new as compared with confessional orthodoxy. But no age may have the credit of imparting to theology the quality of newness. Much less may an individual or a group of individuals claim the honor of creating or inventing a new theology, although this distinction does seem to be accorded to certain teachers and preachers who profess to be the expounders, if not the discoverers of "Christocentric theology."

In apostolic times theology was new; it is new to-day. By new theology, therefore, I mean the newness of theology—an essential quality or principle of all true theological science. Being a science, theology must be progressive; it must renew itself from age to age. It can have no fixed, unvarying standard. Accordingly we speak of New Testament theology, Patristic theology, Mediæval theology and of Modern theology. By these terms we mean that the different periods of history were characterized by a distinctive system of theological belief. Distinctions are drawn still more sharply by assigning a standard to each century, as the theology of the sixteenth century, of the seventeenth, of the eighteenth and of the nineteenth century.



This variation of the theological standard from age to age is no discredit to theology as a science. As a progressive science it must grow and vary in accordance with the law of historical development. A review of the history of theology from apostolic times down to the present fully exhibits the continuous operation of this principle.

When, therefore, the term new theology is applied to the religious thought, or certain aspects of the thought of our age, it should not be implied that a new principle has been discovered, but rather that truth in its development has assumed new forms suited to changed conditions; and, further, that through his struggles and yearnings after more truth new contributions have been made to the fund of religious knowledge.

It must, however, be acknowledged that the changes, which in recent times have taken place in the various departments of theological science, are out of the usual order, and that the phrase "new theology" has special significance as representing the tendency or trend of the religious thought of the present age. The scientific spirit has attained to unprecedented ascendancy, and scientific methods are applied, as never before, to the study and attempted solution of the various problems of religious thought and life. If the characteristic of the religious thought of the age may be defined by one word, it is Criticism. The critical tendency has always, to greater or less degree, accompanied theological science, but only within the present century, and especially during the latter half, has it come to wield dominant influence. With the present century there was introduced a new era of intellectual activity. The spirit of inquiry and criticism invaded every department of learning. Especially in the domain of religious thought did this impulse to original investigation and independent judgment make itself felt.

The old standards of belief which served well the purpose for which they were designed, and which met largely the peculiar requirements of the several ages which produced them, could not satisfy the mind of the nineteenth century.

It is no disparagement of the wisdom of former ages to main-

tain that it could not formulate a system of religious thought so complete as to provide for the solution of the many new problems that would arise in succeeding ages.

Every age must do its own thinking, and out of its own resources must make provision for its peculiar needs. In the degree that the mind of an age seeks to satisfy itself by resting upon the intellectual and spiritual products of former ages, will its capacity for truth become impaired, and the inevitable result is intellectual and spiritual stagnation and decadence. That is what is meant by bondage to traditionalism, the enslavement of both mind and conscience, and the repression of Christian truth and life.

New theology describes a reactionary tendency in the religious thought of the nineteenth century, a changed attitude towards the standards of orthodox confessionalism. It is not an attitude of hostility toward the old standards of doctrinal belief. They are not ruthlessly set aside as possessing no value. They are duly appreciated for the service they rendered in their proper day as safeguards against error and as defenses of the faith. But the old doctrinal standards do not contain the truth in its wholeness, and cannot serve as adequate guides for the Church of all ages. Having served their day and purpose, they must give way to new and enlarged forms of statement, which the expanding life of truth requires for its fuller expression.

New theology, rightly understood, does not array itself against the old. Its mission is not to deny and to destroy. It embodies a positive and constructive principle which adapts old truths to new conditions, and applies new methods to the study of old problems, so that in the light of our day they may find a larger interpretation and truer solution. At the same time it opens up and presses along new lines of study and research, thereby enlarging the realm of Christian knowledge and making fresh and valuable contributions to theological science. I can make but passing reference in this connection to the astounding results of archæological research, as the recent discovery of Assyrian tablets and monuments which add not less than two thousand years



to the chronology of human history, also to the notable development of Semitic philology which has given a new impetus to Biblical science. The benefits of these modern original investigations are of incalculable service to every one who would make earnest with the study of Biblical history and literature.

The age in which we live is one of profound transformation, intellectual and social, abounding in new needs, new questions and new points of view. Theology wisely adapts itself to the new order. Theology, that is to say, takes on a new development. That does not mean innovation, unorthodoxy, nor the renunciation of the truth wrought out in former ages. The real development of theology is a process in which the Church, standing firm in her old truths, enters into the possession of the new social and intellectual movements of each age, and, because the truth makes her free, is able to assimilate new material, to welcome all new knowledge, bringing forth out of her treasures things new and old. Thus does the Church show again and again her power of witnessing under changed conditions to the catholic capacity of her faith and life.\*

The cry that the old orthodox doctrines are not preached as they once were, while it expresses groundless alarm, presents a statement of fact which it would be vain to deny. We do not think, we do not want to think precisely as our fathers thought, and we differ still more in the manner of expressing what we do think. This does not imply a depreciation of their wisdom or a lack of reverence for their memory. Theological fashions change as do all other fashions. Old truths are recast in new moulds. They are viewed from different angles of vision. But, notwithstanding the deviation from old lines, the truth itself is as firmly held and as highly prized as by former generations.

Moreover, it may be claimed, in the spirit of humility, that phases of truth which did not arrest the attention and engage the thought of former ages are revealed to and apprehended by the mind of our own age. The horizon of truth has not been fixed by the intellectual and spiritual vision of former teachers

\* *Lux Mundi.*, page 8.

and pupils. The Holy Spirit continues to be the inspirer and guide of the Church, and promises fuller revelations of truth from age to age.

The mission of theology is not simply to serve as the custodian of the accumulated treasures of preceding ages, and to guard them as a heritage for the generations that follow, but to add new treasures and to make new disclosures from age to age. Such progress does not imply any change in the essential verities of divine revelation. At the same time, however, it should be borne in mind that theological science has to do with truth in its relation to the varying powers of human apprehension. In this respect theological science does not differ from the sciences which treat of the laws and forces of the natural world. Nature's forces existed in former centuries as they exist to-day, but how differently are they studied and applied. By the light of modern science the forces of nature are revealed to us as they could not be revealed to former generations, and the application of material forces is such as could not be foreseen by the wisest of the ancients. We accept without question the results of scientific study as applied to nature, and are eager to learn whatever new discoveries may be made by the inventive genius of the age.

Theology is a science which comprehends within its scope all things in heaven and in earth. Its investigations are pursued, it is true, mainly in the light and by the guidance of the Holy Spirit. But it is equally true that these investigations are pursued by the mind of man as influenced by the light and spirit of the age. Just as one age in its thought and methods differs from another, so does the theology of one age differ from that of another. To attempt, as has been done under the sway of dogmatism, to bind theological thought back to the standards of a past age is manifestly contrary to the law of history and of mind. Such measures, to whatever extent they may be seasoned by pious zeal, do not guard and conserve the interests of truth. To the contrary they hinder its progress.

Theology can be no exception to the rule which governs all other sciences. The idea of progress holds in the very nature of



science. As applied to the discovery and unfolding of truth in the various departments of nature and of mind no objection is raised to the law of development. But such unrestricted progress, it is claimed by some, is contrary to the nature of theology, on the assumption that, as theology has to do with things divine, its standards should therefore be of such a fixed character as to admit of but little, if any, variation. It is true that theology, as regards its objective contents, has to do with Him who is "the same yesterday, to-day and forever." As no other science it deals with realities eternal and unchangeable. But the science of theology relates itself no less to man, his rational powers, his apprehension of things divine. Revelation is always conditioned by the varying aptitude of men, by the intellectual and spiritual capacity of those who seek the truth.

We find, therefore, that theology conforms to the same law which rules the natural and metaphysical sciences. Its standards vary under the influence of the peculiar mental, moral and spiritual forces which distinguish one age from another. Its progress is not uniformly even. There are periods of repression, and what may seem to be retrogression. The consciousness of one age may not be retained in its fullness by a succeeding age, as shown in the serious falling off in the period immediately succeeding that of the apostles. Such retrogression, following seasons of unusual spiritual elevation, does not contradict the law of historical development. The movement in general is nevertheless onward and progressive. In the degree that it partakes of the nature of science, theology must open itself to the mind of the age and welcome to itself whatever of value it may have to contribute.

At the present time theology is exposed to the same influences which affect all other sciences. It is largely controlled by the searching, critical spirit which would "prove all things" by the application of scientific methods. The objection is raised that unbelieving rationalism employs like methods in its attack against the Christian faith. This may not be questioned. The present age is fraught with peculiar perils. Much mental and spiritual

disquietude has been caused through the raising of doubts as to the sources of religious knowledge. But as these perils are not the product of the scientific spirit, neither can they be overcome by the attempt to silence the voice of criticism, and by resisting scientific methods of investigation. The successful resistance of "science falsely so-called," can best be accomplished by a friendly alliance with true science, by enlisting its fullest service in the interests of Christ's kingdom. By its help men may secure that "reasoned conviction" as to the facts and doctrines of Christianity, which is the high reward of the Christian student, and which the writers of the New Testament sought to produce.

Scientific investigation does not imply unbelief, hostility to, or denial of the Christian faith. Its purpose is to verify, to attain certitude as to alleged facts. Is there anything to be feared from such source and methods? It is justly claimed as a strong proof of Christianity's legitimate tenure that it can encourage free inquiry into its title-deeds. We should have such confidence in our defenses and their impregnability as to be willing to face the enemy at every point of attack. If, in the conflict with the forces of unbelief, we discover that our weapons and armor are weak by reason of the admixture of error and ignorance, then there is but one course to pursue, namely, to enlighten ignorance and to eliminate error. If in the quest after truth we discover that our vision has been contracted, then must we rise to a higher plane that truth's horizon may be enlarged, and that we may see with clearer vision. To this end we should welcome light from every possible source—the light of the Holy Spirit, the light of nature, the light of reason, the light of modern science, the light of Christian scholarship, so that we may be led onward into an ever-widening realm where new disclosures may be made to us and fuller revelations of truth become our possession.

Now, it must be acknowledged that these phases of recent theology—its liberal tendency, its impressibility, and its close affiliation with other sciences—appear in marked contrast with the sternness, the rigidity and exclusiveness of the older systems. And it is not strange that in the transition there should be a re-



action accompanied with more or less violence. The abandonment of old wine-skins always excites provocation and protest.

The contrast between the old order and the new becomes very apparent when we inquire into the main characteristics of present theological thought.

Modern theology differs widely from the older systems in its diminishing regard for, if not aversion to the use of metaphysics, and in giving prominence more particularly to the ethical side of religion. It throws open for fresh consideration problems which, for a long time, had been sealed up in ecclesiastical dogmas, and gives to them a vitality and power both in the sphere of theological thought and that of practical religious life, which they could not have under the rule of traditional orthodoxy. They are being brought into sympathetic touch with the mind and heart of the age.

In emphasizing the truth that Christianity is life rather than dogma, theology is finding a congenial home for itself on earth. Nor does it lose any of its heavenly properties by being brought down out of the clouds into the abodes of men where the minds and hearts of the unlearned may share with scholastics the knowledge of the deep things of God.

The doctrine of God is presented in a light in which all who will may see. And the knowledge of God is made as real for men as that which through the senses they obtain of the external world. What God is in His ontological relations and transcendental attributes, may or may not be known to those who profess to be schooled in the esoteric mysteries; but what God is in relation to His own children and to the world, is a knowledge open to all who from the heart profess belief in Him as the Father. The love of God, which is something more than an attribute of Deity, defines, as nothing else can, the essential nature of the Divine Being. This is regarded by new theology as the starting point of all Christian theology, for the reason that it brings God face to face with man in the relation of a father to his child. It is also the true *anfangspunkt* for the study of all of God's relations to man and to the world. Only in the light of this regu-

lative principle may the metaphysical relations of Deity be studied by theologians who delight to contemplate the being of God in His pretemporal and purely heavenly sphere. And to those who are content to contemplate God within the sphere of revelation, there is presented a view of God, of man and the world, and of their relations to one another, which serves to correct the one-sided conception of Augustinianism, as well as the false views of materialism and Pantheism. At the same time, it gives due recognition to the truth of natural theology, of ethnic religions, and of the various systems of philosophical and religious belief taught by all searchers after truth in pre-Christian times.

A phase, perhaps I should say a system, of theology expounded by a certain group of Christian thinkers, and which at present attracts considerable attention, appears under the title of "Christocentric." It is so named because it identifies Christianity with the doctrine of the person of Christ. The simple creed of this new theology is that Christ is a unique being who incarnates the love of God, and satisfies perfectly all the requirements of ideal humanity.

It is not entirely free from mystical and philosophical tendencies, as may be inferred from such phrases as "the Eternal Filial" and "the Christ in Deity." It professes, however, to confine its scope to the revelation of Christ on the fact-basis of His earthly history. The doctrine of pre-existence transcends the sphere of revelation, and also the limits of human apprehension, and is of no value to the science of theology because it has no direct bearing on Christian experience. The historical foundations of Christianity as these are laid in the Gospel history are adequate for the doctrine of the Divine nature of Jesus. He is the perfect revealer of God; and the revelation of Divinity is one with the revelation of perfect humanity.

In Christocentric theology there is a reaction against the old orthodoxy which exalted the Divine at the expense of the human in Jesus. It allows no abridgement of the nature and laws of humanity in Jesus, but enlarges the conception of both to the



fullest possible extent, and claims at the same time by this means to exalt equally His divine nature. This theology gives special prominence to the Father-nature of God, and to the perfect ideal human life as lived by Jesus. It is a practical, simple Gospel which makes an appeal to the heart as well as to the mind.

It bids all to worship, obey and love Jesus. To have the same mind which was in Him, to possess His spirit, is salvation. This is the Christianity of the Gospels as taught by its Founder.

To the readers of this REVIEW who, for fully half a century, have been familiar with Christocentric theology, and have contended for it against various forms of error, it may seem a surprising thing to hear it announced that "a certain group of thinkers propose a new theology known as Christocentric." Here there might be occasion to quarrel for honors not rightly placed, if one were to yield to petty denominational pride. The only regret is that the Christocentric theology long familiar to Mercersburg and Lancaster should at so late a day find its way to New England and Old England. It would be interesting to note, from the standpoint of this REVIEW, the differences of the two theological systems which claim to be controlled by the same great principle, but criticism is not the purpose of this paper. Reference is made in this connection to the professedly new Christocentric theology not because it appears under an old name, but because it is new theology notwithstanding the old name. The quality of newness must be ascribed to it as taught in its original home no less than as expounded by later disciples in other parts. If at times it has seemed to lack much of its former freshness and vigor, this has been due, perhaps, to the error of regarding it as a finished product of the earlier master minds. It does not diminish the high honor which the theological world attaches to the names of Nevin and Schaff, to say that these eminent and earliest teachers of Christocentric theology in America simply led the way in the study of theology from a new and better standpoint as compared with that of former doctrinal standards. They wrote no final chapter. They did not profess to set bounds to the realm of truth into which they led and accom-

panied their pupils. As prophets they pointed the way to a fuller apprehension and wider application of the theological and philosophical principles which they taught.

It may be said, therefore, that Christocentric theology has a larger meaning for men to-day than it could have fifty or twenty-five years ago. As appropriated by Biblical theology it is opening anew many of the old theological problems that were closed by doctrinal fiat. God, man, the relation of God to man, Christ in His relation to the Father and to man, the Kingdom of God, the Church, the Sacraments, ecclesiastical polity, Christianity in relation to human government, the sociological and economic problems of the age—all these questions, old and new, are demanding earnest study, and, as believed by many thoughtful minds, can find their proper solution only in the light of the Christocentric principle.

New theology applies critical methods to the study of the Bible. That does not mean an assault upon the Bible. It means a clearer, more enlightened apprehension and more rational appreciation of the Word of God. A theology that would rest upon the Bible as “the only rule of faith and practice” very justly asks that the Bible be widely opened, and that nothing be hid which can be made manifest. It asks that every page and line and letter be examined under the most searching light that can be shed upon them. It will have all the facts pertaining to the history of the Bible made known. It accepts the Bible as the Word of God and as the work of man. As a book composed by many authors of varied talent, transcribed over and over again, often by careless hands, some of its pages annotated, others subjected to editorial revision—as a book passing through many vicissitudes—it is not exempt from the laws of literature.

Theological science does not transcend its province when it invites thorough inspection of every part of the Bible, and presses to the utmost limits questions pertaining to the purity and integrity of the text, “proving all things,” so that it may “hold fast that which is good.” If purity of text be essential to correct interpretation, there should be nothing to fear from Textual



Criticism, whose aim is to recover, as far as possible, the original Scriptures. Rather should the results of such critical investigation be gratefully accepted as valuable aids to intelligent Bible study.

Criticism goes a step further, and inquires into the antecedents and credentials of each separate book. It applies the tests of science to ascertain, if possible, the authorship and date, the sources from which the author drew, the peculiar circumstances of his age, the various influences which aided in shaping his thought, and thereby to obtain all possible information as to the origin and structure of every book of the Bible. If such questions should be answered at all, it is of utmost importance that they be answered correctly. This is the aim of Higher Criticism. Its purpose, as pursued by Christian scholars, is to bring to light all available data which may be of service in the study of the Bible as literature, with the view to correct misconception and misinterpretation, and to bring the Bible nearer to the hearts of men by making it clearer to their understanding.

New theology makes room for Historical Criticism. By means of it alleged historical facts are investigated in order to ascertain the basis of reality on which they rest. Bible history is entitled to no less thorough study and research than secular history. It merits more because it is Bible history. If we admit that Christianity is a historical religion, and that it bases its claims ultimately upon the actual occurrence in human history of certain visible and audible events, then no one may deny the right and duty of inquiring into the exact nature of these events, and of seeking all available information concerning them not only from the Bible, but also from collateral sources.

This is the work of Historical Criticism. It applies scientific methods in testing the validity, and in determining—so far as it can determine by scientific methods—the meaning of Biblical history. It pursues in like manner the study of Christian doctrine and Church History, and seeks to ascertain from all available sources to what extent doctrinal belief and ecclesiastical polity have been fashioned and modified by the manifold forces which have been operative in human history and civilization.



Criticism turns its burning light upon every phase of religious thought and life. Problems in doctrine, polity and cultus are being re-studied from new standpoints, and that the results are largely influencing religious belief may not be questioned.

It is not argued that scientific methods are the means above all others best adapted for acquiring and promoting religious truth, and that the critical function is of primary importance as applied to things spiritual.

As a reaction against the former sway of traditionalism, as an extreme begotten by an extreme, the scientific spirit may have assumed undue prominence in controlling the religious thought of the age, and it is probable that the results will not prove in all respects satisfactory. But, on the other hand, there should be no hesitancy in acknowledging that new interest has been awakened in every department of theological science, and that contributions of incalculable value have been made to the fund of religious knowledge as the result of the application of scientific methods.

New theology has made friends with the scientific and critical spirit, and by its aid investigates truth in the light of human reason as well as in the light of the divine Spirit. It obviates thereby a conflict between religion and science, between faith and reason. It does not distinguish as widely as theology hitherto has done between the natural and supernatural, and thus avoids a dualism between God and nature. It views the universe as one, over which and in which God rules. His presence and power are revealed in the ordinary course of nature and history as well as in miraculous phenomena and portentous events.

All laws and forces in the natural and spiritual realms are under the direction of His will, and conserve a common purpose and a common end. New theology, therefore, recognizes all truth as having a common source. The truths of science, philosophy and religion in their last analysis are one. All are of God. All sciences which have the truth of nature as their object, are the handmaids of religion. Inherently there can be no conflict between science and religion. Nature and revelation are both the expression of the divine mind. Fortunately there is a grow-



ing recognition of the unity of truth, which is fast overcoming the barriers which hitherto have kept religion and science apart. Their complete union is possible, because theology is seeking Christ and Christ is the truth, while science is seeking the truth and the truth is Christ.\*

Consistently with its conception of the unity of the universe new theology maintains also the idea of the unity and continuity of human life. It does not draw a broad line of separation between the present world and that which is to come. Whatever power death may have in the way of effecting a transition, a mysterious change, it does not break the course of life's development. Of itself, death has no transforming power upon personality and character. It does not save, nor does it condemn.

New theology gives encouragement to the "larger hope." It allows the possibility of entrance into the Kingdom to those who have passed into the death state without having willfully rejected the truth as it is in Jesus.

It raises the questions: Whether it is within the province of Christian dogma to issue the decree that all hope of repentance and redemption necessarily ends with the grave, and whether souls that struggled through conflicts and doubts after light, which was not seen this side of the grave, shall, by means of death, be plunged into eternal and hopeless darkness?

The relation of the Reformed Church to the later developments in theological science has been plainly indicated throughout the present discussion. The Reformed Church has never wavered in fidelity to the fundamental articles of the Christian faith as these are set forth in the brief and simple statements of the Apostles' Creed. This ancient symbol is the foundation upon which rests the entire structure of the symbolical and theological literature of the Reformed Church. The Apostles' Creed holds a central place in the Heidelberg Catechism, and, like a beating heart, warms with its vitalizing power every part of the system. Further, the Apostles' Creed regulates

\* Recent Tendencies in Theological Thought, *The American Journal of Theology*; January, 1897, p. 121.

the Pericopes, the scriptural selections, which are adapted to the cycle of the Christian year. Likewise the theology of the Reformed Church, throughout its history, has rested upon, and found its regulative principle in this brief but unexcelled symbol of faith.

Holding firmly to the essential and unchangeable facts of Christianity, as expressed in the articles of the creed, all of which relate themselves directly to the person of Christ as the central object of faith, the Reformed Church has always felt secure as to the foundations of its doctrinal teaching, and has allowed, perhaps, exceptional freedom in the development of theological science.

It recognizes the fact that the Christian thinks as well as believes, and that the apprehension of truth varies from age to age, and, therefore, it has never formulated a fixed doctrinal standard which should serve as a mould for the religious thought of succeeding generations. Reformed theology has always been new and progressive. While honoring the past and the standards of the past, it cannot rest content with the truth as wrought out in former ages. It would ever move forward, seeking to attain to higher planes, that it may apprehend the truth with clearer vision and in larger measure.

Such is its attitude to-day. It will accept no system of theology, whether belonging to the past or present, as the embodiment of all truth. It retains and cherishes the truth of old theology, and, at the same time, warmly welcomes the truth of the new. It asserts its claim upon all truth, and would have the scope of theological science so enlarged as to allow unrestricted freedom of inquiry and research along every line that has been opened or may be opened by the mind of man in its quest after new light and more truth.

The truth shall make men free, and as freedom comes by truth so does truth advance by freedom.



## II.

# THE PRESENT TREND OF THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT.

BY REV. J. I. SWANDER, D. D.

The writer's visit to the leading Presbyterian city in the world afforded him a rare opportunity to observe and compare a few of the various methods of ecclesiastical thinking now prevalent, if not predominant, in the compass of an ever-restless and inquiring Christendom. Arriving in Glasgow June 16, 1896, and alighting from the London Day Express, we found ourself, first of all, impressed with the presumptuous and pretentious ecclesiasticism of narrow-gauged Presbyterian glory. The coming together of "The Alliance of Reformed Churches" in the sixth General Council was liberally preannounced by large and attractive posters. On our way through the crowded streets to the Windsor Hotel we could read the evidence of our arrival: "Twenty millions of Presbyterians represented in the city; three hundred Presbyterian delegates in Glasgow from all parts of the world; the Pan-Presbyterian assembly will convene on the 17th in St. Andrew's Hall." Great is Presbyteriology!

On the morning of the 17th, as a recipient of unbounded Scotch hospitality, under the Christian care and direction of the local management of the "Pan," and forgetful of the fact that our certificate as a delegate from the Reformed Church in the United States was a testimonial of our appointment to the "Alliance," we immediately fell into the "Pan" and joined the trend of theological thought or thoughtlessness to the Barony Church, whence the company proceeded to the Cathedral. At the Cathedral, both the "Pan" and the "Alliance" were apparently left out of mind. The imposing and impressive service was such as to render the occasion a sweet communion of saints in the fellowship of a broad and catholic conception of the Gospel. The spiritual

edification and delight of the hour received no little assistance from the very appropriate and truly gospel sermon preached by that advance agent of Scotch theology, Dr. Marshall Lang, who left his audience under the impression that he was fully abreast with the world's leading trend of stalwart and progressive theological thinking. Although a genuine Scotchman of Glasgow, he seems to have inherited not only a German name, but also the German method of apprehending the truth. Indeed it was intimated that he had been drinking deep at the Pierian spring of German literature. His great convocational and communion sermon on "The Church as the body of Christ" was very properly regarded by many as a keynote to the tune of future Presbyterian theology. That his sermon found approval in the general theological sentiment of the "Alliance," and that the preacher had the full confidence of the "Pan" was shown beyond a doubt when the Council, at one of its subsequent sessions, elected him by a unanimous vote as its next President, at the 7th assembly of the Alliance to convene at Washington city in 1899.

Aside from the reading of current theological literature, there is probably no means on earth that affords more correct information concerning the various methods of theological thinking and inquiry than regular attendance upon, and close attention at the sessions of a great assembly like that convened in Glasgow in 1896. It was the writer's privilege to be present at twenty of those sessions and, to some little extent, take part in the proceedings and discussions growing out of the very excellent papers read in St. Andrew's Hall on nearly a hundred phases of the general subject under consideration by that pious and scholarly assemblage of Christian men convened from different parts of our general Christendom. Having availed ourself of the means of information indicated above, we re-crossed the Atlantic fully convinced that the Church has not yet reached its theological Millennium.

We are probably safe in assuming, without fear of reasonable contradiction, the correctness of the following propositions: 1. The Millennium will in some sense be the closing chapter of the



world's great history. 2. History, unless it should meet with the catastrophe of a terrible abortion, involves a process destined to culminate in perfection. 3. Such process is not primarily one of accretion, but of development, progress and triumph. 4. Such triumph must of constitutional necessity be sufficiently broad to include, not only the victory of holiness over sin and life over death, but also that of truth over error; truth must triumph gloriously. 5. Such triumph means vastly more than the overthrow of error and the dispersion of its darkness; truth must triumph for itself and be glorified for its own sake. 6. Such glorification implies a twofold process, viz.: A revelation from and by the Divine and Infinite to and through the human and the finite; and also such a clear and full apprehension of the former by the latter as to reflect the image of the Personal Divine and Infinite, like the sea of glass round about the throne.

This reflective process which looks toward and is destined to culminate in a full and final apprehension of the absolute truth is carried forward through legitimate and persistent scientific inquiry after, and investigation of the revealed, yet deep things of God. Although divine revelation is twofold in form, through the Holy Scriptures and Nature, it is only one in fact. So science, though manifold in the several immediate fields of its inquiry, is nevertheless one in its scope and ultimate purpose. The distinction between theology and science is without foundation in fact. Theology is no less a science, but rather more so, because its peculiar realm of truth is explored in the exercise of Christian faith, as well as human reason. Theology is the queen of sciences. They are the vestal virgins in attendance at her holy altar. "Theology," says Dr. Augustus H. Strong, "seeks Christ and Christ is the truth, while science seeks the truth and the truth is Christ." The foregoing sentence contains truth, yet it may not be unqualifiedly true to state that "the truth is Christ."

That the foregoing views are not entirely out of line and harmony with the leading trend of modern theological thought is clearly evident from up-to-date current theological literature. Dr. Charles A. Briggs, whatever may be thought of his higher criti-



cisms, must be acknowledged as one of the most vigorous thinkers, versatile scholars, progressive theologians and fearless writers of the present time. His recent paper on "The Scope of Theology" may be regarded as fairly indicating the present tendency of inquiry and progress. According to his view, the properly arranged seminary course of study includes the whole range of sciences, because "all the sciences spring from theology as their common mother, and tend to theology as their common goal."

Philology, philosophy, the physical sciences, psychology, historic theology, medicine and law belong, in all their proper ramifications, to the household of the mother queen, and should be permitted to accompany and assist her in her onward and upward march to prepare the way for the absolute truth and make His paths straight.

Progress, in the sense of development in the science of theology, or, for that matter, in any other science, can neither be recognized nor satisfactorily viewed, only by thinkers whose minds are endowed with at least some little degree of philosophical acuteness. There must be a clear distinction made and kept between truth as something having objective being, and any possible apprehension thereof, as that which is notionally subjective, and subject to modification or change in the minds of men. Evolution may not be predicated of truth as to its divine essence, "whose goings forth have been from of old, from the days of eternity." It belongs to the realm and onflow of history. It is God's method of doing things in time. Viewed as such, who is afraid of it? Only those fixed and finished theologians whose pessimistic and atomistic methods of unprogressive thought lead them to accomplish but little more than to scare the children, and immortalize their mechanical theories in dessicated orthodoxy.

What then is truth as it comes from the realm eternal and source divine through a progressive revelation to man, to the intent that it may be apprehended by the human in the realm of the historic? "Truth," says Dr. J. W. Nevin, "is not something abstract, existing only as a notion or unsubstantial thought. It is



actual being and substance, and lives everywhere instinct with the life of God Himself. It is not an accidental outward and separable quality of other things anywhere, but the very inmost essence and sense of all normal things, the original necessity of their existence, and the self-active power and force by which they continually subsist. This character of substantiality and vitality belongs to truth first of all only in the Lord Himself. He is the absolute truth, as He is for that reason the absolute life, the one involving the other. Those then who think of either life or truth as having in itself any existence for either men or angels in separate view, or as something disparted from life and truth in God, may be sure that they labor here under fundamental mistake." It is partially because the leading theological thinkers of the present age, assisted by recent archæological, philological and psychological discoveries, are no longer obliged to labor under the above-mentioned fundamental mistake, that the highway for development and progress has been opened up and broadened for the incoming century of the Christian era.

The present trend of theological thought is measurably retarded in its movement by several circling eddies of inquiry along the current as to the primary source of knowledge essential to the solution of the problems toward which the science is now bending its best energies. These alleged sources are various, and differ according to the points of view respectively occupied ecclesiastically or otherwise. Romanism lays stress upon the Church, Protestantism upon the Bible and Rationalism upon reason as sources of knowledge. It matters but little what Romanism teaches on any subject touching the general question of theological science, because she is confessionally and traditionally committed against all proper progress. "It would be unreasonable," says Dr. Van Oosterzee, "to prescribe to the function of reason an unconditional silence" in searching after the knowledge of divine things. "The written word," says Dr. E. V. Gerhart, "is in one view a valid source of knowledge, but under another view it is not. It is a derived and subordinate source, but not original and fontal. Such subordinate source it is only when held in its

internal and vital connection with the entire economy of the Messianic revelation." This last view is fundamental and in harmony with the central tendency of all Evangelical and scientific theology which is just now emphasizing the fact that in Jesus Christ "are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden."

The truth expressed in the foregoing quotation from Col. 2:2, is received as a matter of course by the entire Christian world, while its various interpretations and applications to the science of theology are widely different. This fact was probably more fully demonstrated in the proceedings and discussions of the recent great Council at Glasgow than is generally obvious from even a careful reading of the representative ecclesiastical literature of the times. There was to some degree a manifest feeling that even Presbyterianism had, in some sense, drifted away from some cardinal point of the Christian compass. "Let us get back to first principles," was in substance the desire and purpose of all. But what are first principles, and where shall we find them? was echoed from the other side of St. Andrew's Hall. "We shall find them with the Fathers; let us hurry back with rapid speed and according to standard time," was suggested by the left center of the orthodox. Dr. Blackie was of the opinion that we ought to go back to the Grandfathers, meaning, probably, St. Augustine and the theologians of a more primitive age. Others thought that we had better get back to the Apostles, provided, however, that no concession be made to the Anglican claim of finger-tip succession. At this point the United Presbyterians from Canada suggested that we had better go back to the Psalms of David. Then, after Isaac Watts and the organ had been put to silence by the magnanimous suggestion of Dr. Lang, it was tacitly agreed that we should all go back to Christ. But in what sense? Is the Church of history to retrace its history to obtain the truth from the historic Christ—"the forerunner?" Heb. 6:20. It was interesting, and at times smile-provoking to listen to those learned pious children from every continent of the world piping a thousand samples of their theological wares. Of course there was a union of hearts and a harmony of voices in every move-



ment that would crown Immanuel Lord of all, but, as with Pilate of old, the troublous question would constantly arise from the standpoint of each theological school: "What more shall we do with Jesus?" It was claimed by each one that Christ was central in his own compilation of biblical doctrines or catalogue of theological tenets; yet it was apparent to a close observer that the centrality of Christ's person was generally accorded a place in the plan of salvation in a sense somewhat similar to that in which the Kohinoor diamond might be regarded as having found its proper setting in a jeweled cluster of less precious and less brilliant stones.

It is not according to anything like the foregoing conception of Christ's relation to theology that He is held by the most vigorous and leading type of Christian thought. The cardinal principle of this truly progressive theological science is the theanthropic person of Immanuel. What think ye of Christ? is now the test question of all doctrinal systems. What relation is His person recognized as sustaining to the human race and to all the departments of human learning? Is He recognized as the generic man, the second Adam, the refounder and reorganizer of the human family, upon a higher plane of human being, with a broader field of human activity and a higher goal of human destiny? This Christo-fontal and Christological question has been coming to the front for several decades of anxious years. The fundamental principle that it proclaims is evidently destined to work itself into the blood and fiber of all theology worthy of the name, until the theological teachings of all the Christian schools shall send their flashes of new inspiration through all the world and to all the inhabitants thereof. It is even now stimulating much thoughtful Christian scholarship to a higher recognition of Christ as the architect, archetype, foundation and crowning glory of all religious, ethical and philosophical superstructures not constructed out of the wood, hay and stubble whose only element of worth is excellent combustibility. It is through such an organic and growing apprehension of the personal and absolute truth that the wisdom of God in a mystery becomes the wisdom of man in



history. "And look that thou make them after the pattern which was shown thee in the Mount." Ex. 25:40. This command has not lost its force, neither has it passed away with those Heaven-ordained types of better things to come. Obedience to the general principle underlying that injunction, made the son of Pharaoh's daughter illustrious, and his work enduring through all the ages. It was no mistake of Moses. Neither did the great pioneer and master builder in modern theological thought make a mistake when Dr. J. Williamson Nevin wrote: "It is the order of things in Heaven reaching down into the condition of things on earth, that serves to impart to these any significance they can ever have in the way of resemblance to heavenly things." It should, therefore, ever be held and must be allowed to govern as a principle of general application that "As is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly." It applies to wisely-built religious institutions and doctrinal systems no less than to the saints who have the promise of a glorious resurrection in virtue of their mystical union with that same Second Adam who is now reconstructing all things after Himself, the Archetype. All Christians are lively stones in the edifice now in the process of erection; some are builders and a few are master builders, but Christ still continues to build His Church, and to mould everything pertaining thereto in such sense as to have and hold the organic preëminence. The whole must conform to the heavenly personal "pattern in the Mount"—Mount Zion. The life and truth of the personal Christ is the moulding power within and from within. Hence it follows that the Church and everything pertaining organically thereto is ordained and freely destined to take such form, and ultimately only such form as will be fairly and fully responsive to the personal pattern therein. Any attempt therefore, either in the way of ecclesiastical legislation, confessional compilations of fragmentary truths or even mere logical reasonings, to mold the rising and prevailing theology of the future, will prove to have just about as much effect as the crowing of the cock upon the heaven-ordained ordinance of sunrise.

This movement in stalwart theological thinking is destined, in



the solution of the problems that confront it, to eliminate much now tolerated by virtue of old traditions in the present system of orthodoxy, reject much of the so-called Christian doctrine which is yet to be tested of what sort it is, and incorporate much that has hitherto been kept under the ban of the standards. Unitarianism, humanitarianism and all Christless theories of sociology, together with the logical results of their teachings will be repelled and cast on desert shore to perish in the destructive winds of heaven. Some of the tentative theories now held in speculative theology may triumphantly pass the test of the newly kindled old fires by which every man's work is to be tried: For example, the question of the eternal humanity of Christ; whether the eternal Son would have become incarnate if man had not sinned, as held and openly advocated by Liebner, Martensen, Ebrard, Dorner and others; whether salvation is to be offered to the millions of heathen who are now in the hadean realm, that "hell may ope her dolorous portals" to the Gospel's heavenly light.

It is also a faithful saying worthy of all acceptation that this Christological and historical theology does not radically antagonize or aim to destroy the essential parts of any doctrine or tenet of the faith once delivered to the saints. For example, the divine Sovereignty, the elective prerogative of the absolute One, the fatherhood of God, the eternal sonship of Jesus Christ, the personality of the Holy Ghost, the brotherhood of man, universal depravity on account of sin, justification by faith—these, with all other obvious teachings of the Bible, whether formulated into confessions or otherwise held, will be neither ignored nor set aside as of less importance than as generally held in the creeds of Christendom. It is claimed, however, that they are to take their respective positions in the periphery and around the center of a more organic system. As now placed and viewed in the atomistic and manufactured plans of salvation none of these doctrines appear in their truth and beauty. It is not proposed to shoot a new theological meteor into the skies to serve as a new luminary, but to permit the old Sun of righteousness to arise with healing

in His wings. It is only with such a sunrise that a better theological day is ushered in. Christ as the illuminative center will drive the Ptolemaic system of unphilosophical theology away. The science of Christology will then have a different meaning because of the ready recognition of a more proper and organic relation to anthropology, soteriology and ecclesiology.

The common element of comparative weakness in some of the theological systems of the world is not that they are destitute of the truth as to their several parts. Their incompleteness consists neither in a want of quantity nor quality, but in the lack of organic wholeness. A fragmentary collection of even perfect parts does not necessarily constitute a perfect whole. One of the weaknesses of much theology is a defective ecclesiology. Although the Church question has been prominently before the Church for half a century, the institution is not yet clearly conscious of itself as an organic constitution. The truth of the foregoing sentence was made clear to close observers in the great Glasgow alliance. The faith of that large Cathedral audience was much better than its theology. When Dr. Lang preached his opening sermon on the Church as the body of Christ, his audience was frequently electrified with some of the fairest samples of gospel lightning ever liberated from the clouds of the upper world. It was interesting, to those of us who watched as well as prayed, to see the old Scotch divines receive the flashes of Christocentric truth with a relish that caused them to smile themselves into a comparatively high degree of Presbyterian felicity. The next day the ceilings of St. Andrew's Hall echoed the old distinction between the visible and the invisible Church. What nonsense! In this particular holding what advantage has Protestantism over popery? Is a head with two bodies any less a monstrosity than a body with two heads? A sound Christology must bring with it a correct and consistent ecclesiology; and it seems reasonable to expect that the Christological sentiment which is now laying hold of the best life and learning of the Christian world will soon come to see, as Dr. Marshall Lang stated in his convocational sermon in Glasgow, that a "body" is



not a mere aggregation of materials thrown together in a convenient and comely shape, not a mere organization, but an organism, incorporating not only members, but invisible forces and functions which grow out of and are ever resident in that order of life which is in the world by virtue of the incarnation, and which is now unfolding itself in the *One Holy Catholic Church*.

It follows, moreover, that the development of this Christocentric idea, when complemented with a corresponding ecclesiology, will not only retain all the elements of truth now possessed by the several old theories of the atonement, but also restate and incorporate them in a system of theology more consistent with itself, and more in harmony with a growing Christian consciousness and its reasonable demands. In obedience to such demands the science of soteriology must so modify itself as to fall more fully into line with better conceptions of the character of God. Such modification is not only possible, but also necessitated by that Christocentric Sun which can never be the center of any theological system in which each part is not organically related according to that which every joint supplieth. Without such organic relations the new theology would be worse than the old. It would be merely a new patch on an old garment, or the sewing of an old patch on a new crazy quilt. In either case the rent would be made worse. How, for example, could a sound Christological theology have room for any of those old theories of the atonement which now seem to have had no other aim than to keep God out of trouble and to give the devil his dues. The Anselmic theory, which moulded many of the doctrines of the Reformation and shaped the standards subsequently produced, would and should be saved as to all the "gold, silver and precious stones" which it contains, but such salvation is possible only by the fire of that higher criticism and development which belong to God's method of moving things on to superlative perfection.

The origin and history of this Christological tendency in modern theology have already received considerable mention in the January number of this REVIEW. Whether it be an outgrowth of the Hegelean philosophy, as charged by some, or a

product of New England's inventive genius, as claimed by others, need not be discussed in this paper. Suffice it to say that the movement is on in cumulative force, with staying as well as progressive qualities. In a proper sense of the term it is a new theology; in another sense it is not. It roots itself in the fertile soil of the past, unfolds itself as the current of years rolls by, and will go on to perfection in that great hereafter which is close at hand. Free to be bound by the true of the past, bound to be free from the error of the present and inspired by the hope of full freedom in the future, it is already playing its progressive parts before a more appreciative audience than the one that tried to hiss it from the stage a half century ago. On the 8th of April, 1848, the *New York Observer*, standing then upon the highest watch-tower of perfected orthodoxy, denounced the theology of Dr. Schaff as "German transcendentalism." In less than a quarter of a century after the promulgation of that Protestant bull the German transcendentalist had become the biggest Indian in the revisionary wilderness of Presbyterianism. So goes the world around. The men who were cannonaded in the middle of the 19th century are canonized at its close. Some seminaries that once taught theology according to the Standards are now teaching that the Standards should be revised and raised according to some higher rule. There is a growing consciousness that the personal, historic Christ is the only creed that needs no revision. This fact was made distinctly clear in the frequent flashes of light from some of the most vigorous and logical thinkers in the Glasgow Assembly. In view of the foregoing facts it seems that the night is far spent, and that the day is at hand. Let the day star continue to arise, and the central movement in theological science continue to go forward in the light of its own achievements, with a sweep of power that no prejudice can resist and worthy of the vital principle it involves.

TIFFIN, O., February, 1897.



### III.

## THE WITNESS OF JESUS TO HIMSELF AND CHRISTIANITY.\*

BY REV. A. S. WEBER, A. M.

Many of the foremost theological minds of our day are earnestly engaged in studying anew the witness of Jesus to Himself and Christianity. Wearied and unsatisfied by the accumulated traditional forms and theories of religious thought, they have laid them aside, and, like men thirsting after pure water, turned to the personal Fountain in Whom there is a revelation of all truth. Their favorite cry "Back to Christ," sometimes too narrowly interpreted, indicates that it is by Jesus' witness alone they propose testing and verifying whatever is to be given authentic place in the Christian Theology of the future. It is not strange that this cry should be calling out enthusiastic followers in constantly increasing numbers, so reasonable seems the purpose, so full of promise the method that is to be pursued. Nor is it strange that the intellectual results of the movement should be so rapidly multiplying. Not a few of the most interesting and helpful productions in current theological discussion are inspired by the principle, and the direct outgrowth of the method to which reference is here made.

Among these there is a volume of last year whose marks of theological insight and power, combined with a rare felicity of literary execution and finish, make it worthy perhaps of being called a work of genius. The book notices of THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW have already directed attention to it, but its character and contents seem to deserve the somewhat more particular examination which in this connection it is proposed to give them. One needs not to read far into *The Mind of the Master* to

\* "The Mind of the Master," by John Watson, D.D., Dodd, Mead and Company, New York, 1896.

discover that the title of the book is indicative of its aim and purpose, its method and results. The author of it belongs to the school of thought that is laboring for the reconstruction of doctrinal formulas according to the word and spirit of the great Teacher come from God, and to free them from all bondage to creed or confessional standard. He does not conceal his impatience with the dogmas of the past that "once flowed molten from hearts fired with divine love, but have now run down into a mould and settled into a cast-iron shape." He applauds the earnestness of men who are "dissatisfied not with principles, but their forms, and therefore make a clean sweep of dogma; who raze the building to the ground, and then examine the foundations, the elementary facts and experiences of revelation." He believes that already "a few swallows" are heralding the better spring that is approaching, and mentions Dr. Fairbairn's *Christ in Modern Theology*, and Canon Gore's *Incarnation* as "the beginning of a time, a time for which many are praying." His own volume, though more modest in pretention, and less systematic and comprehensive in purpose, is deserving of a place side by side with those remarkable and justly famous books.

If reliance can be put in what appear to be authentic reports as to the large sales of *The Mind of the Master*, no recent contribution to theological thought has received so wide a reading from the public in general as Dr. Watson's volume. It is certain that for some time none has furnished ministerial and theological circles with a more interesting theme for discussion, or the religious magazines and journals a richer topic for review. Such facts, however, will not commend the book to those who always look askance upon a widely read author, and regard with suspicion the pages he has written. But no one will discover Dr. Watson to be pandering to a vicious popular taste, or to be supplying light and frivolous thought to satisfy a perverse theological opinion on the part of the public. The enthusiastic reception given the volume must be accounted for in some other way.

This may be done in part, no doubt, by the stimulus which



had been given to public desire for the author's writings by his previously published semi-fictitious books. The simplicity, the moral earnestness, the beauty, the pathos of those publications, all of which have a distinct ethical and even spiritual purpose, had won a large constituency ready to welcome this more stately, if not more serious, effort of his gifted pen. In part also, the happily chosen name given to his book must have contributed to the same end. Somewhere he indignantly declares it to be "an impudent assertion that people of average intelligence have no interest in theology," adding that "if anyone dares to deal with questions of faith after an understanding fashion he has the wind with him. Since the early morn, when the echo of Christ's footsteps was still on earth, and His very appearance in the flesh was remembered, there surely has been no age wherein Christians were so anxious to understand what Jesus was and what He taught. The trend of the graver intelligence among the public is evident and is distinctly toward those great questions which form the substance of the Christian faith, and lie at the foundation of religion." The very name of the book is a challenge to those "anxious to understand Jesus," an invitation to "the graver intelligence among the public" to read its pages essaying to give an honest and earnest interpretation to the mind, the spirit, the teaching of Christ with reference to the themes brought under discussion. And the wide reading his book is receiving would seem to be a vindication of the claim that Christian doctrine properly dealt with does find favor with the people, and is not the despised thing that superficial observers have imagined and declared it to be.

It is to the character and contents of the book itself, however, rather than to its name, and the literary fame of its author, that the extraordinary warmth of welcome it has met with, must be referred. The subjects which it discusses in the light of Gospel testimony, are some of the great and absorbing themes of the spiritual life. The treatment of them, characterized by a broad-minded charity, and a refreshing simplicity, is always interesting and suggestive. The entire absence of worn-out words and

phrases from theologies that are regarded obsolete, gives a crisp, fresh atmosphere to every page. There is no want of acquaintance however, on the author's part with doctrinal systems of the past. Repeated allusions by single word, and more extended direct reference to those systems, show with what a light touch and graceful movement a scholarly theologian of the new school can pass them by.

Though not a theologian in the ordinary sense of the word, Dr. Watson, in his pages, is constantly disclosing the spirit of a theologian combined with the spirit of a poet—an intellectual love of the truth, with a spiritual vision of its relations, significance and power. The book has nothing of a controversial air about it. The result of its inquiries are set forth with a grace of calmness and ease that wins regard even where it fails to command one's approval. Thus, for instance, the results of the literary criticism of the Bible, when taken as established, are announced here and there, as quietly and confidently as if the writer had no knowledge of the discipline visited by his own Scotch communism upon others whose views he shares. Every chapter of his book reveals a heart made tender by communion with the Master's spirit, and a mind honestly and fearlessly in quest of the truth simply as confirmed by the witness of Jesus recorded in the Gospels. When the truth is missed, as to my mind at not unimportant places it is missed, one feels that this is owing, not to preconceived notions or ulterior doctrinal designs, but rather to errors of interpretation or logical inconsistencies into which he has been inadvertently betrayed. And better than all this, one lays down the book when the end of it is reached, with the conviction that, whilst imperfect here and calling for modification or correction there, its evident purpose is to magnify the Son of Man and to declare Him to be the Son of God; to show the divine character of His teaching, the supreme authority of His claims, and to commend the same to the acceptance of all for the improvement and perfecting of social conditions and relations, and for the guidance, the ennobling, the solace of individual life.

In support of this general estimate of *The Mind of the*



*Master* many characteristic passages from its several chapters would readily lend themselves, were there space at one's command for their reproduction. The end just now sought after does not necessitate this however. The present purpose will be accomplished by here pointing out, in barest outline merely, some of the more prominent doctrinal views which, as measured by the witness of Jesus, seem not to our author only, "faithful sayings and worthy of all acceptance."

To begin with, the doctrine of sin may be mentioned, of whose conventional chapters, origin, nature, treatment, Christ recognizes only the last two. Sin in its final issue is self-will, or selfishness, a view that holds every man responsible for his own sin, no matter what his hereditary weaknesses, or his social environment. With this idea of sin corresponds the Gospel teaching of salvation. Salvation comes through the cross of Christ, the cross which Christ commands his disciples to take up daily in following Him. It is the symbol of self-renunciation, and self-sacrifice; these constitute "the unsightly beam which must be set up in the midst of a man's sinful pleasures, and the jagged nails that must pierce his selfish soul." Jesus does not describe His cross as a satisfaction to God, else He had hardly asked His disciples to share it. He always speaks of it as a regeneration of man and therefore disciples must take it up daily while journeying toward Heaven. The method of salvation by magic is, in this view, displaced by a method that is grounded on reason and open to the test of personal experience.

By the side of this reference to the doctrine of sin and salvation may be placed a notice of those of faith and the person of Christ. Faith is the religious faculty and belongs to the human constitution as really and vitally as reason or conscience. Faith has self-sustaining, self-verifying power. It is the sixth sense, the sense of the unseen which detects, recognizes, loves, and trusts the goodness of God as revealed by Christ, in whose character it believes, before whose Deity it bows and worships. Christ's religion from the beginning was life, and its irresistible attraction is not the doctrines or ethics of His system, but

Christ Himself. He is the life-blood of Christianity. In spite of every intellectual difficulty we must believe Jesus to be the Son of God. He has done what no other ever did, and what only God could do. He is God because He discharges a "God-function."

Equally strong is the author's representation of the doctrines of judgment and immortality. These latter words express two of our chief convictions, and, resting in the last issue on pure reason, they sustain the heart of humanity. Judgment will be according to type of character. The conviction can never be crushed out that there must be one place for St. John, who was the friend of Jesus, and another for Judas Iscariot, who was His betrayer; one for St. Paul, the self-sacrificing Apostle, and another for Nero, the selfish persecutor. Heaven and hell hinge not on the arbitrary will of the Almighty, but on personal character. "If one surrender himself to Jesus and is crucified on His cross, there is no sin he will not overcome, no service he will not render, no virtue he will not attain. None that follow Jesus will miss Heaven; none that makes 'the great refusal' will be thrust into Heaven. One is afraid that some will inherit hell and be content."

The doctrine of the relationship between God and man, marked for notice at this point, in addition to those just referred to, is treated in one of the most brilliant and compelling chapters of the entire volume. Instead of attempting in a line or two to convey an idea of its character, it might be better perhaps simply to recommend the study of it in its entirety. It is eminently worth it, and will return abundant compensation. The idea of Divine Fatherhood, which is wholly wanting in psalmists and prophets, is a constant and radiant sense in the consciousness and life of Jesus. He toiled for years to write the truth of the Fatherhood on the minds of the disciples. In terms of the Fatherhood He stated and described with minute and affectionate care the entire circle of religious truth. Fatherhood is a revelation of the final idea of God, and is inclusive of all mankind. "People with dogmatic ends to serve have striven to believe that



Jesus reserved 'Father' for the use of His disciples, but an ingenuous person could hardly make the discovery from the Gospels. In them it is recorded: 'Then spake Jesus to the multitude and the disciples, saying, One is your Father, which is in heaven.' If Jesus did not teach a Fatherhood embracing the race, then He used words to conceal thought, and one despairs of ever understanding our Master. With the single word Father, He defines the relation of man and God, and illuminates theology." The introduction of that word, the author might have added, not only illuminates, but transforms the queen of sciences as hitherto known, in every part.

Barring the interpretation of the cross of Christ, which has been noticed, and which probably to very few will seem adequate or satisfying, the several doctrines now instanced, it is believed, will generally be regarded as a valid representation of the witness given to them by Jesus in the Gospels. And it is believed, moreover, that when read in their elaborated form in the chapters of our book, rather than in such abbreviations of them as above given, they will be found to occupy ground considerably higher than the same doctrines do in systems of thought which are no longer supported by the sanctified reason, and the enlightened Christian consciousness of our day.

From these entirely too meagre observations upon several of the numerous admirable and reassuring features of a really able and inspiring book, we turn now to the consideration of a few particulars in which it appears open to adverse criticism. This seems rather an ungracious task. One's confidence in the method of study proposed by those who, with our author, wish to go back to Christ for the data of theological thought, and one's desire to see that method approve itself to wider adoption in doctrinal effort by results free, as far as possible, from error, may be sufficient excuse however, for one's venturing to point out several peculiarities in the views of Dr. Watson's volume, which seem to reflect the Master's mind, not only imperfectly and inadequately, but erroneously and untruthfully.

Into these deficiencies the author has been led, I take it, by not

adhering strictly or consistently to the wider conception of what "Back to Christ" imports. Correctly understood it means a return to the Christ not simply of the Gospels, but the Christ also of glory. He who in the days of His flesh spoke to His disciples that of which we have a record in the Gospels, continued to witness to Himself and Christianity in the days of the Apostles subsequent to His ascension. He continues, indeed, to do so age after age in the events and experiences of history, in our individual hearts also by the mysterious working of His Holy Spirit, just as really and authoritatively as He did while present on earth in the body. These later teachings are intended to amplify and perfect and confirm the knowledge which the Gospels are designed to impart, and may not be disregarded, in my judgment, by students of theological truth who wish to build upon the broadest foundations of the witness of Christ.

Of this our author is not unaware. "When a minister leads his people in the return to Christ it is well for him," he has said in another of his books, "to avoid two extremes. He must neither go to the Gospels alone for there he is dealing with an earthly Christ, nor to the heavens alone for there he is dealing with an unknown Christ; but to Him who is alive forevermore and Him whom we have in the Gospels. Criticism gives us the historical Christ, and mysticism gives us the spiritual Christ, and both together give us the real Christ." But of this counsel he seems to be losing sight in the practical development of *The Mind of the Master*. Without recognizing, as most readers of this REVIEW probably would do, the Church and the Christian consciousness as important, if not coördinate factors with the Scriptures in our religion, Dr. Watson advances the old view, slightly modified, that "the religion of Protestants is not the Bible in all its parts, but first of all that portion which is its soul—the very words of Jesus."

Limiting his horizon in this way simply to the witness of Jesus as given in the Gospel records, he succeeds indeed, under the power of his strong historical imagination, in making "Christ after the flesh," to live once more most vividly before our eyes.



For those of us, however, who believe, with the Apostle writing to the Corinthians, that it is more important to know "Christ after the spirit," the success achieved is, of course of little significance. For is it not after all faith in the glorified Christ that is needed, rather than belief in the earthly Christ, for both our peace here and our bliss hereafter? "The historical imagination, carried even to its highest power, and suffused with the tenderest feeling," it has been strongly put by one whose words are appropriate here, "is not the same as religious faith and cannot do its work. The Christian religion depends not on what Christ was merely, but on what He is; not simply on what He did, but on what He does. It is not because He lived, but because He lives, that we also have life. It is not because the historical imagination is highly developed, so that we can make the evangelist's pages vivid, and be affected as by a fine scene in a drama, not for this reason, but because we confess with our mouth and believe in our heart that God raised Him from the dead, that we are saved. Faith always has its object here and now, and without faith there is no religion." Our author's avowed one-sided reliance simply upon the witness of the historic Jesus, to the prejudice or neglect of the witness of the glorified Christ, marks to my mind the great weakness of his book and the disclosure of it is perhaps the severest criticism that can be put upon it.

Due to this weakness, there are three views, one pertaining to Scripture, another to Creeds, and a third to the Church, which are insisted on in this volume with some warmth of emphasis, and which, according to my reading of Christ's testimony, are not sustained by it. The view of Scripture referred to draws a wide distinction as regards authority between the Gospels and the other portions of the New Testament. With reference to it, it may be remarked that much of what Dr. Watson says concerning the unique character of Christ's words must find ready acceptance with all. No thoughtful student of the New Testament books can fail to notice a wide difference between the Master and St. Paul, for instance. The voice of God is certainly audible, intelligible, persuasive, in a peculiar sense in the words of Him who

spake as never man spake. What Christ says comes from the full, overflowing depths of divine consciousness itself. Paul speaks through the medium of a human intelligence, aided and illuminated, however, by the Holy Spirit, and of course his words fall with a different sound upon our hearing.

It comes with somewhat of surprise, the stress which Dr. Watson puts upon this difference and the inference he draws from it. According to his pages the distinct sphere to which Jesus limited His teaching was religion, a science dealing not with intellectual conceptions, but with spiritual facts, such as the character of God, the principles of the spiritual life, the discipline of the soul, the development of character, the ageless life. "These are His great themes, upon these He has spoken the last word. Having come to declare the divine will and to reveal the holy and righteous Father, He would hardly omit any truth of first magnitude to be told afterwards by His servants. No one apostle or saint could or did add anything to the original deposit of Christ, however much he might expound or enforce it."

What is to be done with Christ's assurance that he had yet many things to say to His disciples which, at the time of His departure, they were not prepared to receive, but which they were to learn when the Spirit of truth, to lead them into all truth, had come, our author does not pause to inform his readers. He only insists that "it is a question that will have to be settled whether the Epistles are of the same authority for faith as the Gospels," and by implication at least shows that for himself they are not. He compares with "Jesus' Evangel," which is never local, never unintelligible, which is ever calm, convincing, human, Paul's style "at times overwrought by feeling," his illustrations, "some of which are forced," his doctrine, "often rabbinical rather than Christian," his treatment of marriage and asceticism "as lacking in sweetness." But granting all this and even more that might be shown by way of contrast between Jesus and Paul, does that empty Apostolic teaching of divine authority? Must we with the Ritschlian school, whilst accepting Apostolic testimony as to what Jesus said and did, refuse to recognize binding authority in



Apostolic theology, a theology which interprets the truth revealed in the life, death, resurrection and enthronement of Christ, and for which interpretation, the gift of the illuminating Spirit, seems to have been specially designed? The correct answer to be given to this question, it seems to me, is a negative one. The Right Rev. Dr. Satterlee, bishop of Washington, in a sermon before the Church Congress recently held in Richmond, mentioned "Ian Maclaren," among others, as teaching Ritschlian doctrine, animadverting at the same time with some severity upon this Neo-Kantian school as he characterized it. In this view on the relative authority of the Epistles as compared with the Gospels our author certainly seems to lay himself open to the bishop's charge. And, whilst willing to bow in humble and adoring worship before Christ, as the Teacher of Supreme Authority, many will continue, contrary to *The Mind of the Master*, to insist that His authority is vindicated by the Holy Spirit as being present also in words of prophets, psalmists and apostles, and that, to their thinking, the distinction as to authority in different portions of the New Testament made by the author is pressed beyond proper warrant.

The second view, that of the contrast between the Sermon on the Mount and the creeds of the Church, brings to the surface Dr. Watson's extreme revulsion from all dogma. Intimation of this has already been given. The commandment of Christ to acknowledge Him as the only Lord of conscience was suggested, he thinks, by the intolerable bondage of thought into which the religious people of His day had fallen. Just as the scribes, who regarded themselves the dictators of faith and practice, became, through their arrogance, the religious blight of the time of Christ, so scribes of a later age, by the exactions of Creed or Confession, might become a menace to the new religion unless the sole Lordship of Himself should ever have full recognition. Hence Christ's warning.

From this word of Jesus witnessing to Himself our author gathers that "among all the Creeds of Christendom the only one which has the authority of Christ Himself is the Sermon on the

Mount. When one reads the creed which was given by Jesus and the creeds which have been made by Christians, he cannot fail to detect an immense difference, and it does not matter whether he selects the Nicene Creed or the Westminster Confession. They all have a family likeness and a family unlikeness to the Sermon on the Mount. They deal with different subjects, move in a different atmosphere and are constructed on different principles. The creed of Christ demands a pure heart, a forgiving spirit, a helpful hand, a heavenly purpose, an unworldly mind. Christ does not ground Christianity in thinking, but first of all in being, in character. The Creeds have nothing to do with character, do not ask pledges of character, have no place in their constitution for character." And, therefore, so the conclusion runs, they deserve simply to be thrown aside.

Now, whilst much of what is said in drawing this contrast is readily acknowledged as being true, it is, at the same time, believed to be based on a wrong conception of the nature and purpose of a creed, and the author's inference accordingly is invalid. We all know and deplore how fearfully creeds and confessions have been misused, how insufferable the yoke they have been the means of placing on thought and life. Such abuse does not warrant the judgment, however, that they are without authority from Christ, and no longer of use to men. Neither does it follow that the ancient formulas of faith, which so long have been furnishing the substance of truth and the basis of life to the Christian Communion, must now, once for all, be hurled into outer darkness. And it seems certain, moreover, that so long as the Church realizes that her faith rests on the great realities of revelation, central among which is the glorified person of our blessed Saviour, the creeds of the Church sanctified by the use of ages will not be displaced by the "Ethical Creed" suggested by Dr. Watson, even under the cordial endorsement which Theodore F. Seward, the enthusiast for church union, has given to it! "I believe in the Fatherhood of God, the words of Jesus, the clean heart, the service of love, the unworldly life, the Beatitudes; I promise to trust God and follow



Christ, to forgive my enemies and to seek after the righteousness of God," is a formula of Christian ethics which, so far as it goes, may be good enough, but by the side of the Apostles' Creed, it must be seen at once, it is lacking in features which belong to the very substance of our faith.

The third view, that having reference to the Church, is, from the standpoint of our churchly Reformed faith, a surprising underestimation of the character and significance of the divine human organism in which Christianity is objectively embodied. *The Mind of the Master* thinks "it has been a calamity that for long Christians paid hardly any attention to the idea of the Kingdom of Jesus on which He was always insisting, and gave their whole mind to the entirely different idea of the Church which Jesus only mentioned once with intention in a passage of immense difficulty. The Kingdom flourishes in every corner of the Gospels, and languishes in the Acts and Epistles, while the Church idea is practically non-existent in Jesus' sermons, but saturates the letters of St. Paul. With all respect to the great Apostle, one may be allowed to express his regret that St. Paul has not said less about the Church and more about the Kingdom. One knows also why the Church has a stronger fascination for the ordinary religious person than the Kingdom—the Church is a visible and exclusive institution which one can manage and use; the Kingdom is a spiritual and inclusive society whose members are selected by natural fitness and which is beyond human control. One must *affirm* this or that to be a member of the Church; one must *be* something to be a part of the Kingdom of God."

This conception of the Church, which we need not stay to discuss at any length, is the outcome of disregarding the witness of the glorified Jesus in the acts and writings of the Apostles whom He had commissioned to disciple all nations, and endued with power from on high to accomplish the work entrusted to them. It ignores likewise the witness of Jesus in the Church of to-day, which, through its ministry, its worship, its sacraments, is surely of significance in the economy of human salvation, and which is

vindicating its divine functions in carrying forward in unbroken continuity the triumphs which Christianity is designed to achieve. And, instead of believing that "the characteristic product of the Church is ecclesiastics," as our book affirms, we believe the product to be saints, in the sense of the Creed—men and women sanctified in body, soul and spirit through vital fellowship with Christ in the communion of which He is the ever-living and glorious head. And, so long as Christ is witnessing through the Church, which is His body, to the truth as it is in Himself and in Christianity, we need not regard it a calamity to place large emphasis upon the Church, for so doing can tend only to the enlarged influence of the kingdom of God and the greater glory of His Christ.

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND.



#### IV.

### HOW CAN WE BEST CULTIVATE A DENOMINATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG OUR PEOPLE?

BY REV. A. B. KOPLIN, D. D.

Recognizing the Reformed Church not as the only valid ecclesiastical organization, but rather only as one of the various branches of the Christian Church, our subject involves an answer to the question: How can we best bring our people to, and establish them in a true recognition of themselves as members of the Reformed Church in contradistinction from other churches, on the one hand; and, as in common with all the people of God, of every name and order, and of all ages and climes, members of the Church Catholic, and as such sharers of the universal brotherhood of Saints, on the other hand? Or, what is the best way to establish our people in an intelligent apprehension and earnest appreciation of their peculiar inheritance as members of the Reformed Church; and how shall we best help them to realize that they can best serve the Great Head of the Church universal, by making faithful use of the means of grace in, and seeking earnestly to promote the best interests of the Reformed Church, as that branch of His Zion, which, under God, is their Spiritual mother and their Christian home?

This is at once an interesting and far-reaching question, the importance of which is not apt to be overestimated. Indeed, it is a theme well worthy of deep study and earnest discussion. And, notwithstanding, it is a theme which is eminently practical in its nature, it is none the less difficult in its full apprehension and clear elucidation.

During the early history of Christianity the principle involved in our subject was much more simple. Now, however, since the Church has developed into various denominations, each with its

own distinctive peculiarities, it has become complex. Then the Christian world was comprehended in one household. Now it is unfolded into many households. Hence as a true world-consciousness is possible only where a normal self-consciousness has been developed in the family and community to which the subject belongs, so can we come to a true knowledge of the common brotherhood of all believers only as we have come to a consciousness of ourselves as living members of the "True Vine" in that congregation and denomination of which we are living members.

Much of that which passes current for a boasted denominationalism amounts to nothing better than downright bigotry and sectism, which will have it that the broad and deep stream of salvation must flow, for all time, within its own narrow, shallow channel, whilst all other branches of the Church are looked upon as just so many synagogues of Satan, or, at best, only as the stagnant eddies along the stream of Christian history; a resuscitation to life of the elements of which, being looked upon as possible only in so far as they allow themselves to be wrenched from their ancient moorings and become identified, here with the *true doctrine*, there with the *true Church*, and there, again, with the elements of vital godliness, falsely so called; and so on down from a stupid, though self-complacent sectism, through a deceitful rationalism to a bald infidelity. With this false denominationalism the great mission seems to be, not to gather within its folds those who are without, but much rather to "canvass sea and land" to make proselytes. And as such it fastens itself, parasite-like, upon the Body Mystical, and, whenever and wherever possible, feeds upon its very life.

And not a whit better nor less harmful is that pretended liberalism, that false catholicity, which sees no distinction between the different branches of the Church, and, not knowing its own identity, is ever ready for any pretended cause, or no cause at all, to pass from one church to another, a veritable vagabondism which tramps from denomination to denomination, as the proletariat tramps from house to house to beg his daily bread.



Thus it is seen that a hyper-denominationalism or sectism, on the one hand, and a non-denominationalism on the other hand, prove themselves to be opposite poles only of the same evil; which, whilst it pretends to promote the cause of truth and righteousness is, after all, only seeking its own personal and selfish ends. And it is the same evil spirit which manifests itself only too often, between adjacent congregations of the same denomination, when each would build his house higher than his neighbor's, even though it should be of material either unjustly obtained, or actually purloined. Thus, instead of furthering the cause of religion, both play into the hands of the common enemy, and bring disgrace and shame upon the cause they profess to serve.

That is the true denominational spirit which enables the professing Christian fully to appreciate his blessed heritage, in that branch of the Church to which he rightfully belongs, and which prompts him earnestly to devote his energies to its usefulness and prosperity, whilst it enables him, at the same time, also, keenly to realize and deplore whatever imperfections and defects may yet mar the beauty and strength of his spiritual mother; and urges him ever to put forth his best efforts to improve her condition until her "righteousness shall shine forth clear as the moon, and bright as the noon-day sun." And if, under the providence of God, it should be his privilege to belong to that branch of the Church which may prove to be superior to other churches, in genius and history, creed and cultus, he may well glory in his good fortune, but he must take good heed that he may ever be far from disparaging those less favored. And wherever the Gospel is truly preached, the sacraments rightly administered and the power of the keys lawfully exercised, there he must recognize the existence of a branch of the true Church; and must ever feel an interest in its legitimate prosperity. And so also must he ever pray and labor that all who call themselves Christians may be united in the bonds of a holy faith as one body, "that there may be one flock even as there is one Shepherd." This we conceive to be the true denominational spirit which should characterize every member of the Body Mystical.

And now, what must we as a Church do to bring our people to a full consciousness of this feature of the Christian life? And how shall we establish them in this consciousness, so as to give proper tone to their Christian character and activity? This is the important question which calls for an answer in this paper. In dealing with our subject we have elected to speak by parable, saying :

The Kingdom of Heaven is like unto a prudent, wise and loving mother, who, after having given birth to her children, now, as she feeds their physical life upon her loving breast, neglects not to nourish their souls also with the food of the spirit ; but by the loving and life-giving intelligence of her own higher life, which beams in upon them through a mother's loving eye, and penetrates them through her cheering voice, she quickens into life the powers of their souls, and brings them to that consciousness of self, and of that world of which they constitute a part, which must find its goal in a consciousness of God as the Father of all.

And, should it be asked, what is the interpretation of this parable? The answer must be this : The mother is the Church, who is the Bride, the Lamb's wife ; and as such the bearer of His life and grace to dying men, who through the "laver of regeneration and washing away of sin," giveth the birth of the Spirit to all who are brought to the font in the faith of the Triune God, and who feedeth them upon the sincere milk of the word, and bringeth them to a knowledge of the adoption of God as His dear children ; whilst she guardeth them with a strong arm and jealous care against all the evil of sin and corruption, and guideth them by an unerring council, in the way of righteousness and life, and bringeth them unto the full stature of man and womanhood in Christ Jesus our Lord. Thus doth our Spiritual mother bring her faithful children to a knowledge of themselves as loyal citizens of the Israel of God, and as such, in common with all His people, heirs of the heritage of love and eternal life, which He hath given to His saints.

In training her children the true mother does not seek to cultivate in them a filial regard by depreciating her fellow mothers



and their families because of any real or imaginary inferiority which may mar their beauty or modify their standing in the domain of motherhood. On the contrary, she is actuated by an earnest desire, augmented from first to last, by that self-sacrificing love and undying devotion which only a Christian mother can have for her offspring, to prepare her children for a useful and happy life. To reach this end she breathes into them from her warm and loving heart, the spirit of love, which in turn receives its rightful response in their growing and grateful submission and willing obedience to her rightful authority. She fondles and feeds, clothes and adorns them, and in every way supplies their many wants, always from a self-rewarding love. She teaches them, by word and example, the lessons of the love of righteousness, virtue and purity of life, and habits of industry and economy, as well. And as touching their relations to their fellow man, she instills that principle which makes us kin to all our race, and as such lies at the foundation of all social relations and obligations, namely: "As ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them, likewise." And above all, she "brings up her children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, that when they are old, they may not depart therefrom."

And surely that mother who thus brings up her children never needs to fear, though there may be ten thousand mothers who may be in every way her superiors, that she will ever be disowned or forgotten by her children, whilst she has every reason to hope that they will prove a blessing to their race, and will bring lasting honor upon her memory.

So also with the Church. That denomination which would bring her members to a recognition of herself as their spiritual mother, and would establish them in her embrace as their proper ecclesiastical home, in whose bosom they are to enjoy all the comforts of the religion of Christ, and if she would assure them that, in promoting her interests, they can best enhance the cause of our holy religion, and, with the residue of God's people, finally attain to a glorious reward, she must not feel it to be her mission to berate or bite and devour her sister churches. Much rather

must she prove her motherhood by bringing her members to a conscious realization of themselves as in and through her, living members of that one holy catholic Church of Christ, which the Son of God, from the beginning to the end of the world, gathers, defends and preserves to Himself, by His Word and Spirit, and that as such they are, in common with all the people of God, chosen to everlasting life.

To accomplish this glorious end, the denominations of the Church must see to it that they establish their people in the faith once committed to the saints; and they must lovingly, promptly, constantly and fully supply all their wants, and bring them to enjoy all the blessings of grace. And no less must they see to it that proper opportunity and inspiring encouragement be at all times given to their members to exercise their gifts, thus enabling them at once to develop an active Christian life, and have full part also with the members of other churches in the work of the evangelization of the world and the salvation of men.

That denomination of the Church which will bestow upon her people an inheritance at once so grand and glorious, so inspiring and soul-satisfying, will have the consciousness of knowing that she hath done what she could; and will ever have good reason to hope that she may marshal her forces with ever increasing numbers, who are always ready to go forth in the strength of the Lord and do battle against the common enemy of God and man.

From these general considerations we draw the following conclusions:

First. If we, as a church, would cultivate a true denominational consciousness among our people, we must bring them to fully realize that the Reformed Church is a living branch of the Church Universal, and that, therefore, all her faithful members are incorporate in the Body Mystical.

Second. We must bring our people to stand consciously and firmly in the true faith; holding to the Holy Scriptures as being the inspired Word of God; the Apostles' Creed as a summary of the true expression of the foundation articles of the Christian



Faith; and the Heidelberg Catechism, as a system of doctrines which flow from the Bible in the sense of the Apostles' Creed.

Third. That we impress upon our people the biblical and historical right of the Reformed Church to exist as a distinct branch of the Christian Church, which, therefore, has full authority, in God's name to demand of her members a willing obedience to all the requirements of the Gospel.

Fourth. That we fully acquaint our people with the history of our Church, as being preëminently the Church of the martyrs.

Fifth. That we impress our people ever more and more with the important fact that the Reformed Church recognizes no human hero, nor theory of the schools around which to marshal her hosts; but that she is planted firmly upon the broad and deep foundation of a Christological theology; and that she holds with an unflinching faith and undying love to the once crucified, but now risen and gloriously exalted, yet ever present Christ, as her only Lord and Master, whom she serves with ever growing zeal and delight. And, therefore, we must bring our people to realize that we, as a Church, can rally our forces only in so far as they are permeated with the life and spirit of our blessed Master.

Sixth. We must bring our people to a full knowledge of the central position which the Reformed Church occupies on account of her irenical spirit, her living theology, her churchly character and her broad catholicity.

Seventh. That we inform our people of the ample equipment of the Reformed Church, in every way, to have full part with our sister churches in the great work of the conversion of the world.

Eighth. That we ever solemnly challenge our people to take full part in all the services of the sanctuary and in all Christian work.

Ninth. That we teach our people to regard other churches with a becoming Christian kindness and courtesy; and that they earnestly pray the Great Head of the Church, in His goodness to hasten the day, when there shall be one Flock, even as there is "one Lord, one Faith and one Baptism, one God and Father of all, who is over all, and through all, and in all."

## V.

# PESTALOZZI, THE SWISS EDUCATIONAL REFORMER.

NATHAN C. SCHAEFFER.

John Henry Pestalozzi, the famous Swiss teacher whose influence as an educator has been felt the world over, was a member of the Reformed Church, and as such his career is of peculiar interest to the members of the same denomination in America. He was born at Zurich on January 12, 1746. His father was a surgeon, whose ancestors had migrated from Italy in the period of the Reformation to escape religious persecution. The death of the father left the boy at the age of six, in the care of his mother and a female servant by the name of Babeli. In many respects he grew up like a spoilt darling. It was necessary for the mother to practice the most rigid economy in bringing up her three children. To keep him from tearing his clothes he was kept in the house, away from other playmates. "From one year to another," says he, "I never left the domestic hearth; in short all the essential means and inducements to the development of manly vigor, manly experience, manly ways of thinking and manly exercises, were just as much wanting to me, as from the peculiarity and weakness of my temperament I specially needed them. I saw the world only within the narrow limits of my mother's parlor, and within the equally narrow limits of my schoolroom; to real human life I was almost as great a stranger as if I did not live in the world in which I dwelt."

This sort of training would have made most children shy and timid, or selfish and self-willed. Owing to his peculiar temperament it made him queer, dreamy and apt to follow a dominating idea to the exclusion of all other ideas, and utterly regardless of his environment. Clumsy and awkward, good-natured and oblig-



ing, he became the victim of the jokes at school and developed a disposition which made him ready at all times to take up the cause of the unfortunate and the suffering. When he saw the rich man's children receiving better treatment at school than the sons and daughters of poor parents, it stirred up within him a feeling of righteous indignation. From his ninth year he was permitted to spend a part of his time with his maternal grandfather, who was the pastor of a village about three miles from Zurich. The grandfather's piety made a deep impression upon his heart, and to the end of his life daily prayer was a necessity to his soul. Here he also saw the yoke of oppression which rested upon the necks of the rural population. At fifteen he joined a society (of which Lavater was the head), whose members leagued themselves against all oppressors of the people. The league brought the charge of injustice against Grebel, the governor of the canton, impeached the character of Brunner, the mayor of Zurich, and made war upon unworthy clergymen.

It is not surprising that a youth growing up under these influences should be deeply stirred by Rousseau's *Emile*. "The moment Rousseau's *Emile* appeared," says he, "my visionary and highly speculative mind was enthusiastically seized by this visionary and highly speculative book. I compared the education which I enjoyed in the corner of my mother's parlor and also in the school which I frequented, with what Rousseau demanded for the education of his *Emile*. The home, as well as the public education of the whole world and of all ranks of society, appeared to me as altogether a crippled thing, which has to find a universal remedy for its present pitiful condition in Rousseau's lofty ideas. The ideal system of liberty, also, to which Rousseau imparted fresh animation, increased in me the visionary desire for a more extended sphere of activity, in which I might promote the welfare and happiness of the people. Juvenile ideas as to what it was necessary and possible to do in this respect in my native town, induced me to abandon the clerical profession, to which I had formerly leaned and for which I had been destined, and caused the thought to spring up within me, that it might be pos-

sible, by the study of the law, to find a career that would be likely to procure for me, sooner or later, the opportunity and means of exercising an active influence on the civil condition of my native town and even of my native land.”

While living with his grandfather he conceived a strong affection for country people. The complaint of the country clergy, *omne malum ex urbe*—*all evil comes from the city*—left its impression upon his soul. A fierce hatred toward the aristocracy, who oppressed the rural population, was kindled in his heart, and continued to burn within him along with love of the people; it characterizes him in his youth as well as in old age, and is visible in most of his writings.

Sickness caused him to abandon his legal and historical studies. His physician advised him to seek health in the country. Under the influence of Rousseau’s diatribes against scientific study, he abandoned his books, burnt his manuscripts and visited Tschiffeli, a farmer of reputation in the Canton of Bern. From Tschiffeli’s plantations of Madder, he conceived the idea of making a similar experiment near the village of Birr, where he purchased for ten florins about one hundred acres of barren, chalky, heath-land, which had been used as a sheep walk. The erection of a dwelling house in Italian style upon this tract, he afterwards regarded as an imprudent step. He named it Neu-hof. In this enterprise he associated himself with a mercantile firm of Zurich. The members of this firm withdrew their support when they found him lacking in the essentials of success as an agriculturist.

In another direction he met with more success. At the age of seven he got a few coins which he determined to spend in a confectionery store. The girl behind the counter, instead of selling him what he wanted, gave him the advice not to spend his money so foolishly. At the age of twenty-four he offered this same girl his hand in marriage. She was seven years older or about 31. The tongue of modern gossip would have said that he married her for her money and that she accepted him as her last chance. Their subsequent life showed that it was a union brought about



by more worthy motives. With her money the two might have lived in ease and luxury. But when he looked about him, he saw the rich in the enjoyment of all which the heart could wish for. The poor, on the other hand, were grovelling in rags and filth and dirt. They were not living; they were only existing. His heart, which always beat high for humanity, led him to conceive the idea that he might gather the children of the poor at Neuhof, and give them an industrial education. The readiness with which his wife sacrificed her wealth to further his schemes, the devotion with which they clung to each other in the midst of misfortune, and the words which he uttered after she lay a corpse, show that the match was a love match in the best sense of the word. Without doubt she had much to complain of by reason of his lack of tact and business capacity. In the very year in which the New World struck the first blow for liberty, he made his first move against the ignorance of the masses. Before the end of 1775 he had fifty children under his care at Neuhof. In addition to the ordinary instruction in which he made experiments after his own kind, he taught them farm work in summer and some handicraft in winter. This attempt at industrial education failed because the mothers begged and received pay for their children, whilst the children who were unaccustomed to steady employment and found a regular life irksome, often ran away as soon as they were dressed in Sunday clothes. The help which came to him from those who were in sympathy with his experiment, only served to postpone his second financial failure. After five years of gradual loss and endless worry he was obliged to close his school.

Poverty is sometimes a condition of success. He had failed in his attempt to create a model farm as well as in his endeavor to better the condition of the poor by a new education. In what direction should he next try to realize his ideal? The only avenue now open to him is to send forth his ideas and to give vent to his aspirations through the pen. In 1780 he wrote "The Evening Hours of Hermit," a series of aphorisms which were printed in Iselin's *Ephimerides*. Karl Schmid says that they

contain the key to Pestalozzi's pedagogic activity, and likens them unto grains of gold in capsules of silver. Raumer characterizes them as concise and thought-teeming aphorisms forming a beautiful and ingenious whole, and calls attention to the points of agreement and of difference between him and Rousseau. "Like Pestalozzi, Rousseau requires real knowledge and trained skill in the business of life, not an empty display of words, without an insight into the things themselves, and a ready power of acting. Like Pestalozzi, Rousseau ridicules the plan of giving a discursive knowledge about things remote, and leaving them in ignorance of the things in their immediate vicinity. He requires, like Pestalozzi, that they should be first at home in this vicinity. In this manner many other things might be pointed out in which both men agree, arising principally from their common aversion to a baseless, dead talkativeness, without any real intelligence, activity of mind or readiness of action. But when viewed more closely, how immensely different are the two men in all that is most essential. Rousseau will not have God named before children, he is of opinion that long physical and metaphysical study is necessary to enable us to think of God. With Pestalozzi God is the nearest, the most intimate being to man, the alpha and omega of his whole life. Rousseau's God is no paternal God of love, his Emile no child of God. The man who put his children into a foundling hospital, knew nothing of paternal and filial love; still less of rulers as the fathers of nations, and of the child-like obedience of subjects; his ideal was a cold, heartless freedom, which was not based on love, but was defensive, isolating, and altogether selfish. While, according to Pestalozzi, the belief in God penetrates, strengthens, attunes, sanctifies all the relations of men; while the relation between ruler and subjects, between father and children, and the paternal love of God to his children, men, are everywhere reflected in his paper—with Rousseau there is never any mention of such bonds of love."

His fame as an educator was secured by his Leonard and Gertrude. It appeared in the year in which Cornwallis surrendered



at Yorktown, and caused more stir in Europe than the closing event of the American revolution. Two brothers by the name of Füseli were discussing the fate of the philanthropic dreamer at Neuhof. One of them, an artist by profession, pointing to something from Pestalozzi's pen, asked, "Who did that," and on being told the author's name, exclaimed: "The man has talent and might help himself by writing." The other brother, who was a bookseller, urged him to ply his pen. After attempting some tales in imitation of Marmontel, without much success, he touched upon domestic education and, drawing upon his own experience, he found it growing beyond his most sanguine expectations. Like so many works of genius, it was almost a spontaneous creation. "The history of Leonard and Gertrude," says he, "flowed from my pen I know not how, and developed itself of its own accord, without my having the slightest plan in my head, and even without my thinking of one. In a few weeks the book stood there, without my knowing exactly how I had done it. I felt its value, but only as a man in his sleep feels the value of some piece of good fortune of which he is just dreaming." It is a tale in which Gertrude, the wife of Leonard, a good natured but weak man, is the teacher of her own child. The neighbors seeing her skill, ask that their children may be admitted. The village pastor, whose preaching had been dull and lifeless, visits the school; his heart is touched and his preaching is transformed. The bailiff who sells the beer and then fines the peasants for quarreling after they are intoxicated, finally becomes a changed man. He closes the saloon and the village, in which everything was going from bad to worse, is renewed in its life. The manner in which Gertrude keeps house and trains and instructs children, is Pestalozzi's ideal. The book is full of love for the common people. It is an appeal for the uplifting of the masses through the school and the home.

While its author was struggling for bread, it went in triumph over Europe, everywhere stirring up an interest in popular education. The newspapers praised it; the almanacs were full of it; the agricultural society of Bern awarded him their great gold

medal with a letter of thanks. Fichte referred to it in his lectures at Berlin as indicating the way for restoring the prosperity of the fatherland. At Königsburg a woman of royal rank has just finished the book and writes in her diary: "To-day I was reading a book for the people by J. H. Pestalozzi. One feels at home in the Swiss village which he describes. If I had my own way I would step into my carriage, roll off to Switzerland in order with tears in my eyes and with the warm pressure of my hand, to thank the man for what he has done for the people." It was the wife of Frederick William III., of Prussia, and she persuaded her husband to send seventeen young men to Switzerland to study at Pestalozzi's Normal School at Yverdun, and when these returned and introduced their reforms into Prussia, she visited the schools, studied their methods and followed them in the training of her own children. For half a century Prussia was called the land of schoolmasters. When the war of 1866 broke out, many predicted a downfall for Prussia as great as in the days of the first Napoleon. Soon the astonishing news came that, after seven days fighting, Austria lay powerless at the feet of the king whose mother had wept over a book on education. The newspapers said it was the needle gun that did it. A few years passed and the war with France broke out. This time the best guns were not on the side of the Prussians. In seven months Napoleon III. had lost his crown, haughty Paris lay at the mercy of the German armies; five thousand million francs were paid to indemnify the German nation for the expenses of the war and the son of Louise was proclaimed as William I., Emperor of Germany. The world saw and acknowledged that the schoolmaster had conquered, and that the principles of Pestalozzi had borne their fruit in making Prussia the strongest kingdom of Germany and united Germany the strongest empire in Europe. Through Pestalozzi Prussia became the land of schools, and through Prussia's example and influence Pestalozzi moulded the civilized world in favor of popular education.

In the preface to the second edition of *Leonard and Gertrude*, Pestalozzi gives as the object of the book, the bringing about



of a better popular education, based upon the true condition of the people and their natural relations. It contained his message to the poor and destitute, to the hearts of those who stand over them in God's stead. It was his first word to the mothers of the land and to the heart which God has given them, to be unto their children what no one else on earth can be in their stead.

The eighteen years, from 1780 to 1798, which Pestalozzi spent at Neuhof after the failure of his experiment in industrial education, remind one of the eighteen years which the Great Teacher spent at Nazareth after His visit to the temple at Jerusalem had caused the doctors to marvel at His wisdom and understanding. Years of thought and of work with the pen were needed to clarify Pestalozzi's views on education after he became conscious of his mission as an educational reformer. During these years he engaged in no educational enterprise, but spent the time in making books and in editing a Swiss journal. His writings during this time were mainly of a philosophical and political character, and relate only indirectly to education. But with the progress of the French Revolution, old forms were doomed to pass away. The French armies entered Switzerland, set up, after the model of their own republic, a government with five directors, among whom was Legrand, a friend of Pestalozzi. When he continued to urge order, justice and law upon the new government, he was tendered an appointment in the hope of keeping him quiet. In reply to their inquiry as to what office he would accept, he said: "I will be a schoolmaster." The idea pleased Legrand. A Capuchin had persuaded the Catholic population of Unterwalden to believe that the new government was the work of Satan. To crush the rebellion a force of 12,000 French marched into the canton, and on September 9, 1798, burned Stanz in Unterwalden; the entire canton was laid waste, and many orphans were left destitute and without shelter. Pestalozzi was invited to take charge of them in a convent of the Ursulines. Eighty neglected children, infected with the itch and scurvy, and covered with vermin, not one in ten knowing so much as the alphabet, were entrusted to his care. He sought to combine intellectual



education with manual training. For want of assistants, he selected some of the children to instruct others, a plan which afterwards made Lancaster famous in three continents. "My aim," says he, "was to carry the simplification of the means of teaching so far that all the common people might easily be brought to teach their children, and gradually to render the schools almost superfluous for the first elements of instruction." The mother, according to his scheme, was to supplant the teacher; the home was to fill the place of the elementary school. Seeking to take the place of the parent to his orphan children, he acted as teacher, paymaster, manservant and even housemaid. The arrival of French troops, who were hard pressed by the Austrians, broke up the school; the wings of the convent were converted into a hospital; the few children who remained were placed in the care of others; and days of rest restored Pestalozzi's failing health. He next became an assistant in the school at Burgdorf, in the Canton of Bern, where the jealousy of the headmaster, the report that he was not using the Heidelberg catechism and the rumor that he could not write or cipher or even read well (the last accusation he admitted to be true) caused him many enemies. A committee of investigation reported that his pupils made extraordinary progress and that he had shown what power can be developed by efficient teaching. A pulmonary trouble, however, made him give up the position before a year had passed. The arrival of Krüsi, who came from Appenzell to Burgdorf for the purpose of opening a seminary for the training of teachers, opened a new epoch for Pestalozzi. Although the plan was not carried out by reason of the death of Fischer, the Swiss minister of education, Krüsi and Pestalozzi learned to esteem each other, and the two opened a private school in the Castle of Burgdorf. Four years they labored together in this school; other teachers joined them in the enterprise. During these four years he published a book, entitled "How Gertrude Teaches Her Children," and went as a Swiss deputy to Paris, where he hoped to plead for the children in the presence of Napoleon Bonaparte. Instead of an interview he received the reply that Napoleon had no time



to waste on A B C's. Conscious of the lofty purposes which animated his soul, he afterwards said: "I did not see Napoleon, nor did he see me." What a contrast between the subsequent history of the people whose emperor had no time to waste on the alphabet and the people whose queen wept over a book on education!

In 1803 the personnel of the Bernese government changed; the school was deprived of its home in the castle. Among the buildings which were offered to him for school purposes, he selected the castle at Yverdun (sometimes spelled Yverdon and in German Ifferten, the ancient name was Ebrodunum) on the southern extremity of a Swiss lake. Here he conducted his school from 1804 to 1825, and drew to himself world-wide attention. Pupils came from foreign lands, and teachers like Froebel visited him to study his methods and to enjoy the tonic atmosphere of his normal school. A gentleman came all the way from Sweden to consult him about the education of his sons. An Irish gentleman who was persuaded to visit the school, remained several months. The Czar Alexander bestowed upon him the order of Wladimir, and the authorities in Spain made him a Grandee, that is a nobleman of the first rank who may be covered in the King's presence. Two hundred persons could be accommodated in the castle and between fifty and sixty dwelt in the town. The arrival of pupils from foreign lands gradually undermined the discipline, he lacked the executive ability to master the new conditions which the presence of rich men's sons imposes upon an educational institution. Moreover his teachers quarreled. He lacked practical tact in the management of men; he was not enough of a leader to make subordinates of diverse talents and temperament work in harmony and in obedience to his will. Moreover a grandson who had no tact either as a teacher or a disciplinarian helped to bring the institution into disrepute. The sums which he realized from the publication of an edition of all his works, did not suffice to save the institution from ultimate ruin. It would be tedious to follow the quarrels between his teachers and the misfortunes which befell the institu-

tion. For two years he survived its downfall, lamenting his mistakes and planning a new institution. On February 17, 1827, death released him from his sorrows and regrets. "He seemed to be smiling at the angel who came to fetch him," said those standing around his death bed. "I wish," said he, "to be buried under the eaves of the school and that my name alone should be engraved on the stone which covers me; when the drops of water have made a hole in the stone, the people will perhaps be more just to my memory than they have been to myself during life."

The prediction has been verified. Seventy years have elapsed since his death. His ideas are a living power in every school throughout the world, and he himself is awakening fresh interest every day. Reserving the consideration of his theories and his method for a future article, let us turn to a spectacle witnessed at Yverdun, on July 5, 1890. Amid choruses of rejoicing and garlands of flowers, the children are singing: "Glory to Pestalozzi, glory to the friend of children." Bells are ringing, bands are playing, speeches are made. Then the statue by the Swiss artist, Alfred Lanz, which was on view at the Paris exhibition, is unveiled. It represents Pestalozzi as standing. "With one arm he encircles a little girl. On the other side a bare-legged boy holding a book looks up into his benefactor's face with confidence and affection. The wonderful expression of fatherly love and benevolence which gave Pestalozzi's rugged face a beauty all its own, is there, and we hear him saying, as he often said to his adopted children, 'And you too mean to be wise and good, do you not?' On the base are inscribed the words from his epitaph at Birr, 'Benefactor of the poor at Neuhof, Father of the orphans at Stanz, Founder of the National School at Burgdorf, Educator of the people at Yverdon. Everything for others—for myself nothing.' On the other side are his own immortal words: 'I lived like a beggar to teach beggars to live like men.'"



## VI.

### SERMONIZING.

BY A. E. TRUXAL, D. D.

Individuality is just as prevalent and pronounced in the ministry as anywhere else. Men differ from each other in the natural constitution of their mind, disposition and temperament. Individualism is not destroyed by education, but developed and, in some respects, made to stand out all the more definitely. Still it must also be admitted that education and culture bring out too those powers of the individual which he possesses in common with all men. But while men are in a sense brought together on a common level by general education, and by the study and practice of the same kind of knowledge come to know the same things in the same general way, yet the individuality of each still remains throughout it all.

While ministers of the Gospel, therefore, are all supposed to be educated men and to have studied theology in all its branches, yet, because of their various constitutions and natural endowments and because of the different ways and modes by which their minds work, and the various degrees in which they apply themselves, it necessarily follows that they will pursue different courses and plans in the preparation of their sermons. Consequently it would be a vain task for any one to formulate a detailed system of rules and regulations for the government, and guidance even, of all ministers in the matter of sermonizing. All that can be done in the case is to lay down some general principles that ought to exert a controlling and governing influence with the preacher in the preparation of his sermons.

Any minister who slavishly follows in his sermonizing the plan or mode of another, gradually weakens his own inherent powers. He who wishes to develop and assert his own strength and be

effective in his efforts must work out his sermons in his own way. The study of other men's sermons and of sermon outlines, if judiciously prosecuted and pursued to a limited extent, may be beneficial to any one ; but the minister ought, by no means, depend on others to do his thinking for him, or to work out for him the message which he is to bring from the Word of God to his hearers. Every preacher ought to discover the truth of the Gospel and reveal it to the people in his own way and manner. This, indeed, is the solemn and weighty responsibility laid on him by his calling.

The popularity of homiletic commentaries, books and magazines does not seem to argue very much in favor of the independence and mental vigor of the ministry of the present day. Helps are a good thing only when they lead the person to arrive speedily at such a condition that he can help himself. Crutches are a necessity sometimes, but if the person will not in due time cast them aside he will remain lame and weak to the end. The first general rule then to be laid down for the preacher is that he shall not rely on homiletic helps in the preparations of his sermons. When he sits down to formulate his sermon he ought to work it out from his own heart and with his own mind and in his own way, otherwise his message will not carry with it the desired and required convincing, comforting and upbuilding force to the minds and hearts of his hearers.

*Again*, the minister is to preach the Word. The holy Scriptures are to furnish him with subjects to be developed and elucidated for the spiritual benefit of his congregation. The Bible is the fountal source whence he must obtain the Divine truth to be presented to the people and impressed upon their hearts.

This demands of him that he know what the Bible is, what it contains and what its contents mean for man and the world in all ages. In other words, he is required to possess a thorough knowledge of theology in all its branches. He needs a knowledge of biblical, exegetical, historical, systematic and practical theology. He is supposed to have acquired a general knowledge of these



branches in the schools previous to his entrance upon the official work of the ministry. But this is not sufficient, and the young minister makes the greatest possible mistake when he imagines that his education in this line has been finished when he has passed through the curricula of the schools. He needs to study theology during his entire life in the ministry. The Bible must be studied and restudied by him. He needs to search the Scriptures in the light of new works on theology that are published from time to time. The minister must be a live theologian if he wishes his preaching to be fresh and efficient. A ministry lacking in theological knowledge must ever be a weak ministry.

This does, however, not require that the minister of the Gospel shall preach theology pure and simple, that his sermons are to be theological discourses, but it requires that he shall know something about the Word of God before he undertakes to preach sermons from it to the people. This theological knowledge will give tone, strength and virility to his sermons. It will furnish a solid and substantial foundation for his discourses, though they treat of the most practical affairs of faith and life. One of the essential matters, therefore, in the preparation of sermons, is that the minister never cease to read and study works on theology and on kindred subjects.

Again, the preacher ought to have a knowledge of the people whom he is to address. He ought to know man. He ought to understand the nature of man. He ought to have an apprehension of the laws that rule in man's mental and moral nature, and he ought to have a correct and clear knowledge of the spiritual and moral condition of those to whom he is to preach. The truth of the Gospel is indeed objective and of general application; and some sermons may be of such a common character as to apply to all men everywhere equally well; but it is a question whether that kind of sermons are productive of the best results. The preaching of the Gospel is done mainly by pastors to their own congregations. And to accomplish the end of preaching pastors must know their people, know their condition and needs. And by their sermons then they must apply the truth of God to the particular requirements of their hearers.

The writer in the early years of his ministry was intimately associated with a brother minister of his own church whom he, on several occasions, solicited for a subject on which to preach the coming Lord's Day. The answer given each time in a semi-humorous way was, "preach the Gospel in its relation to man." That of course was a very general direction, yet it contains a very important truth. The Gospel is related to man in general, and it is related to the individual too. The preacher must present it in its relation to his congregation at the time. In preparing his sermons the minister ought to know the Word of God and the needs of the people, and apply the former to the latter.

How shall the minister secure texts and themes for his sermons? These are secured in different ways by different ministers. In regard to this matter we make the following suggestions: 1. Keeping in mind always the surroundings and condition of his people, the minister in his general reading and in the study of works on theology and Christian ethics will discover various themes to be developed in his sermons. 2. In reading the Bible from day to day, he will be specially impressed every now and then with the significance and importance of a Scripture truth, that would be beneficial and edifying to his people. 3. His experience and observation in pastoral work will discover to him numerous phases of faith and morals in regard to which the people need enlightenment. 4. If he follows the church year (which we believe every minister ought to do), the Gospel and Epistle lessons will furnish new truth each year to be developed and illustrated for the benefit of his congregation. It will, of course, be readily understood that if these various sources are to furnish the minister with texts and subjects for sermons, he must be attentive, observing and diligent in prosecuting the work of his calling. He must keep his eyes open, his mind open and his heart open in order that he may apprehend the things that are revealed to him on all sides.

In our opinion, then, it does not matter much what course the minister pursues in the formulation of his sermon. Each one ought to follow that plan for which he knows himself to be best



qualified. With his mind and heart filled up and distended with the truth of his subject and with a clear conception of the condition and needs of the people let him set to work to develop, illustrate and apply his theme in his own way, and he will produce a good and edifying sermon. The rule, however, ought to be that he first of all come to a thorough understanding of the meaning of his text as this appears in the light of its context, circumstances, occasion and authorship; then let that meaning be developed so that his hearers will be able to see it clearly and apply it to themselves. The truth underlying the words of his Scripture ought to furnish the theme for him. May he not obtain his theme first and then seek a text to suit it? Occasionally he is justifiable in doing so. He may feel himself challenged to preach on Foreign Missions, or on Home Missions or on Christian Education, or on some historical subject, or on some other theme. Then it becomes his privilege and duty to seek a Scripture text suitable to the subject and the occasion. But such sermons ought to be the exception. The rule ought to be, first the text, then the theme and lastly the sermon.

Shall the preacher write his sermon? Yes, as a rule, he ought to do so. There are very few ministers who can think out and prepare a sermon properly and thoroughly without writing. He who undertakes to prepare several sermons and an address or two each week without writing a good deal is very apt to become general and commonplace in his public deliverances. The minister ought to write his sermons, but he does not necessarily need to use his manuscript in the pulpit. Yet we could not advise him to commit his sermon to memory. That is a slavish practice, and in the end works injury to the preacher's powers. But he ought to study his written sermon thoroughly so that he knows what it contains; and then preach it with or without notes. We see no objection to his having the manuscript in the pulpit and preaching from it, but he must preach it, not simply read it. He must allow the subject to take hold of him and inspire him as he delivers the sermon to the people.

We believe this subject to be worthy of the consideration and

study of the ministry. Pedagogy is one of the highest sciences and arts. Teaching is both a science and an art, and what is of greater importance than the teaching of the people? It is of great importance to understand how to make known the truth and how to lead others to grasp it. And, in addition to knowing how this is to be done, the teacher must also have acquired proficiency in accomplishing the end in view. Such knowledge is not obtained without study and practice. He must put forth efforts to understand the art of teaching. If he prosecutes his work at random he will not likely produce the best results.

The preacher is a teacher and, to be successful, he must know how to reveal the truth and how to inspire his hearers to seek and apprehend it. He has no right to say that he will preach in any manner that suits him and leave the results with the Lord. It is his duty to sermonize and preach intelligently. He must study sermonizing and preaching, and then practice the principles he has discovered with the view of accomplishing the desired results in the minds and hearts of his hearers. Only in this way will he be able to give a good account of his stewardship to the Master.



## VII.

### THE LIFE OF SOCIALISM.

BY REV. A. G. GEKELER.

Among the questions, in which this Nineteenth Century is so rich, it would be hard to name one of greater importance than the general question of Socialism. It has long been and may perhaps long continue to be a burning question. A theory of society, a scheme for the regeneration and reconstitution of society on rational principles, it has been decried as visionary and utopian, as wicked and unnatural—in short all that is bad in thought and evil in morals. Yet it is the great question which our century will probably hand down to its successors for solution, a question which humanity will not allow to remain unsolved. It may prove, too, to be a question of such far reaching consequences, affecting human life on so many sides and with such power, that the prestige and influence of the Christian Church may largely depend upon Christians occupying a position of undoubted justice, and showing a spirit of fairness, that cannot be gainsaid. In the past the weight of the Church's influence has so often been felt as a conservator of wrong, an ally of tyranny and injustice, that we may well hesitate to prophecy where the leaders of God's people will take their stand.

Some there may be, who deny that there is such a thing as the social question. And the denial may come from the most opposite sources. A Christian may say: "This spirit of discontent and murmuring against the circumstances and conditions of life is all wrong. We all fare better than we deserve. There have always been high and low, rich and poor, and it is rebellion against the divine order of things to wish it otherwise. This dissatisfaction on the part of the lower classes is wicked, and has its roots in the love of the world, in the lust of the flesh and the

pride of life. Murmuring springs from a worldly mind and a corrupt heart ; the remedy is in true, heart-regenerating religion." Now it is no doubt true that we come naked into the world, and naked we depart ; yet if we would make this fact a reason for indifference toward the practical working of our social organization, it is likely that a great many might remain quite sansculotte while in the world, also. From a very different standpoint on the other hand, we may hear : " Society is under the rule of natural law, and by it men are lifted up or cast down, impoverished or enriched. The attempt largely to better the condition of the masses is futile. The deserving will rise by their own force and worth ; the undeserving ought not to rise, and if raised will but drop back through the weight of their follies and vices. Let natural law have its perfect work, it is effectual to reward the worthy and to destroy the unfit, and on the whole it works out a natural justice."

It is, however, often forgotten that men are largely under positive law and customs having the force of positive law. And these laws and customs act like natural law in society. Human law and custom were powerful economic factors in the polity of Israel and Sparta. And in Judea, at least, the only social question was to secure obedience to the laws and customs of the land. It was law and custom, for example, among ancient Germans, that private property in land was forbidden, and that the citizen could hold his allotment but for a year. Under such conditions the accumulation of riches by agriculture was of course impossible, men were but slightly attached to localities and ever ready to engage in predatory raids. To those Germans their comparative poverty, the common equality of the tribesmen, the necessity of war and of frequent migrations must have seemed grounded in nature ; whereas in fact their customs and mode of life were more important factors.

For about the space of a century the wage-classes within Christendom have been striving to better their lot in life by the use of the suffrage, by association, by agitation and strikes, sometimes by violence. Thus in *their* judgment there is a social question,



a feeling that what is meet and just does not tend, of its own accord, to come into their hands, but is to be conquered. Another significant fact is the mass of economic literature that issues from the press, perennially, and is absorbed by the reading public. The great reviews of the country have rarely put forth a number during the past decade, that did not treat of some aspect of the social question. This literature of reform recognizes the aspirations of our time, it finds ready acceptance on the part of great numbers and is rapidly leavening the whole people.

The life of socialistic agitation rests chiefly in two things: one is a modern fact, the other a modern sentiment.

The fact is, the tropic growth of wealth in our century. The national wealth of the United Kingdom was 9,000 millions in 1800, but in 1880 it had reached 45,000 millions, a five-fold increase in 80 years. The population increased in this time from 16 to 35 millions, a little more than two-fold; thus nominal wealth has increased over two and a-half times faster than the population, and real wealth at a still faster rate. This unprecedented growth in wealth is due to the modern machine production and improvements in transportation. The labor expended in production grows in effectiveness in proportion as more capital is ever providing more effective machinery. And this growth in national wealth, marvellous as it has been, is doubtless far less than it might have been, if the ever recurring periods of depression had not greatly checked the production and accumulation of capital.

But, when we inquire into the distribution of this wealth, we find a state of things that is indeed remarkable. Instead of a democratic division we find an aristocratic one, while it is no doubt true that the great mass of the people have participated in the progress, especially through the cheapening of commodities, it is just as certain that their share in the accumulated wealth is strangely small. The distribution has been such, that while a goodly number of estates are unmanageably large, the portion falling to the great majority is uncomfortably small. The annual increment to the national wealth is mostly absorbed by the exist-

ing capital. The sponges of capital have developed a wonderful capacity of absorption. We already have sponges that drink up their river, and soon we shall have them capacious enough to drink up a lake; the multi-millionaire has some time been with us and it is already a matter of speculation how soon we may hail the advent of the billionaire. One hundred and fifty persons own one-half the agricultural land of England, and twelve own one-half of Scotland. Of the cultivable soil of Prussia one-half is held in estates averaging 860 acres. The *N. Y. Tribune*, a few years ago, published a list of more than 4,000 millionaires, and the list has grown longer since. England, by reason of her stores of coal and iron, her maritime supremacy, her machinery and the energy of her people, has long enjoyed great advantages over her competitors. She is the richest among the nations, yet, strange to say, we have left her behind in regard to the concentration of wealth. According to the seemingly conservative and conclusive estimate of Thomas Shearman 70 per cent. of the English national wealth is in the hands of  $\frac{1}{30}$  of her population, but  $\frac{1}{60}$  of our population hold 75 per cent. of ours. If these facts do not carry home the conviction that there is something radically wrong in our social organization, it must remain a hopeless task to work conviction. And in England there is an ancient nobility, that has handed down wealth for generations in its families, besides the accumulations of centuries of industry and commerce; while our great estates are largely the product of the past forty years.

The existence of immensely concentrated wealth has been justified on the ground that these estates form but an insignificant portion of the benefits which arise to the commonwealth through the commercial genius of their founders. By the consolidation and extension of a railway system, for example, one man may have become a multi-millionaire, but the gross saving in freight rates to the public may have amounted to a manifold greater sum than fell to the consolidator. Hence he is fairly entitled to his multi-millions. The underlying idea is, that the value of a service rendered is to be measured by what it would have cost the



party served to perform the service. It may cost the performer of the service a mere trifle, but to the party served the service may be highly valuable. Legal and medical fees are supposed to be sometimes calculated on this basis, but in economics the value of things cannot be estimated in this way. The value of a thing is what it has actually cost to produce it. This justification of the concentration of wealth is significant as showing how brilliant men devise plausible sophistries for wrongs that pay well.

Another defense put forth for these fabulous estates is that no one is injured through their genesis and existence. This justification was attempted for the patrons of the Standard Oil University by one of the professors, but the argument soon got stranded and failed to make the round of the daily press. So long as the wealth and capital are in the country, it is claimed to be indifferent whether they are held by few or many. Thus national wealth, not human well-being, is made the economic end of society. Well, if rents and interest did not mean so much subtracted from the reward of labor, the statement were innocent enough; but as this subtraction is actually made, it ceases to be a matter of indifference to some seventy millions, how wealth is diffused.

We have become familiar in the last few decades with an institution, that seems to be a sure index that our present social system is moribund. That institution is the trust. The significance of the trust lies in this, that it reveals the insufficiency of free competition as the principle of industry. Free competition is the force which has long controlled the process of production and consumption. It has made the industrial sphere an arena, in which whosoever would win, must strive with might for the mastery. In this arena men have compelled each other to put forth a greater and ever greater exertion. Competition puts every one on his mettle, and urges every one to do his best, as no slave-driver ever urged his slaves. It is the struggle for existence in industry, the urgency of self-interest. Its motto is, a fair field and no favor, or, God for us all, and the devil take the hindmost. Nor can there be any doubt that this motive, so powerful and

ever present, has given society a push upward and forward in material things, that is simply tremendous. Whether moral character has been equal to the strain of so fierce a competition is certainly a question ; justice, veracity and fraternity, it is to be feared, are often felt to be impediments on this arena, and are often cast aside. Business becomes like war, and in war much passes for fair.

The significance of the trust lies in this : that it is a declaration on the part of the captains of industry that with free competition their business ceases to be profitable. Competition, unchecked, means the destruction of profit for all but those who have special advantages and large diminution of profits even for these. What more simple than to sign a truce in this profit-devouring stage of competition, and thus save that for which business is undertaken ? And if the participants in a trust could be trusted to content themselves with fair dividends on the capital actually used in production, there would be no injury to complain of. But it is notorious that trusts are not organized from benevolence or patriotism, but for the purpose of securing inordinate profits, and that they are forced to pay dividends on large plants that stand idle. Probably every branch of industry that has been or can be constituted a trust has a superfluity of invested capital. And it is a sort of robbery on the people to exact from them, through the power of monopoly, profits on plants that are idle and to all interests dead. The amount of capital incorporated in unnecessary plants, superfluous concerns that meet no demand ; in rolling mills, distilleries, sugar refineries, parallel railroads, mills and factories of all kinds cannot be told, but it is certainly far in excess of the capital needed to produce the commodities actually called for by the markets. This is only saying that the present accumulation of capital is sufficient to produce far more than the present society can make use of.

A point in the industrial evolution is certainly supposable when all capital cannot find income yielding investment, and the presence of the trust seems to indicate that we are nearing that point, as England has already passed it. England to-day cannot



find employment for its capital at home, but seeks investment everywhere. We thus may see in our present social system signs of old age and decrepitude. The system under which we have made so great progress seems to be nearing that point when its usefulness or sufficiency is outlived, and the work must be carried forward on a different principle, namely, the principle of social coöperation. Society itself, or the state, must become a vast trust, in which the humblest citizen will have his secure position.

The modern sentiment on which socialism lives is the sense of human brotherhood and equality. This we set down, in part, at least, as a direct fruit of Christianity. There can be no doubt that the spirit of Christ is opposed to an unnecessary, artificial division of society into extremes. He uttered no word against slavery; but when master and slave kneel together before the Father, which is in Heaven, and say: Our Father, the relation between them is immediately transformed, not sanctified—that is impossible—but humanized; and the next step will be that both master and slave will feel that the relation is incompatible with their faith. Emancipation is the necessary fruit of the Gospel, and it will remain a proof of Christ's marvellous wisdom that he did not directly attack so great an abuse as slavery; but he gave utterance to principles and awakened a spirit in the hearts of men which must abolish the iniquity as surely as the rays of the ascending sun destroy snow and ice. The sentiment of human worth and human fraternity surely has Christ for its author and patron. Some, called after his name, have opposed the sentiment and still oppose it, but truth tends to prevail. And in part the sense of human right and human equality is a late discovery of the common reason. Our age is eminently a rationalistic age; the next will be such still more—not an age void of reverence and admiration and worship, but an age in which the things revered must justify themselves to the minds and hearts of men. The proportion of men who think and question is larger than ever. And when multitudes toil and endure hardship and comparative poverty, while hundreds are burdened with affluence and luxury, many will ask: Is it a divine or is it a human order that condemns us to our lot?

## VIII.

### THE ORIGIN OF THE ARYANS.

BY REV A. J. HELLER, D. D.

This is the title of a very interesting work written by Isaac Taylor, an English author, and published by the Humbolt Publishing Company, New York. It is the first book in the English language giving an account of the controversy as to the region in which the Aryan race originated. It does not aim at setting forth new views or speculations, but at presenting a summary of the labors of many scholars, and a critical digest of the literature on the subject. "Its object," the author says, "is to present in condensed form a statement of ascertained facts and of the arguments based upon them." Indeed, the book is so replete with facts and arguments closely interwoven, that to give a brief résumé of its contents would be a difficult task, if not one impossible of accomplishment. And we shall not attempt anything of the kind. Our purpose in calling attention to the book is to note the radical changes which the views of the most eminent scholars that have devoted themselves to the study of the subject have undergone since the year 1880, and to present the conclusions to which they have been led, more especially by the discoveries due to the sciences of geology, anthropology, craniology and prehistoric archæology. If we may judge from the utterances of our popular writers and speakers this book and the subject of which it treats have not received that careful consideration from the students of history and the reading public generally to which their importance entitles them.\*

\* See, for example, *The Great Races of Mankind*, By Ridpath: The Jones Bros. Publishing Company, Cincinnati, a work recently issued in four large volumes profusely illustrated. In looking through this work our attention was arrested by charts No. 2 and No. 3 in volumes I. and II. respectively. These charts in glaring red lines exhibit the Eastern and Western Aryans as having gone forth in large numbers from the district in Asia lying immediately south of the Caspian sea. In the text of the work the author wholly ignores the results of the best scholarship on the subject.



The corner stone of the new science of comparative philology was laid by Sir William Jones, who, in 1786, "made the memorable declaration that the similarities between Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, German and Celtic can only be explained on the hypothesis that these languages had a common parentage." Fifty years later, through the persevering labors of Bopp, the correctness of this hypothesis was confirmed by the permanent establishment of the science of comparative philology. It was then found that one great linguistic family "embraced seven groups of European languages—the Hellenic, Italic, Celtic, Teutonic, Slavonic, Lithuanic or Lettic, and Albanian; in fact all the existing languages of Europe except Basque, Finnic, Magyar and Turkish. There are also three closely related Asiatic groups—the Indic, containing fourteen modern Indian languages derived from Sanskrit; the Iranic group comprising Zend, Persian, Pushtu or Afghan, Beluchi, Kurdish and Ossetic; and the Armenian, which is intermediate between Greek and Iranian."

But no sooner was the new science placed on a fair footing than it became encumbered by certain erroneous tendencies which led it astray in the interpretation and application of the results of its researches and threw doubt upon its reliability. They also brought it into collision with other sciences with which it should have been closely allied, and by the aid of whose important discoveries its own investigations could have been confirmed. After many years of severe, and at times acrimonious conflict, such a reconciliation has at last been effected. These erroneous tendencies were due to the tenacity with which even men possessed of great knowledge are disposed to cling to traditional beliefs. Until the middle of the present century the chronology of Archbishop Usher, according to which the origin of the human race was assigned to a comparatively recent period, remained unchallenged. It was believed that the cradle of the human race was in Central Asia; that the primeval language was Hebrew; that the diversity of speech dates from the confusion of tongues at Babel, and that the races of Europe were descendants of the family of Japhet, who migrated from the plains of Shinar about

the year 2247 B. C. It was quite natural, therefore, for those who were engaged in the comparative study of the Aryan languages to proceed on the assumption that if the languages had a common parentage, the peoples speaking them must also themselves have had a common ancestry.

For the popularization of this heresy in the sphere of science amongst English-speaking people, Professor Max Müller is justly considered to be chiefly responsible. "In his lectures on the Science of Language, delivered in 1861, instead of speaking only of an Aryan language, he speaks of an 'Aryan race,' an 'Aryan family,' and asserts that there was a time 'when the first ancestors of the Indians, the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Slavs, the Celts, and the Germans were living together within the same inclosure, nay under the same roof,' and he argues that, because the same forms of speech are 'preserved by all the members of the Aryan family, it follows that before the ancestors of the Indians and Persians started for the South, and the leaders of the Greek, Roman, Celtic, Teutonic and Slavonic colonies marched toward the shores of Europe, there was a small clan of Aryans, settled probably on the highest elevation of Central Asia, speaking a language not yet Sanskrit, or Greek, or German, but containing the dialectic germs of all.' He asserted that the same blood runs in the veins of English soldiers 'as in the veins of the dark Bengalese.'"

The French and German scholars of the last quarter of a century "have shown conclusively that the assumption of the common ancestry of the speakers of the Aryan languages is a mere figment, wholly contrary to the evidence, and as improbable as the hypothesis that a small Aryan clan in Central Asia could have sent out great colonies which marched four thousand miles to the shores of Europe." Numerous examples are cited to prove that "identity of speech does not imply identity of race any more than diversity of speech implies diversity of race. The language of Cornwall is the same as the language of Essex, but the blood is Celtic in the one case and Teutonic in the other. The language of Cornwall is different from that of Britany, but the blood is



largely the same. Two related languages, such as French and Italian, point to an earlier language from which both have descended ; but it by no means follows that the French and Italians, who speak those languages, have descended from common ancestors." The French anthropologist, Borea, is quoted as saying that "races have frequently within the historic period changed their language without having apparently changed the race or the type. The Belgians, for instance, speak a neo-Latin language ; but of all the races who have mingled their blood with that of autochthons of Belgium, it would be difficult to find one which has left less trace of the people of Rome." And our author pointedly remarks : "The language spoken by the Negro of Alabama resembles the language spoken by the New Englander of Massachusetts," but for all that they are at an immeasurable distance from one another as to race.

After it was adopted that there was an Aryan race in the same sense that there was an Aryan language, the next problem that presented itself for solution was : where did this Aryan race originate ? To this inquiry a number of answers were given, but all agreed that the home of the Aryans must have been in Asia. Some placed it in the Valley of the Euphrates, others in the region bordering on the sea of Aral. Adelung placed it in the Valley of Cashmere, which he regarded as the original Paradise. But after it was discovered that Zend, the speech of the Iranians, in the North, was closely related to Sanskrit, the speech of the Indians in the South, and that it was equally archaic in character, it was found that the home of the Aryans would have to be looked for in a more northern region, where the Indians and the Iranians had dwelt together for a time and from which the Indians had journeyed southward into the Punjab. The hypothesis that made Central Asia the cradle of the Indo-Germanic race, had the largest number of adherents, in fact, for fully half a century it received the support of nearly all the great scholars of Europe. Pott fixed on the region north of the Himalaya mountains and east of the Caspian sea, in the valleys of the Oxus and Jaxartes, as the original home of the undivided Aryans.

His argument in support of this opinion he based on the fanciful theory that "the path of the sun must be the path of culture." He was supported in his view by Lassen, who, in 1847, declared his adherence to it "on the ground that the Sanskrit people must have penetrated the Punjab from the northwest through Cabool, and that the traditions of the Avesta point to the slopes of the Belurtag and the Mustag as the place of their earlier sojourn." On this Taylor remarks: "That before their separation the Indo-Iranians were nomad herdsmen inhabiting the steppes between the Oxus and the Jaxartes, is not improbable, but in view of the philological arguments which establish the comparatively late date of the separation of the Indian and Iranian stems, it is now seen that the admission of a Bactrian home for the Indo-Iranians has little bearing on the question." In 1848 the opinion of Potts received the powerful support of Jacob Grimm, who argued that the nations of Europe migrated from Asia under the promptings of an "irresistible impulse." Potts' "path of the sun" and Grimm's "irresistible impulse" may be said to constitute the foundation stones upon which the theory of the Asiatic origin of the Aryans rests. Max Müller, and the scholars of England and Europe generally, adopted the theory. From this speck of earth in Asia great colonies in whose veins ran the blood of a common ancestor streamed forth towards all points of the compass, and especially towards the northeast and west. Müller says, "the main stream of the Aryan nations has always flowed towards the northwest. No historian can tell us by what impulse those adventurous nomads were driven on through Asia toward the isles and shores of Europe. But whatever it was, the impulse was as irresistible as the spell which in our own times sends the Celtic tribes towards the prairies, or the regions of gold across the Atlantic." Elaborate theories of the successive Aryan migrations from central Asia were constructed. The Greeks and Italians were brought by a route south of the Caspian sea through Asia Minor to Greece and Italy; the Celts south of the Caspian through the Caucasus to the north of the Black sea, and then up the Danube to the extreme west of Eu-



rope ; and the Slavs and Teutons by a route north of the Caspian over the Russian steppes to their present seats. But when we come to examine the proofs for these well wrought out and often highly embellished theories we find that they are extremely shadowy and can be summed up in a very few words.

It is alleged that the dialects of Sanskrit and Zend have undergone the least change while the Celtic in the extreme west has undergone a much greater change ; that, consequently, the countries in which Sanskrit and Zend are now in use “ must be nearest the primitive center of dispersion ; ” that this conclusion is confirmed by the statement in the Avesta that the creation of man by Ormuzd took place in the Bactrian region ; that the only two trees whose names agree in Eastern and Western Aryan, are the birch and the pine, while the mention of snow and ice points to a cold climate ; that the universal Aryan myth of the wanderings of Odysseus may refer to the sea of Aral.

In answer to this our author remarks, that “ it is now recognized that the archaic character of Sanskrit and Zend is mainly due to the fact that our knowledge of these languages is derived from documents more ancient than those belonging to any of the languages with which they are compared, that if we confine our attention to contemporary forms of speech, and compare, for instance, modern Lithuanian with any of the vernacular dialects of India, which have descended from Sanskrit, we find that the Lithuanian is immeasurably the more archaic in its character. It may be surmised that if we possessed a Lithuanian literature of a date contemporary with the oldest literature of India, it might be contended with greater reason that the cradle of the Aryan languages must have been in the Lithuanian region. Against the traditions of the Avesta, which are so late as to be valueless, may be placed the certain synchronous traditions of the European Aryans that they were themselves autochthons. The Deucalion legend of the Greeks has as much, or as little, value as the traditions of the Avesta ; ” that “ the philological deductions as to latitude and climate apply with as much force to Europe as to Asia ; and if the birch and the pine were known to the primi-

tive Aryans, so also, it may be urged was the beech, which, unlike the birch and the pine, is confined to Europe, while the ass and the camel, which were certainly unknown to the undivided Aryans, are especially characteristic of the fauna of Central Asia. As for the sea of Aral, and the wanderings of Odysseus, they are disposed of by the fact that the words for sea and salt are not common to the European and Asiatic Aryans."

But while the philologists were practically unanimous in the opinion that Asia was the cradle of the Aryan race, there was, nevertheless, one of their number, Dr. Latham, of England, who, as early as the year 1851, raised a protest against the belief, pronouncing it a bare assumption unsupported by the evidence. He claimed that the facts pointed to a European rather than an Asiatic origin. He based his argument on the close relation which the Lithuanian language bears to Sanskrit and its no less archaic character, and on the fact that it is more rational to assume that the smaller body in Asia broke away from the larger body in Europe than that the larger body broke away from the smaller.

The argument of Dr. Latham as it has since been enlarged is illustrated by diagram on page twelve of our author's work. The European groups are placed in the form of a circle composed of six links. Beginning with the Slavs, lying to the northeast of Greece, we have them presented in the following order: Slavs, Letts, Germans, Celts, Latins, Greeks. Now it has been shown that there is a close linguistic connection between the Slavs and their immediate neighbors, the Letts, between the Letts and their neighbors on the west, the Germans, as also in like manner between the Germans and Celts; the Celts and Latins, the Latins and Greeks. The nations that are contiguous to each other are more closely related, linguistically, than those which lie apart; for instance, the Slavs are in closer affinity with the Letts, and the Letts with the Germans than are the Germans with the Slavs. It has also been shown that there is no cross connection between the Greeks and the Slavs, nor is there any between the Indo-Iranians and the Latins or the Letts; but the connection



between the Indo-Iranians and the Greeks, and between the Indo-Iranian and the Slavonic has been established.

“Hence the European Aryans form a closely-united chain of six links; but there is one vacant place—one link is missing from the chain. This missing link is found far away in Asia, where we find the Indo-Iranians, who are very closely united with each other, but whose affinities are chiefly with the Slavs on the one hand, and with the Greeks on the other. They clearly constitute the missing link in the chain, which would be complete in its continuity if they had at some former period occupied the vacant post.”

“Only two hypotheses are possible. The Aryan languages must either have all originated in Europe \* \* \* ; one member the Indo-Iranian, separating from the rest, and migrating to its present position, or they must all have originated in Asia,” and afterward the Western Aryans must have migrated severally to Europe, “preserving in their new homes the precise relative positions which their mutual connections prove must have originally existed. Which is the more probable hypothesis—that of a single migration, the migration of a people whom we know to have been nomads at no distant time, or six distinct migrations of six separate peoples, as to which there is no evidence whatever that they ever migrated at all, and whose traditions assert that they were autochthons?”

Little attention was paid to Dr. Latham's theory. He suffered the fate of most scholars who lived in advance of their time.

But a complete change has taken place in the minds of nearly all the scholars who are versed in the various sciences that have a bearing on the question as to the origin of the Aryans. The philologists themselves have been compelled, one by one, to yield to the logic of newly discovered and well established facts, and to reconsider their former supposed well grounded opinions. At first they followed slowly and somewhat reluctantly in the wake of the anthropologists, who have been the leading advocates and champions of the new view, but within the last decade and a half nearly all have passed over to the rank of their former opponents.



The change is owing to the new sciences of geology, anthropology, craniology and prehistoric archæology. The assumption that man is a comparatively recent inhabitant of our earth, the traditional belief that Asia is the original cradle of the human race, and that the Aryans are the lineal descendants of the family of Japhet, which for so long a period dominated the thinking of men, have been finally given up. For the oldest historical records of human life are no longer the tablets bearing cuneiform inscriptions, and the pottery rescued from the ruins of ancient cities on the Euphrates and the Nile. These carry us back only six thousand years at most.

The oldest records made by human agency are the "memorials of successful hunts, preserved in the caves of Dordogne, which were inscribed by the contemporaries of the mammoth on the bones and tusks of extinct animals, compared with which the records on Babylonian tablets or Egyptian tombs, much more the traditions of the Avesta, are altogether modern." Linguistic archæology "takes us back to a period older than all written records, to an age before the invention of writing or the discovery of metals, when the first rude plough was a crooked bough, and the first ship a hollow log propelled by poles."

From craniology it has been learned that the peoples "who now speak the Aryan languages do not belong to one race, and that the same races which now inhabit Europe have inhabited it continuously since the neolithic period, when the wild horse and reindeer roamed over Europe.

"The sciences of prehistoric archæology and geology have extended still further the history of the human race, and have shown that in western Europe man was the contemporary of the mammoth and the woolly rhinoceros and other extinct pachyderms, and have brought to light from the gravels of Abbeville evidences of his handiwork, dating from a period when the Somme flowed three hundred feet above its present level and England was yet united to the continent." It is believed that man "must have inhabited France and Britain at the close of the quarter-nary period, and must have followed the retreating ice of the



glacial epoch, to the close of which Dr. Croll and Professor Geike assign on astronomical grounds an antiquity of some eighty thousand years." Three consecutive ages have been established, the stone age, the bronze age, and the iron age. They are not necessarily synchronous in different countries. Greece was in the iron age when Italy was yet in the bronze age and the rest of Europe in the stone age. The stone age is divided into two periods, the paleolithic, or age of chipped flints, and the neolithic, or age of polished stone. With the paleolithic era, however, the question under consideration does not have anything to do. Whether the men of that extremely early age were the progenitors of the races whose records date from neolithic times can perhaps never be told. There have been no discoveries by which a continuity can be certainly established. And the flint flakes taken from the till produced by the last extension of the glaciers give no clew as to race or language. But in the much later neolithic period, when the geology and climate of Europe were already essentially the same as they are now, abundant evidence has been found to prove that three, if not four of the existing types occupied approximately their present sites.

It is now well understood and generally acknowledged on all hands that the evolution and differentiation of the numerous Aryan languages demands a very much longer period of time than the hypothesis that Central Asia was the cradle of the Indo-European peoples allows. The extension of this time limit is now supplied by the contrary hypothesis of a European origin, since the antecedents of the present Aryan-speaking peoples there may be traced to the builders of the shell mounds in Denmark and of the kitchen middens and lake dwellings in Switzerland. The minimum date for the commencement of the neolithic age is placed at ten thousand years. The calculations are all of a rough character, but after all due allowance has been made it cannot have covered less time. The kitchen middens of Denmark are quite numerous and very large. Some are as much as nine hundred feet long and from one hundred to two hundred feet broad. The average thickness is from three to five feet, but some are as

much as ten feet in thickness. The stone implements found in these mounds are more archaic in character than those taken from the Swiss lake dwellings. It has been supposed by some that they represent a transitional stage between the paleolithic and the neolithic eras. They indicate that the people were hunters and fishermen, that they had not yet reached the pastoral stage. The only domesticated animal was the dog. The Swiss lake dwellers, while still living largely by the chase, had domesticated the ox and probably also the sheep and the goat. The shell mounds are, therefore, of very early origin. The degree of civilization which they disclose is much ruder than linguistic archæology demands for the undivided Aryans. They are composed of the shells of oysters and mussels, of the bones of animals and fish, with a few fragments of pottery. Flint tools are very abundant. The population, depending wholly upon fishing and hunting for subsistence, must have been extremely sparse. Consequently the accumulation of so large an amount of refuse must have required many centuries, if not millenniums. Moreover, many centuries must have elapsed since the completion of these mounds, for they are now quite a distance inland, the sea having receded, owing to the slow and gradual tilting of the land, a process which is still going on at the rate of a few inches a century. "On the site of the city of Glasgow there have been dug up, from a considerable depth, three rude canoes, one of which reposed on a bed of sea sand, a quarter of a mile from the river Clyde, and twenty-six feet above its present high-water level. Mr. Robert Chambers, of Scotland, who investigated the circumstances of these discoveries, states 'that we have scarcely an alternative to the supposition, that when these vessels foundered, and were deposited where in modern times they have been found, the firth of Clyde was a sea several miles wide at Glasgow, and covering the site of a portion of the city.' " \* One of these canoes contained, when discovered, a beautifully shaped and polished stone hatchet.

There are in Denmark also unmistakable evidences of three

\* Wells' Principles of Geology.



consecutive periods of vegetation, the age of fir, the age of oak, and the age of beech. "In the Roman period the country was covered, as it is now, by vast forests of beech. These changes in the vegetation are attributed to slow secular changes of climate. The stone age agrees mainly with that of the fir, and partly with that of the oak; the bronze age agrees mainly with the period of the oak, and the iron age with that of the beech. The shell mounds, which belong to the early neolithic period, belong to the age of the fir, since the bones of the capercailzie, a bird which feeds on the young shoots of the fir, have been found in the kitchen middens, while stone implements of the kitchen midden type have been discovered in the peat bogs among the stumps of the firs." In view of all this Professor Steenstrup thinks that "from ten thousand to twelve thousand years must be allowed for the accumulation of the vast mounds of refuse and for the successive changes of the forests from fir to oak, and from oak to beech, which can only be due to considerable changes of climate—changes, moreover, which had already been effected at the commencement of the iron age."

Another method of time measurement is afforded by the peat bogs in which neolithic implements are buried. It is calculated that at least from four thousand to six thousand years were required for the formation of some of these bogs.

The Swiss lake dwellings are considered the best natural chronometers, but as the civilization which they disclose is already in advance of that required by the undivided Aryans, they give only the minimum, not the maximum limit of time for Aryan settlement. One example taken from the author's book must suffice. "At Point de la Thiele, between the lakes of Bienne and Neufchâtel, there is a pile dwelling of neolithic age which is now three thousand feet inland from the present shore of the lake." A calculation based on the rate at which the lake is now filling up with sediment "would give for the foundation of this settlement a minimum antiquity of six thousand seven hundred and fifty years, or about four thousand nine hundred before Christ. At this time, therefore, the neolithic people had abandoned the



nomad life of the undivided Aryans, and had acquired the skill requisite to build their habitation on piles driven into the bed of the lake ; but how much earlier the neolithic period began we have no means of ascertaining."

Many similar examples are cited to show that the centuries required for the evolution of the Aryan languages can be accounted for by the evidence we have of the occupation of Europe by man from immemorial times, if not from that remote period when this part of our globe first became fitted for human habitation.

It is also now admitted that the evolution and differentiation of so many Aryan languages required a numerous semi-nomadic pastoral people wandering with their flocks and herds over a vast territory not divided by insurmountable mountain barriers, impassable swamps or impenetrable forests, a country with a soil fairly productive, and a climate not too severe, but yet sufficiently rigorous to develop sturdy physical powers and heroic characters. It is now conceded that the theatre of the primitive Aryans must have been in the north and not in the south, because the names for trees indigenous to the temperate zone, for snow and ice, for the two seasons, summer and winter, certain grains, etc., all point to a northern habitat. In compliance with this demand of the facts various sections were suggested by different scholars, as the Rokitno swamp, between the Pripet, the Beresina and the Dnieper, Denmark, Sweden and Norway. But each one of these was unsuited for the maintenance of such a numerous nomadic people as the ancient Aryans must have been. The district which most nearly answers all the requirements, it is claimed, is that part of Europe north of the Alps and extending from the Ural mountains on the east to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean on the west. The district in Asia lying east of the Caspian Sea and stretching a thousand miles beyond Lake Balkash has been named as supplying by its fauna and flora all the linguistic conditions of the problem. But much of this territory is too barren and inhospitable to support so numerous a population. Besides, it has, as far as known, always been occupied by Mongol tribes. And there is not a single vestige of any record left there to indi-



cate that it was ever occupied by the Aryans, whilst there is the most positive evidence that the Aryan peoples at present occupying the larger scope of country in Europe, and the one in all respects better adapted to the purpose, are the descendants of those who sojourned there in prehistoric times. All this seems to meet the conditions of the problem presented in the many kindred languages of Europe and Asia.

The theory of the evolution of the Aryan languages which has resulted from the researches and discussions covering a period of two decades or more is based on the principle that languages "are due to some unknown tendency to variation, coupled with extermination of intermediate varieties and the survival of the prepotent." In the first place, the original Aryan tribe, through its greater strength and more aggressive spirit, extended its sway by conquering non-Aryan tribes and imposing upon them its language. In the second place, the displaced language would naturally leave its impress upon the successful one. Third, the difficulty of acquiring a new language would tend to greatly modify the new speech amongst the conquered peoples, and finally, that, whilst at some time the geographical continuity of primitive Aryan speech was unbroken, eventually at certain points centers of disturbance, of new linguistic formations, or new phonetic variations arose which spread like concentric waves. These waves gradually weakened as they enlarged and at last colliding, those coming in direct contact very naturally preserved a closer affinity of speech than those situated at a distance from each other. The people, having now passed the pastoral stage and beginning to cultivate the soil, would, at these centers of disturbance, become organized into separate communities which would gradually spread southward and eastward. Thus the progress from a rude stage of barbarism towards a higher stage of civilization in which fixed governmental institutions are found has been historically continuous in Europe, and there is not the least evidence of a cataclism having taken place, such as the abrupt intrusion of a vast multitude of people migrating from Asia who, with bronze and iron weapons, drove out the original inhabitants, and, on the basis of their superior

civilization and culture, established a new and different order of things. On the contrary, the relics taken from the barrows of England and the Swiss lake dwellings demonstrate the fact that the use of metal implements was gradually introduced, and that these implements were acquired by barter, and that they were brought from the south. Whatever changes have taken place, in language and culture, it is now understood, have been gradually evolved, and have required many centuries for their execution. On the same principle geologists now account for the present configuration of our globe.

If the geological discoveries establishing the early existence of the human race in Europe have been startling, the deductions of the craniologists, drawn from the comparison of skulls taken from the sepulchral mounds and caves of those ancient denizens, if not wholly convincing, are certainly not less surprising.

“As to the nature of the speech of the neolithic peoples of Europe we have inferences rather than positive facts to guide us. As to their physical characteristics the evidence is abundant and conclusive. This evidence consists partly of the statement of Greek and Roman writers, but is obtained mainly from the measurement of skulls. The shape of the skull is one of the least variable characteristics of race, so much so that the skulls from prehistoric tombs made it possible to prove that the neolithic inhabitants of Europe were the direct ancestors of the existing races. The skull form is expressed by the numerical ratios of certain measurements which are called indexes.” Of these the most important are the cephalic index, giving the proportion of the extreme breadth to the extreme length of the cranium; the altitudinal, giving the proportion of the height of the skull to the length; the orbital, giving the proportion of the height of the eye orbit to the breadth; the facial angle, the nasal index, and the index of prognathous by which the shape of the face is estimated. By these indexes in conjunction with the shape of certain bones, the ethnic relationships of prehistoric to existing races may be determined with considerable certainty.

Another test is that of the hair. In the Mongolian the section



of the hair is circular; in the African it is flat; in the white or European it is oval. "The hair of the Mongolian is straight, that of the African frizzled or woolly, that of the European is inclined to curl.

"All these tests agree in exhibiting two extreme types—the African with long heads, long orbits and flat hair; and the Mongolian with round heads, round orbits and round hair. The European type is intermediate, the head, the orbit, and the hair are oval. In the east of Europe we find an approximation to the Asiatic types; in the south of Europe to the African. The neolithic tombs of Europe exhibit notable approximations both to the African and Asiatic types."

When Cæsar entered Gaul he found there three races, the Aquitanians, the Celts and the Belgæ, and beyond the Rhine a fourth, the Germans. These four races, it is claimed, can be traced in the neolithic tombs of Europe. "But it is evident that only one of these four races can represent the primitive Aryans, the others being merely Aryan in speech, but non-Aryan by descent."

In England and on the continent of Europe have been found many ancient burial mounds and caves. These have been thoroughly explored. Many skeletons, and parts of skeletons, of those ancient mound-builders, some of which are remarkably well preserved, have been collected from all parts of the continent and the adjoining islands. They have been carefully measured and compared. It is very plain that the oldest people of whom we have any record are those who buried their dead in caves, since the remains of wild animals are common in the caves, but rare in the mounds or barrows. There is every reason to believe that when the people abandoned the caves, they had reached the pastoral stage. The long mounds or barrows seem to have been built after the pattern of the cave. Many are four hundred feet in length, fifty in breadth and are "provided with interior chambers and passages." The long barrows all belong to the stone age, "no trace of metal has been found in any undisturbed part of a long barrow, while pottery of any kind is very infrequent."

The remains taken from the cave sepulchres, and those taken



from the long barrows are all of the same type ; they exhibit a dolichocephalic, or long headed, an orthognathous, or oval featured race, of short stature and of feeble muscular development. This race has been identified by ethnologists with the Silures, who at the time of the Roman conquest inhabited certain counties of England. It is found in some of the Hebrides, in the west of England and in Wales. Tacitus notes the resemblances between the Silures of the British Isles and the Iberians of Spain, and conjectures that the Silurians were Iberians who had crossed over from Spain into England. It is a notable fact that the Spanish Basques do bear a striking resemblance to the small dark Welshmen of Denbigshire. And now that this same type has been traced along the Atlantic Coast southward to Spain and the countries bordering on the Mediterranean Sea in the caves and mounds of France and Spain, both these peoples have been identified as the descendants of the long barrow people, who have been assigned the name Iberian. They ranged over the greater part of France, but seem not to have reached Germany or northeastern Europe. At Chauvaux a sepulchral cave was found containing skulls of the long barrow type, whose mean cephalic index is 71.8, and also pottery of the neolithic age. This cave marks the northeastern extension of the race. If they may be identified with the Aquitani of Cæsar, they must have retreated to the Pyrenees before the historic period. In the Caverne de l'Homme Mort, in the Department of Lozère, some fifty bodies were interred, and fifteen of the skeletons have been so well preserved as to admit of accurate measurement, and even of the determination of the sex. The measurements establish the identity of this race with the long barrow people of Britain. The Iberian race seems to have occupied all Spain, the coasts and islands of the Mediterranean, for in all these regions skulls of the long barrow type have been found. "In Pliny's time the Canaries were not inhabited. When occupied by the Spaniards in the beginning of the fifteenth century the natives were still in the stone age, using caves for habitation and for sepulture." Mummied bodies



in the caves of Teneriffe correspond in measurements to those found at Gibralter, southern France and Wales. "The Iberian race was probably of dark complexion, with black hair and eyes. Their presumed descendants, the Welshmen of Denbigshire, the Irish of Donegal and Kerry, the Corsicans and Spanish Basques, and the Berbers are swarthy."

Near the close of the neolithic age an altogether different race comes upon the scene; a race that is tall, muscular and brachycephalic, with yellow or reddish hair and florid complexion. These are the people of the round barrows, who probably erected Avebury and Stonehenge in England. They also probably introduced into Britain Aryan speech and implements of bronze. They have been identified with the Celts, and are supposed "to be an offshoot, through the Belgic Gauls, from the great brachycephalic stock of central and northeastern Europe and Asia." A glance at the illustrations exhibiting front and side views of skulls taken from the long barrows of the Iberians in comparison with those taken from the round barrows of the Celts is sufficient to convince one that they belong to wholly different types. "In the Celtic skull the head is massive and powerful, the face angular and prognathous, with a projecting mouth and powerful jaws. The broad, capacious forehead and the short, square chin indicate mental power and determination of character. The cheek bones are high and broad, the orbits of the eyes nearly circular, with supraciliary ridges well developed, which must have given a fierce and beetling aspect to the face. The nose must have projected forwards, and the sockets of the front teeth are oblique. The skulls of this race are usually distinguished by their capacity and vertical height, which is actually greater than their breadth."

In striking contrast with this type the Iberian "face is oval, feeble and orthognathous; the forehead narrow; the chin weak, pointed and elongated. The nose is usually not so broad as in the other race, but longer by a quarter of an inch, the space between the nostrils and the mouth considerable, giving a weak upper lip, and the sockets of the front teeth are vertical. Neither

the cheek bones nor the supraciliary ridges are developed, and the orbits of the eyes are somewhat elongated. The aspect of the face must have been mild and gentle. The vertical views of the skulls show that the greater length of the one, and the greater breadth of the other is due to occipital developments. The difference of the skulls extends also to the other bones of the skeleton. The Iberian race was short, with slender bones and feeble muscular attachments, while the Celtic race was tall, powerful and muscular."

The Celtic race has been traced in a broad zone across the continent of Europe to the Tiber, and eastward down the Danube, and across the great plains of Russia. They also at a later day spread southward through France, imposing their speech on the earlier races of that region. The south Germans are brachycephalic, but Teutonic in speech. It is known, however, that they were Teutonized during the first centuries of our era. The local names are of Celtic origin, and the older tombs contain both orthocephalic and brachycephalic skulls. The Danes, Hessians, Swabians, Bavarians, Lower Franconians, the inhabitants of the Breisgau and Upper Italy, all belong to this brachycephalic type. Also all the nations of Slavic speech, their hair and eyes are mostly light in color.

In the iron age a new type appears in England, which, though dolicocephalic, like that of the round barrows, is radically dissimilar, "the forehead is narrow, the brow low and retreating, the cranial vault low, the nose narrow but prominent, the orbital ridges are well marked, and the back of the skull well developed." It was a very tall race, some specimens being upwards of six feet in height. It has been termed the Scandinavian or Teutonic race, owing to the fact that wherever the Goths, Franks, Burgundians and Saxons made conquests in England, France, Spain, Italy and Eastern Europe, this type of skull has been found. It occupied, at a very early period, mainly the valley of the Rhine, extending, however, as far south as to Würtemberg, and east as far as to Brüx in Bohemia. At a later period it is found on the shores of the Baltic. The Swedes, who



at the present day, are the most dolichocephalic and also the tallest people in Europe, are regarded as the descendants of this race, though in Scandinavia the type has been greatly modified by the infusion of Celtic or Slavic blood. Owing to the prepotence of the Celtic race, the type has become extinct in Germany, but there are curious cases of reversion to an earlier type, of which three examples are given: the skull of Robert Bruce, who was of Norman blood, the skull of St. Mansuel, the Apostle of the Belgic Gauls, who in the fourth century was bishop of Toul in Lorraine. The most remarkable case is that of a Danish gentleman who lived in the seventeenth century. His skull was of the Neanderthaloid or Cronstadt (skulls of a very low order) type, with receding forehead and an enormous development of the supraciliary ridges. These reversions to an earlier type, which occur chiefly among men of Scandinavian or Norman extraction, themselves have an important bearing on the question as to the relationship between the present inhabitants of Europe and the people of prehistoric times whose seats they now occupy.

Another race is that of the Ligurians. Of the three races which Cæsar found in Gaul, the Belgæ have been identified with the people of the round barrows, and the Aquitani with the people of the long barrows. The Celtæ occupied the central and hilly part of France; and this part of France, Broca, the French anthropologist, maintains has been continuously occupied by their lineal descendants, who are a short, dark, extremely brachycephalic race. He also claims that they are the true Celts of history. This type has not been found in the British barrows, nor can it be identified with any of the existing people of Great Britain, but it is found in great purity in Auvergne, Dauphiny, Savoy, the Grisons, and the Maritime Alps. Physically they resemble the Lapps, having the same cephalic index, being of a swarthy complexion and possessed of black hair and eyes. But the principal correspondence consists in this, that both races have "the smallest parietal angle of any existing races—that is, the head is abnormally narrow across the cheek bones, and wide at the temples." The stature of the Lapps and Ligurians is also in agreement.



The former are the shortest race in Europe ; the latter the shortest in France, and the shortest race now speaking any Aryan language.

At Grenelle, near Paris, vestiges corresponding to the existing type of Ligurians have been found in the alluvium and underlying gravels in the ancient bed of the Seine, farther north in limestone caves near Furfooz, three hundred miles further south in the Department of Lozere, "now inhabited by the brachycephalic Auvernat race, and in the prehistoric graves of eastern Switzerland."

Having thus, by a great mass of evidence drawn from these sepulchral sources, established the fact that the present inhabitants of Europe are the descendants of the races who, in neolithic times, occupied the same seats, the author proceeds to establish the continuity of development in regard to culture. We have not space to present a tithe of the evidence upon which the argument is based, but can only say that it seems most conclusive. "In the oldest lake dwellings of Germany and Switzerland we find the remains of a people, believed to have been the ancestors of the Celtic race, usually in possession of cattle, but living mainly on the product of the chase. We trace them during a period which must cover many centuries, at first clad only in skins, then learning to weave mats from the bark of trees, and finally flax. We find them at first in possession of only the ox, and successively domesticating the goat, the sheep and the pig, and, last of all, the horse. We then see them acquiring by degrees considerable proficiency in agriculture, and passing gradually from the age of stone to the age of bronze, and from the age of bronze to that of iron." That the bronze and iron implements came from the South, and were procured by barter from the Mediterranean people is shown by the fact that they are more numerous in the lake dwellings of that region than in those in the North, and that in many they are modeled after the stone implements, while the ages of stone and bronze apparently overlap each other. All of which overthrows the theory of a conquering people possessed of a considerable degree of civilization coming from the East. There is not a particle of evidence to show that there was any such abrupt transition as is involved in the latter view.



The results of philological research, limited and corrected by archæological discovery are briefly summarized as follows: "That the speakers of the primitive Aryan tongue were nomad herdsmen, who had domesticated the dog, who wandered over the plains of Europe in wagons drawn by oxen, who fashioned canoes out of the trunks of trees, but were ignorant of any metal, with the possible exception of native copper. In the summer they lived in huts, built of branches of trees and thatched with reeds; in winter they dwelt in circular pits dug in the earth and roofed over with poles, covered with sods of turf or plastered with the dung of cattle. They were clad in skins sewn together with bone needles; they were acquainted with fire, which they kindled by means of fire-sticks or pyrites; and they were able to count up to one hundred. If they practiced agriculture it must have been of a primitive kind; but they probably collected and pounded in stone mortars the seeds of some wild cereal—either spelt or barley. The only social institution was marriage; but they were polygamists, and practiced human sacrifice. Whether they ate the bodies of enemies taken in war is doubtful. There were no enclosures, and property consisted in cattle, not in land. They believed in a future life; their religion was shamanistic; they had no idols, and probably no gods properly so called, but revered in some vague way the powers of nature."

This answers the demands of linguistic archæology. All the culture words common to the Aryan languages, or for which an Aryan etymology has been found, point back to this rude stone age, before any linguistic separation took place.

The author also undertakes to show that the probabilities favor the belief that, of the four primitive races of Europe, the Celtic were the primitive Aryans who conquered other tribes and imposed upon them their speech.

In reading this highly interesting book we were impressed with the fact, too, that students of secular science are often as slavishly bound by tradition as, it is sometimes alleged, are the students of sacred science; that it is well to keep an open mind; that it is as perilous to cling too tenaciously to that which is old, as to embrace too eagerly that which is new.

## IX.

### EDITORIAL NOTES.

#### RELATION OF THE PULPIT TO QUESTIONS OF POLITICS AND ETHICS.

At a meeting of the Ministerial Union of Philadelphia, some time ago, the Rev. Dr. Tupper read a paper touching the policy of the government in relation to the Turkish outrages in Armenia. This was objected to by the Rev. Dr. Thomas A. Hoyt, on the ground that Christian ministers have no commission and no right to deal with matters of this kind. These are secular things, with which ministers of the Gospel as such can have no concern. Their business is simply to preach the Gospel. Their authority is a "Thus saith the Lord." Hence they can have nothing to do with questions of politics or government, which are merely questions of expediency, concerning which there is no infallible revelation. In a sermon preached subsequently, Dr. Hoyt states his position more explicitly, and maintains that ministers of the Gospel as ambassadors of Christ, "have nothing to speak but what Christ tells them." They have no concern with the affairs of this life. Their only business is to beseech men to be reconciled unto God. They are not even to be teachers of ethics. "Ethics is excluded from the pulpit," says Dr. Hoyt, "as well as politics. Ethics is not religion, and religion is the one theme of the pulpit."

The question involved in this discussion is one which admits of something being said on both sides. It will be generally admitted, we presume, that Christian ministers are especially called to be ministers of religion. They minister to men in holy things. They are servants of Christ whose chief duty it is to bring men into the obedience of Christ, and to be helpers of God in the development of the religious life of believers. They are not pro-



fessors of science, of law, or of political economy, but teachers of religion. Their special calling is to preach the Word of God. They are to develop and illustrate the meaning of God's revelation in Christ. They are to speak to men about the nature and character of God; they are to make known God's will in regard to men; they are to tell men about God's love and righteousness; they are to point sinful men to Jesus, the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world; they are to preach of faith, of repentance, of judgment, of Heaven, and of eternal life. The example of Christ and of the Apostles, who generally abstained from any discussion of the social and political questions of their time, it may be said, should be the law for Christian ministers now. Christ's personal ministry on earth had reference entirely to the establishment of the kingdom of God. He refused to be entangled in any questions relating to secular affairs, such as the division of inheritances, or the payment of tribute. And the apostle Paul refused to know anything save Jesus Christ and Him crucified. It was the message of the cross, and not any world-wisdom, that he regarded as the power of God unto salvation. And now to turn the pulpit into an arena for the discussion of all sorts of subjects, from national finance, or international policy, to the latest novel, would be an entire subversion of the rule followed by the original preachers of the New Testament. This is not becoming to the Christian ministry. So far there will probably be little difference of opinion.

But when it is said that the pulpit has nothing to do with ethics, because ethics is not religion, and that it must be wholly dumb on all questions of social philosophy, national politics, and international relations, then many will protest that this is an unwarranted limitation of the scope and influence of the Christian ministry. Some of the wisest and best men who have ever labored in the ministry would not have been willing to have the sphere of their teaching and preaching thus restricted. The great preachers of antiquity did not hesitate to discuss political affairs; in this respect imitating the example of the prophets of the Old Testament rather than the apostles and the evangelists of



the New. And in times of great national crises, especially, when men's minds were disturbed by great political and social questions, Christian ministers of the saintliest character have not hesitated to come forward as teachers of their fellows in regard to the duties of the hour. This was the case in the time of the Reformation, in the time of the Puritan Revolution in England, in the time of our struggle for independence, and again, as many of our readers will remember, in the time of our civil war. And, in fact, it has been the case more or less at all times. Has this been all wrong? Has it been treason to the Gospel of Christ? According to the narrow rule laid down by Dr. Hoyt, it has.

But we can not accept that rule. We can not consent to the idea of such a radical divorcement between religion and ethics as that rule would imply. Religion, indeed, is not ethics; and yet religion and ethics are most closely connected. This is especially true of the Christian religion. Heathenism may get along without much morality, but not so Christianity. Are not most of the discourses of Jesus of an ethical character? And is not this true also of the discourses and writings of the Apostles? Are there not in the writings of the Apostles contained lists of duties for all stations in life—for husbands and wives, for parents and children, for masters and servants, for rulers and subjects? Are not the ten commandments contained in the Bible, of which six, at least, are of an wholly ethical character, and do not these afford legitimate material for pulpit instruction? How, then, can any one say that the pulpit has nothing to do with ethics, nor ethics with religion? St. James even goes so far as directly to identify ethical with religious activities. He says that "pure religion and undefiled before our God and Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their afflictions, and to keep himself unspotted from the world." Surely the acts here commended are in their nature ethical, and yet they are religious too. The sin of defrauding laboring men out of their just wages could not be more sharply condemned by modern socialists than it is condemned by St. James in 5: 4-6. If a minister were to preach from that text on the economic and ethical question of



fair wages to laborers, would he then be violating the law of the Christian ministry?

Alexander Vinet says that the object of the Christian pulpit is *to introduce the Christian idea into life*. To introduce the Christian idea into life means to cause men's life and conduct to become what Christ's idea of humanity requires that they should be. Christ unquestionably has an idea, a law, a rule, by which men's life on earth ought to be directed and controlled. Christ is not indifferent as to the manner in which men live here. And Christ's idea of human life relates not merely to men's conduct on Sunday, but to their conduct during all the days of the week, and not merely to their behavior in church, but also to their behavior in business. Men are to be Christians not only in church, but also in the store, the shop, the mill, the bank. They are not only to pray in Christian fashion, but they are to act in Christian fashion, or according to the principles of Christ, when they deal with their fellow men in things of this world. Whatsoever they do, whether in word or in deed, they are to do all in the name of the Lord Jesus. And surely the Christian pulpit has something to do with making men thus subject to the law of Christ. Or shall we suppose that the pulpit is properly employed in discussions of the location of Paradise and the rivers of Eden, or of the obligation of psalm singing and the wickedness of the use of musical instruments, and not properly employed in discussions relating to the proper conduct of men in society or the ethical foundations of society itself?

But it may be said that all that is required in order to make men live according to the law of Christ is to get the principle or germ of Christian life into their souls, and then the unfolding of the flower and fruit will come spontaneously. All that the pulpit needs to do is to sow the seed of the Gospel in men's hearts. The growing will take place according to the law immanent in the seed itself. In other words, if men are soundly converted and made Christians, they will do the works of God without any instruction or teaching. Now this would be the case doubtless if the Christian life were merely a physical process.



But the Christian life is a moral process, requiring at every point self-conscious direction and control. In this respect the progress of the Christian life may be compared to the development of mental life. In order to the process of intellectual development it is not enough that there be in the soul the principle of mind with its native laws and categories. There must be instruction, direction, discipline—stimulation of the mental energies by the power of developed mind. And so there must be instruction and direction also in order to the right development of Christian morality. In a word, there must be moral teaching, and this must be imparted by the pulpit. It is not enough that men are baptized and made Christians. They must be *taught* to observe all things which the Master has commanded. And this will require a great amount of concrete ethical instruction, in which the collective conscience of the Church hovers over, stimulates, and quickens the individual conscience. It is not enough, for instance, that men be told that they must love their neighbors as themselves. They often need concrete instruction as to what that means and requires. Had the Prophet Nathan simply repeated to David a general formula about loving one's neighbor and doing no harm to any one, he would have accomplished nothing. It was necessary for him to relate the story of the ewe-lamb, and then to thunder into the ears of the king, "Thou art the man." And so the pulpit, if it would accomplish anything, must often impart very concrete ethical instruction.

It may be said, however, that such instruction, at any rate, can only refer to the private life and conduct of Christians, and can have nothing to do with the duty of citizens in regard to such matters as economics, politics and policies of government. "Politics is a question of expediency only," says Dr. Hoyt. That is doubtless true of the politics of the professional politicians of our time. But is that right? Are there no moral principles involved in politics, and no moral responsibilities in national and governmental policies? Has Christ no concern with matters of this kind? Is it a sin which God will punish if *one* man wrongs another man, but not a sin if a *body* of men collectively, through



their government, wrong some one man, or some class of men, or some other and weaker nation? Has Christ no mind on such matters as these, and shall those who profess to speak to the world in His name not declare His mind? The prophets of the Old Testament, who likewise may be regarded as to some extent examples for the Christian ministry, spoke out on such subjects very plainly. They did not hesitate to discuss national policies, and to rebuke kings, and courts, and politicians for any violations of the law of right. The fact that Christ and the Apostles refrained from discussing questions and policies of government may be explained on another principle than that of indifference. They lived under a despotism which allowed no freedom of discussion and mercilessly suppressed all criticism of public acts. In these circumstances the only condition of personal safety was silence. Under such a government, moreover, the citizen has but little responsibility for the actions of rulers. The people can only be responsible to the extent that common opinion sustains and supports the policies of government. But how is it in a country in which the people are themselves the government, and in which the agents of government are unable to do any thing in the face of adverse public sentiment? Do not the people here share in the responsibility of the acts of their rulers? And does not Christ, then, have something to say to them in regard to the manner in which they vote, and in regard to the governmental policies which they either tolerate or encourage and support? If He has, then plainly it is the duty of the Christian ministry to know and say it for Him.

Dr. Hoyt says that the minister's authority must be a "Thus says the Lord." He must deliver the message which Christ has given him to deliver, and may only speak what Christ commands him to speak. Very well; we are willing to accept that view of the minister's duty. What, then, does Christ have to say on the massacre of Armenian Christians by the cowardly and selfish connivance of the governments of Europe? What does he have to say to those governments and to the people whom they represent? What does Christ have to say to the people of the United States



about those Spanish butcheries in the island of Cuba? Will it be said that Christ has no mind and no message on matters of this kind? Does Dr. Hoyt suppose that the "Thus saith the Lord," which forms the Christian preacher's commission, must always be found written in some chapter and verse of the Bible, and that Christ has no mind and no will on any subject in regard to which no such written instructions can be found? That, we think, would be a poor conception of the Christian ministry, and a most unworthy conception of Christ Himself. That the minister is bound to the Scriptures as the rule of Christian faith and duty we believe, just as firmly as we believe that ordinarily he is a teacher of religion and not of sociology; but we also believe that Christ is not indifferent to the affairs of this world, and that those who faithfully study their Bibles and listen to the voice of the Spirit may know what His will is concerning those affairs. It is one thing to know Christ in the flesh, that is, to know Him *historically*, and another thing to know Him in the Spirit. The latter mode of knowing Him may not contradict the former, nevertheless it may go immeasurably beyond it, and bring the mind of the human subject into immediate touch with the mind of Christ. It is in this sense, we think, that the apostle Paul says "We have the mind of the Lord."

We believe, then, that Christ has a mind, a will—that He has something to say—on all subjects of human interest. He has something to say on war and peace, on government and finance, and on all the social and economic questions which agitate the age. And what He has to say is the very thing that is needed in order to redeem human affairs from the curse of confusion and misery under which they are now laboring. It is not an appeal to *Mammon* that can ultimately settle questions of international relations and of domestic policy, but only an appeal to the law and mind of Christ. We believe that Christ has something to say to the sociological questions which are so profoundly agitating our own country at the present time—questions which can no longer be settled by an appeal to Adam Smith; and we believe that the future peace and prosperity of the country will depend upon whether



the Christian ministry generally will listen to what Christ has to say, and faithfully and fearlessly deliver His message to rich and poor alike. Let not ministers shrink from their duty under the pretense of limitation of their authority. They have authority, not indeed to turn politicians, stump orators, or demagogic agitators, but to teach all that Christ has commanded them concerning the things of this world as well as of that which is to come; and to reason of righteousness, of temperance, and of judgment to come before the Felixes, and Drusillas, and Agrippas of this age until they not *only tremble, but are converted*.

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#### MELANCHTHON, THE TEACHER OF ALL THE CHURCHES.

Philip Melanchthon, the four hundredth anniversary of whose birth was celebrated on the 16th of February of the present year, though the special coadjutor of Luther in the work of the German Reformation, belongs not merely to the Lutheran Church and to the sixteenth century. All Protestant denominations are indebted to him, and all times have been benefitted by his teaching. All the churches may claim him as their own, and all owe him a debt of gratitude as their common teacher, of which they will doubtless show some sense of appreciation during this anniversary year. This should especially be the case in our own Reformed Church, which is in some sense the creation of his spirit, and in which his mind has in some respects come to a clearer expression than in the Lutheran Church itself. It is fitting, therefore, that we should participate, to some extent at least, in the demonstrations of rejoicing over his illustrious name, and that we should study his character and meditate upon the import and tendency of his teaching.

Melanchthon was born in the town of Bretten, in the Lower Palatinate, of pious parents, who were in comfortable circumstances, and able accordingly to procure for him the educational advantages befitting his genius. He was early sent to the University of Heidelberg, which then did not amount to much as a school of learning, but upon whose character he was destined in

after life to exert an important influence. From Heidelberg, after having obtained his bachelor's degree, he removed to the University of Tübingen, where he came under the direct influence of his celebrated uncle, John Reuchlin, the greatest Hebrew scholar of the time. Here, at the age of seventeen, he received the degree of master of arts. He had devoted himself especially to the study of the classic languages and literature, and to philosophy. And now he turned his attention also to theology, of course in the old scholastic form in which theology was then taught, of the emptiness and uselessness of which he soon became convinced. He subsequently, at Wittenberg, obtained the title of doctor of theology ; but he was never ordained to the ministry, preferring, like Calvin, to serve the Church merely in the capacity of a lay theologian. He never preached a sermon, but exerted his influence by means of his university lectures and his books.

In the year 1518, ten months after Luther had nailed his ninety-five theses to the door of the castle church at Wittenberg, Melanchthon was called to a professorship in the university which had been established in that place in 1502, and which was destined soon to become, not merely a storm center, but a center of life and light for all Germany. At first he lectured on philosophy, but was soon transferred to the department of theology, where he powerfully supported the new reformatory doctrines preached by Luther. Luther and Melanchthon, while in many respects direct antipodes, were at once drawn towards each other and entered into a friendship which, though at times somewhat strained, continued through life. In temperament, character and culture, the two men were wholly different. Luther was of an impulsive, passionate nature ; Melanchthon was mild and gentle. Luther was a man of the people, who had come up out of hard and difficult circumstances ; Melanchthon had never known the pressure of want. Luther had passed through severe mental and spiritual struggles, fighting frequently against sin and the devil until his physical strength was exhausted ; Melanchthon had experienced no such conflicts, but, like Zwingli, had gradually grown into the evangelical opinions which were then in the air.



Luther received his education in the heavy atmosphere of an Augustinian convent, praying, fasting, and brooding over the scholastic theology; Melanchthon received his training in institutions of learning breathing the liberal spirit awakened by the *renaissance*. But the two men, while thus different, were complementary. They needed each other in order to their efficiency in the work to which Providence had called them. They were both engaged in the same great task of reforming the Church in faith and practice—the one, the man of action, furnishing the impulse and energy for the work; the other, the man of thought, furnishing the intellectual form and finish.

But there were differences, also, in their respective apprehensions of Christianity—differences resulting from their different mental constitutions and spiritual experiences—which have been reflected in the development of protestant theology, and church life in all subsequent times. In respect of the influence exerted by each of them, Luther was the more potent force during the time of the Reformation and the centuries immediately succeeding, while the power of Melanchthon is more widely felt in our own time. The spirit of Melanchthon is more akin to the spirit of this modern age than it was to that of the sixteenth century; and we are now prepared to do him the justice which his own age denied him. Perhaps he was too far in advance of his time to be rightly appreciated. The times in which he lived needed a rough, passionate, stormy leader, who was able to bear down all opposition by the force of his ponderous personality, and to scorn all suggestions of accommodation and compromise. Melanchthon was a lover of peace and concord. He was an advocate of unity and harmony among the churches, even in spite of doctrinal and practical differences. For the sake of peace he was willing to make large concessions, and even sacrifices, if at least they did not touch the essentials of the faith. We remember, for instance, his relations to the Augsburg *Interim*, and the reproach which was heaped upon him afterwards in consequence of his having declared himself willing to accept certain Catholic ceremonies provided only the foundations of the Gospel were left.



Such a willingness to make concessions, and to agree to differ where unity of doctrine was impossible, was not in the spirit of that age; and perhaps it is well that it was not. It may have been necessary that the new Protestant faith should stiffen into something of a fixed form, and become fully conscious of its own contents and meaning, before it could afford to be liberal towards diverse apprehensions and formulations of doctrine. But things have changed now. There is less account made of precise theological formulas now than then. It is the spirit of Melanchthon that rules the present age rather than the spirit of Luther; so that, for instance, it is harder now to justify Luther in withholding the hand of Christian fellowship from the Swiss at Marburg, than it was in his own time.

Melanchthon saw correctly that Christianity is something different from dogmatic formulas or from speculative statements of doctrine. To the latter he was ever more or less averse on principle. In the earlier editions of his *Loci Communes*, the first dogmatic work of the Reformation, he passed over entirely such doctrines as those concerning the trinity, creation, and the incarnation, treating only of the more practical doctrines of sin, redemption, faith, justification and repentance. He justified this omission of the more speculative doctrines by saying that the mystery of divinity had better be adored than investigated, and that no investigation could even be attempted without great peril. But he was averse also to the exaggeration of the importance of dogmatic formulas, for the reason that they are at best only approximations to the Christian reality with which they have to do. That he appreciated the value of sound doctrine is shown by the fact that he was himself incessantly employed in reaching after it; but this continual effort also showed him how unreasonable it is to over-estimate the results reached at any particular time or by any particular individual. The theologian, like other men, sees only through a glass darkly, and the system which he builds up with such infinite labor and pain, is ever only an imperfect thing, and is ready to be laid upon the shelf about as soon as its author is laid in the grave. The-



ology is a progressive science, and no moment of time will ever be able to boast of having brought it to completion. If there could ever be an infallible creed or dogma, then the acceptance of that would be to the theologian the end of all questioning and thinking. But nothing was farther from the mind of Melanchthon than any such conception of Christian truth. For him personally the apprehension of Christian truth was an ever progressive work. He was ever pressing forward toward a better understanding. Every one of the many editions of his *Loci Communes* presents new phases in the development of doctrine. He was never long satisfied with anything that he had written, but soon proceeded to make revisions and changes. Thus ten years after its first publication, he ventured to make changes even in the Augsburg Confession itself—a proceeding for which he has been often and severely criticised. How could he dare to introduce changes in the Confession, when it was no longer his own property, but had become the confession of the common faith of the Church? The fact is, however, that Melanchthon never regarded it in that character. He never thought that the Confession was a finished and fixed formula of faith, beyond which there was no possibility of progress, and to the exact form of which all church members must be forever bound. He believed that the Confession was capable of improvement, like anything else he had written; and when any better form of thought or of expression occurred to him he did not hesitate to give it place.

But now, if theological science be thus in a state of continual flux, and if its results can never be anything more than inadequate expressions of Christian truth, what reason then is there why theological formulas should be made conditions of Church fellowship? Why should the mode of Christ's presence in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper be a cause of division among Christians, so long as the fact is acknowledged? Melanchthon was not always consistent in holding this broad view of the nature of Christian doctrine, and of its relation to the essence of Christian faith; else he could never have given his consent to the



execution of Servetus. But this was nevertheless the ideal that was hovering before his mind, and hence he was the prophet of Church union at a time when the tendency everywhere was towards a consolidation of the divided fragments of the Church about fragments of truth held in a one-sided and exaggerated form. Melanchthon was of a more churchly temper than Luther, and hence felt more keenly the evils of division. But he also felt that the principle of union must be something other than intellectual apprehensions of dogmatic formulas. And that, we believe, is the position to which the mind of the Church is coming more and more in modern times. If the Church is ever to be one again, it must be united upon something else than creeds and theological systems. The unifying principle must be Christ and faith in Christ as the Revealer of God and Saviour of men. And in a re-united Church theology must be as free as the air. The truth which shall unite, must also make free.

There are in the teaching of Melanchthon, particularly, two points of divergence from the teaching of Luther, in regard to which the theology of modern Protestantism generally goes with the former rather than with the latter. The first of these relates to the doctrine of predestination and of free will, the second to the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. The former made its appearance in time before the latter, but the latter first obtained symbolical recognition, for the reason probably that it was powerfully supported by the tendency of theological thought in the Protestant world outside of Germany. Melanchthon gradually developed a doctrine concerning the Lord's Supper, essentially differing from that of Luther. Whether this divergence was due to an immanent tendency in his own mind, or whether it was occasioned by his intercourse with foreign theologians, especially Bucer and Calvin, is a question that need not here detain us. The fact is that Melanchthon gradually developed a doctrine substantially identical with that of Calvin, to which he gave expression in the *Variata* edition of the Augsburg Confession of the year 1540. The fact of such variation, and especially of the expression of it in this edition of the Confession, has sometimes



been denied, on the ground that no break occurred between Melanchthon and Luther during the remaining six years of the latter's life. This proves, it has been said, that neither Luther nor Melanchthon were conscious of any departure from the standard of Lutheran orthodoxy. But the fact is that the difference is there nevertheless. Luther taught that the body and blood of Christ are present in the *form* of bread and wine (therefore *locally*), and are *communicated* to those eating and drinking, and by all of them orally received. But in the *Variata* we read "that *with* bread and wine are truly *exhibited* the body and blood of Christ to those that eat in the Lord's Supper." It is the Calvinistic doctrine of a spiritual real presence of Christ in the sacrament rather than the Lutheran doctrine of a local presence of the body and blood of Christ in the bread and wine, and consequently of an oral manducation of the same, that is set forth in the *Variata*. That Luther and Melanchthon did not fall out over this matter was, perhaps, because they could not afford to fall out. Their relations were, indeed, sometimes strained. Luther at times fretted and fumed about Melanchthon's broad tendencies, and Melanchthon sometimes grew tired of Luther's domineering spirit; but they continued to the end to treat each other as brothers in the Lord, because they had come to be mutually necessary to each other. And it may be too that neither of them was fully conscious of the whole bearing of their difference in this matter. After Luther's death, however, the difference was discovered by such spirits as Flacius, Hesshuss, Klebiz, Westphal, and others; and then the war was commenced which embittered the entire subsequent life of Melanchthon and made him feel that death would be a desirable escape from the madness of the theologians, and which in the end drove the Palatinate, which had accepted the Reformation under Melanchthonian influences, together with other large sections of German Protestantisms, formally over into the arms of the Reformed Church. That in modern times large sections of the Lutheran Church, especially in this country, and all bodies of Protestant Christians which are not Lutheran, have repudiated the old Lutheran doctrine of the Lord's Supper is a matter of history.



In regard to the other point of divergence from Lutheran teaching, namely, that relating to the doctrine of predestination and free will, the approval of the Protestant world has only come in more recent times, but it is now almost universal. In his first edition of the *Loci Communes*, Melanchthon, like all the Reformers, accepted the exaggerated Augustinian doctrines of sin and grace. Luther adhered to these doctrines to the end of his life; and Calvin not only adhered to them, but elaborated them and fixed them in the heart of his doctrinal system. Melanchthon, however, at first questioned, then doubted, and at last denied these doctrines in the form in which they had come down from Augustine. He was compelled to do this in the interest of an ethical apprehension of Christianity. Melanchthon's mind was preëminently of an ethical cast. He studied Aristotle's ethics, and cultivated ethical thought with special fondness. But the Augustinian doctrine of total depravity is decidedly unethical. If the human soul has no more moral ability than a block or a stone, then where is its responsibility? And so, if human destiny is absolutely fixed by an eternal divine decree, without regard to human character or merit, what reality then can there belong to the moral life of men in this world? A life that accomplishes nothing but the actualization of a pre-determined result, can obviously have no moral value. And the doctrine of irresistible grace is equally unethical. A life in which the will is not free ceases to be a moral life. Hence Melanchthon gradually rejected these doctrines, and assumed that in the conversion of the soul three causes coöperate, namely, the Divine Spirit, the Word of God, and the *human will*. The will is an active factor in the process of conversion, as well as in the process of sanctification. Salvation is an ethical process involving freedom, and not merely a physical or magical process accomplished by divine omnipotence. It is a process taking place in man through his will, which is a factor of faith itself, and not merely a decree concerning man. And good works are necessary, not as a ground of merit procuring salvation as a reward, but as the condition of developing a right Christian character, in which salvation essentially consists.



These views have at last gained ascendancy in modern theological thought. The unethetical determinism of Calvin and of Luther, which was *not* eliminated in the Form of Concord, has at last been radically overcome in modern theology, and theological thought now is free to take on a thoroughly and consistently ethical character and form.

The German Reformed Church, which is the parent of the Reformed Church in the United States, owes its existence and character largely to the influence of Melanchthon's teaching. As we have seen, the Palatinate, the original home of the Heidelberg Catechism, was at first Lutheran after the Melanchthonian fashion; and it became Reformed only because Flacianism rather than Melanchthonianism had become the predominant influence in the Lutheran Church of Germany. But in becoming Reformed it did not exchange its general religious character for the character of a foreign church. Even in accepting the Calvinistic doctrine of the sacrament the German leaders of the Palatinate did not accept any new and foreign teaching. Ursinus had learned the same doctrine from Melanchthon, his personal friend and teacher at Wittenberg, before he had ever learned anything from Calvin. The Calvinistic doctrine of determinism was, indeed, accepted and taught by some German Reformed theologians, just as it was accepted also by some Lutheran theologians, but it never became the exclusive doctrine of the Church. The prevailing sentiment of the Church on this subject has always been Melanchthonian rather than Calvinistic. Our Reformed Church is Calvinistic in its theory of Church government; it is Calvinistic and Melanchthonian in its doctrine of the sacraments; and it is wholly Melanchthonian in its doctrine of free grace, and in matters of cultus and church life generally. In general it has been the genius of Melanchthon rather than the spirit of Calvin that has prevailed in our branch of the Reformed Church, giving it German geniality and depth rather than French formality and legalism.

## SECURITY OF TRUST FUNDS.

It was reported, through *The Outlook*, several months ago, that action had been taken by the Board of Directors of the Western Theological Seminary of the Presbyterian Church in this State, looking to the "introduction of a bill into the legislature to empower the courts of the State to pass judgment on all alleged misuses of trust funds held by theological and similar institutions." The design of the legislation to be asked for was to give power "to the courts to decide whether, in case charges of teaching heresy are made, such teachings constitute a misuse of funds;" and the object plainly aimed at was to get out of the way obnoxious teachers who could not be removed by the machinery of ecclesiastical and civil law now existing. We have not since then heard or seen anything of this movement, although we have been watching for it. Nor do we know whether the legislation to be asked for was or is intended to apply only to the Presbyterian Church, or whether it is intended to affect all churches alike. But in any case, the subject is one of sufficient importance to justify us in giving it some consideration.

We presume that there will be general agreement as to the proposition that trust funds should be sacredly administered in agreement with the intention and purpose of their creation. Money given for a particular purpose, whether it be the building of a church, the establishment of a hospital, the foundation of a library, or the endowment of a theological seminary, should be applied as nearly as possible to the purpose for which it was given. The alienation of such gifts of money, or of the property in which they are invested, to objects entirely different from those intended by the givers, is generally immoral, and should be carefully guarded against by judicious legislation. For example, a church built with the money of a particular denomination, and for its use, should remain the property of that denomination; and legislation should be so framed as to make the alienation of such property impossible, except where the fulfillment of its original destination may demand it. We know of some valuable



church properties which once belonged to the Reformed Church, and which are now in the possession of other denominations; and for us at least it is difficult to see by what code of morals these denominations can justify such possession.

But while we can see the propriety of any reasonable measures to prevent abuses of trust funds, yet we question whether it is not going a little bit too far if, in order to secure this end, we are willing to give to the civil courts power to determine questions of religious doctrine. We should be afraid, for instance, that courts might either not be sufficiently informed, or that they might not be sufficiently impartial to reach just conclusions on such questions. It is firmly believed by some good people that in a certain famous church case in Philadelphia, a good many years ago, the decision of the court was swayed by the Calvinistic bias of one of the judges. Now, we should be afraid that if questions of orthodoxy or heterodoxy were to be submitted to the courts, the decisions would often be swayed by such influences. And we should be afraid, too, that such power might be abused by ill-disposed people to keep the teachers of the Church, whether in professorial chairs or in the pulpit, in continual anxiety and alarm, to the great detriment of the Church. What would be the standard of orthodoxy according to which the courts would be expected to judge? The Confessions, of course, in their strictest and most literal interpretation. But the Confessions are not infallible; and there are few ministers in any of the churches who are willing to swear to everything that is taught in their Confessions. How, for example, would the Presbyterians like to be held to every detail of doctrine contained in the Confession of Westminster? That Confession teaches that the world was made in six days, and that there are non-elect infants in hell. How would Presbyterian ministers now like to preach those doctrines? And yet if they did not preach them, or at least confess them, any contentious member of the Church might prefer charges of heresy against any pastor, and manage to have the case brought to the civil court, where, on a strict construction of the Confession, he would be declared a heretic,



having no right to be supported by the funds of the Church; for in a civil court no such pretenses would be accepted as that the word "day" in the Confession might mean an indefinite period of time, as has been supposed to be the case in Genesis. We think that a power which might be thus used would be a rather dangerous power to entrust to the courts of the State.

But we would question the wisdom of such legislation for another and more fundamental reason, namely, the reason that the confessional standards of a denomination cannot have absolutely binding authority for its members during all time. Confessions are not absolute and final formulations of Christian truth. They represent the commonly received faith of a denomination at the time when they were formed. But time passes, and there come changes; new questions and new issues arise; theological science makes progress, and old formulations of truth are found to be no longer adequate. What are the teachers of the Church to do in these circumstances? Must they go out of the Church, or, failing to do that, must they be thrust out, so soon as their teaching no longer squares at all points with the teaching of the Confession or with the traditional dogmatic system? This view has been maintained by some theological writers, whom, as we think, partisan zeal, and not love of truth, has blinded. We think, too, of course, that any teacher should be in harmony with the spirit of the Church in whose service he is employed. A Methodist, for instance, has no business in a Reformed pulpit or institution of learning. He can be better employed in the Methodist Church. But this is something different from demanding acceptance of all the confessional doctrines of a denomination in order to secure employment in her service as a teacher. Think, for instance, of requiring of all Reformed ministers that they should accept the answer to the 46th question of the Heidelberg Catechism as being a correct explanation of the article of the Creed to which it refers. Such a policy would lead either to hypocrisy of the most infamous kind, or to the stagnation and death of all theological thought.

Is it, then, an abuse of trust funds if a teacher of theology



entertains and teaches theological opinions which are somewhat different from those entertained by the founders of such funds? How can it be known that if those founders were living now, and had passed through the development of theological science which has taken place since their day, they would not entertain the same opinions which the most advanced scholars of the Church entertain now? But even suppose it were otherwise; have those founders a right, by means of their gifts, to fasten their opinions upon the Church for all time? May the dead thus forever enslave the mind of the living? As long as a man lives, he may have the right to do with his money what he wills, and to give it for the support of any opinions he pleases. But does this right also endure into an indefinite future after the man is dead? Must the money which has been set apart by the devout Catholic for the purpose of saying masses for the dead be forever used for that purpose, in spite of any change which may come over the opinion of the Church in regard to that subject? That trust funds should be held for the benefit of the general cause for which they were intended by their founders, is generally recognized, and the courts have always so ruled. For instance, funds contributed to a Presbyterian school of theology are intended for the education of ministers for the Presbyterian Church, and must be so used as long as the Presbyterian Church exists. But does this imply that the teachers in such a school must always be bound in all respects to the known opinions of the founders of the school, or even of the framers of the Confession? Would that be good policy? Would it not give to the "dead hand" an influence over the affairs of the living that would soon become intolerable?

This question came up in the time of the Reformation and in the century following; and, as Schiller has observed, it was one of the causes which led to the Thirty Years' War. The Protestants had taken possession of Church property which had been created by Catholics for the benefit of the Catholic Church. In many cases also Catholics and Protestants contended for the same property. The Catholics argued, "This property was es-



tablished by Catholic men and women, with Catholic money, and therefore it belongs to us." The Protestants replied, "The founders of this property were our fathers and mothers. They established this foundation for the spiritual benefit of themselves and their children, and not for the perpetuation or promotion of a set of theological opinions. Hence the property is ours by right of inheritance." To us it seems that the claim of the Protestants was a righteous claim and should have been so recognized. Schiller, however, intimates that the question was one that could not be settled by law, but only by the sword. "The law," he says, "has decisions only for conceivable cases ; and, perhaps, spiritual foundations do not belong to this class of cases ; at least they do not belong to them when the aims of their founders are made to extend to dogmatic propositions ; for how is it possible to make an eternal donation to a changeable opinion?" The authors of those spiritual foundations had no idea of the possibility of two such opposite systems of Christianity as Roman Catholicism and Protestantism ever contending with each other in the same territory ; and how, then, could they be supposed to have intended their foundation for the benefit of the one system rather than for the benefit of the other ? But the arbitrament of the sword decided the question at last in favor of the Protestants, and Protestant congregations continued to worship in churches built with the money of their Catholic ancestors. And we think that it is bad policy for Protestants now to deny the *principle* involved in that decision.

But we have a more weighty authority even than this : it is the example of St. Paul preaching the Gospel of Christ in Jewish synagogues, and the example of Christ himself preaching in the Temple at Jerusalem. Paul "reasoned in the synagogue every Sabbath, and persuaded Jews and Greeks," we read in Acts 18 : 14. And he did this not only in one place, but wherever he went and found synagogues, he availed himself of the opportunity which they afforded of preaching Christ. What right had he to do this if the principle be correct that spiritual foundations must always be used strictly for the promotion of



the opinions of those who established them? These synagogues had been erected by Jewish piety, with Jewish money, for the purpose of maintaining the Jewish faith. Yet Paul freely entered into these institutions and preached a faith that was subversive of Judaism. His birth and Jewish nationality enabled him to do this ; but had he a moral right to do it? Not if the arguments of some of the extreme zealots who have discussed the question within the last few years were correct. We dare say, however, that the question never occurred to Paul at all. But it may be argued that in using the synagogue for the purpose of preaching the Gospel, he only acted in harmony with the ultimate purpose of all Jewish institutions, which purpose was to lead to Christ. The Jewish faith was not a finality. It was to be transcended when the fulness of the time had come. Its fundamental principle, namely, faith in Jehovah and in His promises was to be preserved, but the shell of Judaism was to be abolished. And it was, therefore, no immoral act for the Apostle to use Jewish agencies and Jewish means in order to lead the Jewish people to serve the God of their fathers after the *way* which they called *heresy*.

This argument is no doubt correct. And this argument will also justify the appropriation of Catholic foundations by Protestant Christians in the time of the Reformation. Roman Catholic Christianity was a preparation for Protestant Christianity. But this is the relation also of one stage of development of theological thought to another in a Christian denomination. There is always a relation of continuity, and the lower stage ever looks to the higher. Presbyterianism, for instance, is not a finality for Christian faith, and the Westminster Confession is not a finality for Presbyterianism. And consequently it is not an abuse of the institutions created by one period if they are used for the propagation of the opinions of a succeeding period, provided the latter aim at the same end as the former. Scientific institutions are bound thus to undergo continual changes. Think of a medical school being forever bound by the terms of its foundation to teach only the medical theories held by its found-

ers! Shall theological institutions alone be put into fetters, and not be allowed to make any progress? What, then, will become of theology and of the Church? For the sake of the future prosperity of the Presbyterian Church we sincerely hope that our Presbyterian brethren will not commit the mistake of putting it into the power of the civil courts to arrest all progress of thought in their theological schools.



## NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

ANCIENT INDIA; Its Language and Religions. By Prof. W. Oldenberg. The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, Ills., 1896. Pages, 110. Price 25 cents, paper binding.

This little work consists of three essays, which were first published in the *Deutsche Rundschau* of Berlin. The translation was made by competent persons, and reads smoothly. The volume is provided also, like all the publications of this company, with a full index, which adds much to its value. The subjects of these essays respectfully are "The Study of Sanscrit," "The Religion of the Veda," and "Buddhism." In the first of these essays we have an interesting account of the progress of Sanscrit scholarship during the present century, and of the relations of the ancient language of the Indian Aryans. In the second essay, the religion of the Veda is discussed. The Veda (or Vedas, for there are four books) contains probably the most ancient religious literature in the world. It consists of a collection of hymns and prayers addressed to the gods; and these gods are the half humanized personifications of the powers of nature, corresponding in point of development to the mythological conceptions of the ancient Germans, as we learn to know them from the Edda. In the last essay the author draws out several interesting parallels between the religious thought of India and of Greece. One of these is the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, which seems to have originated simultaneously in Greece and in India. Certain likenesses between the teaching of Buddhism and of Christianity have frequently been observed, and some writers have supposed that the latter religion must have borrowed from the former. Prof. Oldenberg is of the contrary opinion, and maintains that the similarity of effects is due to a similarity of causes. In conclusion we can only say that any production by so competent an author as Prof. Oldenberg, on so fascinating a subject as India, could not well fail to be interesting.

THE CURE OF SOULS: Lyman Beecher Lectures on Preaching, at Yale University. 1896. By John Watson, M. A., D. D. Pages, 301. Price, \$1.50. Dodd, Mead & Company, publishers, New York.

The nine lectures of which this work consists have respectively the following headings: "The Genesis of a Sermon," "The Technique of a Sermon," "Problems of Preaching," "Theology the Theory of Religion," "The New Dogma," "The Machinery of a Congregation," "The Work of a Pastor," "The



Public Worship of God," "The Minister's Care of Himself." It will be seen that this outline of subjects touches upon nearly the whole field of practical theology, although the theme to which the most attention is devoted is, of course, preaching, which is the most weighty and the most difficult of the minister's functions. The preacher, however, is not merely an orator, nor merely a teacher, but a trainer of souls—one by whose care souls are to be made to grow into their proper divine image. Hence the title of the book, *The Cure of Souls*.

Dr. Watson's idea of a sermon is the idea of a growth rather than of a manufacture. In order to kindle life in an audience the sermon must itself be a living thing. "A sermon," he says, page 11, "is more than a cunning creation; it is an inspiration, not so much dead stuff laboriously fitted together, but a tree whose leaf is green, which yieldeth its fruit in due season." Here is the secret of the failure of a great many sermons. A sermon may contain any amount of sound doctrine and much learning, but if it be not *vitalized by the breath of life* it will accomplish nothing. The formal qualities of a good sermon the author declares to be *unity, lucidity, beauty, humanity, delivery, intensity*. By *delivery* he means *speaking, not reading*; although he insists on the careful preparation of sermons, even to the extent of writing them, and says that "extempore" sermons had better be called "extrumperty" sermons.

The lectures on the problems of preaching and on the new dogma are among the most interesting in the course. Among the problems of preaching is the question how the preacher ought to relate himself to the interests of secular life. Should preaching be confined entirely to matters of the other world—what is sometimes called the "simple gospel"—or should it deal with men's moral life in this world? Dr. Watson, while recognizing the fact that the Gospel has to do mainly with things of the other world, nevertheless does not forget that godliness is profitable for the world which now is. In the lecture on the "new dogma" the author maintains that theological science has developed, "not along a straight line, but in a course of progressive and sometimes intersecting circles." These are *mysticism, dogmatism* and *criticism*. The first of these is illustrated, according to Dr. Watson, in the Apostolic and the first part of the Ante-Nicene period, when Christianity is simply a direct apprehension of Christ and a life in Christ by faith. The second is the period of scholasticism, beginning with the Nicene age, when Christianity is employed with the formation of dogma. And this is succeeded by the period of criticism, when dogmas are dissolved and doctrines are again brought into a state of flux, in order once more to solidify into new dogma. The first is the age of St. John, the second the age of the schoolmen, the third



the age of Erasmus. But these circles of development succeed each other in ceaseless movement, which is always upward towards a better apprehension of Christianity. This last position, we think, must be regarded as correct, whatever may be thought of the author's idea of the process of religious thought. The author is persuaded that we are at present standing at the close of a critical period, and that the characteristic of the immediate future of religious thought will be mysticism, enriched by the results of past criticism. In speaking of the cry of "back to Christ," now so frequently heard, Dr. Watson discourses as follows: "When a minister leads his people in the return to Christ, it is well for him to avoid two extremes. He must neither go to the Gospels alone, for there he is dealing with an earthly Christ, nor to the heavens alone, for there he is dealing with an unknown Christ, but to Him who is alive forevermore, and whom we have in the Gospels. Criticism gives us the historical Christ, and mysticism gives us the spiritual Christ, and both united give us the real Christ."

Dr. Watson himself, we should say constitutionally is neither a critic nor a dogmatist, but a mystic and a poet, though of a very sane and sober order. Some of his former works have been criticised for what has been called "looseness of thought." To the dogmatist his logic may sometimes appear to be faulty. He has even been accused of incorrect quotations from the Scriptures. We presume that he cares but little for such criticism. The same charges could be brought against St. Paul, whose emotion sometimes caused him to forget his grammar. Critics of this class Dr. Watson himself would probably call "wooden thinkers," as he speaks of a certain theology as "wooden theology," and he would have little patience with them. He himself is a preacher who thinks thoughts that live, and that could not, without squeezing the life out of them, be forced into the moulds of a formal logic. This is the secret of Dr. Watson's success. It is the secret of the attractiveness of the book under notice. It is a book which one reads with pleasure; and which, once having taken up, one is loath to lay down. And the thought expressed *forces* itself upon the reader, and sticks to him whether he will or not. That is the kind of writing and speaking which kindles not only thought but life in the reader and hearer. To the Ministry a book like this must prove to be of immense value. If there is any brother who feels his power waning and sees his congregation going down, we advise him to read this book on "the cure of souls," and we believe that it will put new life both into himself and into his church. In fact we do not see how a minister could read what is here said on the duty of study, on the preparation of sermons, on pastoral visitation, on the conduct of worship, on the



organization and management of a church, and on the care of himself, without being inspired with loftier ideals of the functions of his office and quickened with new life and power for the performance of these functions.

GOD'S PLAN OF SALVATION, An Honest Inquiry into the Condition of the Soul after Death. By Rev. D. F. Brendle, D.D., author of the "Prodigal Son," "The Lives and Labors of the Apostles," etc. Berkemyer, Keck & Co., Printers, Allentown, Pa. 1896. Pages, 304.

This work is well printed. Paper and typography are all that the eye could desire. The reading of it, therefore, involves no physical burden, which is a valuable quality in any book intended to circulate among the people generally. A good portrait of the venerable author faces the title page, which will doubtless enhance the value of the work to his intimate friends, and especially to his parishioners whom he has served faithfully and well during so many years.

The work consists of twelve chapters, whose respective titles are as follows : "The Fall and its Import," "The Covenant of Works," "The Covenant of Grace," "The Incarnation," "The Human Character of Christ," "The Crucifixion of Christ," "Christ's Descent into Hades," "Death and Resurrection," "The Mediatorial Kingdom of Christ," "The Future Life," "The Angels," "The Fallen Angels." From this table of subjects it will be seen that the scope of the book embraces some of the most interesting topics in theology, concerning which there has been no little difference of opinion among theologians in the past.

The book is orthodox, and Scriptural as the author understands Scripture. It bears evidence throughout that the author's mind has not been distracted by any contentions of modern science or criticism. Not that he is ignorant of these contentions. He has heard about them, and has probably investigated their claims. But they have made no impression upon his mind, and have not at all affected his thinking. With the theory of *evolution*, for instance, the author of the book before us has no patience at all. On page 17, he says : "It is impossible for one who has adopted the evolution theory to be a Christian. For a Christian is one who believes in Christ. And Christ was not only man, but God. He was the God-man. He did not come into existence by the process of evolution ; not by the descent from a lower species—a monkey. The disciples of Darwin do not believe that men have souls, or that they were in need of salvation, which Christ came to bring into the world. If men and women are nothing but monkeys fully developed, they must be atheists who argue thus."

That may do as a specimen of the author's style both of writ-



ing and thinking. How literally he holds to the good old tradition in regard to matters now much disputed may be inferred from the very first sentence of the book under notice: "In the beginning of time, nearly six thousand years ago, God created the heavens and the earth with all that they contain." We observe, however, that the author is not quite consistent with himself, when he allows, on page 51, that death was in the world previous to the fall of man. "Death," he says, "was no doubt in the world and reigned over animated nature before the fall, as we learn from geological researches, and Adam would no doubt have been translated to a higher state of glory if he had not sinned." How long could death have been in the world, and how many geological strata could have been formed previous to the fall, if the world was created in six days not quite six thousand years ago? That will hardly do. If the first chapter of Genesis is to be taken for literal history, the science of geology will have to be bowed off the stage of knowledge.

In regard to the death of Christ, which our author contends did *not* take place on a *Friday* according to the received tradition, but on a Thursday, he holds the usual legal theory of the atonement; maintaining, however, contrary to the doctrine of many, that Christ "suffered two deaths; one being His physical death on Calvary, and the other the spiritual death He endured in Hades." Christ as our substitute must have suffered not only physical but also spiritual death in our behalf. Hence His descent into Hades had for its end not merely to preach unto the spirits in prison, but to suffer there the torments of the damned. Christ thus paid the full penalty of sin. Why then are not all men saved? Dr. Brendle has the usual answer: "The active and passive obedience of Christ must in some real and living way be imputed to His people," he says. But why must it? When the debt is paid, the penalty of all the sins of all men endured, how can the justice of God require anything more? We think these questions show that the doctrine of the atonement must be wrought out on another line than that of legalism.

We are glad to see that our author holds the doctrine of "the larger hope" in regard to the salvation of the heathen. "If there is no grace in the intermediate state for some," he says, "we do not see how any hope can be entertained with reference to unbaptized infants, idiots, and heathen, unregenerated as they are, who never had the Gospel preached to them, and stood in no living union with Christ before their death. To condemn them in a wholesale way would be unmerciful and unjust, and no one could reconcile the justice of God in saving some and letting others go to destruction without any fault of theirs," p. 167. On this subject the author is in line with "the new



theology," nor should this be surprising in a man of his intelligence.

We welcome this book into the republic of letters as an earnest effort on the part of a laborious pastor to solve for himself some of the difficult questions in theology. Work of this kind is a useful exercise for any minister of the Gospel. It will serve to keep his mind keen and fresh; and his preaching and pastoral work will be the more effective for such literary exercises. Besides, no man really knows theology until he has thought out its various problems for himself; and the way to do that, for many men at least, is to write treatises. And such efforts should, therefore, be encouraged by the Church and her members. Books written by Reformed ministers are not numerous; and the few that have been written ought to be in the libraries of our Reformed people. We hope, then, that Dr. Brendle's book may meet with an extensive sale.

MARTIN LUTHER. By Gustav Freytag. Translated by Henry E. O. Heine-mann. Pages, 127. The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, Ills., 1897.

This book is not intended for the professional theologian, but for intelligent readers in general. It is not a biography in the ordinary sense; but it is a picture of the man who was the leading agent in the Reformation of the 16th century. As such it is successful in a high degree. It places its subject before the mind of the reader so vividly that the latter cannot fail to obtain a clear conception of it. The colossal personality of the man, his relation to his age and environment, his virtues and his faults are so vividly portrayed, that the reader will rise from the perusal of the volume with a better idea of Luther, the man of God, than he possessed before.

Luther was the impersonation of his age and of his people. He and his coadjutors were but the instruments created by Providence through which old abuses were to be abolished and the progress of the Church into a new stage of development accomplished. When at the Diet of Worms he refused to recant with the exclamation, "I can not do otherwise; may God help me," that was the literal truth. Luther was not a wilful, capricious man who merely acted a part which he had chosen from ambition or vanity. He became a reformer, not because he wanted to be one, but because he could not do otherwise. He was the representative of the German mind and life, and was impelled forward with a force that was irresistible. Consequently all sections of Christendom are interested in his life and work. Even the Catholic Church is better now than it would have been without Luther and his co-laborers.

This is the view in which Luther is presented in the book



before us. Indeed, in this book Luther is not a *Lutheran*, but a Protestant Christian with universal tendencies and affinities, which, however, did not always come to their rights. For instance, according to the view of the author, Luther's doctrine of the Lord's Supper was defective, and his literal interpretation of the words of institution was a mistake. This shows his limitation. Such limitations in the character of his hero our author does not seek to conceal—a fact which makes his work all the more interesting, especially to persons who are not members of the Lutheran Church. To Sunday schools and to intelligent Christians of all denominations, accordingly, this new portrait of Luther ought to be welcome.

THE CELESTIAL SUMMONS. By Rev. Angelo Carroll. Edited by Homer Eaton, D.D. Publishers, Eaton and Mains, 150 Fifth Avenue, New York. 1896. Pages, 280. Price, \$1.25.

This is a volume of sermons named after the first one in the series. The sermons are twelve in number, bearing the following titles respectively: "The Celestial Summons;" "Christ the World-Leader;" "Nature's Interpretation of Immortality;" "The Land of Uprightness;" "The Star of Bethlehem;" "Watching with Christ One Hour;" "Christianity a Spiritual Warfare;" "The Great Plaudit;" "Christ's Sovereignty over the Human Heart;" "The Ethical and the Æsthetical in Christianity;" "A Religion for All Time;" "The Millennial Call."

Mr. Carroll, the author of these sermons, was a minister of the Methodist Episcopal Church, who labored at first in New England and later on the Pacific Coast. He is said to have been a preacher of exceptional mental power, as well as of religious fervor and eloquence. From the titles of the different sermons in the collection it will be observed that they cover a variety of interesting topics; and these are treated in an interesting way. The sermons on "Christ the World-Leader;" on "Nature's Interpretation of Immortality;" and on the "Ethical and Æsthetical in Christianity," are particularly worthy of mention. In the second of these sermons the author shows that nature points to the immortality of the soul no less distinctly than the Bible, and that the two revelations, the natural and the supernatural, are not contradictory. From the third, which is the tenth in the series, we shall quote a few sentences as specimens of the author's style and spirit. "Religion is the living action of God's presence in men, breathing forth its divine spirit through all the turmoil and darkness of the world." "There is a man in the road distressed and dying. He has fallen into bad hands. Now I may come along, the best and most zealous of Pharisees, meditating profoundly on the law of



God on my way to offer sacrifice at the altar. But if I leave it to that half-heathen Samaritan to get down from off his beast and pick that man up and carry him into the inn and have him cared for and pay the expense himself, I may depend on it that the Lord Jesus Christ will endorse the Samaritan's orthodoxy before he will endorse mine."

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. By Alfred Weber, Professor in the University of Strasburg. Authorized Translation. By Frank Thilly, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Missouri. From the Fifth French Edition, New York; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1896. Price, \$2.50.

For purposes of instruction this is without doubt the best history of philosophy in the English language. The arrangement of the subject seems to be perfect. The indispensable facts are expressed in simple, clear-cut statements, which any person of ordinary understanding and culture can comprehend, and in a style which renders them easy to retain in memory. The History of Philosophy, if true to its claim, must grapple with many difficult problems, such as have taxed the powers of the acutest intellects in all ages. But, philosophy to be of any real value must give its deliverances in conceptions, expressed by language, which can be understood. Otherwise it fails of its purpose, and becomes obnoxious to the common reproach that it deals with, a subject which befogs alike its masters and their scholars. Weber is an author who gives us the pleasure that always attends those *who have something to say*; who understand themselves and can make others see what they see.

A History of Philosophy to be complete would embrace a statement and criticism of the general principles which underlie all positive science as well as speculation. Hence a manual must make a selection of the vital points, and the author's skill will be shown both in the material selected and that omitted. While the time given to class study of philosophy in our universities and colleges is limited, and only an outline can be taught to the great body of students; still there will be, in every class, some inquiring minds who will not be satisfied with this meagre outline. These wish to pursue the subject farther, and need a guide to their inquiries. They wish to know the sources which are authorities for further investigation; they desire the latest editions of the best works in the entire field of inquiry. In this respect Weber and his translator are especially valuable. The bibliography of the subject, the references to the only latest sources of information, are a marked feature of this work. For anything the advanced student requires for an unlimited prosecution of the researches is here presented in a condensed form, which saves a painful search in our endless list of works on the subject of philosophy; and presents at



a glance the very information he ought to possess. Meanwhile the skillful arrangement of the leading points at the top of the page in large, clear type, and the farther elucidation and references to yet more complete information in foot notes, render this manual exactly suited to the purpose of instruction; while it provokes any but the dullest and most indifferent to continue their studies. The author most happily combines the thoroughness of the German specialist with the clearness which characterizes the French mind and language. The translator has done his work well. The style is simple and vigorous; free from those obscurities which are prone to creep in through the endeavor of a translator to be fair to the original while faithful to his own idiom.

No better book could be desired in our present stage of progress in the teaching of philosophy. It must supercede the larger works, such as Ueberweg and Wirdleband, which, from their size, are unsuited to class rooms, and the smaller one of Schwegler, which, though exceedingly able, is written in a style too difficult for the ordinary student, and is destitute of those helps in the way of notes and bibliography which render Weber so valuable. And not the least noteworthy are the references to Americans and those, who, by their work in the last thirty years, have won for themselves an honored place among the world's workers in the domain of philosophy and logic.

JACOB COOPER.

NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY: an Historical Account of the Teaching of Jesus and of Primitive Christianity, According to the New Testament Sources. By Dr. Willibald Beyschlag, Professor of Theology at Halle. Translated by Rev. Neil Buchanan. In two volumes. Pages, 442+532. Price, \$6.00 per set. F. and F. Clark, Edinburg, and Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1895.

Biblical Theology is comparatively a new theological science. It has only been cultivated seriously since the beginning of the present century, and has become entirely emancipated from dogmatics only within the past twenty-five years. What was meant by Biblical theology at an earlier time was only the dogmatics of a denomination or the theological system of an individual *fortified by proof passages from the Bible*. A work on theology was believed to be Biblical when its various propositions were supported by like-sounding texts taken indiscriminately from any part of Scripture. What is understood by Biblical theology now, is the theology of the different books of the Bible treated each as a separate and independent whole. It is only in this way that the meaning and intention of the writers of the Sacred Scriptures can be ascertained. It can easily be seen that for Protestantism Biblical theology, in this sense, must be of the utmost importance. It may be expected too,



that, within Protestantism, much of the theology that has come down from the past, will in the future be revolutionized by the influence of Biblical theology. The Church will first learn more thoroughly what the Bible teaches, and then revise her dogmatics accordingly.

This work of Dr. Beyschlag's is a treatise on Biblical theology in the sense indicated above. Its general character and style are calculated to secure for it wide reading and study. We have been accustomed heretofore to expect a translation of a German theological work of this kind to be dull and heavy, and only intelligible to one who could translate the English sentences back again into German. The work before us presents a delightful exception to this rule. Prof. Beyschlag's German style is clear, direct, and perspicuous. There is about it none of the involution and haziness which characterized so much of the writing of the earlier mediation school. And his translator, Mr. Buchanan, who is himself a theologian, has caught the sense of his author, and rendered it into clear and elegant English.

Professor Beyschlag, who, by the way, is one of the editors of the *Studien und Kritiken*, which circumstance is an evidence of his high standing as a theologian in Germany, occupies something of an intermediate position between the old mediation school and the modern school of Ritschl. He has given up many of the positions of the mediation theologians; and he does not wholly go with the Ritschl school. In his criticism of the sources he is more conservative than many others; while in his interpretation he is very free, refusing entirely to be bound by any past traditions. What does the Bible teach? is his only question. He has no concern as to whether the result shall agree or not with what the Church has been teaching. We have no hesitation in saying that to us many of his constructions of New Testament teaching appear to be incomparably more reasonable than the traditional dogmas to which they are opposed. As an illustration, we would refer to his construction of the doctrine of the atonement. On some points, however, we are bound to dissent. We could, for example, not accept his Christology in the form in which it is presented. That he has finally overthrown the *Kenotic* theory, if it still needed any overthrowing, we are ready to admit. But we are not prepared to admit that the preëxistence of the Logos was only the preëxistence of a personified idea. We think that the teaching of the New Testament involves a deeper truth than that. But it is not our purpose to criticise the work under notice, but merely to call attention to it. The American theologian may find in it much that is strange, and much that he may not be able to accept.



# THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW.

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NO. 3.—JULY, 1897.

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## I.

### THE MATERIAL BASIS OF INHERITANCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL. (Second part.)

BY RICHARD C. SCHIEDT.

SUMMING up what has been said in the first part of the discussion, I preface the second part with the following propositions :

1. The chief characteristic qualities of an individual organism are contained potentially in the germ-cells.

2. Each parent transmits its hereditary characteristics by means of one single germ-cell.

3. The material substance of hereditary transmission is the highly coloring protoplasm or chromatin in the nucleus of the germ-cell.

4. The chromatin bodies or chromosomes perfectly agree in form, size and number in the two sexes of a definite species, but vary in different species.

5. Before or during this union the hereditary substance of both the male and female cell is reduced to one-half of the original amount found in the typical cell by the separation of the so-called polar bodies, so that the sum total of the chromatin bodies of the fertilized egg would be equal to that of each original germ-cell.

6. The multicellular body is the result of the repeated cleav-

age of the fertilized ovum, ultimately differentiated into the elements of the various tissues.

7. The chromosomes multiply by division and are transmitted from cell to cell in the process of division until again germ-cells arise containing the same hereditary substance in the same proportion as the original cells from which they were derived.

8. The differentiation of tissue is produced by extra-nuclear heredity; only a number of chromosomes emigrate into the surrounding protoplasm; they are influenced by the specific functions of the locality, and produce a specific tissue, while the rest remain latent.

9. The *transmission* of individual character is, therefore, the function of the *nucleus*, its *development*, the function of *protoplasm* and *environment*.

10. The activity of the cell is dependent upon the variations in the process of nutrition.

These facts apply to plants and animals alike; they have been the same from times immemorial to the present; they exhibit to us the tools used in the great workshop of life. They offer a more complete definition of life than Herbert Spencer has given, when he says that "life is the continual adjustment of inner relations to outer relations." We must add that it is not only the adjustment of inner relations to outer relations, but also the reverse, as well as of inner relations among themselves; or, it is a process of mutual adjustment of all the parts engaged in it. These phenomena are, therefore, the manifestations of organic life in its broadest sense; they alone proclaim its absolute unity. In its lowest forms they reveal to us organic functions apparently without the vehicle of particular form, and, as we advance in the scale of existence, they demonstrate more clearly the particular relation of function to form, and still more wonderfully the dependence of form upon individualization. In the simplest cases, viz.: that of *Pandorina*, *Euglena* and *Volvox*, the parental chromosomes exhibit the most profound function of life, *i. e.*, that of self preservation, or reproduction almost to the total exclusion of all others and the first differentiated individual is a reproductive individual; next the



function of nutrition becomes individualized and nutritive cells are particularized with the rise of the sponges, while the corals and kindred animals demonstrate the individualization of muscular function and form. In each case, however, the antecedent is transmitted to the following, so that the higher always becomes the heir of the lower. Each function becomes, as it were, individualized in form, in order to develop in harmony with given conditions of the environment in its manifold variations. Sensation naturally involved in all the functions of life passes through a series of individualizations before it reaches its predominant character in man. *Inheritance is, therefore, first of all, that of function and form* transmitted through the chromosomes which, in the case of man, partake of all the manifold developments of the organic world. The separation of form and function is, however, an abstraction, as is that of matter and motion; we can hardly suppose the connection of particular functions with particular forms, *i. e.*, particular organization, to be accidental, any more than we can suppose the particular properties of particular inorganic composites and elements to be accidental, or those particular properties to be without results in the organic matter into which the particular composites and elements are taken up. The environment must contain complementary conditions of function in order that the individual may even come into existence and survive at all. The great question then is, how much must be allowed for original tendency and how much is to be attributed to the account of the action of environment. No matter how far back we may go, even if we go beyond the organic, we must come to irresolvable elements whose motion, as distinct and particular action and reaction, must have definite form. The ultimate elements of the lowest organism thus represent positive factors and the primal organism itself must be regarded as a positive factor without which the development of the highest organism would be impossible. We must, therefore, regard it as an independent force that prefigures the whole animate kingdom. We would then define an organism from the physical point of view, to be simply form (*i. e.* organization) and function; subtracting these we subtract the organism.



This fundamental organic inheritance present in the reproductive elements of man as well as of the plant and capable of adjusting itself to variations in environment, must be reckoned with in the discussion of ethical questions. I do not make the assumption that the psychical is dependent on the physical, nor do I mean to assert that the psychical can be measured by the weights and measures of the physical, all I claim is that there is always a physical function connected with the psychical and that the relation between the two is not a variable but a constant one, *i. e.*, that whatever the metaphysical truth as to the freedom of the will, such freedom cannot interfere with the constancy of nature. However, some one may ask, what do you mean by nature? If we take into consideration that the processes described above are invisible to the naked eye and in their ultimate manifestation invisible to any aid man can employ, we conclude that in the ordinary sense of the word we have to deal here with processes immaterial rather than material, that the physical manifestations exhibit the progressive revelation of a power which baffles the understanding of the wisest of men, a power which we call God. We must, however, add that while it is true that matter *per se* never progresses, it is also true that whenever function becomes organized (individualized) in form, such ultimate expression establishes definite fixed laws which maintain their constancy in every subsequent progressive movement. The constancy of nature, therefore, seems to be bound up with individualism, reaching from the inorganic to man, or from the ultimate elements of the lowest organism as positive factors to the highest manifestations of manhood. The propagation of species is, in one sense, an isolated fact, but in like sense is the evaporation of water or the formation of the crystal of a particular chemical; but none of these phenomena are isolated in any other sense, as less or more than a part of a universal whole. None is a greater mystery than the other, the propagation of animal form no greater than the continued flowing of a stream in spite of evaporation, or the growth of a crystal to the form of its kind. *Inheritance, therefore, involves a constancy of law which is normal and influences volition.*



If we then assume a progressive revelation, tending towards the establishment of constancy, we must, at the same time, accept the fact of progressive inheritance. What has become constant in protozoan revelation enters as a factor *per se* in all higher development, function expressing itself in ever higher form through the medium of individualization. The reproductive cells of man would thus represent, by virtue of progressive inheritance, complex individualism, and so it does, as the embryonic stages of human development sufficiently prove. We find, however, that in every case, form or organization precedes function, showing that form and locality, if once individualized, become constant; the function only becomes operative in the proper environment, *e. g.*, the digestive organs only begin to perform their functions after their development is completed and their proper environment is established; so long, however, function seems latent, or rather, specialized function is only one, viz.: that of growth. Only the chromosomes of the nuclear substance are active in the process of division. Thus we find the fundamental functions of reproduction, growth and nutrition purely cellular, that is active in all the cells of the body alike, while organization as such becomes functional with the completion of the whole individual. *Progressive inheritance, then, is conditioned by perfect environment.* Under the most primitive conditions the primitive factors are self assertive, the more specialized the environment the more differentiated is the response of the higher factors. In any case, however, the transmission is by chromosomes, possessing the power of adaptation and obeying the law of progressive revelation; function and form must be ever operative in them in such a way that all the factors are interdependent. Exercise of function is impossible without a sufficient complementary factor in the environment, but this is evidently sufficient only with the existence of that tendency in the organism of which it is the complement. I can, therefore, not accept the theory of the determinists, chief of whom is Professor Weissman, of Freiburg, who maintain that every set of chromosomes is predestined to become a definite organ. The most thorough-going experiments have dis-



proved such claims which at one time fascinated quite a number of distinguished men in the scientific world. The famous experiment upon the fertilized ovum of the frog is still fresh in the memory of everyone interested in the question. Professor Roux, of Breslau, celebrated for his extraordinary skill in biological research, carefully watched the development of a fertilized frog's egg; as soon as the first cleavage had made its appearance he killed, by means of a hot pin, one of the two cells, stating that the result would be a onesided tadpole, because the chromosomes of the other side had been extinguished. His prediction came true, only one half of the tadpole developed. However, Roux did not go far enough, some one else continued the experiment and, in due season, the other half of the tadpole appeared, proving conclusively that the chromosomes of the cells are by no means predestined to form only one or the other particular organ or even layer of the body, but that their destiny is entirely dependent upon the conditions of the environment and the interrelation of the cells. All that we can affirm, therefore, is that chromosomes are the active agents in the process of development and that their character is universal, specific differentiations being due to epigenetic influences. At every moment in the life of an organism the impelling force is active a millionfold, controlling the individual in every nerve and fiber of its being, while the chromosomes of the mature reproductive cells receive this enormous power in a concentrated form potentially unmeasurable. And just as the single cell, though differentiated towards a particular function and form, always exhibits all the other functions of organic life, its differentiations depending upon them, so the individual man, though differentiated from other organisms, inherits all the qualities of differentiated individualism that has preceded him.

Some one might say, this is rank materialism, and has nothing to do with the ethical question which you propose to discuss. For nature there is no good and evil. It is argued that intention only awakes with consciousness, that while the animal is capable of distinguishing between pain and pleasure, it cannot dis-



tinguish between these as the result of its own action in distinction from that of nature outside itself. Only the self-consciousness of the human being knows good and evil; nature does not know evil, for she does not know the opposite on which it is based. I grant that only partially, for, as I said above, there is always a physical function connected with the psychical which is not variable but constant and the so-called freedom of the will cannot interfere with the constancy of nature; besides, I deal here only with facts on which ethical theory may be based, not with such theory itself. In order to understand life we must appeal to the simplest form of existence in which life manifests itself. That which the finite mind can reasonably grasp in any sphere of knowledge is primarily the simple and undifferentiated. Chemical analysis with its marvellous revelations dates from the discovery of the molecular structure of matter and the establishment of the atomic theory; understand the nature of an atom and you understand chemical reactions. Thus, likewise, the analysis of vital phenomena, in its broadest sense, becomes a possibility when we reach a clear understanding of the simplest factors in the manifestations of life as such. Anatomy, psychology and ethics become intelligible only when studied from a comparative point of view. In order to appreciate the extremely complex forms of good and evil manifest in the most civilized human society, we must know something of the condition of the savage and something of the former savage condition of society. Again, in order to properly deal with the savage, we must acknowledge that the physical is by far the most predominant in his composition, and, for the intelligent appreciation of vital physical manifestations, we must go to the simplest organism capable of independent actions. I do not forget, however, that the reverse is likewise true, viz., that the existence of the simple finds its true interpretation only in the light of the complex; the root of the plant finds its true interpretation in the flower and fruit, for which it exists, but both flower and fruit have their ground in root and stem and leaf; no matter how beautiful and complex the flower and fruit are, they are ultimately nothing but modified leaves.



There is nowhere in nature a development from the complex to the simple, but always the reverse. The same holds good in the moral sphere. The consciousness of self did not appear all at once and full fledged as did Minerva from the head of Jupiter ; the ethical does not begin with the human being known to us by natural history ; there are still races of men which stand lower than many species of animals ; and the early development of moral activity was of necessity much more of the nature of that which we call evil than that which we call good. Palæontology points to a severe struggle for existence throughout prehistoric times. The argument that we know as a matter of fact that painful or pleasurable excitation makes itself felt before it is connected in consciousness with any distinct object becomes fallacious, since we know nothing at all of the beginning of consciousness, but only its variation, and cannot, therefore, pronounce dogmatically on the absence of consciousness in the cases of organisms differing from our own, or even in the case of inorganic matter. If we carry our considerations in a spirit not prejudiced by a human-interested bias of observation, beyond the province of life we may, like Du Prel and others, arrive at a theory of intelligence as a universal property of matter, this would not be in opposition to the most orthodox dictum of progressive revelation. For we lay ourselves open to the accusation of gross materialism, if we begin with inorganic matter and assume automatism to be the cause of its motion, interpreting much of the function of organic existence as due to material action and reaction. But, if we assume that in the great cycle of creative development, the divine life and energy, which God first involved into the lowest conditions, is at length, through a series of forward movements gathered, organized and individuated, does it not seem logical to maintain that the marvellous tendency of all systems of material parts towards harmony must be due to the same causes as those to which we ascribe action towards an end, action that involves self-preservation in the broadest sense of the word in man ? May not the heavenly bodies, learning from experience in some way, as man does, gradually come to choose, though still in accordance



with natural laws (as man also invariably chooses), that orbit which preserves them from collision? "Why may we not equally well suppose," says Williams, "merely a difference in the direction of consciousness corresponding to differing organization and function in the one case and differing composition or constitution and corresponding motion in the other?" What we call "blind instinct" or automatism may in reality be consciousness, the difficulty with us is that we cannot discern the end involved for the organism performing the act. When we, therefore, speak of the material basis of inheritance in man, we must assume that the nuclear chromosomes, however infinitesimal, involve in their transmission, likewise, the sum total of the growth in progressive consciousness, all that had been active in root, stem and leaf of the great world-tree, millions of years before him and capable of further developments within him. Genesis itself is proof that consciousness of self was not born with man. The Eden of the Bible does not present spiritual or even intellectual perfection, but only that which is sensuous; it represents the ripeness and perfection of a great kingdom, the climax of the physical development of man; there was, as yet, neither moral nor spiritual law to be observed or violated. Only gradually the God-voice in man became audible and the throes and birth-pangs of a new kingdom began; the adaptation to a new environment, no longer purely physical but moral and spiritual, inaugurated a struggle much severer than the world had hitherto witnessed. The purely organic consciousness—sometimes called instinct—so powerful by an inheritance of an untold number of years, began its warfare against a new response to environment, called human reason, infantile and tottering in its beginning, and the result could only be a constant stumbling and falling, however not downward, but "upward" as Henry Wood has suggested. "Man forever lost his sense of completeness in animal development and a rational and spiritual restlessness possessed him. There was no more Eden. The flaming sword was the evolutionary bar which unceasingly interdicted a return to perfect sensuous repose and satisfaction. The rational and moral nature passed from latency to activity.



Gestation was ended, the umbilical cord severed, and man was cast out to begin at the very foundation to build a new consciousness and project a higher kingdom. The moral freedom of choice and of possible voluntary character came to light. The mistakes connected with infantile and ignorant choosing are typified by thousand thistles, toils and sweat. The perfect delight of Eden was missing and this, to the childish stage of human consciousness, seemed like a great loss—a fall.” These words of Mr. Henry Wood in the May number of the *Arena* of 1895, pp. 364–365 are still applicable in the present condition of the human race ; the fundamentals of inheritance are still the same, in spite of untold modifications produced by change of environment. A child of civilized parents of a higher type of morality, if carried off in infancy by savages, will fail to exhibit the high character of its parents, to the same degree as it is possible that it would fail to exhibit their higher intellectual gifts. It can only be reasonably expected that the child would show a certain mental acuteness applied to savage affairs and some greater degree of human feeling, demonstrated, however, by savage conception. No inheritance can ever be more than this, the fundamental tendencies inherited from life as such will under any circumstance assert themselves most potently. Organic inheritance then furnishes an explanation of the primary character of evil. Think for a moment of the unnumbered forces predominant in the chromosomes of the mature reproductive cells and “the lust of the flesh” finds an explanation ; the horrible forms of this particular evil predominant in all classes of society, and more potent in its results for the race than any other form, are the consequences of the unlimited exertion of forces perfectly normal. Or, picture to yourself the ever growing tendency of ordinary somatic cells towards multiplication dependent upon the constant supply of food, chromosomes at work in epidermal cells, in muscular cells, in digestive cells, in excretory cells, in nerve cells, in brain cells, and the “pride of the eye” with all its variations of greed and selfishness finds its proper interpretation. Beyond these two forms of evil, viz.: sexual corruption, the physico-moral evil and greed of selfishness our ethical discussions never advance.



Evil, therefore, in the primary sense, has its origin in the fundamental constitution and function of life as such. Just as the energy of the engine depends upon the constant supply of fuel, so does organic energy upon the constant supply of food. The difference between the motion of inorganic masses and that of organic is, however, far reaching; the former is external, the latter internal, an internal energy capable of overcoming all resisting natural forces. This internal energy rests upon a mechanical displacement of molecules, produced by a stimulus. But between stimulus and motion there intervenes a certain peculiar something called sensation. It transmits the stimulus to the organ which sets the latter free and produces thus, at the same time, impulses for action—capable of setting stimuli free. Primarily, the sensation centers in the acquirement of food for purposes of self-preservation and growth. Growth by means of intussusception depends upon another primitive process, viz., that of exchange of food and waste-matter by means of diffusion, generally called metabolism. We witness here the manifestation of the most powerful function of an elementary organism, the first heritage in the organic kingdom. The elementary organism is capable of absorbing as much food as the circumstances permit. We know practically nothing of the limit of the resorptive capacity of an organism under the most favorable circumstances; as a matter of fact, however, it has been found to be enormous under peculiarly favorable conditions. The lower animals are constantly eating, and among plants this tendency is still more frequent. Experiments with electric, violet and super-violet light have produced enormous growth in plants, causing an excessive acceleration of metabolism and assimilation. The same results of hypertrophy are reached by a change of temperature. A slight increase in the temperature of an incubator will produce a monstrous increase of those organs of the chick, which at that time undergo their chief development. Exactly the same effect is obtained with aquatic plants and animals when density and temperature of the water change. In an extended series of experiments with oysters, I succeeded in producing the most wonderful changes in the circula-



tion of the blood as well as in the color of the animal. All these facts prove that the organic cells possess a much larger resorptive power than they are capable of developing under normal conditions. We may, therefore, affirm that the cell is capable of satisfying every demand which nature makes under normal conditions ; and, since the reception of the largest possible quantity lies, under given conditions, beyond the controlling power of the creature, the latter is practically insatiable. This insatiability thus appears as a normal property of cell-life, as a permanent tendency towards an increase of its income. The same phenomenon is observed in the inorganic world : chemical reaction takes place along the line of greatest heat development, the tendency being always towards strongest and most complete saturation, a fact which throws considerable light upon the inter-relation between the vital and the purely chemical functions of the protoplasm. This insatiability of organized protoplasm has been called by Ralph mechanical hunger in contradistinction from the psychic hunger which is based upon the former. The chief concern in the economy of nature is therefore not merely the replacement of loss, but the increase of income, of metabolic substances, so that the measure of growth depends upon the intensity of metabolism. This again depends upon a corresponding condition in the environment, especially that of light and heat. The creature which can maintain itself in continued sunlight has better chances to reach the maximum of saturation, chemically as well as physiologically, than the one which is exposed to the negative influences of darkness. Light and darkness change every twelve hours. An organism born during the period of light will lose in intensity of metabolic power during the period of darkness, one born in darkness will gain in light, decreasing again during darkness. Decrease of metabolic power means decrease of nourishment, *i. e.*, hunger, and hunger creates pain. The natural tendency of such organisms would, therefore, be to escape the condition of hunger ; its first movements will be those of flight. The restlessness of spores, *e. g.*, in the dark is due to a want of food, *i. e.*, hunger. They seek with feverish excitement the light, with-



out which assimilation cannot take place with sufficient energy to keep them alive, much less to permit reproduction by division. The same is true of organisms born in darkness, that increases metabolic powers; a change from darkness to sunlight will increase the capacity as well as the demand for assimilation, *i. e.* hunger will become more intense in spite of increased assimilation. The need for assimilation, or hunger, is therefore independent upon the quantity of food-supply but upon other conditions, especially light and temperature. Rapid assimilation, therefore, creates a much more intense hunger than slow assimilation. All these phenomena are absolutely normal and God-given. They are common to all cells and cell-life as such; they condition the rise of multicellular beings and determine even the differentiation of sex; they are controlled by the hereditary factors and in turn control the hereditary factors.

Hunger, then, is the central factor in our problem. Around it cluster, as it were, the strongest tendencies for self-preservation or the evasion of pain; by it egotistic qualities are developed, inherited and transmitted, and with it comes the power of choice. It is, therefore, a factor in progressive revelation as well as in progressive inheritance. No matter what the freedom of the will in the metaphysical sense may be, such freedom cannot interfere with this constancy of natural law. Pain then is primarily not the result of guilt, but simply the inability to satisfy normal demands. Man's early existence as an individual is distinguished by the length of duration of a condition of helplessness, at the beginning of which, beyond the fundamental so-called organic actions, only a few simple activities manifest themselves. The fundamental actions will make themselves felt under any condition, in other respects the child is born with almost everything to acquire. As reason slowly unfolds itself, the child becomes peculiarly susceptible to the nature of its surroundings and the early tendencies are generally under the influence of the fundamental so-called organic actions; they will remain so if the environment remains primitive, reason will become operative solely in the direction of the satisfaction of the appetites. "Conscience," says



Burton, "does not exist in eastern Africa" and "repentance" expresses regret for missed opportunities of mortal crime. "Robbery constitutes an honorable man; murder—the more atrocious the midnight crime the better—makes the hero." Evil thus grows out of the normal property of organic inheritance, viz., insatiability, which had reigned supreme in the organic world long before man appeared on the scene, which had led to the intense struggle for existence, and spread torture, agony and death. It is significant that Genesis represents the cause of the "fall of man" under the image of a craving for food. "And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruits thereof and did eat and gave also unto her husband with her; and he did eat." Here we have, as it were, a supersaturation of organic activity, a reaching out beyond the confines of the original environment and with it the necessity of pain and of readjustment. Revelation progresses one step further and brings experience, and with experience knowledge of good and evil. Thus the stumbling and falling gradually lifts man on a higher plane or on a higher environment. The fundamental organic inheritance becomes, under new conditions, the stimulus for the constant exercises of higher powers. The thorns and thistles are found to be not "evil" but only unripened and undeveloped good. "Edenic products come spontaneously, but after falling upward, man—now real man—forms under the constant guidance of progressive revelation for himself." He has become as "a god," says Mr. Wood. In all our struggles against evil, especially in all our educational efforts, the prime necessity is the creation of more perfect environment and here again the fundamental organic inheritance has to be taken into consideration. We have to begin with the physical training of children, and here the prime question ought to be: what is the ultimate ability of the respective organs of a child at various periods, how much can we expect from them, how can we aid and develop them towards a stage of perfect health *i. e.*, perfect ability? On it depends not only the ability to cope with circumstances, but



also the moral power of cheerfulness. This ultimate ability or endurance depends in any case upon the number of accessible normal cells of the peripheral organs and of the nervous system. However, the mere external exhibition of ability is in the case of children not by any means the absolute criterion for the sum total of living forces within the human organisms. On careful investigation it has been ascertained that the body resists diseases most successfully during the childhood period from the seventh to the fifteenth year. Physiology teaches that during this time the metabolic changes are much greater than during any subsequent epoch and the chromosomatic changes are extraordinarily intense. The general mortality is very small, consumption is entirely retarded, great epidemics attack only a very minute percentage of the children of that age ; scarlet and typhoid fever occur only in a mild form. But with the approach of sexual maturity, and largely through it, the vital energies begin to decrease in the other organs and death begins to lay its hold upon the human form. During the years of childhood therefore the process of internal growth consumes so great an energy that the sum total of all the forces of the bodily organs is larger than ever afterwards in adult life. It is during these years that the material basis of inheritance assumes its final form and function in the chromosomes of the ripening reproductive cells. It is during these years that impressions are deposited which are more probably transmitted than those in later life. Thus it becomes the supreme duty of parents and children to lay the proper foundation for the future happiness of their children ; physically by a careful development and nourishment of the organs of the body, morally by properly guiding the innate tendencies towards insatiability and selfishness.

In touching upon the highest stage of progressive revelation, *i. e.*, the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, we must reverently refer to the significance which the birth of Jesus has for our discussion. If the material basis of inheritance is contained in the fertilized ovum, and if this partakes of the character of organic nature in its universal manifestations, developing in conformity

with the environment, we reach the conclusion that the creation of a new spiritual environment necessitated the introduction of a new principle in the original process, viz., "the conception by the Holy Spirit." It is only in perfect correspondence with this new spiritual environment, *i. e.*, in communion with the divine master that the fundamental organic egotism is lifted up and transformed into the manifestation of absolute unselfish love of God and love of man. Does not our Lord himself constantly testify to this fact? "Man does not live by bread alone but by every word that proceedeth from the mouth of God." "Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God." "For the bread of God is he which cometh down from heaven, and giveth life unto the world." "Whoso eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day." A new environment, a new food, a change in the direction of insatiability, a new factor of internal and external correspondence, a new basis of inheritance by communion and transmission with and from above, a new light shed upon the significance of all organic existence—all with and in Jesus Christ. If man is to be partaker of divine inheritance he must be heir to all that is included in the divine from the atom to the Spirit—and the Problem of Evil finds its explanation and its solution.



## II.

### SOCIAL EVILS AND THEIR REMEDY.

BY REV. S. Z. BEAM, D.D.

In attempting to cure the evils of society, it ought not to be forgotten that society like the poet, *is born, not made*. It has become what it is, not by mathematical addition, but by organic growth. It is composed, not like a sand heap, of an innumerable multitude of particles having no sort of relation to each other, but of living persons animated by a common life. The radical principle of society is found in the family, which rests in that mysterious but essential and reciprocal relation which exists between husband and wife. The male and female principles, in their conjugal relation, form the whole ground work of the social organism, and out of this sacred relation has grown the social system, of which every individual forms a legitimate and essential part. "The idea of man which is of course originally one and single, in order that it may become actual, must resolve itself into an innumerable multitude of individual lives, whose perfection subsequently can be found again in no other form than that of their general union in a free way."\* This solidarity of the race makes their interests mutual, so that the elimination of evil must be for the good of all.

The human body is an individual organism, of which even the smallest member is a natural necessity, and the organism is imperfect if any member is missing; and it suffers if any member suffers. So the body politic, the nation, or society in general, is a living organism, the outgrowth and extension of the family; and the individual personalities are its organs. The "Social Compact," in which the individuals to the contract wave certain rights, for the interests of all, may suffice for business purposes. But it is a mechanical contrivance, which by no means answers

\*Dr. Nevin's Moral order of Sex. Mer. Rev. Vol. 2, page 551.

to the true idea of society. A contract may be broken, or made subservient to the interests of one party, and detrimental to those of another. Whenever that idea prevails, the interests of all are not conserved. The majority are held in subjection by the few, so that the principle underlying it proves to be both shallow and vicious. It is not the true principle underlying either the state or the social organism, in general. But both state and society are of divine ordination and depend not on human contract. A violation of our relation to either can not therefore better our condition, but always makes it worse. And therefore all efforts for reforming society, which ignore its organic nature, must be calamitous to all.

Another thing to be recognized and reckoned with, is the fact of sin, that foreign element in the human heart, out of which grow all the evils which afflict us. No remedy, which does not provide for the eradication of this root of all evil, can effect a cure. All intelligent physicians know that a correct diagnosis in any case of disease, must be obtained before they can hope to effect a cure. They can administer an anodyne, a sedative, or a palliative, but, unless they find a remedy, the patient is deceived, and may be left in a far worse condition than he was before. The palliative furnishes a temporary relief, and lulls the patient into a false hope, unless it is followed by an application of the effectual remedy. This same principle applies to the diseases of society. And it is sad to contemplate the quackery of so-called reformers, whose remedies afford, perhaps temporary relief, but ultimately result in disastrous failure, because the diagnosis of the case was false. An example of this kind of doctoring is furnished in the reforms of Jean Jacques Rousseau, in the eighteenth century. He was a man of bad private character, but also a philanthropic philosopher. He undertook the reformation of society in France. His views, advanced with extraordinary enthusiasm and eloquence, were kindly received in all parts of Europe, and many of the best minds fell in with his theory, which, for a time, seemed to promise relief. Assuming the "essential goodness of human nature," he relied on education chiefly



for its improvement. And while avowed infidels were undermining the foundations of society, many good people embraced Rousseau's ideas with the hope of preventing its fall, or aiding in its reconstruction. But the sad history of the eighteenth century, with its overthrow of society in France, shows the futility of his efforts. We can not enter into details. But the Revolution, caused by the inequality of privileges among all classes, and the oppression of the poor, was rather helped than hindered by his measures. Education is power for evil, as well as for good. In this case it worked evil. The efforts at reform took a stand against the Church, and, however well meant, they were conducted in an irreligious way. They indeed recognized the equality of all men, and promised a golden age and a better condition for all. With such false promises a ferment was raised, which burst forth in the complete overthrow of State and Society, the setting up of the goddess of reason in the person of a misguided woman, and "the reign of terror," the contemplation of which makes the blood run cold in one's veins.

Another such failure is that of Robert Owen in England. This man spent a great fortune in bettering the condition of his own laborers, and in attempting to reform and elevate their social condition. He established schools for the poor, and for orphans and outcast children. This was laudable and, doubtless, many received great benefits from his philanthropy. But, unfortunately for the character of his measures, he assaulted the religion of Christ, and sought to destroy the most sacred institutions of society, including the sanctity of the marriage relation; and treated the Bible doctrine of the future state as a delusion. As a natural consequence, his communistic society came to grief, just as all such ill-conceived efforts have failed in the past, and must fail in the future. Now it is evident in these, and all similar instances, that the true nature of society was misunderstood, and that the real cause of its evils was entirely overlooked. All that these reformers have seen was on the surface of society, and, not comprehending its organic nature, or penetrating to the heart of society, whose corruption was the poisonous source of all the



troubles, their efforts, even in their best results, amounted to a mere whitewashing of the outer crust, while the inward corruption continued to fester and pollute the whole organism. They tried to heal the streams without purifying the fountain.

The abnormal condition of society has been manifested in all ages, and history furnishes examples in every age, of persons attempting to rectify, or remove its ills. But, like the efforts just described, they have all ended in failure, because neither the true nature of man, nor the true need of society was understood. The disease was in the heart. From this corrupt source flow all the streams of sin and sorrow and suffering which afflict the whole social body. No treatment, therefore, can heal the streams, that does not purify the fountain. This implies, of course, that *regeneration* is the only panacea. But regeneration can affect society as a whole, only as it renews the hearts and purifies the lives of individuals, who, through their vital relation to the family, constitute the general organism. As the imperfections of human nature are felt in all universally, the evils of society, as a whole, can disappear eventually only as they are removed from all. That this end can not be reached by mere external educational means, history is a standing witness.

That the remedy for social evils can not be furnished by law, is equally demonstrated by the history of the nations. The cry for class legislation raises a demand which cannot be supplied. All laws are more or less partial in their application, helping some and injuring others. Laws are not, and can not be, specific enough to regulate all the actions of men. The very best of them are often evaded, or nullified by men who profit by injuring others. The divine law itself was not sufficient to put away sin, or to relieve the sorrows of suffering men. Such is the declaration of inspiration, which is fully demonstrated and sustained by all human experience. The nearest approach to a perfect legal code, for the regulation of human actions, known to us, is furnished by the laws of Moses. These were indeed imperfect, though of divine origin, simply because, as Jesus explained, they had to be adapted to the imperfect moral and religious state of



the people for whose government they were enacted.\* Still, if the Jews had kept these laws, they might have been the happiest people in all the earth. They taught the equality of men. They required every man to treat every other as a brother, and not to oppress the widow and orphan, or grind the faces of the poor. These laws were just and righteous, regulating the moral conduct, and making every one feel that he was responsible for the happiness and welfare of his fellows. They permitted slavery and divorce indeed, but the hardship of slavery was mitigated by requiring the master to treat the slave as his own child—while no man could divorce his wife without an adequate cause, which was named and limited by the law itself. A master could command the service of the slave, but it must not be hard service, and must be rewarded, and, after a certain time, at the year of Jubilee he must be manumitted, and sent out into freedom, not empty handed, but with a portion sufficient to start in business for himself. These laws provided also that property, taken for debt, must not be alienated forever, but must be restored to the original owner or his heirs, in the year of Jubilee. This was a sort of Socialism which respected the equality and privileges of all. But these beneficent laws were violated continually, and so the people nullified their otherwise salutary effects by incurring their penalty. And at last, when, through perversity, that people had defeated the good intent of their laws, they were discontented with their divine King, and demanded a human king, under the delusion that a royal government would improve their condition. They desired to be like other peoples. But they soon found that their kings trampled on the laws, and they suffered worse evils than before.

The situation was no better, but rather worse among the other most cultivated peoples of the ancient world. Greece, in many respects, was the most glorious of countries. The Greeks were the teachers of the world in science and the fine arts. Aristotle rules, even to this day, a great part of the world's thinking. The æsthetic beauty of Greek sculpture and painting are still unsur-

\*Matt. 19: 8.



passed. Their law givers rank among the wise men of the earth, while their philosophy and language are studied and admired in all our institutions of learning. When now we add to all these advantages, the natural beauty of Hellas, together with its glorious climate, we might be led to think that, in Greece if anywhere, the evils of society were overcome, and that the people enjoyed the maximum of happiness. But, in fact, all these advantages were nullified by tyranny and oppression. There were citizen and slaves—more slaves than citizens—and neither were happy. Those who had high privileges abused them, and turned their noblest blessings into a curse. The slaves were oppressed, often to the verge of rebellion, so that the best of men were unhappy in the fear of violent death. In Greece the state was everything, the man nothing, only as he was useful to the state. The highest officers, from the tyrant down to the petty clerk, were constantly subjected to the danger of deposition, disgrace, confiscation or death, for the most trivial offences or mistakes. A soldier, who permitted himself to be taken prisoner, was a disgrace to his nation and his family, and was disowned by both, if, indeed, he was not put to death as a common criminal. A victor in the Olympic or the Isthmian games was as highly honored as the captain who saved his country from its enemies. The noblest lawgivers, the wisest statesmen, and the greatest teachers were subject to the whims of an irresponsible multitude who might, at any moment, for any cause, or no cause, vote for his destruction (*e. g.*, Socrates). The laws of Greece were no bar against the evils of society. The rich might oppress the poor. But the rich themselves were in bondage by the fear of violence, so that the fair and sunny Greece, with all its natural and acquired advantages, suffered all the evils of social corruption and vice.

Again, a similar state of affairs confronts us in the Roman Empire. A Roman might sometimes save himself from a disgraceful death by crying, "*Romanus civis sum.*" The Romans are the accredited lawgivers of the ancient world. Rome sat mistress of the ancient world on her seven hills and, in her wisdom, developed the principles of common law, and dispensed



them to the provinces. And so excellent were her laws, that many of our modern statutes are modelled after those of Rome. But under her laws many amassed immense fortunes, and lived and revelled in luxury and effeminacy, and the emperors rolled in wealth and fattened on delicacies imported from her remotest provinces, and from distant India and Cathay, while poverty wallowed in the streets of Rome or people starved on the Palatine Hill.

Under the later emperors we discover some evidences of improvement among the masses, which we trace to the ameliorating influence of Christianity, which was already making itself felt for good, notwithstanding the resistance of law, literature and heathenism. The combined antagonism of these adverse powers it had to meet in deadly conflict, but it met them successfully. Gibbon, the inimitable historian of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, in seeking for the cause of this improvement, affects to find it in the virtue or policy of the emperors, in the self interest of the masters, and in the habits of education. But, in his search, he ignores the presence and influence of Christianity, though in other passages of his history, he is constrained to acknowledge its power in elevating the morals of the people.

These three things, in his judgment, contributed to the alleviation of the hardship of servitude. But he neglects to say, what his own history of the times seems to prove, that these causes themselves owe their existence, in a large degree, to the benign teaching and example of the religion of Christ. But he declares that there is great reason for the belief, that before the reigns of Diocletian and Constantine, the faith of Christ had been preached in all the provinces and cities of the Roman Empire. And since, according to his own account, the social improvement of the poor and of slaves, began after the introduction of that religion into the empire, he furnishes us a good reason to believe that the improvement was due in large measure to the progress of Christianity. The advancement, of course, was slow, but we may well suppose that it was retarded, not by any weakness inherent in the faith or the methods of its adherents, but, rather, by the bitter

opposition of its enemies, which it was compelled to encounter from every quarter.

That classic heathenism contributed nothing to this elevating influence, is apparent from the well established fact, that, when Christianity began its conquests, the religion of the old world had already reached its highest development, without elevating the masses, and was now falling into decay. Human nature, with all the advantages of power, wealth and glory, had proved itself incapable of rising above its helpless misery, and a night of despair was casting its dreary shades over a well-nigh hopeless world. All the resources of law, of science, and of a man-made religion had been exhausted, and the civilization of the age was sinking into a state of moral decrepitude, which unassisted human nature had no recuperative power to overcome. The religion of heathenism with the poetic beauty of its mythology, and its multitudinous pantheon of divinities had left its golden age in the irredeemable past; and it had no new-creative energy, and no regenerative principle, to bring back the golden age, or to elevate mankind to the mastery of sin. Hence vice ran riot, and was unrestrained. Misery and wretchedness oppressed the poor, and even the rich and powerful were hopelessly floundering in the "slough of despond," or weltering in their blood. Religion could no longer afford comfort, because of its own moral decay. It had become a tool in the hands of a venal priesthood, with which to grind the faces of the poor and to bleed the rich, while all classes of society were wallowing in the mire of moral corruption, and intellectual debauchery. The laws of Rome, born of her highest civilization, were powerless to destroy the evils of society, to heal the cancer which fed on its vitals, or even to mitigate any longer the wretchedness of a social organism, perishing under the crushing weight of its own iniquities. But, happily, at this juncture in the tide of human affairs, when men were helplessly crying for deliverance, the God of infinite love, not desiring the destruction of men, but yearning after their salvation, revealed a religion which was capable of liberating them from the fetters of a false religion, from the dominion of sin, and from the



condemnation of irreligion, and from the consequent corruption and misery which they were suffering. In the theanthropic person of His Son, Jesus Christ, He revealed, and in His religion, unfolded, in the midst of the world's decrepitude and decay, a regenerative energy, which was able to mortify the old sinful nature of man, to quicken him with a new divine life, and to restore harmony and love and good will among men.

These salutary effects were not accomplished in a moment, or without a struggle. The regenerative principle, though conceived in the womb of humanity, which was overshadowed by the divine Spirit, had to struggle to its birth in the lives of individuals, through faith, bringing them into living union with Christ in the Church. And so it is destined to work its way till the whole social organism becomes animated with the new divine life, and is led in the way of peace and happiness.

How grandly did the few disciples of Jesus, impelled with the energy of this new life, with no weapon but the sword of the Spirit which is the word of God, win victory after victory for the kingdom of Christ, until at last His religion ascended the throne of the Cæsars, and extended its saving health among the nations! And in all succeeding ages it has continued to spread, and ameliorate the condition of men wherever it has been believed and embraced, until this present day. And, deny who may, we confidently affirm that this blessed religion, though confronted with bitter opposition in every conceivable form, is gradually transforming society, overcoming its evils, and bringing happiness to all who honestly embrace its overtures of mercy, and obey its heavenly precepts. He who can not see its salutary influence on the society that is pervaded by its life and Spirit, must read history with eyes closed, or mind prejudiced against the truth. He who thus reads history, without discovering the fact and effects of the religion of Christ, running like a stream of light and glory through the ages, loses the most salutary lessons which it teaches.

And yet, in the face of these inestimable facts and effects of this divine regenerative energy, we must witness the melancholy

spectacle of reformers ignoring the religion of Christ, reproaching His church, and, like reformers of an earlier day, appealing to the passions of men, creating dissensions, and exciting them to revolt against society, with the vain hope of improving their condition on the basis of heathenism. The socialism thus based on falsehood, and led by infidel principles, must always, in the future, as it has done in the past, result in the degradation of society, and multiply the evils it seeks to destroy. Communism, socialism, coöperative trade and labor unionism, however antagonistic among themselves, all appear to agree in ignoring, or condemning the Church of Christ. They leave God out of the account, and, as a necessary consequence, we find them floundering in the mire of naturalism, irreligion and immorality. They see only the worse side of the social system. They seek diligently amid the garbage of human decay for its rottenness, and in this they revel and rollic, with no eye and no taste for the pure and holy.

They look upon mankind as a host of separate units struggling for existence and pleasure. They see the strong prevail and the weak go down. For all who succeed they have only words of censure, as if success deserved punishment. Failure they call misfortune for which the successful must be held responsible. Those who fail are held as innocent and oppressed. Their self-constituted friends industriously sow seeds of dissatisfaction, array the poor against the rich, arouse the spirit of rebellion, and, failing to gain their ends by warlike words, they proceed to enforce their arguments with flames and blood. Losses are thus suffered on both sides, in time and wages, on one side, in property on the other; and the breach between capital and labor is widened.

Many of the rich undoubtedly oppress the poor for selfish purposes; but justice requires that all should have their due. Sin is at the root of all the ills of life, and failure is often the penalty of sin, while success ultimately becomes equally disastrous to those who succeed by trickery and fraud. The guilty rich are walking in slippery places, and many have paid the penalty by falling into poverty. Knowing, therefore, the evil propensities of human nature in all, the aim of all reformers should be the recon-



ciliation of the antagonists. All know that the interests of the employer, and the employee are mutual. And mutual understanding of this relation, by which each will consider the best interests of both, will improve the condition of all. But such reconciliation and mutual understanding can only be secured through the mediation of Him who was born to be the Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, in whom is embodied personally the energy of a new creation. The life-giving power of His Holy Spirit, active in the "sacramental energies" of the Church, must be permitted to regenerate, and elevate society into the sphere of grace, before the needful reforms can be effected. For in Christ alone, through whom we have the atonement, can men be reconciled to God and to one another; because in Him alone resides the power, which is able to destroy the evils that afflict mankind.

But those who neglect the Church and the means of grace, some of whom in a patronizing way admire the example of Christ, never rise above the sphere of nature, and their plans of reformation are destined to failure. God can not help men who attempt to elevate themselves independently of the means which He has provided for their use, but, as of old, He permits them to go in their own ways, which always end in disaster and ruin.

There is, of course, a better side to human nature, and because there is, it is possible to renew and save it, by bringing it sacramentally into living union with the life of Christ. But this life is supernatural and spiritual, and is from above. But many of the reforms of the present day are purely natural and not spiritual. They are agnostic, not scientific. They are full of zeal, but without knowledge. They are blind to the ameliorating influence of the Gospel. They pay more heed to the groans of pessimistic philosophers than to the inspiring optimism of the Gospel. And, hence, they fail to see that the condition of men in Christian lands *is growing better—not worse*. Suffering, sorrow and oppression, it must be admitted, do prevail to an alarming extent, and yet in the interest of truth, it must be asserted, that this age surpasses all preceding ages in everything that

contributes to the comfort and happiness of all classes of society. And, while poverty and oppression do afflict the many, it is not true that all the rich grind the faces of the poor, and that all the poor are oppressed and unhappy. Neither is it universally true that the rich are growing richer and the poor growing poorer. Leaving out of view the slums, and "down town tenements" of the large cities, and some public works where strikes are carried on as part of the trade, we find the poor of to-day better fed, better clothed, and better sheltered than at any former period in the world's history. And besides, Christian philanthropy is doing more for the relief and elevation of those in extreme poverty than ever before, and a large number receive its benefits. So that we feel justified in the affirmation that to the same extent the people are happier.

These statements, it must be admitted, are in conflict with the views of many intelligent people. But a fair comparison of the present state of society with that of any previous period, will abundantly sustain the position here taken. The difficulty with many good people is that they close their eyes to everything but the evils that afflict society; and in the continued contemplation of the worst side of life, they have come to believe that all the evils which ever tormented mankind have been concentrated and focussed on this wicked and suffering age, while all the good has either passed away or is yet to come. On the contrary, while we see the evils, we rejoice also to contemplate the other side of human life, which by its present progress in better things, inspires hope for the future.

This better state of society will be found on honest inquiry, to have its origin and support in the regenerative and elevating power of the religion of Christ, as this is mediated to men through the instrumentality of His Church.

And on the other hand it will be found, that, with few exceptions, the most miserable and wretched are those who despise and reject the church of Christ, are strangers to the covenant of grace, and refuse the kind offices of our holy religion. The rich and the poor alike, who cut themselves off from the blessings of



religion, are fighting their battles on the plane of nature alone, where God allows them to destroy each other. So it ever has been, so it ever will be. The wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations that forget God.

And yet God is infinitely merciful, ever ready and anxious to help the poor and needy, if they will come to Him for help, or if they will let His blessings come upon them, without laying the obstructions of unbelief in the way. He is the common Father of us all, and we are brethren. And God desires us to recognize the relationship. To this end He revealed Himself in Christ, that the race might be united in Him, as their common Savior and elder brother, and that under the enlightening influence of the Holy Spirit, the moral darkness and evils which oppress society might disappear. Let Christianity thus have its perfect work, and we feel sure that every one then, under the guidance of this spirit, will compete with every other in spreading the Gospel of Christ, and for the complete emancipation of the social organism from the evils and oppressions that have so long afflicted it.

### III.

## THE COUNTER-REFORMATION.

BY JOSEPH HENRY DUBBS, D.D.

In our studies of the great religious movement of the sixteenth century our attention is apt to be confined to a single phase of that stupendous theme. Our Protestant faith and Teutonic blood lead us to ignore its Romanic elements. We forget that, though in its earlier stages, the Reformation was a German protest against the corruptions of Rome, the time arrived when Rome herself was forced by the logic of events to recognize the reformers in her own communion, and thus to institute a *quasi* Reformation of her own.

Before the middle of the sixteenth century Protestantism had in a great degree accomplished the work which it had set out to perform. It had given the Scriptures to the people; it had taught the world a higher and a purer system of morals; it had, in the language of a recent writer, "successfully renewed the protest of Paul against Peter." However greatly suppressed public opinion may have been in the countries which still adhered to the papacy, there had been an undeniable change of religious sentiment, and neither the clergy nor the laity would have tolerated the election of popes like the Borgias and the worst of the Medicis. The church was in fact ashamed of the flagrant abuses which had led to the great revolt, and was determined that such things should not happen again. It was felt rather than confessed that on the question of morals Protestantism had the best of the argument; that since the empire had departed from Rome she had no occasion to exist as a mere political center; and that if the church of Rome desired to command the respect of the nations she must assert herself as she did at the beginning of the Middle Ages, when Gregory the Great went forth to meet the barbarians and gained their submission by the power of the truth.



It was high time if something was to be done to check the progress of triumphant Protestantism. The Teutonic races were practically alienated from Rome; in Scandinavia the hierarchy itself had renounced its allegiance. Poland and Hungary no longer recognized the authority of the papacy, and in Bohemia the Hussites were more than ever alive. The northern provinces of the Low Countries had become thoroughly Protestant; Austria was preserved only by the personal influence of the emperor; England and Scotland were lost, and France hung in the balance. The only parts of Christendom on which the pope could count with any degree of confidence were the regions occupied by the Romanic races—the great peninsulas, Iberian and Italian—and even there the influence of Protestantism was everywhere apparent. In Portugal the University of Coimbra occupied a decidedly Protestant position; in Spain all the bigotry of Philip II. could not prevent the new doctrines from making their way among the intelligent classes; even in Italy many of the best men were once more advocating a *reformatio in capite et membris*, and Pope Paul III. had gone so far as to give some of these men a place in the college of cardinals. In their desperation the popes had made secular alliances which involved them in war, and having taken up the sword they were in danger of perishing with the sword. It was the emperor's army which, in 1527, sacked Rome; and, it is said, did more to ruin the monuments of antiquity than all the barbarians had done. Philip II., though always ready with torch and faggot, did not hesitate in his secular capacity to wage war against the pope, though his generals were afterwards required to do penance for any disrespect which they had shown to "the Lord's anointed." There can, in fact, be no doubt that before the death of Martin Luther the cause of the Reformation was believed to be practically won. A great empire is, however, never entirely crushed by a single defeat. It possesses resources which do not immediately appear; and when the first humiliation is over there is sure to be a reaction which proves more formidable than earlier attacks. Though the Church of Rome had been beaten in its conflict, it still retained the

allegiance of the Romanic countries. Protestantism, it must be confessed, did not speedily lay hold of the Latin races; it may have been too logical, too didactic, to suit their imaginative natures. The ritual of the mass, elaborated with the artistic skill which had produced the masterpieces of the Italian renaissance, was to them a source of never-ceasing wonder and admiration. The idea of visible unity—the thought of Rome as the ruler of the world—was also fascinating and impressive; they had no conception of the fact that the divisions of Protestantism had been induced by the enthusiasm for the minutest forms of truth which is the crowning test of sincerity. To the ignorant multitudes of Spain and Italy religion was obedience to a spiritual guide; they had no more inclination to study its grounds than the ordinary patient feels to examine the motives of the physician in prescribing for his ailments. Those of higher culture who were inclined to devotion were almost certain to study ascetic ideals. They contemplated the examples of monastic self-sacrifice which the Church presented to their admiration, without appreciating the fact that the time had come for a higher and freer development of Christian life.

The prevalence of such sentiments was due in great measure to the persistent influence of the religious movement which was known as the Cluniac Reform. This movement—which may, of course, be traced to earlier sources—assumed its peculiar characteristics in the eleventh century, at the hands of the monks of the celebrated convent of Clugny, in southeastern France. These monks held to the Benedictine rule, but were very ascetic and laid claim to unusual purity of life. They began their public labors at a time when the church was, in great measure, dependent upon the state; when the emperors assumed the power of appointing bishops, and even of controlling the papacy itself. That the morals of the secular clergy had reached the lowest ebb cannot be doubted.

It was under such circumstances that the abbots of Clugny began to preach the necessity of a reformation, and soon the heads of many other convents joined in the movement which they



had inaugurated. Their ideal of the Christian life was, of course, monastic. Their first purpose was to render the monastic rule more rigorous, and to compel the secular clergy to live after this rule. The marriage of the clergy was denounced as the greatest of crimes, and it was insisted that laymen must be excluded from participation in ecclesiastical matters. Simony was declared to be sacrilege, and the life of the cloister presented as the model of righteous living.

The preaching of the monks of the Clugny led to popular enthusiasm for ascetic ideals. The ideal of the imitation of Christ was as old as Christianity, but it now acquired a new meaning. Christ was to be imitated by a life of voluntary poverty and, especially, by becoming a partaker in his passion. In this way a form of devotion was developed which was not to be satisfied with the service of the church, nor with the ministrations of the parish priest. On hill-tops great crosses were erected, and these consecrated places, which were known as "Calvaries," were approached by multitudes upon their knees. Some of the more enthusiastic devotees even went so far as to endure penances, which only stopped short of death itself. In this way, it may be added, the longing to worship at sacred places was greatly stimulated, and Christendom was prepared to engage in the wars of the Crusades.

Gregory VII., who is better known by his family name of Hildebrand, had been brought up under the influence of the reform of Clugny. He was not an author, nor a great scholar, nor a distinguished theologian ; and yet he was in many respects the greatest man of the Middle Ages. A little Tuscan monk, the son of a carpenter, he became at an early age the leading Cluniac reformer, and under five successive popes was the power behind the throne. In A. D. 1073 he was chosen pope, and it was at once felt that a great man was at the helm. His theory, which is generally known as the mediæval theocracy, was in strict accordance with the teachings of Clugny. With his intense conflict with imperialism we have here nothing to do, but it is plain that

he impressed his ideas upon his age, and that for centuries his spirit ruled the thought and devotion of the church.

It may be urged that the establishment of the *Fratres Mendicantes*, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, involved a protest against the exclusiveness of monasticism; but it was rather a means of conveying its ideals to the comprehension of the laity. The friars retained the monastic vows, but they made earnest with them to a degree which had become unusual. Their members were to be really poor, serving as common laborers, and begging only when their necessities absolutely required it. We cannot fail to recognize the self-sacrificing devotion of St. Francis of Assisi, and the profound earnestness of St. Dominic; but it is plain that their ideas of religious life differed in no essential respect from those of the monks of Clugny. The Dominicans and Franciscans were great revival preachers, but they preached the lessons which they had learned in the cloister.

Though the Cluniac reform was proclaimed in all the countries of Christendom, it is plain, we think, that its influence in Germany was not so complete—so all engrossing—as it had proved in Italy. Some of the grounds of this failure are evident at a glance. First we have the long conflict of the papacy with the imperial house of Hohenstauffen, during which many Germans conceived a violent dislike for “Italian machinations.” When Rudolph, of Hapsburg, became emperor, in 1273, he at first made an effort to establish his authority in Rome, but soon became convinced that Germany and Italy had better be separated. He confirmed the pope in the possession of a great part of central Italy, thus securing his gratitude and practically preventing his interference in German politics. From this time the two countries drifted apart, and room was left for the development of different forms of thought and sentiment. In the Church, no less than in the state, men came to occupy different standpoints; and at the hands of such men as Master Eckhardt, Tauler, Thomas á Kempis and Geiler von Kaisersberg, German mysticism assumed a form as far as possible removed from Italian ideals. Savonarola represents a very different form of thought from that which prevailed in Germany.



In Italy the Renaissance had by this time driven the Cluniac reform into the background. Especially among the higher classes men cared more for classical antiquity than for the Gospel of Christ. In the year 1300 Dante began to write his "Divine Comedy," and from that year may be dated the beginning of the marvelous movement which revived the study of antiquity, and adorned Italy with cathedrals, libraries and museums. It no doubt accomplished much good in emancipating the mind from the bondage of dogma; but unfortunately it brought with it a revival of heathenism in religion and morality. Some of the so-called Humanists combined culture with religion, but the majority despised Christianity, if they did not actually worship the gods of Greece and Rome. It became fashionable, we are told, to call upon "the immortal gods," and Providence was called *fatum* or *fortuna*. Morality was separated from religion, and men who were prominent in the Church indulged in the most hideous forms of vice. Theological teachers denied the immortality of the soul, and several of the popes publicly sneered at the religious system which they represented.

It is not our purpose to trace the history of the Roman system during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and we have not even room to refer at length to the abortive efforts which were made for its reformation. From what has been said it is easy to discover the material of which Rome rebuilt her desolated kingdom. Humanism was dead; Protestantism she would not accept, and her only apparent resource was to fall back upon the monastic foundation she had lately despised. At first, it would seem, the efforts to suppress Protestantism were not dictated by a settled policy. In some localities avowed Protestants alone were made to suffer, but elsewhere liberal Catholics were treated with equal harshness. To Roman Catholic scholars of the present day it must be a painful subject of reflection that the majority of the sufferers of Spain and Italy were men who had no desire to separate from Rome; that in faith and doctrine they were apparently not further advanced than some of the American bishops of the present day; that, in fact, they were profoundly

sincere in endeavoring to raise the Church to a higher stadium of religious life.

In Italy there was really more religious freedom than in Spain, for the simple reason that there was no political unity. There was no Philip II. and no archbishop of Toledo to carry out his wicked purposes. For a while the pulpits of the great cathedrals of Italy rang with the message of Wittenberg and Geneva, but then came the dark days when Peter Martyr, Ochino, Vergerius and hundreds of others were forced to seek a refuge beyond the Alps.

Charles Borromeo, archbishop of Milan, may be regarded as the leader and chief representative of a movement for a reformation of the Roman church in accordance with mediæval traditions. It was fortunate for Rome that he was too powerful to be crushed. Himself one of the greatest princes of Italy—a nephew of Pope Pius IV.—he was thoroughly devoted to the preservation of the existing order, but could venture to promote reformatory measures to which Rome had hitherto been a stranger. Of his extraordinary mental ability there can be no question, and that, according to the light which he possessed, he manifested earnest piety and devotion will hardly be doubted. In early youth he had been forced by his relatives to enter the priesthood, but he fully appreciated its responsibilities, and though the pope afterwards advised him to be absolved from his vows and to assume his hereditary position he refused to be released. The revenues of his archbishopric, and indeed his private fortune, he devoted to benevolent purposes; he founded hospitals and orphanages, and more than seven hundred schools are said to have been established at his private expense. The opponents of his reforms attempted to assassinate him, but he escaped under circumstances which seemed miraculous. In his diocese were many Protestants, but he was firmly convinced that persecution is the weapon of intellectual weakness, and consequently treated them with great kindness, even setting apart for them a church in Milan, in which the services were conducted in accordance with a simpler ritual than that of Rome. It is



said that "when the Swiss spoke of the wickedness of the Italian clergy they made an exception in favor of Carlo Borromeo." His course may have been dictated by policy, but it was after all a policy that was in accordance with the precepts of the Gospel.

The position held by the modern Roman church in works of general philanthropy is not to be ignored. As the leader of a long line of humanitarians, of whom Philip Neri, Francis of Sales and Vincent of Paul are prominent representatives, Borromeo holds an honorable position in the development of Christian life, but after all the work of this great man would have accomplished little to save Rome from impending ruin if it had not been that a man of greater power was already at work. What seemed to be demanded was a great organizing genius—a born leader of men who united intense enthusiasm with unusual mental acuteness and who would send his agents to distant regions to gather and unite the fragments of the ancient system. He must be a man who combined in his own person the most astonishing antitheses. He must feel the keenest sympathy for the multitudes among whom he labored, full of their superstitions and sharing their prejudices, and yet alive to the necessity of modern methods of discipline and organization; an ascetic and devotee, presenting an undeniable example of that form of self-sacrifice which his age regarded as an infallible test of sincerity, and yet in manners a gentleman who felt at home in the cabinet of kings; a politician more acute than Macchiavelli; a soldier who fought with keener blades than those of Damascus. He must, in fact, be a many-sided man with but a single purpose; a man who by an act of the will had become a "cadaver," a living corpse, a martyr of authority. Such a man the Church had never known, but at the hour of the deepest humiliation he appeared, a man whom his friends have regarded as a new Camillus, another founder of Rome.

Ignatius de Loyola was born in 1491, the youngest son of an obscure Spanish nobleman. He was destined for the profession of arms and his early education was consequently neglected, though he learned to read and write—accomplishments which in

those days were by no means universal. In his boyhood he was a page at the court of King Ferdinand; afterwards he became a soldier and fought bravely against the French at the siege of Pampeluna. In this conflict he was severely wounded, but his chivalrous captors conveyed him to his father's house. The wound healed slowly and he was lamed for life. During his convalescence he read a number of mediæval romances which had been found in a forgotten closet. With intense interest he followed the adventures of the Cid, the hero of Spanish chivalry; rejoiced in the knightly achievements of Amadis of Gaul, or joined in spirit in the disastrous rout:

“When Roland brave and Olivier,  
And every Paladin and peer,  
At Roncesvalles died.”

It was a course of reading not unlike that which Cervantes ascribes to the hero of his great romance, though the knight-errantry which it induced differed greatly from that of the knight of the sorrowful countenance.

When Loyola had read all the romances in the castle he turned to the “Lives of the Saints” and from reading them became fired with religious zeal. Curiously enough, he found that these Lives had a romance of their own which was not less fascinating than tales of war and slaughter. The ideals of self-sacrifice were similar, and in both there was an element of the marvellous that heightened the charm. Compared with the conquests and rewards of the saints the victories and renown of Roland and Amadis waxed dim. Loyola was crippled and could no longer hope to gain distinction at tilt and tournament; but might he not hope to emulate the saints? Might he not plight his fealty to the Queen of Heaven, whose honor he believed had been assailed. “For as the heavens are above the earth would be the service of the knight of the Virgin above the noblest devotions of human chivalry. In her service he would cast his shield over the church which ascribed to her more than celestial dignities; he would bathe in the blood of her enemies the sword once desecrated to the mean ends of worldly ambition.” \*

\* Stephen's “Loyola.”



The more Loyola suffered his mind to dwell on this subject the more glorious it appeared. In his delirium he even thought he beheld the being to whom his devotions were addressed—the picture which he had beheld at innumerable shrines had impressed itself upon his imagination. In the first glow of enthusiasm he arose and, like a knight of the Crusades, hung up his weapons at the nearest altar.

Now begins the ascetic period of Loyola's life. As soon as his health was sufficiently restored he betook himself barefooted to a pilgrimage. He waited on the sick in hospitals, dwelt for some time in a cave, where he prepared the first draft of his "Spiritual Exercises," and finally went as a pilgrim on foot to the Holy Land, where he conceived a gigantic scheme for the conversion of the Mohammedans, but was turned out of the country by the Christians themselves, for fear that he would embroil them with the Turkish government.\*

Loyola seems to have reached the verge of insanity, but he went no further. He never wavered in his consciousness of an exalted mission, but became convinced that extreme penance must necessarily interfere with its accomplishment. Every day he was made to feel the defects of his early training, and at the age of thirty-three he returned to Europe to begin a course of systematic study. For eight years he studied like a schoolboy, spending six of these years at the University of Paris. During all this time he preserved the manner and appearance of an accomplished gentleman; but it was observed that his society had a peculiar fascination for young men. It was reported that a company of students met in his rooms to engage in religious exercises, and Loyola was several times arrested and brought before the Inquisition. It was found that he was a "Romanist of the Romanists," and on each occasion of his discharge he solicited and secured a certificate of unimpeachable orthodoxy. This was a shrewd act, for the certificates proved of great service to him in later days.

In the meantime Loyola was quietly extending his influence. It is said that on one occasion he played a game of billiards with

\*Dr. Lord's "Lectures."

a young nobleman, under the penalty that the loser should serve the winner for six weeks. Loyola won the game, and having locked up his servant compelled him to study the "Spiritual Exercises." At the end of six weeks he had become his enthusiastic disciple. Michelet, who claimed to be a Catholic, described Loyola as "a strange combination of hermit and politician—a Pharisee with the shrewdness of a Macchievelli—a fusion of Spanish asceticism and Italian policy."

On the 15th day of August, 1534, in the morning before day-break, Loyola and six companions ascended the heights of Montmartre, in Paris, and, entering the church on the summit, promised before the altar life-long attachment to each other and unconditional obedience to the pope. This was the beginning of the "Society of Jesus," better known as the Jesuit order. Among these founders, next to Loyola, the most distinguished in later days were Francis Xavier and Diego Laynez.

It is believed that the members of the new society were at first under the impression that their fraternity would develop into a great missionary society, but Loyola's views were evidently much more comprehensive. He afterwards explained to the pope that, while the priests and monks might be regarded as the infantry of the church, he desired the society to be the light cavalry, to hasten to the place where they were most needed at a moment's notice. As some one has expressed it, the Jesuits became "a sword whose hilt was in Rome and whose point was everywhere."

Dr. Lord dates the beginning of the Counter-Reformation from the first vow of the Jesuits at Notre Dame de Montmartre; but this view appears superficial and unsatisfactory. It is only in its militant aspects that this great movement can be held to be so derived. There can, however, be no doubt that soon after this event great changes began to appear in the church of Rome. It was as if a defeated army had at last found a commander to restore its discipline. Every word of Loyola was obeyed by his disciples without hesitation, and it is said that he had to guard his glances for fear that they might be supposed to convey an unspoken command. A single word was enough to separate Francis



Xavier from the company and send him on a missionary journey to India. A recent writer says: "Before the remembrance of Loyola's passionate eloquence, his eyes of fire and his countenance of seraphic piety had passed away from the minds of his own generation, his disciples had planted their missionary stations among the Peruvian mines, in the marts of the African slave-trade, among the islands of the Indian ocean, on the coasts of Hindustan, in the cities of Japan and China, in the recesses of Canadian forests, amid the wilds of the Rocky Mountains." Before the death of Loyola his society numbered more than two thousand members, all educated men, and over one hundred colleges were under its direction. That it had become a mighty power not even its enemies presumed to deny.

It has been asserted that the Jesuits saved the church of Rome, and this may be true, so far as external organization is concerned, but it is also true that they infused into its policy a spirit so malignant, so intractable, as to render the reunion of Christendom a practical impossibility. At the Council of Trent they secured the appointment of three of their number as "the pope's theologians," and Laynez spoke for three days against the adoption of an article which favored the doctrine of justification by faith. It is said that more than one-half of the members of the Council were in favor of granting the cup to the laity, but the Jesuits fought the proposition with all their might, and their enthusiasm carried everything before it.\* If the advice of Borromeo had been taken it might have been possible to find a common ground for reunion, but the Jesuits were for war with Protestantism, and in this purpose, at least, the order has never wavered.

Loyola is said to have prayed that his society might never be without enemies, and his petition certainly appears to have been granted. On this subject it is not necessary that Protestants should express a personal opinion; it has been done again and again by professed Catholics in language more decided than Protestant writers would be likely to employ. Hardly had the

\* Sir James Stephen, *Edinburgh Review*, 1842.

society been fully organized when Charles Borromeo, who had at first favored it, ordered its members to depart from his diocese. Many of the popes expressed their disapproval of its methods, but with little effect. Paul IV. vainly commanded the society to elect its general for three years and not for life. Nine popes fruitlessly condemned the "Chinese rites" by which the Jesuits had assimilated Christianity to heathenism to gain more converts. Clement XIV. once more attempted to reform the order, but its general met him with the celebrated words: "*Sint ut sunt aut non sint.*" "Let them be as they are or let them not be." In 1773 the pope formally dissolved the society, but the Jesuits waited for better times and in 1805 secured their restoration. Since that time they have not been as numerous as in former times, but they are still a powerful organization and their influence in securing the decrees of the Vatican Council is a matter of common knowledge. "It is clear," says the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "that the society has always regarded itself as an independent power, ready, indeed, to coöperate with the papacy as long as their roads and interests are the same and to avail itself to the uttermost of the many pontifical decrees in its favor, but drawing the line far short of practical submission when their interests diverge."

The chief enterprises of the Jesuits have proved gigantic failures. They fomented the wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—the Spanish invasion of England, the war of the League, the struggle in Holland, and the 'Thirty-Years' War—but in every instance the results were favorable to Protestantism. They established great missions in Japan, in Paraguay, and among the North American Indians, but they have utterly disappeared. "In India," says Michelet with keenest sarcasm, "they did one great thing—they paved the way for the English."

In the Counter-Reformation the Jesuits took the foremost part. Littledale asserts that they were the whole of it, but this statement, as we have seen, is not strictly correct. It was founded on the monastic reformatory movements of the Middle



Ages, and from this fact its reactionary character was mainly derived. In its extreme conservatism it preserved ceremonials and forms of devotion which might well have been discarded, and which have proved a heavy burden to the Church. Its monastic ideals may have fostered private virtues, but they were too narrow to include the highest developments of the life of Christ.

It was to the advantage of the Counter-Reformation that it appeared at a time when the people had grown weary of constant discussion, and were consequently prepared for organized philanthropic efforts. The marvellous success of these efforts deserves recognition and respect, and we do not in the least undervalue the self-sacrifice which it plainly displays. It is not without reason that it has been called the crown and glory of the Counter-Reformation.

As for the matter of organization—in which the fine hand of the Jesuits is most plainly apparent—it has proved both the strength and the weakness of Rome. It has rendered the Church strong as an instrument in the hands of its rulers, but has prevented the free development which is the result of the highest form of life. It is withal responsible for much of the prejudice which continues to separate the churches.

In the present wonderful times the life of Christ demands room for its highest developments. Unless the Counter-Reformation should rise to a higher plane than it now occupies, the future of our country and of the world must remain in Protestant hands. There is, however, a sense in which the Reformation is still in progress, and though for a time denominations may continue to cherish memories of the past, and to do their work in their own peculiar way, the Church will at last reach the period in its development when prejudice and exclusiveness must pass away, and there will be, in the final sense of the prophecy, one fold and one Shepherd.

## IV.

### SOCIALIST CRITICISM.

BY REV. A. G. GEKELER.

Existing society is made up of two classes, the employing and the employed, the wage-giving and the wage-earning. The word class is sometimes objected to, but economically our society easily falls into these two divisions or classes, and the dividing line is clearly visible in the residence quarters of our towns and in the make-up of our churches.

In the hands of the capitalist class are the means of production ; in the hands of the wage class is the ability to labor, physical strength and human skill. The wage worker is strictly dependent upon some capitalist entrepreneur or corporation for the opportunity of earning his subsistence. If religion is the sense of absolute dependence upon God, the religious laborer is sensible of two dependencies, one upon God and one upon the dispenser of employment. Upon the latter the vast majority of laborers are absolutely dependent for the opportunity of living an honest life. Thus the oft-repeated phrase about the identity of interest between labor and capital contains some truth ; if capital is in use, labor is employed ; if idle, labor also is idle. Thus far the respective interests harmonize ; but when it comes to dividing the added value into profits and wages, these interests are as opposed to each other as can be.

And these classes are continually being produced. The system produces capitalist and proletary with the same necessity as the mill turns out flour and bran. The mass of the people is held and fixed in the wage class almost as securely as the slave was held in bondage. Every one feels free, exempt from the coercion of others, but with few exceptions laborers are held by the force of circumstances, by a necessity operating through our system, in the wage-earning class. The epoch of the large con-



cern, the department store and the trust minimizes the chances of rising into the independent employing class and forces many small entrepreneurs back into the working class.

How wage workers are held within their class will appear from a consideration of the iron law of wages, a phrase of Lasalle's and a notion effectively used by Socialists. When we speak of economic laws we must remember that they are really economic tendencies; they do not execute themselves with like unfailing certainty and force as the law of gravity. The iron law of wages is the tendency of wages to seek that point where they just suffice for bare subsistence of the laborer and the rearing of the average workman's family. It is claimed that wages tend to vibrate about that point, sometimes rising a little above, sometimes falling a little below. Bare subsistence must further be qualified, as the lowest degree of comfort, on which men will consent to work and marry. It is the lowest standard of living that men will submit to and on which they will found families. If American working people would submit to the Chinese or East Indian standard of living, there would, of course, be large room for wages to fall and the law would be discredited, or if men would cheerfully imitate the New England publicist who for a few days experimented upon himself in order to learn how cheaply he could live on corn meal, no doubt our wageworkers could save money even in our present hard times. But Americans are not yet willing to live like that and to furnish an army of workers for the next generation on such a standard. And they ought not to do so. The object of civilized society is not the filling of the earth with human beings, not mere life, but civilized human life, under humane conditions and with the largest possible measure of comfort and culture.

The iron law of wages, then, is the tendency of wages to settle about the level of the lowest standard of living, to which the working classes of a country are accustomed, or with which they will put up. And we submit that there is such a tendency. There are but two ways in which it can be resisted. One is by the refusal to marry and found families. That is self-evident.

An income that will not suffice for the support of a family will probably be ample for an individual. But this is a way of overcoming the alleged law by not submitting to the conditions under which the law operates, and the cunning of nature provides that few choose that way. The other is by combination. No one can doubt that the union has kept the rate of wages higher than if there had been no combination. In Indianapolis the stonemasons and bricklayers have succeeded in securing the union rates of wages during all the four years of the panic; the house-carpenters' union, however, representing a far greater number of mechanics, has gone to pieces, and the wage rate has been about halved. In prosperity the union usually secures living wages, but in long continued depressions the force of circumstances proves stronger than the union. And, if in such times the unionist secures his wage rate, no device known will secure him work, so that the unionized workman is thrust into a lower scale of living, and his opportunities are destroyed as well as in the case of no combination. But large numbers of wagedworkers cannot be organized, and the union succeeds by limiting the supply of workers in a trade and thus destroying competition for work. All unions of skilled artisans limit the number of apprentices, and thus many are denied the privilege of learning trades and are thrown into the army of common laborers and the casually employed. This is one serious objection to the labor union; another is, that by as much as unionists secure better pay, the condition of unorganized labor is made worse, since the mass of consumers must make the higher wages of the union men good through higher rents and prices. The union is thus available for but a portion of the laboring class, and a movement that does not contemplate the good of all cannot afford the desired remedy nor lead us out of the wilderness.

In the investigation of this alleged iron law it is necessary to consider more fully the conditions of production now obtaining. If the daily wage is multiplied by 300 the approximate number of working days in the year, we will have a sum larger than is compatible with our law. But if we make the proper deduction



on account of involuntary idleness the law will agree with experience. Carroll Wright estimates the number of workers idle in normal times at 5 per cent.; but what the number has been the past four years no one has the necessary data to base an estimate on. It certainly has been very large. How many concerns have been closed entirely for long periods, or have been running with a diminished force? And where employment has been continuous how many cases of reduced wages are found. During Harrison's administration, that golden age of high tariff, the coal miners of western Maryland lacked employment fully one-fourth of the time; on an average men were able and ready to earn 25 per cent. more than the state of the market permitted.

Now, the more exactly the iron law of wages is realized in fact, the clearer it becomes that the mass of laborers form a class from which individuals can rise only by rare fortune or rare gifts; a class harassed and disquieted by the fact that while the expenses of living are continuous the opportunity to dispose of their labor is quite uncertain.

And the corollary to this iron law is that the capitalist class absorbs the wealth destined for increased production. That the rich grow richer when the mass of the people is limited to a subsistence is mathematically certain, provided there is increase in wealth at all. Thus, too, the poverty of the masses, no less than the riches of the few, is the natural and necessary result of our system. We are moving toward the condition that a few millionaires and millions of poor people make up the nation.

And here we may further touch upon the sorest spot of present conditions. It is neither in the power of employer nor employe to avoid these breaks in employment. While we feel that something is wrong we can blame no one. Employer and employe are both under a power outside themselves against which they are helpless. That power is the effective demand of the markets. The ability to produce commodities is constant, expansive, practically unlimited; the opportunities to exchange them are irregular, limited. The ability to produce is much in excess, we cannot say of the desires of consumers, but of what can be sold. Production is

always able and ready to outrun actual consumption, but must always take a rest until consumption catches up. The trust alone is in the position to calculate consumption and then to determine the output; the trust alone can guarantee constant employment to a limited number of men. All other concerns are subject to great fluctuations in the markets; when demand makes itself felt, concerns that have suffered from slack markets rush into activity and soon the output necessitates renewed restriction of production. Twice within half a year have the New England factories of textiles shut down in order to lessen the glut of the market. The course of industry therefore is not a level, but a seesaw between active demand and no demand; this means for the entrepreneur distracting care, and introduces something akin to gambling: the necessity of making ventures without the ability to make up a clear judgment. And for the wageworker it means a state of uncertainty as to obtaining the means of life that is harassing to an extreme degree.

There is a great difference also in their effect upon character between an occasional holiday and frequent periods of enforced idleness. A holiday is of a joyous nature, a day of relaxation and visiting, from which men return to their daily tasks with renewed energy and vigor. But the period of enforced idleness is dreary and dull, a time of care, often distress and discouragement. The rainy day fund is encroached upon, the effort to save is thwarted, thrift and enterprise are apt to be checked by the thought that it is all of no avail. There can be no doubt that irregular employment tends to weaken and imperil the character of those affected and their dependent families, and in judging the working classes this most important enviroing feature ought not be lost sight of. If there is often mischief for idle hands to do, there is worse mischief for enforced idleness; it favors the increase of poverty, intemperance and domestic discord. A life from which hope is largely excluded, a career that engages few high sentiments and aspirations, and is handicapped by sordid care and often embittered by a vague sense of injustice—must this not profoundly affect character? Will it raise a man to his best or tend to sink him to his worst?



It is an evil moreover, which cannot, it seems, be remedied in such a way that freedom of industry, contract and competition can be left intact; an evil, evidently, for the remedying of which there is no proposal before society but that of socialism in some form.

Karl Marx points out these periods of boom and ruin in the English cotton trade. After reviewing the course of the trade from 1770 to 1863 he sums up as follows: *Capital*, vol. ii, p. 461, "We find thus in the first 45 years of the English cotton trade, from 1770-1815, only 5 years of crisis and stagnation; but this was the period of monopoly. The second period, from 1815 to 1863 counts, during its 48 years, only 20 years of revival and prosperity against 28 of depression and stagnation. Between 1815 and 1830 the competition with the continent of Europe and with the United States sets in. After 1833 the extension of the Asiatic markets is enforced by "destruction of the human race" (the wholesale extinction of the Indian handloom weavers). After the repeal of the corn laws, from 1846 to 1863 there are 8 years of moderate activity and prosperity against 9 years of depression and stagnation." The Civil War caused the cotton famine and sore distress among the operatives. "From the indications as to the condition of the markets of the world in 1860 and 1861, we see that the cotton famine came in the nick of time for the manufacturers and was to some extent advantageous to them, a fact that was acknowledged in the reports of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, proclaimed in Parliament by Palmerston and Derby and confirmed by events." The fact was that the markets were so glutted with goods that even in 1863 they had not absorbed the whole lot and a crisis was inevitable even without the famine.

It seems certain that this unsteadiness in industry increases and becomes more acute from one critical period to another and that we must prepare ourselves to live under a permanent crisis. Depression and stagnation are becoming chronic and normal. The shortening of the labor day would afford some temporary relief by lessening the number of idle men and increasing con-



sumption ; but as the fertility of labor increases by reason of more efficient machinery and cheaper transportation, society would after a while again be in the same straits. The past four years cover perhaps the longest crisis period in our history, a period not yet ended and threatening to continue still for considerable time. We do well to remember with grateful hearts that they have been years of unusually abundant harvests and low prices for provisions. Who does not tremble to think what might have happened if the harvests had been bad and scarcity prices had prevailed? But what we have now escaped through a beneficent Providence is not this certain sometime to befall us?

When Proudhon defines property as theft the majority of men look upon the declaration as violent and highly exaggerative, for although every one has knowledge of individuals who wrongfully possess property, the majority of property owners are known to have made their acquisitions by honest toil or in legitimate business. When Socialists make such declarations we must understand their premises. And we must remember that men like Marx expressly disavow the intention of stigmatizing capitalists as thieves and robbers, although Marx would probably subscribe the definition of Proudhon. How, then, does capital grow? It can grow only when its roots are in the labor process, in production. The growth of capital rests upon the fact that labor commonly produces a value in excess of its cost, a surplus value. In the process of production a laborer produces a value equal to the value of the wages he receives ; he produces the equivalent of his wages day by day, but in a profitable business he produces a value greater than his wages, a surplus value. If all outlays in production, such as wages, salaries, insurance, taxes, wear and tear, cost of raw materials, are added together, the resulting product is found to be of greater market value than was laid out in production. And if we seek for the source of this additional value we can find it only in the fact that the wageworker received—not less than his labor was worth—but less than his labor produced. The laborer has received what his labor is worth ; for labor has a value whose magnitude may be estimated in the same manner



as the value of any commodity. A thing is worth what it customarily costs to produce it. And so the value of labor, or wages, depends upon the cost of rearing the workman up to his entrance upon the labor market plus his daily subsistence. If  $x$  represents the cost of rearing a laborer to maturity,  $y$  the average daily living expense and  $z$  the number of days available in the life of the average workingman, then the formula  $\frac{x}{z} + y$  represents the cost or

value of an average day's work. This method of getting at the cost of labor, the natural wage, is borne out by the rates of wages paid in countries having a low standard of living, *e. g.*, India, China, the South. But the labor performed in a day imparts to the raw material a value greater than this cost of labor, a certain quantity of surplus value, and from this surplus value capital draws its nourishment in the form of interest, profits, dividends and rent. Here nothing is to be seen of the boasted identity of interest between labor and capital. The whole quarrel is about the disposition of the surplus value. The capitalist class now appropriates it; the Socialist claims that the laborer is entitled to it. By transferring this surplus value from the pockets of capitalists to the commonwealth the production of the classes will cease; then will there be neither proletary nor capitalist, but laborers of brain and brawn receiving, as nearly as possible in this world, what they create.

Socialists, it will be perceived, set down nothing to the credit of machinery in this surplus-value, arguing that only the actual wear and tear on the plant, cost of superintendence, insurance, taxes and raw materials enter into the actual cost of commodities. No place is left for interest on capital as *none is left for interest on the cost of the laborer.*

It is true that the machine is the greatest multiplying factor by far in the production of wealth, of use values; machinery is manifoldly more efficient than the operative's labor. But in estimating the magnitude of exchange or market value the cost of labor represented in the commodity and not the degree of utility is regulative. It is exchange values, not use values, that feed capi-

tal. Values that cannot be expressed by and turned into the money forms are of no avail to the increase of capital, and it is in proportion as values are the depositories of labor that they admit of this change.

And so it is found to be in fact. If the value added to the raw material in the process of production is divided into two parts, one representing the value added by labor, the other the value added by the efficiency of machinery, it will be found that the latter value cannot be realized. Forty years ago all shoes were made by hand and the cost of labor entering into a pair of shoes may be put down as \$2. To-day, by the use of machinery, perhaps twenty pairs of shoes of like quality are turned out by the same labor and in like time. Nineteen pairs of shoes thus represent the efficiency of the machine. But no manufacturer dreams of selling the twenty pairs of shoes for the cost of raw material, plus wear and tear, plus \$38, which sum represents the saving in cost by machine production. A profit of \$38 per day per workmen is indeed beyond the dreams of capital; nor will the operative now earn \$40 per day; he may be thankful indeed if he receives the \$2 which his father earned. Now the twenty pairs of shoes, as use values are worth twenty times as much as one pair. They represent twenty times the wealth, twenty times the utility and comfort, but they do not bear twenty times the exchange or market value. As soon as the manufacture of shoes by machinery is well established, the market value of shoes will fall by as much as they contain less labor minus the wear and tear on the plant, and, at present, minus the profit that can be extracted from the transaction. When commodities are exchanged labor is balanced against labor, the surplus value having first been abstracted. Use-values are subject to few changes but those of decay; exchange-values are affected by their freight of labor, by inventions, monopolies, fashions.

Labor is thus indeed the factor which produces market or exchange value. Out of the profit on labor, out of surplus-labor creating surplus-value capital is composed, and the capitalist classes are fed.



The increased productivity or fertility of labor, by reason of improved machinery *gradually* becomes a common benefit. Under free competition—a thing becoming rarer from year to year—consumers eventually reap the entire benefit arising from the use of machinery; this is a good which, under the conditions named, cannot be monopolized. But we say *gradually* and *eventually*, for until a process or machine becomes the common property of all competitors, many individual capitalists will have greatly increased their capitals.

And it is only by participating *quâ* consumers in the cheapening of commodities that the common people are benefited by the material progress of society, a gain to which must be noted the serious offset, that the machine makes the laborer superfluous. When this cheapening of commodities is adduced, as proof that the poor are better off than formerly, inasmuch as a greater number of desirable things are within their reach, it ought not be forgotten that the laborer still fails to receive what he produces, is often necessarily idle, and that the standard of living is altered by this very cheapening. Besides it does not alter the comparative positions of the classes, as the lower prices redound to the advantage of both.

While the competitive system is supposed to provide the maximum efficiency in production and a maximum product, a little reflection shows the falsity of this view. The individual plant, indeed, is interested in applying the greatest economy, and a failure to do so is soon brought to light by a reduction of profit and output. But in spite of the rigid economies practiced in the individual concern, the system involves and supports an enormous wastefulness. And it does this through an injudicious multiplication of the means of production, with the result that these means of production cannot be fully used. But just so far as the means of production cannot be exploited to their full capacity, they represent waste. An ideal system of industry would keep its productive appliances in full use and activity; it would not lock up and bury labor and capital in unneeded establishments. A case in point is the paralleling of railroads. There can be no doubt that

the plant of the N. Y. C. R. R. is sufficient to carry its own freight, besides what its former rival, the West Shore, carries. The sum represented by the latter road thus represents almost entirely so much waste. And the final result of such parallels is to keep rates high, a result which, of course, is possible only because railroads are natural monopolies. For now the N. Y. C. is obliged to make dividends and interest on its own plant and also on the capital invested in the leased West Shore. And this waste of capital and labor extends through all industry, not excepting our churches and institutions of learning. The capital and labor of our country are able to turn out an output much greater than they do.

The department store is the one concern now rapidly coming to the front, which eliminates this waste; its capital rapidly changes the money form to the commodity form, and *vice versa*, and its staff of employees is in constant activity. The trust fails to accomplish as much, because a large amount of its capital, locked up in closed plants, is idle and, notwithstanding the spreading opposition to these forms of industrial organizations, they are likely to be permanent. But, like improvements in machinery, they made the laborer superfluous.

“By their fruits ye shall know them.” The certain and natural effects of our system of private property, and competition on upper and lower classes are not of a character to recommend the system. The struggle for existence, which goes on untempered in the plant and brute creation, serves its purpose in those spheres most excellently; no higher ends exist for them than the production of individuals fit to live and preserve their kind. But among men something more than strong bodies and fierce wills are desired. Men everywhere are aware of a moral ideal, of the obligatoriness and sacredness of truth and right and love. Fidelity to the moral ideal is universally felt to be the duty and glory of man, and history teaches unceasingly that moral forces constitute the power and stability of nations.

“Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey,  
Where wealth accumulates, and men decay.”



And how does this moral ideal fare under the strain of universal competition? Better than might be expected, indeed, for Heaven takes an interest in it and Providence keeps it under its own patronage. It lives in spite of our social system and not because of it. The effect of competition, calling into activity the selfishness and lower tendencies of our natures, is altogether against the ascendancy of right and truth and love. Our system mightily fosters a selfish and materialistic spirit in society, for it gives men social importance not in proportion to their virtues, their wisdom and skill, but in proportion to their worldly means. Man is not the measure of all things, but money. Success is our idol. In order to succeed, every consideration is pushed aside, and success attained, all stains are covered with the mantle of forgetfulness. Even honesty is recommended on the ground that it is the best policy. Bismarck long ago said, "The lie is a world power of the first magnitude," and even that blunt man of blood and iron made use of this power in his diplomacy.

In the sphere of legislation the principle of our society becomes the source of corruption and class legislation. Many things are attempted and many accomplished that point to bribery and corruption, as the only reasonable explanation. Elections are evidently very expensive, and it is not denied from what sources the contributions come, nor is it a secret what equivalents are expected and obtained. It is well known, for example, that in Germany the tariff on provisions is laid in order to hold the vote of the nobility and landed gentry on the side of the government. Bread is made dear for the many poor and hungry in order that the great landholders may be conciliated. Can there be a ranker injustice? And yet we do similar things in this land of democracy. In tariff legislation it is not the comfort and happiness of men and women and children that it sought, but the enhancement of property and capital. In short, our system rests upon an injustice, namely, the appropriation by capital of the surplus-value, that life-blood of economic prosperity and growth; it is wasteful beyond calculation, it multiplies temptations, it encroaches upon the rights, destroys the hopes and embitters the lives of the mass of the people.

## V.

### THE PERSONAL ELEMENT IN PREACHING.

BY REV. GEO. W. RICHARDS.

The test of centuries has proven the foolishness of preaching to be the wisdom of God. The prophet of the Hebrews, the philosopher of the heathen, and the preacher of the Christian Church have been the molding force of the thought, emotion, and action of the world's life. The rapid spread of the gospel of Jesus Christ and its world-wide conquest, against apparently insuperable difficulties, show the power of truth proclaimed by man to his fellow. The decay of religion, morality, and civilization, whenever and wherever the pulpit is superseded by the altar, the preacher by the priest, is a negative evidence of the positive influence of preaching. In the tracks of the gospel, civilization with its attendants, education and commerce, are sure to follow. The living voice of the preacher has awakened nations, dead in idolatry and superstition, and they arose in newness of life.

Preaching will remain the great power for the maintenance and completion of the kingdom of truth to the end of time. Inventions cannot take the place of the *viva voce* gospel. The printing press, the telephone, and the phonograph can only be handmaids of the pulpit. They can never fill it. Only when the preacher becomes a machine, instead of a living personal force, is he in danger of the competition of these mechanisms of his age. "The word of God, the testimony of Jesus, the gospel of our Salvation preached in tongues of men of every race is to be the form of power by which the Kingdom of God in our dispensation is to spread abroad and prevail."

There have been prophets, accordingly, since the world began. These have interpreted God to their generation. Their message came fresh from the heart over the lips. They wrote after they spoke. Moses objected his slowness of speech to God's call.



Isaiah's mouth was touched by a live coal from the altar. His lips were purged for his message. The symbol of the Spirit's coming was cloven tongues like as of fire. The two greatest teachers of the ancient world entrusted their wisdom to oral speech. Neither Christ nor Socrates wrote a book. The latter, being asked why he did not write his instructions, replied: "I would rather write upon the hearts of living men than upon the skins of dead sheep." They had the same confidence in the word of truth which the sower has in his seed. Cast it into the soil and it will take care of itself. "So shall my word be that goeth forth out of my mouth, it shall not return unto me void." Isai. 55 : 11.

A large part of Christ's ministerial activity was devoted to the training of preachers. No act had more significance for the future of his kingdom than the choice of apostles. He continued all night in prayer. He felt how much depended upon the little band who were to be his mouthpiece after the ascension. He laid the matter before his Heavenly Father, and when it was day he called unto him his disciples, and of them he chose twelve, whom also he named Apostles. He took them under his special supervision. To them he revealed the mysteries of the kingdom. He sent them out on preaching tours and taught them by precept and example for the work which they were about to begin. In his final commission he commanded them to go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature.

This last injunction gives us the elements of preaching. It is the deliverance of a message from Jesus Christ to men, by men sent forth from Christ. The preacher, therefore, is a messenger of Jesus. Malachi called the priest, "the messenger of the Lord of Hosts." John was a man sent from God. Jesus was sent by the Father. Hence he could say; "As the Father hath sent me even so send I you." (John 20-21.) The preacher is a messenger like the prophet, the Christ, and the apostle. In this respect he differs from the philosopher and the scientist. In a broad sense they, too, are messengers of the truth, yet they do not have the specific commission of the apostle. The messenger of the Glori-

fied Christ is clothed with authority, and endowed with power, more than he would be as a mere individual. The same man coming as a citizen to the Court of St. James could not command the attention and audience which he would have as an ambassador of the United States. He then represents seventy million people. By them he is supported and protected from insult and harm. The preacher is the ambassador of Him unto whom all power in heaven and earth is given. That power co-operates with him and is active in his behalf. Great is the significance of the last words spoken to the seventy, both for themselves and their audience. "He that heareth you heareth me; and he that rejecteth you rejecteth me, and he that rejecteth me rejecteth him that sent me." The rejection of the divine messengers was the doom of Jerusalem and will always bring the wrath of God upon every city that "killeth the prophets and stoneth them that are sent unto her." (Luke x, 16.)

As a messenger he is the bearer of a message. It is an *εὐαγγέλιον*, a good message, from God to the world. The message must authenticate the messenger. He, in his own mind, may be convinced of his mission but not so the people. His ordination, his installation, or his priestly robe do not in themselves approve him. He must speak with authority and not as the scribes. His opinions and speculations are of no more value than those of the audience, driven by the wind and tossed. He cannot originate his message, but must receive it. "The Lord God hath spoken who can but prophesy." (Amos 3,—8.) "Thus saith the Lord," breathes through his speech. He need not say so; the people feel it. Such positive doctrine has been the strength of the ruling minds of nations, whether in the propagation of truth or error. Preaching of that kind will never lack an audience. The publicans and sinners flocked to hear Jesus. Crowds of all classes trembled before John the Baptist. He was a voice, not an echo. Woe to the Church when her preachers cease to be a voice, and become a mere echo.

This definition of preaching is one-sided and defective. The messenger and the message may be independent of each other.



The wire is not conscious of the tidings it transmits. The King's messenger often bears sealed messages, with which he is not personally concerned. Certain prophets received revelations external to them and they declared them as external things. They were mere tools in the Spirit's hands. The hand of the Lord so came upon Gideon and Samson. The child Samuel heard his voice. The serpent in Eden and the ass of Balaam are extreme instances of such communications. The preacher may sink to the level of that rude form of prophecy and still be a messenger with a message. (Brigg's Messianic Prophecy, p. 12.)

This defect is overcome when we consider the other term applied by Christ to the Apostles. "Ye shall be witnesses unto me both in Jerusalem and in all Judea and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth." (Acts 1-8.) The messenger must be a witness also, and the message a personal testimony. Then he will speak of that which he has heard, that which he has seen with his eyes, that which his hands handled concerning the Word of Life. (I. John 1-1.) The message percolates through his personality and becomes an experience of his life. In his epistles John does not narrate the historical facts and incidents of the earthly life of Jesus as any contemporary might have seen them. But in His Gospel and Epistles He interpreted the significance of those facts both for himself and the people whom he addressed. He bore testimony under the direction of the Spirit of Truth. For only after the Comforter had come could they be witnesses of Jesus. (John 15 ; 26, 27.) A cold, indifferent, and unapplied recital of the birth, death and resurrection, is not preaching Christ. It is not a personal testimony to the power and significance of those events upon the spiritual welfare of men. Those facts spiritually discerned and felt in their relation to personal salvation will make the preacher a lawful and true witness of Jesus Christ. He must not originate his testimony. He cannot testify beyond his vital experience. In the former case he is untrustworthy, in the latter he is uncertain. This phase of preaching reveals the importance of the personal element which enters into it. Great responsibility rests upon it.

Truth and personality are closely related. Without a person truth would be like a cannon ball without a cannon. A person becomes both powder and cannon by which the truth is projected. Truth, like oxygen, pervades the atmosphere, but the oxygen only becomes visible in the burning candle. The candle is the exponent of the oxygen. "The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord." (Prov. 20-27.) Truth surrounds the brute, but the brute can neither see nor expound it. The person of man alone is the center, in which and through which truth is revealed. But like as the carbon is concealed by the flash of the electric rays, the preacher's personality should be irradiated by the celestial light which he emits. Not like as water is led through pipes from the reservoir into the homes of a city, does the Gospel flow through the mouth of the preacher into the ears of his people. Rather like as the tree drinks in the sunshine and dew, draws nutriment from its soil, and absorbs them until they are transformed into luscious fruit, does the preacher assimilate truth which becomes the precious food of his audience. He is a tree of life whose leaves are for the healing of the nation.

When we speak of the personal element in preaching we do not refer to the eccentricities or individuality of the preacher. It includes these but is more than these. They are transient and accidental. The personal is permanent and essential. God could only reveal Himself to a person. God in the universe without a person was like Adam in Eden when he had no helpmeet, or more literally, no one "answering to him." In this vast system of suns and planets, "this interminable wilderness of worlds," there was no one answering to God. He could not impart himself in love to rocks and trees. They could not be His companions. In man, however, He found a creature, in His own image, after His own likeness. He drew nigh in love, man could respond. He revealed His wisdom and man could read His thoughts.

As the person of man became the intelligent recipient of divine revelation, he also became its medium of expression. The sea could not reveal God. The poet speaks figuratively when he calls the ocean, the



“Glorious mirror, where the Almighty form  
Glasses itself in tempests,  
The image of Eternity, the throne  
Of the Invisible.”

The heavens but partly declare the glory of God. Through these avenues of nature we may approach the realm invisible and the power eternal. *Yet a person only can reveal a person.* Man, therefore, is the only efficient medium of divine revelation. “No man knoweth the Son but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him.” (Mat. 11-27.) The perfect revelation could come only through the perfect man. This element in man through which God has revealed Himself in patriarchs, and prophets, apostles, and saints is the medium through which the gospel of His Son must forever pass, be vitalized, and interpreted to the generations which come and go. The Holy Spirit works through human personality. The truths of Jesus must continually incarnate themselves in the men of the age before they can mold the age. Through them must play freely the messages of God. The Personal Element in the preaching of the truth accordingly serves a wise practical purpose in the plan of salvation.

I. First of all, *it is the Bond of Union between the old Gospel and the new Age.* The personality of the preacher is new. It is about the only new thing under the sun. The gospel is old. The old gospel should be renewed by the new person. Paul would not send the epistle to the Romans to Boston. He sent quite another letter to Ephesus. The Boston preacher, however, must apply the eternal truths of Romans to the necessities of Bostonian life. The Bible contains a body of truth which we accept as the revelation of God. It is a revelation to the Jewish nation, however, before it is a message to the American people. It was once the living experience of individuals and of a nation. Their relations toward God, man and the devil are recorded in the various forms of literature. Yet the Bible of the Hebrews, like the nation of which it speaks, is in one sense a dead book. It treats of ages past and nations gone. But the same Bible, apprehended, assimilated and reproduced in the form

and fashion of the nineteenth century by a living person, becomes the power and wisdom of God. That is the function of the preacher.

He is a representative of the needs, the inquiries and tendencies of his time. To him, personally and first, comes the message of old. In it he must find an answer to his own questions, peace for his own soul, comfort for his own troubles. He must have an ear to hear what "*the Spirit saith,*" not *hath said*, to the churches. The dead material of the past is taken up by the roots and root-lets of his personality and changed into the form of his own life. Only as he is himself apprehended by the truth can he interpret it in a living way to others. He needs, therefore, to live in close touch with his surroundings. The welfare of his community is of vital interest to him. With the tender care of a Shepherd he will watch over his flock. He has no right to live behind his age. He is rather unfortunate if he is born ahead of his time. The great preachers of the ages have allowed the past to bury its dead, and the future to solve its problems. The present was their divinely allotted sphere.

Such a sympathetic union with one's environment is the result of the activity of the whole nature of man. The scholar in his study may master the dominant scientific and theologic principles. It is well that he should. Yet he may remain cold and be unable to reach men in the shop, the counting room and on the market. These are the living epistles upon which are recorded the feelings and thoughts and motives of the hour. Only by the closest observation of man and all the passing affairs of the Home, School, Church and the State can he feel the pulse throbs of the spirit of life around him. Opened manward, the soul should be thrown wide open Godward. God is the unchangeable in the midst of the uncertain movements of the tides of life's sea. Christ speaks the word, and the storm-driven waves obey and are still. In these troublous times that calm and peace, which the world cannot give, can be obtained only by the perception of the eternal glimmering through the temporal into the inner consciousness of men. The Bible and the age are thus wedded by a



living personality. The old message comes through a new person. Then the Bible and the preacher fulfil their mission.

II. *The Personal Element is a Means for the proper distribution of the Gospel.* The same gospel has to be adapted to different people. Paul was free from all men, yet he made himself the servant unto all. "Unto the Jews I became as a Jew that I might gain the Jews; to them that are under the law, as under the law, that I might gain them that are under the law. To the weak became I as weak, that I might gain the weak. I am made all things to all men that I might by all means save some." (I. Cor. ix. 20-39.) The apostle to the gentiles had wonderful versatility. This was due to his previous training and his varied experience. He could enter the synagogue, and like a learned rabbi expound the Law and the Prophets. Before the philosophers of Athens he felt at home, and boldly presented his cause. In the palaces of Kings he spoke with becoming grace and dignity. Few men, however, have the genius of Paul. Different men, accordingly, have diversities of gifts but the same spirit. In the choice of the twelve, Jesus was undoubtedly guided by their personalities. He sought such a diversity of temperament and training as would fit them to preach to all the classes of Israel.

Corresponding to this variety of personality in preachers, there is a difference in the people. There are national, social, intellectual, and moral distinctions. These are the results of ages of development and growth. However much we may insist upon the equality of all men before God, we cannot destroy the lines of division, inherent in the world's life. They will be made to minister, in the divine plan, towards the complete development of man in history. It becomes, therefore, necessary that the gospel be adapted to these divisions. Canon Liddon could command the breathless attention of his vast audience in St. Paul's. He might have failed in the Metropolitan Tabernacle. Spurgeon, great as he was, would hardly have satisfied the audience which sat spell-bound under Liddon's voice. The evangelist in the New York slums, is reaching a class which Philips Brooks could

not have touched. Mission boards have learnt by experience that a native Japanese ministry is far more effective than the most cultured European or American missionary. Matthew became an open door for Christ into the center of the community of publicans and sinners. He chose some fishermen. But he did not send a Galilean fisherman to Athens, the paradise of philosophers, or to Rome to preach to those of Cæsar's palace. He found his servant at the feet of Gamaliel. In our times these diversities of human conditions have not been lessened. Our hope of bringing the gospel of Jesus to all nations, classes, and individuals, is based upon the various personalities of the men who are prepared from their mother's womb for their life's mission.

Yet this truth is frequently overlooked. The great diversity of operations in the Church surpasses the comprehension and liberality of the average Christian. One is too shallow, the other too fanciful, the third too profound. The customs and habits of the ecclesiastical life of the fathers must not be broken. The form of address, the substance of the discourse, are measured by a Procrustean standard and thereby approved or condemned. It is a criminal attempt to repress personality and rob the individual of those characteristics which were designed to make him an original messenger of God. Styles of sermons, modes of thought, are as manifold as preachers. The white sunlight does not display its wealth of color and beauty before it passes through the scientist's prism. Who would dream of the rainbow in the sunray? The unsearchable riches of Christ Jesus, the Light of the World, can only be appreciated after passing through the countless personalities by which the truth is revealed in living form and adapted to the comprehension of all men.

III. *The Personal Element gives Originality and Freshness to the old message.* The preacher may well despair of presenting new truth. The gospel has been preached for so many centuries, by most scholarly and devout men, that originality in the sense of newness is practically impossible. That, however, is not the meaning of originality. The same truth may be as original with me as with Homer. Two things are original and new, the per-



sonality and the age. These two are the preacher's hope against vain repetitions, vague platitudes, and the ghastly dead line. The words of Jesus passing through a unique person will partake of his impress. Every preacher who allows the truth to sink into him and be assimilated and absorbed must become original. There will be the freshness of the morning dew and the brightness of the rising sun in his discourse. He is preaching Christ as Christ apprehended him. The same text, accordingly, yields many sermons to different individuals. No two preachers can preach the same sermons if they are true to themselves. The young man, who exhausted the Gospels and epistles the first year of his ministry, lacked the personal enlargement which a single year's preaching will necessarily produce. In giving forth truth, the seed of a new harvest is sown. As the years advance and the intellect, will, and affections unfold, the truth must take possession of the expanding mind and captivate the heart. When that is the case the dead line comes only with the death line. The congregation will not weary of their preacher because of his age. Neither will they long after young blood for their pulpit. There are preachers with gray hair in Reformed pulpits who preach with the power and vivacity of youth. Every year seems to increase their strength; while the outward man perisheth, the inner man is renewed day by day. Others, however, have reached the dead line on this side of the forties, possibly because they never held on to the life line.

At this point we cannot help quoting at some length the words of Philips Brooks. "If a preacher is not a man of his age, in sympathy with its spirit, his preaching fails. He wonders that the truth has grown so powerless. But it is not the truth that has failed. It is the other element, the person. That is the reason why sometimes the old preacher finds his well-known power gone and complains that while he is still in his vigor people are looking to younger men for the work which they once delighted to demand of him. There are noble examples on the other side; old men with a personality as vitally sympathetic with the changing age as the truth which they preach is true to the word

of God. They have a power which no young man can begin to wield and the world owns it willingly. People would rather see old men than young men in their pulpits, if only the old men bring them both elements of preaching, a faith that is eternally true and a person that is in quick and ready sympathy with their present life. If they can have but one they are apt to choose the latter, but what they really want is both and the noblest ministries in the church are those of old men who have kept the freshness of youth." He strikes at the root of the present day demand for young preachers and the premature decay of the old ones. When there is a personal appropriation of the infinite treasures of truth and a sympathetic contact with the people, the preacher will flourish like the palm tree. He shall bring forth fruit in old age. He shall be fat and flourishing.

The Personal Element is not fixed, so as to prevent culture and development. It is true, all men are not born equal. Blood will tell. The training of preachers begins a hundred years before they are born. The blood of centuries flows in their veins. We speak about the humble origin of Jesus, yet humanly speaking he had the best Jewish blood, a scion of David's house. No one, however, is responsible for the fortunes and misfortunes of birth and ancestry. But he is responsible for the best use of those talents which he has received. As a moral and intellectual being, man can fully apprehend and show forth God through the faculties which make him akin to Deity. These faculties are subject to law, and obedience to that law is the condition of growth. In preaching, perhaps, more than in any other form of activity, all the powers of man are called into action. He, then, who has made the most of his physical, intellectual and moral qualities, will be the best instrument of the Holy Spirit, and the most efficient medium of divine truth.

There are two typical classes in the ministry of the Church. The one reminds you of the vineyard in a very fruitful hill. The Lord made a trench about it and gathered out the stones thereof, and planted it with choicest vine. And he looked that it should bring forth *grapes* and it brought forth *wild grapes*. They pass



through the institutions of the Church. They are accepted as the pastors of congregations. They are under the care of Providence. Yet they become lean of soul. Their personality withers. Their mind shrinks. Their heart becomes hard and cold. It is a case of intellectual and spiritual starvation. When they should bring forth grapes, they bring forth wild grapes.

The other is like the fruit-laden tree under the shadow of whose branches children love to play, and the weary are refreshed. He has a rich personality. Out of the environment of his half a century he has drawn from God, nature and man, nutritious food for body, mind and heart. By instinct, he has rejected the vicious, low and immoral. He has opened his leaves and spread his branches, to bathe in the sunlight of heaven, and drink the crystal drops of the cloud. He speaks the same old truths, but they are electrified and radiant with his irresistible life. It is not his giant intellect, nor his eloquent tongue, nor even his practical tact, but the calm, majestic, silent influence of his personality, aglow with God, which is a perpetual benediction to his church, his community and his home.

## VI.

# ST. PAUL'S DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION, WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS. A BIBLICO- THEOLOGICAL STUDY.

BY THE EDITOR.

Paul was the greatest of all the Apostles; and the Epistle to the Romans is the greatest of all his literary productions. In this Epistle, written to a church which was destined to exercise an immeasurable influence upon the fortunes of Christendom, he comes nearest to giving a systematic representation of the Christian faith as it had taken shape in his own mind. Hence to understand this Epistle is to understand Paul's conception of Christianity. It is, however, one of the strange phenomena of history that the church to which this Epistle was first addressed, has never understood it. The Roman Church, with its legalistic doctrine of salvation by works, is more in accord with Paul's Judaizing opponents than with the mind of Paul himself. This is a fact which was recognized by the Reformers of the sixteenth century. But the Reformers were themselves too much under the influence of Augustinian and Medieval ideas to be able to do full justice to Paul's teaching; and it is only in the biblical theology of more recent times that the spell of dogmatic traditionalism has been broken, and the Apostle's great thoughts have come to be apprehended, not in the light of the bishop of Hippo, but in the light which belongs to themselves. It is the design of this paper, and of others that may follow, to endeavor, in this light, to understand the teaching of the Epistle to the Romans in regard to some of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity.

The leading principles of this epistle are anthropological and soteriological ideas. St. Paul, in all his writings, shows more predilection for the doctrines of redemption and justification than



for the more speculative doctrine of Christ's person, and treats the former much more fully than the latter. This turn of his thought was doubtless due, in part, to his personal religious experience, and, in part also to the attitude of the Jewish opponents of Christianity. Paul was one who had sought righteousness through the works of the law, but failed to find what he sought. He was a scrupulous observer of that law of which his race was so enormously proud. He observed its feasts and fasts. He offered the sacrifices which it prescribed. He repeated the regulation prayers with painful precision. He washed often. He was careful of his meat and drink, so as to swallow no unholy thing. In a word, he lived strictly according to the law, in this respect exceeding most of his equals among his countrymen. (Gal. i. 14.) But, like Luther at Erfurth, engaged in similar practices, he failed to derive any satisfaction from all this legal devotion. His soul could not be quieted by any such performances. He was taught that God is a jealous God, who will by no means justify the ungodly. Every act of transgression and every motion of involuntary sin must be strictly expiated before it can be forgiven. But Paul performed his expiatory rites to no purpose. After every act of expiation his conscience cried out for new acts of the same kind. He had never done enough. The law was always accusing him, and he could never satisfy its demands. (Cf. Heb. ix. 9.) It was in this way that he proved what a psalmist had already experienced, that by the works of the law no flesh can be justified in God's sight. (Rom. iii. 20.) But what he could not obtain by the many works of the law, that he obtained by one act of faith in Jesus Christ. That righteousness before God, that sense of peace with God for which his soul cried out, had become his the moment he believed in Jesus as the Messiah. He now felt that there was not only no longer any condemnation for him, but also that he had become inwardly free from that law of sin in the flesh, which had prevented him from obeying that law of the mind which was a part of his higher nature, and in which he always delighted according to the inner man. His faith in Jesus Christ had procured for him peace with God and peace with himself.

But this faith in Jesus had been hindered for a long time by the offence of the cross. As a pharisee and a Jew he found it difficult to believe in a crucified Messiah. The law had declared "accursed of God every one that hangeth on a tree." (Deut. xxi. 23.) The fact that Jesus had died the ignominious death of the cross was, therefore, to the ordinary Jewish mind, the most infallible proof that He could not have been the promised Messiah. A crucified Messiah was to the Jews a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence. Upon this stone Paul had himself for a long time stumbled. This had made him an enemy and a persecutor of the followers of Jesus. And when at last he was arrested in his career of persecution by the crucified but now also exalted and glorified One, and when, after believing in Him, he had found that peace of conscience, which before he had sought in vain, it was natural that his first and profoundest thought should be given to the question as to the meaning of the cross in the economy of human salvation. It was in this way, doubtless, that the death of Christ obtained its transcendent importance for the mind of Paul. The Jew objected to the Messiahship of Jesus on the ground that He had died the accursed death of the cross, and this prejudice Paul himself had once shared. It was, therefore, incumbent upon him to explain the mystery of the cross in such way that to the believer at least it might cease to be an offence, and he explained it by making it the central fact in the process of redemption, or by showing that by means of it only could the redemption of the world be accomplished. If the opponent of Christianity objected to the accursed death of Jesus, Paul answered that "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us." (Gal. iii. 13.) That curse of the law, which the conscientious Jew so much dreaded, was annihilated by the innocent One being, on account of the law, treated as accursed. The suffering and death of Christ was the price which He paid for our redemption. It was, we may say, then, the stress of Jewish controversy that made the cross central in the theology of Paul, and caused him to resolve to know nothing save Jesus Christ and Him crucified. We have reason to believe that when



free from the influence of this controversy, he took a larger view of the meaning of Christ and His work. He certainly takes a larger view in the epistles of the captivity, in which the significance of Christ's person is more strongly emphasized. And it is a notable circumstance that at Athens, surrounded by Epicurean and Stoic philosophers, where no cavilling Jews were present, the Apostle preached, not Jesus and Him *crucified*, but Jesus and the *resurrection*; as also subsequently in the first epistle to the Corinthians he laid supreme stress upon the fact of the resurrection. May we not infer from this that, according to circumstances, Paul could vary somewhat his representation of the Gospel, emphasizing now one and then another of its important facts?

Having now seen how Paul came to emphasize so strongly the idea of redemption through the death of Christ, let us, next, try to understand his construction of this idea. To this end we may begin with the passage in Rom. iii. 20–26. In the preceding part of this chapter the Apostle is speaking of the universal need of salvation. The Jews, indeed, had the law; and that would have been an advantage in many respects, if they had kept it; but they kept it not; and, therefore, their own scriptures testify against them, that they are all guilty sinners. In proof of this statement a number of quotations from the Old Testament is presented, vers. 10–18. It follows, therefore, that in the language of Ps. 143:2, no flesh, that is, no living man, can be justified in consequence of the works of the law. The law serves only to bring sin properly into the consciousness and to make us know and feel its culpability. The law only leads to the knowledge of sin, not to righteousness. But now, apart from law, a righteousness of God, typified indeed by the law and predicted by the prophets, has been manifested; which righteousness is realized through faith in Jesus Christ, and may be realized by all believers without distinction of nationality or past relationships. All such distinctions amount to nothing. For all men have sinned and come short of the glory of God; nor can any one save himself by working out a righteousness of

his own according to the precepts of the law. But men are now justified freely, or gratuitously by grace, through the redemption which has been accomplished by Jesus Christ; for Him God has set forth as a means of propitiation, through which sin is made remissible and principally annihilated. And this propitiation is realized subjectively through faith; while objectively it is accomplished by the violent and bloody death of the cross. In this propitiation there is a manifestation or exhibition of God's righteousness. If, in consequence of forbearance with past transgressions, it might have appeared as if God were not righteous, He is now shown to be righteous by this propitiation, or atonement, which takes place in the blood of Jesus; for in this God not only proves Himself to be righteous, but He also shows Himself as making righteous, that is, as acquitting and sanctifying, him who is of faith in Jesus Christ. The atonement or propitiation, here spoken of, is not merely a covering up and concealing of sin from the eye of God, but a breaking of the power of sin in the believer, and the beginning of the moral process of sanctification.

The above we believe to be a fair paraphrase of this difficult passage, whose chief source of difficulty, we think, is in its breviloquence. If we have succeeded approximately in reproducing its meaning as a whole, we may now proceed to study separately its leading conceptions. We observe that *justification* has its ground in *redemption*; for men are *justified freely by grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus*. This latter term, then, will demand our first attention. *Redemption*, ἀπολύτρωσις, is *deliverance, liberation*. The primary idea is the notion of deliverance of a prisoner or slave by the payment of a ransom. It is not the idea of transgression or guilt, then, that is implied in the primary notion of redemption, but rather the idea of misfortune and bondage, and the application of the term in the sphere of religious thought can, therefore, not be natural, but only metaphorical. The ἀπολύτρωσις is accomplished by means of a λύτρον, or *ransom*, an idea which is sometimes, though not by Paul, represented by the term ἱλασμός, *propitiation*. But Paul has the kindred adjective ἱλαστήριον, which, however, occurs



nowhere else in his writings, except in our present passage, and but once in the New Testament besides, namely, Heb. ix. 5, where it signifies the lid of the ark of the covenant, the *Kapporeth*, or mercy seat. In this sense the word is used in the Septuagint with the article τὸ ἱλαστήριον, the word ἐπίθεμα being supposed to be understood with it. Some commentators suppose that in our present passage the word is used in this sense, and they would read: "Whom God set forth as a mercy-seat through faith in his blood." So Luther, who translates: *Guadenstuhl*. But it is difficult to see what sense there could be in this. The *Kapporeth* was the place where the blood of atonement was sprinkled in order to cover the sins of Israel in the sight of Jehovah. But how could Christ be said to be sprinkled with His own blood? This interpretation is not now adopted by many. A more common method is to supply θῦμα, *sacrifice*, as the word with which the adjective is supposed to agree. The meaning would, then, be that God set forth Christ as a propitiatory sacrifice through faith in His blood; thus bringing His suffering and death into distinct relation to the sacrificial offerings of the law. To this interpretation, however, it may be objected, that here God is the subject who sets forth Christ in the character of an ἱλαστήριον, while the offerings of the law which are intended to render God propitious, are not set forth by God, but offered by men. But to this it might be replied that the phrase, *Got set forth*, contains an allusion to Lev. xvii. 11, where the soul of the atoning sacrifice also is regarded as the gift of God: "For the life of the flesh is in the blood; and *I have given it* to you to make atonement for your souls." Though the sacrifice is brought and offered by men, it is in the end only Jehovah's grace that manifests itself in this mode of reconciliation. Prof. Bruce, however, calls attention to the fact that Paul had at this time no great fondness for the ritualism of the Jewish law, and would not have been likely to describe the great conceptions of Christianity in terms of that law.\* Many modern expositors take ἱλαστήριον

\* *St. Paul's Conception of Christianity*, p. 167. Bruce refers to Weiss and Pfleiderer as concurring in this opinion.



as a neuter adjective used substantively, and signifying a *means of propitiation*. We hold that the most natural construction is to take *ἱλαστηριον* as a predicative adjective agreeing in gender and case with the preceding relative *ὃν*, and would translate, as the margin of the R. V. suggests: "whom God has set forth *to be propitiatory, or as propitiatory*." The word *ἱλαστηριος*, *propitiatorius*, has an active signification, signifying the quality of *making propitious, rendering favorable, conciliating, reconciling*. "*Habens vim propitiandi et expiandi*," says Schleusner, *ad verbum*. Our passage, then, means that Christ has been set forth or given of God as a propitiator, whose propitiating activity consists in the shedding of His blood, by means of which they who believe are reconciled unto God and delivered from the power and curse of sin. In its results this interpretation agrees substantially with that which takes the adjective as a neuter substantive, and defines it as a *means of propitiation*, or a *means of reconciliation*.

But what is the content or meaning of the idea of propitiation? How is Christ in His death a means of reconciliation? Here we at once touch the crucial question in Paul's doctrine of the atonement. Laying stress upon the idea of *λύτρον* in the notion of *ἀπολύτρωσις*, the Greek fathers usually explained the death of Christ as a ransom or price paid to satan, in order to effect a release of the human souls which were justly held in his power. In consequence of sin, it was thought, satan had acquired lawful dominion over the souls of men to torture them at his pleasure; and this dominion could only be broken by offering satan a sufficient ransom. The cross of Christ was that ransom, the precise effect of which was differently explained by different theologians, some supposing it to have been an exact fulfillment of satan's just claims, others regarding it as a species of deception practiced upon the arch-fiend. This view maintained itself with varying fortunes for a thousand years. In the eleventh century, however, this doctrine of atonement was essentially modified by substituting the justice of God for the claims of the devil. Anselm, of Canterbury, was the author of this new theory; and the elements



out of which he constructed it were the notions of Roman and Teutonic law and the penitential system of the Roman Church.

The Roman law yielded the notion of the necessity of satisfaction in order to forgiveness of sin; the Teutonic law suggested the notion that the measure of human guilt is infinite because it is proportionate to the dignity of the person offended; and the penitential system of the church, which allowed the penance imposed upon one person to be performed by another, suggested the thought of substitution.\* God is merciful; but he cannot be merciful without the satisfaction of His justice. And as God's justice is infinite, the guilt of sin also must be infinite; and hence an infinite satisfaction must be required. Such a satisfaction is the death of the God-man. The divine nature in Christ imparts to His suffering and death, which he was not bound to

\* *Satisfactio* was a familiar term in Roman law, and signified an action by which a legal obligation was discharged without being actually fulfilled. It belonged especially to the sphere of private right. In case of a debt, for example, the person owing it must either pay the amount due, or do something else that will content, *satisfy*, the mind of the creditor. So in the case of an injury the offender must either repair the wrong, or suffer punishment, or do something else that will satisfy the injured party. In some cases an apology would be a sufficient satisfaction. This principle was expressed in the maxim, *aut solvere aut satisfacere*. Satisfaction, then, was not regarded as a legal equivalent of punishment, but rather a compounding of the obligation of punishment. Where satisfaction was made, the obligation to undergo punishment ceased. There was a certain *merit* in the act of satisfaction, which, instead of a reward, the usual correlate of merit, effected the cessation of a legal obligation. In this sense the word came into use in Latin theology from the time of Tertullian onward. For instance, the punishment of sins committed after baptism was believed to be warded off by means of *satisfaction* or penance. This thought lies at the foundation of the penitential system of the Latin Church. In this sense the term *satisfaction* is still used by Anselm. Anselm did not teach that the suffering of Christ was a quantitative equivalent to the suffering of eternal damnation which was due to all men. That is a later notion. What Anselm meant was that the suffering of Christ possessed a merit which could be regarded as a legal substitute for human punishment. On this whole subject see a series of very exhaustive articles by Herman Schultz, in *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, for 1894, on *Der Sittliche Begriff des Verdienstes und Seine Anwendung auf das Verständniss des Werkes Christi*. Schultz shows that the whole conception of *merit* in the accomplishment of human salvation is unscriptural and unwarranted. The work of Christ is not a *legal*, but an *ethical* work.



endure on His own account, an infinite value or merit, which may be set to the account of sinners in order to effect their escape from eternal punishment. In later times, and especially in Protestant theology, the idea of satisfaction came gradually to be understood in the sense of a quantitative legal equivalent to the punishment of human sin. Christ strictly suffered on the cross, as well as before and after, the penalty which was due for the sins of the whole world. According to this theory of atonement, propitiation consists in the vicarious punishment of sin ; and Christ is the propitiation because He suffered this punishment. God is rendered propitious, or favorable, because the whole punishment which human sin deserved has been inflicted upon His innocent son. Thus the debt which man owed to the divine justice has been entirely paid.

Much might be said in the way of criticism upon these theories, which must here remain unsaid. The Patristic theory which makes the atonement essentially a transaction with the devil, is dead now ; and the vicarious punishment doctrine, both in its Anselmic and in its more modern form, is dying. While still lingering in some traditional dogmatic systems, and in hymns and prayers, the ethical Christian thought of the present time can not appropriate it. But in the way of apology for the long predominance of these theories in theological thought, it is often said that they contain elements of truth which must be recognized and conserved, and that they are, therefore, still worthy of respect. In the former theory, for instance, there is this truth that there is a devil, whose works were destroyed by the manifestation of Christ. And in the latter theory there lies the truth that God is righteous, and that he can not be reconciled to the existence of sin. But surely it boots little for a theory or doctrine that it involves some elements of truth, if that truth is held in unrighteousness. And that this is the case with the Patristic doctrine as well as with the Anselmic, both in its medieval and in its modern form, we think can easily be made manifest by a little more close study of St. Paul.

We would here call attention especially to two points in the



passage under notice. St. Paul says that Christ has been set forth as a means of propitiation *through faith in His blood*. Both of these adjuncts, *through faith*, and *in His blood*, are essential parts of the proposition in which they stand. The proposition, *He was set forth as propitiatory*, is modified by both of these adjuncts. He was set forth in His blood, that is, in His violent death, and He was set forth as propitiatory through faith. Without faith, then, Christ is not a means of propitiation or of reconciliation to the sinner. On the principle of the vicarious punishment doctrine, however, it ought to be otherwise. If Christ made full satisfaction for all human sins, or if He suffered the penalty of all the sins of all men, what reason then is there for demanding faith, or any other condition, in order to participation in the benefit of the atonement? The debt has been paid and the payee has no right to demand any further conditions of the debtor. A creditor who should undertake to do that would be declared unreasonable and unjust by every legal tribunal in the world. But again Paul says that Christ was thus set forth as a propitiation *in order to the manifestation of God's righteousness*. Had there been no such sacrifice made, then the announcement of the forgiveness of sins, and even the idea of forgiveness as a spontaneous suggestion of the human heart apart from any special revelation, would have appeared to indicate that God is not righteous, but that He is indifferent to sin. But the sacrifice of the cross is a manifestation of His righteousness. How, then, is the righteousness of God manifested thereby? Is it by the imposition of the sins of the guilty upon the innocent one, and by punishing the latter in the stead of the former? Would that be a display of righteousness? Suppose a human tribunal should consciously and deliberately propose to crucify an innocent man in place of a guilty one. How would that accord with the idea of justice?

But we are told sometimes that we must not judge God's righteousness by any human standard. God's righteousness, it is said, may be different from our righteousness, even as His thoughts are different from our thoughts. But this is a kind of



obscurantism that throws all moral thought into confusion. If God's sense of right could be supposed to be essentially different from our sense of right; if, for example, He could be supposed to regard as right the deliberate punishment of an innocent person instead of the guilty, then there would be an end to all moral thought. Our moral ideas derive the guarantee of their objective reality and permanence only from the supposition that they have their foundation in God, and that they are a reflection of God's moral nature. And when Paul speaks of the manifestation of God's righteousness, that must surely mean such an exhibition of His conduct as shall commend itself to our sense of right. There could be no manifestation of righteousness, if what is manifested were not seen and felt to be right. And here we venture the assertion that, if it were not for the influence of long and venerable tradition, no Christian man would now consider as right and just such an arrangement as that which the Anselmic theory supposes, either in its medieval or in its sixteenth and seventeenth century sense. In religion and theology we are very much what our inheritance and environment make of us. The notions and dogmas which come to us from the past are for us sacred things, just because they are connected with the religion which we inherit from the past; and because they are sacred we refuse to analyze them, and to recognize in them any contradiction with the ideas which the progress of religious thought has produced. It is in this way that all historical religions come to contain ideas that are no longer intelligible to existing generations. We believe that the doctrine of vicarious punishment is an eminent illustration of this truth. In our time a soul naturally Christian, and not influenced by any traditional theology, would never suppose that there was any manifestation of righteousness in the infliction of pain upon an innocent person on account of other people's guilt. On the contrary this would be regarded as being itself an act of the greatest injustice.

And this theory is not materially helped by the notion of a voluntary assumption of human guilt on the part of Jesus, and a voluntary endurance of the penalty thereof. It is sometimes



said: "Certainly, the punishment of an innocent person in the place of the guilty would be wrong. It would be wrong to say that God laid upon Jesus the sins of the world and punished Him on their account. But may not an innocent person assume the sins of the guilty, and bear their penalty? May not one man pay another man's debt in bank, and so free the debtor from his obligation? May not, moreover, one person freely undergo suffering for the sake of another; as, for instance, when a wife clings to an unworthy husband, and shares with him the consequences of his life of sin, or when a father suffers for the sins of a rebellious son?" Yes, *only this is not suffering punishment.* To suppose that the vicarious payment of a debt, or the vicarious suffering of pain, is equivalent to the idea of vicarious punishment, is totally to confound the ideas of physical and ethical relations. Sin and guilt are not things that can be transferred from one person to another, any more than moral goodness can be so transferred. Nor can one person assume another's guilt. Suppose that after the conviction of a criminal in a court of justice, an innocent person were to step forward and say: "I take upon me that man's guilt; please consider me guilty and punish me in his stead." Would such vicarious punishment make the criminal any the less guilty? Would it free his conscience from the sense of guilt to see any one else suffering in his stead? There is doubtless much vicarious suffering in the world, and this fact presents one of the hard questions to the student of theodicy. We see children suffering in consequence of the sins of parents and parents in consequence of the sins of children. We see the best men suffering on account of the sins of the worst. No great moral work can be accomplished without suffering and death. The man who would redeem and elevate his people, must usually offer his life as a sacrifice to his undertaking. Why this is so we may perhaps never be able to understand. We can only remember that the essence of God's ways in the world is love and that sacrifice is of the essence of love. But there is one thing plain in all the vicarious sacrifice and suffering which we behold, and that is that it is not in any proper sense punishment; for



the innocent sufferer can never suffer with the same conscience as the guilty. Punishment implies guilt, and no innocent person can ever accept another's guilt and make it his own in such sense as to be able to suffer the punishment thereof. The physical pain he might undergo, but the tormenting sense of conscience he could not share, and it is only this that makes suffering to be really punishment. No innocent sufferer can ever feel guilty of another person's sins; nor can such suffering ever relieve or diminish another's guilt. The only way in which the guilt of another person could be assumed, would be *to will his sins*. That would create a communion of guilt, but the ground of this communion would be the bad will of each person and both would be alike personally guilty. But, certainly, no one will imagine that Christ assumed the sins of the world in this sense, which is the only sense in which the assumption of sin is a possibility.

It was, then, not in the sense of having suffered the penalty of the world's guilt, or a legal equivalent thereof, that Paul could have thought of Christ as a means of reconciliation. But to have shown that this explanation of Paul's language is not correct, is not yet to have explained his meaning; although something has been gained if an inveterate misunderstanding has been cleared out of the way. Let us, then, see whether from Paul's unconventional and popular use of language we can construct a consistent conception of his doctrine of redemption. What, then, was his precise notion of *propitiation*? Certainly he thinks of it as of something by which man is brought into favorable relation to God. To propitiate means to obtain favor, to avert displeasure and secure good will—to *make atonement*. And to make atonement is to remove the obstacle to peace and unity between persons and establish friendship between them. What, then, was the obstacle to *at-one-ment*, or reconciliation, between God and man, which the sacrifice of Christ removed? Was it any disinclination on the part of God to be well disposed toward men, or was it a disinclination on the part of men to be well disposed towards God? Manifestly not the former, for the atonement, according to Paul's representation, proceeded from God. It was



*He* that set forth His Son. The propitiation was not anything by which God's love or good will towards man was procured. On the contrary it was itself the result of that good will. It was *because* God loved man, that He set forth His Son as a propitiation; as according to the Gospel of John also the love of God is the motive of the gift of His Son. The propitiation, then, did not consist in offering to God something by which His wrath was appeased and His justice satisfied. So much is involved in the proposition that "God set forth His Son as a propitiation."

With this conclusion agrees the passage in Rom. v. 6-10. In the preceding verses of this chapter the Apostle speaks of the peace with God which comes from justification by faith, of the joyful sense of blessedness which lifts the believer above the depressing influences of life's misfortunes, and of the love of God which, through the operation of the Holy Spirit, is realized in the hearts of believers; and then he continues: "For while we were yet weak, in due season Christ died for the ungodly. For scarcely for a righteous man will any one die; though perchance for a good man some one may indeed be willing to die. But God commendeth His own love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. Much more then, being now justified in His blood, shall we be saved from the wrath through Him. For if, while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of His Son, much more, being reconciled shall we be saved through His life." Here it is plainly stated that the death of Christ was not the procuring cause, but the effect of God's love. Christ died for us, not in order to make God love us, but because God did love us. The formal relation of the death of Christ to the sinner is in this passage, as always in the writings of Paul, expressed by means of the preposition *ὅτι*, which with the genitive signifies participation and benefit, not substitution. The idea of substitution would require *ἀντί*, which is never used in connection with the saving work of Christ except once, namely in Matt. xx. 28, and in the parallel passage, Mark x. 45, where, however, the object is not sin or punishment, but men, "the many." When it is said that Christ died *for us*,



that means, not that He died in our stead in a legal sense, but that He died for our benefit. And that benefit, according to Paul in this passage, is that *we are saved from the wrath*. The Apostle does not say *wrath of God*, perhaps because in a passage in which the whole work of salvation is traced to the divine love as its principle, that would have been incongruous. In i. 18, however, the wrath of God is spoken of, and is said to be poured out upon all ungodliness of men. But this simply means the misery which, in consequence of the righteous world-order founded in the nature of God, is the inevitable penalty of sin, and which cannot be escaped by any legal arrangement or fiction, but only by a real conformity of life and conduct with the principle of divine righteousness. We are not saved from the misery of sin by another's having borne that misery, but by His having annihilated the power of sin in us.

That this is the meaning of salvation, in Paul's view, will further appear from the fact that, according to the passage now under consideration, the *enmity* which was removed by the death of Christ, existed not on the part of God but on the part of man. The Apostle says that, "we being enemies, *ἐχθροί*, were reconciled unto God by the death of His Son." We are aware that the word *ἐχθρός* has a double meaning, an active and a passive. Sometimes it expresses the idea of *hating*, and sometimes the idea of *being hated*. My *ἐχθρός* may be the man who hates me, or he may be the man whom I hate. In Rom. xi. 28, the word seems to be used in the latter sense, being opposed to *ἀγαπητός*, *beloved*. Here the Jews are said to be *ἐχθροί*, *hated*, as touching the Gospel, for the sake of the Gentiles. But this is the only passage in the New Testament in which the word seems to be used in this sense. In Col. i. 21 the Gentiles are described as having been in times past alienated and *enemies* in their minds in evil works. That this active sense is the sense in which the word is used in our present passage is apparent from the fact that the goal of the reconciliation is God. We as enemies were reconciled to God, who never was our enemy. The propitiation was not something that changed God's mind towards us, but something



that changed our minds towards God. It broke down the enmity of the carnal mind (for the mind of the flesh is enmity against God, Rom. viii. 7), and with that also the law of sin in the members, setting the sinner free from the dominion of sin. This is the idea of that ἀπολύτρωσις, or *redemption*, which is the effect of the propitiation. For while ἀπολύτρωσις involves as a consequence the *forgiveness* of sins (Cf. Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14), it is in its own essence deliverance from the external and internal power of sin; for in Gal. i. 4 it is said that "Christ gave Himself for (περί) our sins that He might deliver us from this present evil world; and in Tit. ii. 14, that He gave Himself for (ὑπέρ) us, in order that He might deliver us from all iniquity, and purify unto Himself a people for His own possession, zealous of good works."

What, then, is the atonement according to Paul? It is the bringing of the human will into union with the will of God. It is the breaking of the power of sin in man, in consequence of which the sinner comes to be in a friendly state of mind towards God, and able to fulfill the demands of God's holy law. This is in accordance with the teaching in Rom. iii. 26, where it is said that the end of the atoning act, the setting forth of Christ as a propitiation, is that God may be just and the justifier of him that is of the faith of Jesus. Here evidently the atonement is not regarded as a device by which God, without infraction of His own righteousness, may treat the unrighteous sinner as righteous. The meaning is that God may not only be shown to be righteous Himself, but also as making righteous him that is connected by faith with Jesus, δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ; where δικαιοῦντα, while including, evidently means more than the idea of *declaring righteous*. It means the induction in the sinner of that quality of the divine being which is expressed by the term δικαιοσύνη. This is evidently the thought contained in Rom. viii. 1-5. "There is, therefore, no condemnation," it is here said, "to them who are in Christ Jesus." Why not? "Because the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus has freed them from the law of sin and death." The law of sin, which leads to death, is



the impulse to sinful acts which is inherent now in human nature. This law of sin could not be broken by the legal system of Judaism. But that which the Jewish law could not accomplish, being rendered impotent through the flesh which it could not control, that God has accomplished by sending His own Son not *in* sinful flesh, but in the *likeness* of sinful flesh and condemning sin in the flesh, in order that the just requirement of the law, *δικαίωμα*, may be fulfilled in them who walk not in the flesh but in the spirit. The atonement accomplished by the death of Christ, then, is not an arrangement by which sinners may be saved without the fulfillment of the law in its ethical nature, but a means by which the fulfillment of the law may be secured. And this shows that what is said of God's condemning sin in the flesh can not mean a vicarious punishment, or a legal satisfaction by means of a meritorious performance, but such a judgment of sin as secures its own destruction. What God has done is that He has pronounced judgment upon sin in such way as to bring about its annihilation in men's souls, somewhat as the curse of Jesus brought about the destruction of the barren fig-tree.

St. Paul looked upon the death of Christ somehow as bearing a causal relation to the annihilation of the law of sin in human nature. By the death of Christ the soul that is of faith in Him, has been in principle severed from sin. It has come to stand in the same relation to sin in which one stands to something from which he has been separated by death. In Chap. vii. 1-6, the Apostle illustrates the separating, absolving power of death by its breaking up of the marriage bond. There is a law binding a wife to her husband so long as the latter lives. This law is dissolved by the death of the husband, and the wife is then no longer bound by its conditions. Now the death of Christ effects a similar liberation of the believer from the law which works sin and death. "So, my brethren, ye also have died unto the law through the body of Christ, to the end that ye should belong to another, even to Him who was raised from the dead, that we may bear fruit unto God." The Apostle says of Christ Himself that,



“in that He died, He died unto sin once; but in that He liveth, He liveth unto God,” Rom. vi. 10. How could Christ be said to have died unto sin? Not in the sense that He endured the penalty of its guilt, but in the sense that it ceased to have any existence for Him. During His earthly life He was continually brought into relation to sin. He experienced its tempting and its persecuting power. In the beginning He was tempted to be a Messiah in the carnal sense of His Jewish contemporaries. That was the form in which sin assailed Him. He resisted its assault in that form, and then the assault changed into violence. If the offer of a crown did not tempt Him, the exhibition of the cross might. But He endured the cross; and henceforth sin had no more power over Him. “He that has died is freed from sin,” Rom. vi. 7. This is the ethical explanation of the death of Christ, which we also meet with in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Cf. Heb. ii. 10, and v. 8. But the death of Christ as an ethical transaction, wherein His renunciation of sin, both in its tempting and in its threatening aspects, was forever sealed, and His own character made perfect, was not according to Paul, an event in which He alone was interested. It was an event in which somehow the whole race was involved, and therefore the counterpart of Adam’s transgression in Paradise. It was the one act of obedience on the part of the Second Adam by which the many shall be made righteous; as by the one act of disobedience on the part of the first Adam the many were made sinners, Rom. v. 19.

That this is the meaning of Christ’s death, according to the teaching of St. Paul, may be made to appear from some other passages in his writings. Take, for example, 2 Cor. v. 14: “For the love of Christ constraineth us; because we judge thus, that one died for all, therefore *all died*.” ‘Οι πάντες ἀπέθανον. This sentence reminds us of that in Rom. v. 12: ἐφ’ ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον. Here, as there, the verb is in the aorist tense, denoting a momentary act completed at some definite time in the past. They all sinned, once for all, at some time in the past, namely, at the time of Adam’s transgression. So all died once for all, in

the death of Christ. And this death is ethically a death unto sin, both for Christ and for all—a death unto sin in the sense that the power of sin has been broken, and that the moral tendency in human nature has been in principle reversed, the spiritual element having gained the ascendancy over the carnal. This, however, is not to be understood in the sense that it is no longer possible for individuals to sin, but in the sense that it is possible for them not to sin, and that the main tendency of their moral being is no longer evil but good. As in the natural state of the soul there is liberty of choice, or moral freedom, so that men sin not of necessity, but are capable among particular acts to choose the good ; so also in the Christian state the power of self-determination not only remains, but is strengthened, and the individual is not compelled to live unto Christ, but may continue to live unto his carnal self. Where, however, the grace or power of Christ's death abounding in the life of humanity is appropriated by the individual will, there the law of sin in the members is actually slain, and the man lives according to Christ in newness of life. Thus Paul says, Gal. ii. 20, "I have been crucified with Christ ; yet I live ; and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me ; and that life which I now live in the flesh I live in faith, the faith which is in the Son of God, who loved me and gave Himself for me." *Crucified with Christ*—that means that the crucifixion of Christ was not a legal transaction apart from the sinner and in the sinner's stead, but a transaction in which the sinner himself was essentially involved, so that his moral and spiritual life was thereby renewed according to the law of Christ. It is in this way that, through the atonement of Christ, God proves Himself not only just, but also the justifier of those who believe in Jesus. The righteousness, which God in this way manifests, does not consist in accepting the merits of another in behalf of the sinner, but in imparting to the latter His own righteous character, His *δικαιοσύνη*.

This, however, leads us to Paul's doctrine of *justification*, which we do not propose to take up at present. But there remains still one question in regard to the doctrine of redemp-



tion, which may claim a moment's attention. We have seen that, according to Paul, redemption consists in deliverance from the guilt and power of sin through the sacrificial death of Christ. We have also seen that his conception of the connection between redemption and the sacrifice of Christ was not the notion of a meritorious satisfaction or of a vicarious punishment. What, then, was Paul's idea of this connection? In other words, what was his *theory* of the atonement? Did he have a theory? The epistle to the Romans, the epistle in which he develops most fully his doctrine of sin and redemption, certainly contains no such theory. The presumption, therefore, is that he had no formal theory, or philosophy of the subject, in his own mind. He accepted the fact. It was for him a fact of experience that we are reconciled to God through the death of His son, and saved in His life. And this fact he constantly opposed to the notion of salvation by the ceremonies of the law. If the Jew hoped to be saved by means of priesthood, altar, or sacrifice; Paul said, Christ is for us all that you think you have in your legal institutions, without meaning thereby to bring the work of Christ under the scheme of the law. He never asks the question, how the death of Christ comes to exercise its redeeming power. If he ever speculated upon this question, he has nowhere given us the results of such speculation.

But do not the apostle's statements involve a theory; and may we not by closely scrutinizing them detect his principles and formulate them into a consistent rational doctrine? This has been the usual supposition, and theologians have generally acted in accordance with it. Taking together what was believed to be the teaching of Paul and of all the writers of the New Testament, they have sought to evolve a philosophical doctrine or theory of the atonement. But how difficult this task is, may be seen from the variety of theories that has resulted. If the statements of Scripture were plain statements of rational truths, whence then is this variety of theories? And which of these theories would Paul have accepted as his own? We have already seen reasons to believe that he would not have accepted the theory of meri-

torious satisfaction or substitutionary punishment. If that theory had been stated to him, he would probably not have understood it; and if he had understood it, he would have rejected it with horror as reflecting dishonor upon the character of God. And the *governmental theory*, which is only a modification of the theory of vicarious punishment, would have received no more favor. Nor is it likely that the so-called *moral influence* theory would have been acceptable to the Apostle. His mystical conception of the union of men with Christ in His death would have prevented him from accepting a theory which makes the whole value of that death to consist in its spectacular influence upon men's minds. Paul would doubtless have admitted such an influence; but he would not have been willing to believe that the whole efficacy of Christ's suffering and death consists in this influence.

Some have taken the ground that no theory of the atonement is possible. The reserve of St. Paul and of the other writers of the New Testament is regarded as a warning to us, that, when we attempt the construction of a rational theory of the atonement, we transcend the limits of our intellectual powers. It is a moral reality with which we have here to do and, therefore, no merely theoretical judgments can ever be an adequate expression of it. Lotze, for example, writes: "He who in an unprejudiced way, allows the teaching of Christ and the history of Christ's life to influence his mind without analyzing this impression, may be convinced that an infinitely valuable and unique act has occurred here on earth for the salvation of humanity. But the attempts to settle speculatively the content and value of this fact, do not, as a whole, lead to the end designed."\* With this conclusion the adherents of the school of Ritschl would generally agree. Their theory of knowledge, which makes all knowledge merely phenomenal and removes the metaphenomenal beyond the reach of the human faculties, would favor the idea that such a fact as the atonement must be forever an insoluble mystery. Now it must be admitted, of course, that the power of the human mind

\* *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 151.



has its limitations. There are many things of which we can form no mental image, and there are even things of which we can form no conception in thought. For instance, we can form no conception of the origination of matter, and Lotze warns us continually that we cannot understand how existence is made. But it is true also that the apparent limits of human thought are continually receding farther and farther into the distance and that men will always continue to speculate even in regard to the profoundest subjects of religion. Is this speculation to be forever doomed to fruitlessness? We can not think so. If religion is real, then it must be rational. The fact that its leading conceptions are moral conceptions, does not remove it from the domain of rationality, and the human mind must be capable at last of discovering its ultimate rational principles. We believe, therefore, that rational speculation on the doctrine of the atonement is legitimate and will at last lead to relatively satisfactory results. We now see through a glass darkly, but we expect sometime to be able to see face to face. But in order to this end speculation must be free. The speculation of one age cannot suffer itself to be bound by the speculation of any previous age. If Anselm could be allowed to formulate a new theory of the atonement in the eleventh century, there is no reason why later thinkers should not have the same liberty. But in all such efforts it is important to bear in mind that the conclusions reached are not identical with the facts of Scripture. No theory can pretend to be the very teaching of Scripture itself, but only a more or less rational explanation of that teaching; while all that is necessary to Christian living is a cordial acceptance of the facts of revelation as they are contained in the New Testament and reflected in the fundamental Christian creed.

## VII.

### RICHES AND POVERTY.

BY REV. D. B. LADY, D.D.

There are, in this free country of ours, some very wealthy men. They have more money than they need. All their legitimate wants are fully supplied, and they are able to spend large sums of money for luxuries. They live in palaces. They possess books and pictures and statuary. They enjoy the privileges of foreign travel under most favorable conditions. They are able to give their children the finest clothing, the wholesomest food, the best education, the most thorough culture, and an advantageous start in the competition of life. And they see their store increasing in spite of all their expenditures. They are compelled to seek new investments; they are under the necessity of looking for fresh sources of enjoyment that the accumulating income may be spent. These are "the favored few for whose benefit the world seems hitherto to have framed its institutions."

The large majority of men are not so fortunate. Some enjoy a moderate prosperity. Others find it a hard and exhausting struggle to procure food and clothing and shelter for themselves and their dependents. They have absolutely no prospect of improving their condition, or contributing to its improvement in the next generation. There are multitudes who seem doomed, under present conditions, to spend their lives in the severest labor and the most abject poverty. The common workman in the mill or mine earns but a pittance, and lives in a hovel, and subsists on the coarsest food, and during a strike or a shut-down, brought about by over production, business depression, a disagreement with his employer, or an economical blunder by the National Legislature, he is on the brink of starvation, and often only keeps body and soul together by begging from door to door of those just one or two degrees more fortunate than he is. Then



there is the tramp, covered with filth, clothed in rags, without shelter or home or family ties, a moral and social wreck, drifting on the uncertain currents of reluctant charity, doled out in the form of cold victuals and cast-off clothing in life, dying unattended and filling a nameless grave after life's hardships and horrors are over.

It is estimated by good authorities that "the average annual income of the 100 richest Americans cannot be less than \$1,200,000 and probably exceeds \$1,500,000." Says Dr. Strong: "If 100 workmen could earn \$1,000 a year they would have to work 1,200 to 1,500 years to earn as much as the annual income of these 100 richest Americans. And if a workingman could earn \$1,000 a day he would have to work until he was 547 years old and never take a day off, before he could earn as much as some Americans are worth. \* \* Three-tenths of one per cent. of our population control seventy per cent. of our property. In other words, in the distribution of the national wealth, one man out of three hundred receives \$70, and 299 men receive the other \$30, which if averaged would give them about ten cents each."—*The New Era*, pp. 151, 152.

And there can hardly be any question but that these inequalities are increasing. The rich are becoming richer, whilst there is no proportionate increase in their number. The poor are growing poorer, and they multiply upon the face of the earth. Several non-speculative estates in New York have increased five-fold in less than forty years. The steady increment in the value of city lands added to the rent of the property has brought this about. Mr. Thos. G. Shearman thinks that the American billionaire may be reasonably looked for within the next half century. Over against this may be set an extract from the *Greenville Argus* under date of April 8, 1897. "A woman in Annville, Lebanon county, Pa., has kept strict account of tramps fed at her back door for one year. During that time she answered no less than 419 calls of this sort." The writer adds: "Many a Greenville matron equals this record, and the evil is growing worse instead of better."



What is the reason of this state of things? This is one of the burning questions of the day. And it is not a sufficient answer to say that wealth has always been more or less unequally distributed among men, and that even the Bible says: "the rich and the poor meet together and the Lord is the maker of them all," that it cannot be helped, and that, according to Shakespeare, "things without remedy should be without regard." The men of this age are disposed to inquire into the righteousness and legitimacy of excessive wealth and poverty. They are convinced that the "times are out of joint," that conditions are abnormal, and however venerable the disease, they are looking for a cure. They feel that it is incumbent upon every age of the world to look boldly into the face of the evils peculiar to its civilization, and to endeavor to find a remedy for the wrong and suffering which it has entailed upon men. A free inquiry into what we see about us, an outspoken opinion of its righteousness or wrong, and an honest and persistent attempt to right the wrong when it is discovered, is always in order in a republic, where the people are the source of power, and where all citizens take part in electing those who make and administer the laws and shape the course of economic and public affairs. Why then are some men excessively rich and others extremely poor?

Men become wealthy because they are industrious and economical, because of special advantages and opportunities inherited or acquired, because they exercise great energy or are endowed with extraordinary capacity, or are very specially adapted to some line of work for which a market exists or may be created. "Many rich men render services of very exceptional value to society by means of their exceptional executive abilities, which services deserve and obtain a high reward." There are those who have a genius for literary composition, for useful inventions, for statesmanship or for military affairs. So there are those who have a genius for accumulating wealth. They possess the Midas touch, which turns everything it comes in contact with into gold. That such men are often lacking in intellectual and moral culture, that they are narrow and selfish and cruel, does not alter the fact that



they can make money. It should not be thought strange that a race which produced a Shakespeare, a Newton, a Napoleon, and a Bismark, should also give the world a Rothschild, or that a country which numbers among its notable men an Edison and a Grant should also contain a Gould, a Rockefeller and a Carnegie. As there are great leaders in art, war and government, so there are great leaders in industry, in the organization of vast combinations for the manipulation of money, for the production, transportation or distribution of the necessities of life. And as such genius is employed and as such combinations are found and carried on, for the most part, for purposes of gain, many of these men succeed in enriching themselves in the most wonderful manner.

On the other hand, men remain poor or become poor because of laziness, carelessness, wastefulness, improvidence, immorality and incapacity. It is an old law that if a man will not work neither shall he eat. To spend time and energy in the service of sin is a sure way to bring disaster and failure in life. "One vice is more expensive than ten virtues." We may go further than this and say that whilst virtue is one of the foundations of success, vice frequently results in ruin. To employ time and strength in drunkenness is to waste them. To use money in the pursuit and practice of any form of ungodliness is worse than throwing it away. "One can't eat his cake and have it too." Slothful men, men of degraded tastes and vicious habits, come to want. They misuse life's opportunities carelessly and foolishly. They ruin themselves. They squander their property, beggar their children, and deprive themselves and those dependent upon them of the prospect of improvement, and thus take away the incentive to exertion which hope and confidence in the future are accustomed to provide.

There are many men also who miss their calling in life. Their early predilection for a particular career is not sufficiently strong to indicate what they are best fitted for, and they fall into a groove to which they cannot adjust themselves. They miss their chance of success because they are able to do but indifferently

what they have undertaken to do. There are others who do not seem to be adapted to anything. There is no place in the organization of the world's enterprises to which they belong. They can neither find nor make a field of activity for themselves apparently. Their exertions end in disappointment and failure. They contribute nothing to the world's progress. They are of no benefit to the human race, and none of the rewards of successful service come to them. Neither they nor others get any good from what they do. They often end by becoming a burden to their friends or to the community. They crowd our almshouses. They fill our pauper graves.

And who can find fault with these things? It would certainly be unwise and unjust, if it were even possible, to arrange society upon such principles and govern it by such laws as would secure equal prosperity to the virtuous and the vicious, the diligent and the sluggard, the man of a hundred talents and the man of no talents. If the most pitiful and loving and righteous man that ever lived had the power given him of creating a world and filling it with human beings such as we are he would certainly not make it any different in these respects from that which the Almighty has made. It is right that industry and economy should be rewarded, that application and skill and genius, employed with good judgment in the service of mankind, should meet with recognition and success. A world constructed on any other principles and laws would be a world constructed without love or justice. It would be much harder to live in than this world, and would probably not be able to maintain itself for many years. We can not alter the inequalities of men's condition in life, so glaring in their apparent injustice, and stirring our hearts with such pity for the unfortunate as they do, by attempting to reverse the laws of nature by means of human legislation. Anything which sets aside fair play for those who under present conditions become rich, as well as for those who seem doomed to hopeless poverty, is sure to end in failure and in worse evils than those we would seek to avoid. All men must be left free. All are equally entitled to an unobstructed course in the pursuit of



prosperity. The laws must be so framed and the government so administered as to secure this to them.

But so much having been said and admitted, the discussion is not ended. There is much poverty in the world which does not result from any defect, avoidable or unavoidable, in those who suffer from it. There is much prosperity among men which cannot be fairly attributed to the industry, economy, superior endowments or attainments or virtues or services of those who enjoy it. There are the poor who have in no way brought poverty upon themselves, and the rich who do not deserve to be rich. The question is not, why should vice and incompetence be followed by failure, and virtue and great talents and faithful and persevering effort result in success. Every thinking and just man is satisfied with that. But the question is, of a hundred men, equally deserving, why should money, high place, social advancement, culture, the prizes and advantages of life, come to one and not to all. Why should there be among men an aristocracy, other than that of high character or distinguished service, a privileged few elevated, for no merit of their own, far above the common herd. Why does the language need such words as the classes and the masses? Assuming that there is enough money in the world, and enough of that which money can buy, to make the whole race comfortable, why should a favored few have far more than sufficient for their wants and others, a multitude which no man can number, live through years made wretched for want of what the more fortunate could spare, and that for no cause for which they can be held justly responsible?

We take a few extracts from Strong's *New Era*: "There are 1,103 millionaires in New York City worth from one to one hundred and fifty millions." "There is a growing class of idle rich whose only business is their own amusement, and who, though they toil not, neither do they spin, yet rank Solomon himself in luxury." In Boston "there is a fruit market which has existed for thirty years upon the whims of the rich. Hamburg grapes at ten dollars a pound are regularly in stock. In winter, strawberries and asparagus sell easily at three dollars a



box or a bunch. When the first Florida berries come, thirteen in a cup, at four dollars a cup, parties are supplied. One hundred and twenty-five dollars' worth of fruit to a single order causes the dealer no surprise."

In the "sweat-shops" of the same cultured city there are women who earn sixty cents by sewing sixteen or seventeen hours a day. One woman makes cheap overcoats at four cents apiece; another knee-pants for boys at sixteen cents a dozen. There are women in Chicago who make twelve shirts for seventy-five cents and furnish their own thread, and others who work four hours for six cents. "The workingman finds his labor rated as a commodity whose price is determined solely by the law of supply and demand." "Such men have often to beg for work, and are treated as if they were asking for favors. In the winter time, when the uncertainty of getting work becomes the certainty of not getting it, in our great industrial cities, things are at their worst. After having vainly trudged from workshop to workshop, from factory to factory, from wharf to wharf; after having perhaps fought fiercely but unsuccessfully for a few hours' work at the dock gates, the man returns home, weary, hungry, half dead and ashamed of his growing raggedness, to see his home without fire or food, perhaps to go to bed in order to try and forget the misery around him."

Last winter the Pennsylvania Legislature sent a committee to the western part of the State to investigate the condition of the bituminous coal miners. The committee was accompanied by reporters for the Pittsburgh papers. Here is a specimen of what they found, as given by one such reporter. "The first sight that met the eyes of the committee was a long row of narrow one-story frame shanties occupied by Polish and Slavonic miners' families. In each of the miserable hovels was one woman and from three to ten men. Every house rented for, at least, \$6, and in those where more than six men resided the rent increased \$1 per month for each man. The houses were not plastered or lined and were built over swamps. In the rear of this row were a number of larger houses which rented for from \$7 to \$10 a month.



The sanitary conditions were terrible. All offal, filth and refuse was deposited in the road in front of the houses and the stench arising therefrom was simply unbearable. One woman said she had lost two children with fever since living there and herself and husband had both been sick several times. They are anxious to get away, but cannot get enough money ahead, on account of work being so poor."

The lot of these men is a very hard one. Many of the common laborers in the mines and manufactories of this section of the country work for from 90 cents to \$1.30 a day and pay from \$60 to \$100 a year house-rent, and large numbers of them are frequently out of work. They cannot support their families in any sort of decency or comfort. And it is not a question of vice or improvidence here. Most of these men are sober, industrious, economical and without bad habits. They are compelled to be or they would starve. Their only luxury is smoking, and poverty forces them to use a brand of tobacco, a little of which goes a great way. They drink beer occasionally. There is all the more reason why those more prosperous and of superior moral culture should set them an example of total abstinence and labor earnestly for the success of the prohibition cause.

And the farmers will soon be in as bad a condition as the mine and mill and "sweat-shop" laborers. There has been for a number of years a steady decline in the value of agricultural lands and of farm products. "Many farms in New England can be bought for less than the cost of the buildings and walls on them." "Governor Foraker said in 1887, that farm property in Ohio was then from 25 to 50 per cent. cheaper than it was in 1880. During the same time the value of agricultural land in the ten cotton states declined \$459,000,000, or thirty-one per cent." It is the same in Europe. "The wealth of Great Britain has more than doubled since 1840, but there has been a decline of £138,000,000 in the value of the lands. In France the peasant proprietors have ceased to buy land and are anxious to sell it; and in the department of Aisne, one of the richest in France, one tenth of the land is abandoned, because the sale of produce does not cover the

expense of cultivation. In Russia there are 80,000 beggars who, once land owners, have surrendered their land, because the cost of ownership was greater than the profits of cultivation." (*New Era*, pp. 156, 157.) In western Pennsylvania, within hearing of the locomotive whistles of four important railroads, before Easter this year, eggs were selling at 8 cents a dozen, butter at 14 cents a pound, potatoes and corn at 15 cents a bushel and oats at 18 cents a bushel. By the 1st of May potatoes had gone to 12 cents a bushel, and by June 1st butter was selling at 8 cents a pound. Other farm products brought corresponding prices, about one half of what was obtained for them a few years ago. To pay taxes, support the church, keep up farm repairs, and feed and clothe their families, is all that the most prosperous farmers can do. Those who pay rent or farm on shares or carry a mortgage are not making ends meet. Bankruptcy is staring them in the face. Their going under is only a question of time. And not only the bone and sinew, but much of the virtue and character of the nation is found among these people. The writer is disposed always to look at the bright side of things. But contact with these conditions turns the sunniest optimism into the most despondent pessimism.

And what kind of men grow wealthy in our day, for the most part? Is it the fascinating writer, the eloquent orator, the ingenious inventor, the learned scientist, the skillful general, the wise statesman that becomes the multi-millionaire? The user of slang would reply: "I should smile." It is the corporation lawyer, the corrupt legislator, the distiller or brewer and wholesale dispenser of intoxicants, the oil magnate who monopolizes the business, crowding small producers and refiners to the wall and then buying and selling at his own figures; it is the manager and large stockholder in the syndicate, the pool or the trust, the railroad wrecker, the man who engineers successive corners in the securities of a great corporation, or in the necessities of life, who sometimes adds a million dollars to his fortune in a single transaction. Take an extract from the "Pittsburg Post." It occurs in a series of reports of the transactions of a committee



of the New York Legislature ordered to investigate trusts. It appears under date of February 27th. It says: "The tobacco trust has been a daisy. It was organized with a capital stock of \$10,000,000, which has since been increased to \$35,000,000. The total paid for live assets was \$5,000,000. The rest is water. And on this dividends are paid at the rate of 12 and 15 per cent. on the common and preferred stocks. This has been going on since 1890, with the addition of a total surplus last year of \$8,000,000. In the great fluctuations of 1896 the stock fell from 117 to 63, notwithstanding dividends and surplus. It is suggested that those on the inside sold out at 117 and bought back at 63. At the outset there were less than 50 stockholders, while at this time there are about 3,000. That is the way to make money."

But whilst it may be an example of the way money is made by many of those who become millionaires, it is certainly no way to make money honestly and fairly. For what goes into the long purses of the wealthy by these methods comes largely out of the meagre incomes of the poor. And there is, or soon will be, a trust in every important necessary of life. There is, or was lately, a steel trust. There is a sugar trust, a lumber trust, an oil trust, a leather trust, a bicycle trust. And there are those who are so uncharitable as to say that there are *steal* trusts too.

It is not pretended to argue that combinations of capital, entered into with a good object, skilfully directed, honestly and wisely administered for the public good, could not be, or have not been, of vast benefit to the country and to its citizens, whilst yielding a fair profit upon the money, skill and energy invested in them. They have contributed very largely to the development of the material resources of the country and have added much to the wealth and comfort of the people. They are not in themselves either economically or morally wrong. They belong to our age and he who advocates their abolition writes himself down a short-sighted statesman. The employment of steam and the most powerful machinery in manufacture, a good banking and credit system, rapid transportation and almost instantaneous communi-

cation by means of the magnetic telegraph, make them possible and necessary. We could not get along without them. To attempt to do so would be to take many steps backward and would be extremely foolish. They should be encouraged in right courses. They deserve praise and support for the good they do.

But when these combinations in the hands of unscrupulous and self-seeking men, because the opportunity to do so is presented and they have the power, make it their aim to crush out competition, drive rivals to the wall, exact enormous profits on the necessities of life, control elections, corrupt statesmen, dictate laws to the legislatures and to Congress, secure the enactment of prohibitive duties upon imports, thus making foreign competition impossible and force a contraction of the currency upon the nation, then it is evident that they care nothing for the public good, but exist only to enrich themselves and that they have become the tyrants and slave holders of the day, more cruel and unfeeling toward the poor than were the robber barons of William the Conqueror to their subject Saxons in England or the aristocrats of the South before the war to the helpless negroes who were their slaves.

But injustice and wrongdoing are not peculiar to the rich, nor are righteousness and virtue found only among the poor! Most certainly not. The doctrine of total depravity is of universal application. The rich only live up to it more fully than the poor because they have larger opportunities for doing so. The men who rose to power in the French revolution were more tyrannical and bloodthirsty than the feudal lords had been whom they hurried to the guillotine; and the despotism of the Bourbons was followed by the greater despotism of Napoleon. But is the lesson that which lies on the surface: "Better endure the ills we have than fly to others that we know not of?" Is it impossible to abolish the wrongs under which we suffer without substituting for them greater wrongs? It may be true that the tyranny of those accustomed to wealth and power is more endurable than the tyranny of lawlessness and anarchy would be. But is this the alternative? Is oppression a necessary element in human society? A thousand



times, no! The power and wealth of a great nation should not be allowed to come into the hands of the few in such manner that every millionaire produces a hundred thousand paupers. And when the trusts are dethroned the anarchists must not be elevated to their seats.

But we have houses of correction for the vicious, inebriate, and insane asylums for drunkards and those who lose their reason, hospitals for the sick and the victims of accidents, who would otherwise find no one to care for them. We have poor-boards and almshouses and out-door relief. In the large cities and in smaller places in times of special depression, there are cheap soup houses and lodging houses, and often a free distribution of food. And all these are established and supported by the well-to-do and wealthy people. They tax themselves that the unfortunate and even the vicious may be cared for, that the poor may not starve. They go further. They contribute of their means to maintain schools. They found and endow educational and benevolent institutions. We owe many of our colleges and theological seminaries to the munificence of the rich. Has not Pittsburgh's great coke and steel king given pipe organs to many churches and public libraries to a number of cities, even though it is a common remark in the mills that every act of this kind is followed by a cut in the wages of his workmen to reimburse himself? Some of our millionaires are magnificent in their charities as well as in their wealth.

Yes, but it is not gifts that self-respecting men want from their oppressors. *Panes et Circes*, was the cry of the Roman population only in its degenerate days. The legitimate object of private and public charity is to relieve the distress of the vicious and the unfortunate poor. The man that is strong of limb and sound in mind and sober and industrious of habit does not want charity from the rich. He wants justice, an opportunity to succeed by his own exertions, fair play, an even chance with all others in the race of life. He does not have that now.

Government is for the punishment of evil-doers and for the protection of those who do well. Laws must be made and

administered so as to give the rich no advantage over the poor. That will be a long step in the right direction. Monopoly and privilege as now existing must be abolished. They are a rehabilitation of feudalism and belong to the dark ages. No shadow of them must be left. There is no primogeniture in this country and the entailment of estates is not recognized by our laws. The laws should go farther, and prohibit it. Would that not be tyranny? No, it would only be legitimate protection for the many against the greed of the few. It would be prevention of tyranny. It might be well if all inheritance were abolished except that of an honored name, high character and personal culture. The principle is already recognized in the collateral inheritance tax which the state exacts from the estates of those who die without direct heirs. And the Pennsylvania Legislature has recently passed a direct inheritance tax law. The large fortunes of the wealthy should be heavily assessed for the public good, even if new interpreters of the constitution must be secured to bring it about, and after death their property might be used for the construction of good roads, the support of the public schools and the improvement of rivers and harbors. Their sons would have the same, if not superior opportunities of success in life which the sons of other men have.

The world has not been without attempts to solve the question under discussion. The early Christians had all things in common. This, however, proceeded from a religious rather than from an economic impulse. And we have no means of knowing how long the experiment continued. A more permanent attempt, and one based on economic, as well as religious grounds is recorded in the early history of the Israelites. They were a nation of agriculturists. The law was that every fiftieth year the landed estates should return to the original owners or their heirs. "In a kingdom whose foundation is the true religion," says Ewald, "the only things which can go wrong in the course of time and be set right again by human agency at particular periods, are the mutual relations in regard to the possession of the external goods of life. \* \* \* The relations and conditions



of a nation's external possessions may go wrong to such an extent that gradually a few citizens become excessively rich, while the majority become excessively poor, so that irregularities arise which lead to the weakness or even the overthrow of the realm as a human institution. Human authority in ordinary times is tolerably competent to meet such threatening dangers, when the proper means for the purpose have a legal existence, and a legislator can not easily have a more worthy task than to devise the proper means by which such irregularities, which imperceptibly arise in the kingdom and which are such strong incitements to seeking redress by violence and revolution, may be legally counteracted, and an outbreak of brutal rebellion be avoided." It is the opinion of this distinguished student of the history of Israel that these regulations were in force for a number of centuries. (*Ant. of Israel*, pp. 272, 273.) A condition of things felt to be unjust confronted the Jewish lawgivers 3,500 years ago. They met and solved the difficulty. It exists among us to-day, only intensified an hundredfold.

The nineteenth century has witnessed a complete revolution in the production and distribution of the necessities, comforts and luxuries of life. The invention of machinery and its superiority to human strength, the large factory and its advantages over the small shops, telegraphic communication, rapid transit, the increase of capital, the concentration of population in large cities, the multiplication of artificial wants, making men much more dependent on one another than formerly, these things have put power and wealth into the hands of the few, and brought consequent industrial dependence to the many as in no preceding age of the world's history, and have greatly increased the difficulty of finding and applying a remedy. But "when the tale of brick is doubled then comes Moses." The age and country which produces the skill and genius to inflict a tremendous wrong upon the people, ought to be able to produce the wisdom and the statesmanship to correct that wrong. The nation that rid itself of the incubus of African slavery, which has outlawed Mormon polygamy, and which has often firmly resolved that free govern-

ment of the people, by the people, and for the people, should not perish from the earth, will certainly be able to provide a remedy against the unequal distribution of wealth among its citizens.

It is for the people to awake to the enormity of the evil under which a large portion of our population are suffering. The press, the platform and the pulpit must throw off their indifference and get rid of their own subserviency to wealth and power. The public conscience must be awakened. The patriot must be made to feel that the country is in danger, the Christian, that the principles of his religion are set at naught, the philanthropist that millions of innocent victims are being mercilessly tortured, the fathers and mothers that their children are being sold into an industrial slavery.

When once men in moderate conditions of comfort and prosperity, men of intellectual and moral culture, whom high character makes influential, begin to think of these things, the fire of their indignation will burn. The love of righteousness will assert itself. A new crusade will be preached, not against rich men or corporations and trusts as such, but against the greed and conscienceless exactions of certain rich men and their soulless syndicates. The matter must not be left in the hands of those who condemn all law and order, who do not believe in a future and in a God. We do not want another French Revolution. The struggle may be a long one, far longer than the anti-slavery struggle. But it will be between right and wrong, between the people and their oppressors. It is not hard to see who will win. A brutal, bloody, destructive upheaval of society is unnecessary. But a wise, statesmanlike and conservative readjustment is absolutely essential. We need not be wrought up to madness to do this. Our soberest senses are required to bring it about.



## VIII.

### EDITORIAL NOTES.

#### JONAH AND THE CRITICS.

Much excitement was occasioned some time ago by certain statements made by liberal theologians and preachers, calling in question the historicalness of the book of Jonah. The character of this book has long been a matter of dispute. The fact that it is counted among the prophetic writings shows that it was not regarded as ordinary history by those who arranged the Old Testament books. It was not written by the prophet Jonah. He is merely its hero, not its author. The aim of the book is didactic and edificatory. It was not written for the purpose of recording certain historical events, as though there were a saving power connected with them, but for the purpose of communicating certain moral and spiritual instruction. For this purpose, it is claimed by critical scholars, the book would be quite as effective, if the events recorded were regarded merely as imaginary and fictitious, as it can be if these events are regarded as real and actual. Fictitious narratives may be made the means for the communication of moral lessons, as we learn from our Lord's parables and from Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*. Much of the world's most influential literature, both religious and secular, has taken the form of fiction; and to regard the book of Jonah in this character is at least not to do violence to any literary idea.

The announcement of this view, however, has recently been met by a perfect storm of opposition and reproach. An excited host of preachers and newspaper writers have sounded an anxious alarm. They see in this view nothing but peril to religion. If this view be correct, then, it is said, we have a denial of the supernatural in history and revelation. The reality of Jonah's miraculous fish must be assumed as a necessary support to the doctrine of supernaturalism. Even so sane a man as Mr. Moody

has been credited with saying that, if the story of Jonah goes, then the divinity of Christ goes, and with it goes every Christian doctrine, and in fact the whole system of Christianity. Not that such a story is inherently necessary to the essence of divine revelation. Ineed, if it were not in the Bible, the credibility of the Bible would be somewhat easier to maintain than it is now; but being in it, the story must be maintained at all costs as literal history; for if this may be denied, where is such denial to stop? Besides, the veracity of Jesus is supposed to be pledged to the historicalness of the story of Jonah. Jesus, it is said, refers to this story of Jonah's being three days and three nights in the belly of the whale, as a type of His being three days and three nights in the heart of the earth after His death. Thus, it is contended, Jesus has set the seal of His omniscience to the historicalness of the story of the miraculous fish; and to question this story must, therefore, be to deny the divinity of Christ, and to overthrow the foundations of Christianity. The critics among the theologians who do this must, accordingly, be enemies of the Bible, opponents of Christianity, and despisers of God.

Of this extreme view the *Christian Intelligencer*, of New York, whose orthodoxy will certainly not be questioned, has said: "This is dangerous ground and altogether unwarranted. What may be entirely logical and seemingly a necessary conclusion to one mind may to another, coming to the question from another standpoint, be far from conclusive." With that opinion we entirely agree. To stake the reality and divinity of Christianity upon the interpretation of a doubtful passage of Scripture, is certainly a most unwarranted and most rash proceeding. If such proceeding be followed honestly, then it is evidence of an alarmingly small degree of faith on the part of those concerned. The man whose faith hangs upon any such premise as this, is not a very strong believer in Christianity. A faith that would give way if the story of Jonah in the belly of the fish, or the story of Joshua making the sun to stand still, should prove not to be literal history, is certainly a most insecure kind of faith, and will most likely collapse, sooner or later. In fact no faith that can



be shaken by any merely external testimony or argument, can be secure Christian faith. The only secure Christian faith is that which possesses Christ directly, and is therefore in itself sure of its possession, needing no extraneous support to make it more sure. The preacher whose faith is in danger of snapping, if an argument in the chain of evidence gives way, is not going to accomplish much in the matter of converting the world to Christ. His need is to pray: "Lord, increase my faith." And if such doubts as these about the historicalness of the narrative of Jonah should have the effect of either driving such men out of the Christian ministry, or of driving them nearer to Christ, in either case they would have served a good purpose.

But, besides being an exposure of a lamentable degree of weakness of faith, this representation of the conclusions of the critical students of the Bible as anti-supernatural and anti-christian, is unjust to these students of the Bible and perilous to the faith of unlearned Christians. In the first place this representation is unfair and unjust to a most earnest and able class of Bible students. To represent the critical theologians of the day, the men who have spent their talents and their lives in the enthusiastic and painstaking study of the Sacred Scriptures, as atheists, disbelievers in the supernatural and enemies of the Bible, is an offense against truth which no Christian ought ever to commit. "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor," is a command which those ought to bear especially in mind, who have a zeal for the honor of Scripture. These men, the critics, who study the Bible so minutely, are not enemies of the Bible. Their aim is not to destroy the Bible or to undermine confidence in it, but to find out what the Bible really is and what it teaches. There can be nothing gained by resisting or suppressing the truth. If there is any fiction in the Bible, or if there are in it errors in history, geography or science, they are the best friends of the Bible who honestly and fearlessly admit the fact. "Lying for God" is the most odious of all forms of falsehood.

Nor are the critics opponents of Christ. That there have

been unchristian critics must, of course, be admitted, but there have also been unchristian dogmatists, and the principles and methods of criticism are not responsible for any unbelief in the ranks of the critical scholars. The critical scholars, as a class, do not deny that the Son of God has come in the flesh. In their view, at least, the divinity of Christ does not stand or fall with any interpretation of the book of Jonah. But what about Jesus' reference to the miracle of the fish? Must not the historical character of that miracle be maintained in order to defend the veracity and divinity of Christ? The critics think not. In the first place, they point out the fact that our Lord's language in the parallel passage of St. Luke (xi. 29 sq.) is quite different from what it is in St. Matthew (xii. 39 sq.). In Luke there is nothing said about the miracle of the fish. The scribes and Pharisees had asked for a sign from heaven. Jesus answered: "This is an evil generation, it seeketh after a sign and there shall no sign be given unto it but the sign of Jonah. For even as Jonah became a sign unto the Ninevites, so shall also the Son of man be to this generation." In what capacity was Jonah a sign? Plainly in the capacity of a prophet preaching repentance. This is evident from the concluding sentence of the passage: "For they repented at the preaching of Jonah, and behold a greater than Jonah is here." In Matthew we have the same course of thought, but this is *interrupted* by the statement concerning the three days and three nights in the belly of the fish. Let any one carefully read first the passage in Luke and then the one in Matthew and he will observe that this statement concerning the fish *breaks the connection of thought*. The inference, therefore, is obvious that the statement is not an utterance of Christ, but an interpolation; although it must be admitted that there is no manuscript evidence to this effect.

But in the second place, the critics contend that, even supposing the language in Matthew to be genuine, there is no valid reason for concluding that by quoting the story of the fish, Christ must necessarily have vouched for its historicalness. Do we not continually quote fictitious literature in the same way, without



supposing that any one will understand us to take it for literal truth? How often do we quote from the speeches of Homer's and Shakespeare's heroes, and how often do we refer to their history for purposes of illustration or argument, without in the least intending to imply that we take that history for literal fact? What reason, then, is there for supposing that our Lord must necessarily have assumed the literal historicalness of all the statements of the Old Testament to which He refers in His discourses, and that His divinity is pledged to the accuracy of this assumption? Jesus did not claim to be omniscient during His life in the flesh; and He doubtless used language and arguments much as other men do. When, for instance, He spoke of the rising and setting of the sun, He did not thereby communicate any divine authority to a particular system of astronomy. What reason, then, have we for supposing that by His quotations from the Old Testament He communicated any divine authority to a particular method of interpreting Scripture? This is the way in which the critics argue. In their view the credit of Jesus is not affected by such a question as whether the book of Jonah is history, or romance with a religious tendency. The critics, of course, may be wrong; but they are at least not enemies of Christ and of the Bible. Their purpose is not to destroy faith in the Bible, but to make faith more easy and the Bible more precious as a means of moral and spiritual teaching. Professor Cornill, of Königsberg, is one of those critics who deny the historicalness of the story of Jonah, but the following is what he says of the book of Jonah: "I have read the book of Jonah at least a hundred times, and I will publicly avow it, for I am not ashamed of my weakness, that I cannot even now take up this marvellous book, nay, or even speak of it, without the tears rising to my eyes, and my heart beating higher. This apparently trivial book, is one of the deepest and grandest that was ever written, and I should like to say to every one who approaches it, 'Take off thy shoes, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground.'" (*Prophets of Israel*, p. 170.)

But, secondly, this intemperate and indiscriminate denuncia-



tion of the critical students of the Bible, in the pulpit and in the religious newspaper, is not only unjust to a most earnest class of theologians, but must also have an unfavorable effect upon the minds of common Christian believers. If common Christians are continually told that the most competent scholars of the Bible are not believers in the supernatural, will they not at last come to think that not to believe in the supernatural must be about the most natural state of mind? And here it might be pertinent to ask the question: what is the supernatural, anyway? How much argument and angry denunciation we have had on this subject during the past few months without any definition at all! There is more than one doctrine of supernaturalism. There is a rationalistic supernaturalism, which banishes God outside of His world, and supposes Him to interfere in its affairs only occasionally and in an external way—a supernaturalism which in fact is essentially at one with the deistic naturalism to which it seems to be opposed. According to this view the supernatural is not the divine being and power abidingly present in the world, but merely a series of disconnected interventions from a foreign realm. The Bible is the final result of these interventions, and since it has been written it is the only guide given to mortals to conduct them well through the journey of life. God Himself has withdrawn from the world. The Holy Spirit left the earth after He had accomplished the inspiration of the Bible. The Bible is divine, but the Church is not. With this view of the supernatural it is quite natural that there should be much nervous perturbation at the mere suggestion of the possibility of the Bible containing any errors. If there is one error in the Bible, or one fictitious narrative, then the Bible is no longer an infallible revelation, for *falsus in uno falsus in omnibus*. Hence these nervous fears inspired by the discoveries of the critics. Of course these fears are not shared by those who believe that Christ, according to His promise, is always with His Church through the spirit to guide her into all truth. And they are not less believers in the supernatural, but more; only their supernaturalism is of a different sort from that rationalistic-deistic



supernaturalism which was once so common in the Christian world. On this sort of supernaturalism the reader may consult with profit the *Life and Work of Dr. J. W. Nevin*, by Dr. Theodore Appel, pp. 714-15. Dr. Nevin asserts that this kind of spurious supernaturalism was the reigning orthodoxy in this country during the first part of the present century, and there is no doubt that its leading ideas are still lingering in many quarters.

It is to be feared, indeed, that the supernaturalism of many who are loudest in their talk about a supernatural Bible, is only of this bad sort; and when they are belaboring the critics, they are in fact only exposing the weakness of their own faith. But, as already intimated, their belaboring the critics can have no good effect for the further reason that the ability and learning are generally understood to be largely with the critics. Do not the people know that these much denounced men, like Professors Briggs, Cheyne, Driver, Cornill, and others, must know a great deal more about the Bible than the ordinary preacher and newspaper writer can know about it? Is it, then, good policy to keep up this denunciation? Will it not tend to shake the faith of some, to keep on telling them, from the pulpit and through the press, that the foremost Bible students of the age are not believers in Christianity and the Bible? If this were the truth, it would of course have to be told at all hazards. But, as we have already seen, the charge is not true. The men who believe that the book of Jonah is a romance, are not for that reason infidels; and it can do no good but only harm to disturb the minds of simple Christians by telling them the contrary. In any case the pulpit is not designed for the discussion of such themes. The book of Jonah can be used as a means of moral and spiritual instruction—instruction, for instance, concerning the omnipresence of God's power, the impartiality of his justice, and the universality of His love, without raising the question of its historical character; and these are the subjects for the discussion of which the pulpit exists. And we doubt very much whether the religious newspaper is well employed when it is used for the purpose of

creating suspicion or alarm in the popular mind as to the tendency of the teachers of theology. We believe that there is better and more profitable employment for the religious press than that.

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### PREACHING CHRIST.

The purpose of the preacher's office is to instruct and edify the Church. But the edification of the Church is possible only as the result of a continuous interaction and correspondence between it and its living Lord. Christ is the light and life of men. He is the source of moral and spiritual power for men ; and without Him, or apart from Him, men can do nothing that is good. Hence the preacher can discharge his office only by serving as a medium of communication between Christ and the Church. What he preaches is Christ. " We preach Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God," says St. Paul, I. Cor. 1 : 24.

But what is it to preach Christ ? Upon the right answer to this question will depend, in a large measure, the effect of the preacher's activity. Christ has not lost His power ; and if the preaching of the Gospel no longer produces its customary effects, it must be because Christ is not truly preached. We do not forget, of course, that the effect of the Gospel depends not merely upon the nature of its contents, nor upon the manner of the preacher, but also upon the character and disposition of the hearers. The word must be mixed with faith in them that hear, in order that it may produce its proper effect (Heb. 4 : 2) ; and all men have not faith (II. Thess. 3 : 2). There are some sons of perdition, who make the word of God unfruitful by their own unbelief. But it would nevertheless be a mistake for a preacher who sees his audience dwindling down to small proportions, to lay to his soul the flattering unction that his want of success has its cause not in any defect in his preaching, but solely in the spirit of reprobation among his hearers. Human nature now is the same as ever ; and the preaching of the Gospel of Christ in its genuine power, will still have its old effect of drawing men unto Him and making them new creatures.



But in order to this effect, the preaching of the Gospel must be truly a preaching of Christ. Preaching merely *about* Christ, for instance, will not produce the effect for which the office of the preacher exists. There is doubtless much preaching in Christian pulpits that is not preaching Christ. Eulogies of Christ, for example, statements of doctrine about Christ and learned discourses upon His words and works, may all be presented in such form as shall make them to be devoid of the personal Christ Himself. And this may be the case not merely in heterodox pulpits, where the divinity of Christ is formally denied. Even in the most orthodox pulpits the preaching of the Gospel may cease to be a preaching of Christ and may degenerate into mere abstract statements of dogmas concerning Christ's person or work, which will kindle no faith and move to the performance of no duty. What is sometimes called objective preaching, that is, preaching which is supposed to deal with truth as something extrinsic to the mind and apart from experience, may be such a dead and fruitless performance. Thus ringing changes upon the name of Christ is quite possible without really preaching Christ; and theorizing about Christ, even if it be in the most orthodox way, may easily become a performance that has not Christ in it. The preacher may spin out profound theories concerning the incarnation of God, or concerning the atonement and similar interesting topics in scientific divinity, and yet touch no soul and produce no spiritual effect. Such performances are merely like the holding up of a dry light, in which there is neither warmth nor vitality and by which no soul can be quickened into a higher life. The most skillful theory of the atonement will not free a soul from sin, nor will the most ingenious theory of justification by faith ever justify a sinner.

The preaching of Christ consists not in presenting theories or doctrines about Christ, and about divine things, but in presenting Christ Himself in all the fullness of his living personality. The preacher's business is to *present* Christ, that is, to cause Him to be present to the souls of his hearers. And the presence of which we are here speaking is not merely an *ideal*, but a *real* or

personal presence. There is such a thing as an ideal presentation of an object, in virtue of which a lively imagination may summon around itself the great and good men of all past ages. One may fancy himself to be in the presence of Plato or Socrates and to hear from them words of philosophic and moral wisdom. And there is in such ideal communion something of an elevating, meliorating power. To call to memory, for instance, the counsels of wisdom and piety of a revered teacher or of an honored parent, will exercise something of a moralizing and saving influence. To reflect upon the example, the life and the teaching of a good man will have a tendency to make one good. And now such an ideal presence and communion is possible also in the case of our Lord Jesus Christ. We may with reverence and affection think of Christ as He was here nineteen centuries ago. We may follow Him with wonder as He performs His miracles, we may listen with rapt attention as He teaches the multitudes, and we may gaze upon Him with sympathy as He hangs upon the cross. In thought, in imagination we may cause Him to be present with us. And in such ideal presence there is something of redeeming power. Some, indeed, would have it that this is the only kind of presence that Christ can have for us. Christ Himself is dead and gone, like any other man. It is true He arose from the dead ; but that was only to ascend into heaven, and thus to be the more effectually separated from us. And all that the preacher can do now is only to call up images of Christ by the skillful use of New Testament material ; and these images are to be for the healing of the nations. *To this view we can not agree.* While we admit the possibility of an ideal presentation of Christ to the soul of the Christian, we demand vastly more than this in order to our salvation ; and we hold that it is the Christian preacher's business to accomplish vastly more.

It is the Christian preacher's business to cause the living Christ Himself to be present, and to come into touch with the souls of his hearers. Christ is alive, and not dead ; and the only effective way of preaching the Gospel, is to preach a living and not a dead Christ. There is a way of construing Christianity in



which this truth is ignored. Briefly, it runs about as follows: Christ has redeemed us by His death, by which He paid the penalty of our sins. The record of this redemption we have in the Bible by infallible inspiration. And all that we need to do now in order to be saved, is that we consent to this arrangement. We are justified by believing that our debt was paid by the death of Christ. Of a living and present Christ we have no need. All that we need is the dead Christ. This Gospel of a dead Christ has been preached all too long; and the consequence is largely a dead Church. What the Church at the present time needs to quicken it into new life is the sense of a living and present Christ—not merely a Christ occasionally manufactured on the altar by priestly magic, but a Christ who, in His living and omnipresent personality, is at no time absent from us. And the preacher who rightly understands his office will exercise his functions in the consciousness that he is serving as the medium through which the minds of his hearers are brought into touch with the mind of the living Christ.

This may, in the first place, be explained to mean a presentation, through the preacher, of the character and mind of the living Christ to the Church for its instruction and edification. The character of Christ must ever be regarded as the ideal or pattern of a Christian life. And this pattern it is the business of the preacher ever to set before the eyes of his congregation as an ideal, by the contemplation of which they are to be transformed into the same image, from glory unto glory. But whence is the preacher himself to obtain this pattern? From the picture, it may be answered, which he finds of it in the New Testament. That answer is, of course, true; but it is after all only partially true. The picture of the historical Christ is a local, a finite picture. It presents us the Christ in definite historical surroundings and circumstances. But the eternal Christ who is the pattern for every man, is more than that. In the picture of the New Testament, for instance, Christ is not a husband and father; and yet Christ is to be presented as an example to husbands and fathers. In the picture He does not appear as a ruler, or mer-

chant, or business man ; and yet He is to be an example to rulers and merchants, and men of business. In the picture He belongs to a certain age and nation ; but He is to be an example to all times and peoples. How, then, is the preacher to discover that character of Christ which may be held up as a living ideal to men in all times and circumstances? We answer, by knowing Him not merely according to the flesh, but by learning to know Him according to the Spirit—by holding communion with the living and glorified Christ until he has entirely caught His mind and received the impression of His character. “We have the mind of Christ,” says St. Paul; and any preacher who can not appropriate that sentence to himself, can not be a true preacher of Christ.

But to have the mind of Christ means more than to have thoroughly studied Christ’s utterances in the New Testament. It implies that, of course, but it implies also an immediate personal communion with the living Christ. And in this communion there must be conceived an activity in the divine object no less than in the human subject. Christ must be able now to impress His mind upon His servants no less really than Jehovah impressed His mind in old times upon His servants, the prophets, and this without any contravention of the laws of psychology, which govern the acquisition of all knowledge. Shall the possibility of making such impressions now be denied to Christ? Then the Church is hopelessly separated from her head, and in that case His divinity could be no profit to her. We have had eager disputes in recent times concerning the question of Christ’s omniscience during the days of His flesh. Did He then know infallibly, for instance, the authorship of the pentateuch, or of the 110th Psalm, and similar things? Some, going beyond any claims that Christ Himself ever made, have given an affirmative answer to this question. But what is that question in comparison with the question whether *now* He knows all things, and is able also to communicate His mind to His servants in the Church, concerning those things which it is necessary, or profitable, for them to know? *This we affirm.* And we hold that it is just this that



makes the Christian ministry a ministry of Christ—an organ through which Christ impresses upon the Church His own mind for its instruction, direction and spiritual edification. And the more fully conscious the Christian ministry may at any time be of this great fact, the more efficiently will it discharge its functions. Some may call this mysticism, or at least transcendentalism. It is, however, nothing more than the mysticism of St. Paul, who felt sure that in himself Christ was speaking to the Corinthians (II. Cor. xiii. 3), or the mysticism of Jesus, who assured His disciples that the Spirit of their Father should speak in them, and who on the eve of His departure promised to send the Holy Spirit to abide with the disciples forever, to glorify Himself in them, and to lead them into all truth. Should anyone answer that this promise extended only to the age of the New Testament, we should reply that for such an one Christianity is virtually extinct, and arguing with him could accomplish no good.

To preach Christ, then, means to proclaim the mind and will of Christ to the men of any generation according to their circumstances and needs. It means to have apprehended that which is true and right according to the mind of Christ, and to proclaim truth and right to the world for its present spiritual illumination and guidance. In order to such an apprehension of the mind of Christ, no supernatural or miraculous revelation is needed. What is needed is that the human mind simply withdraw into its own depths and there, undisturbed by the world's voices, but touched by the universal mind of God, listen to what the voice of the Spirit may say. The Spirit has at all times something to say to the churches, if men have but ears to hear. And, in fact, all truth is in a profound sense divine truth and can only come to the human mind through communion with the divine Reason, or Logos, which is in Christ. Truth in its ultimate essence is the divine thinking, and we come into possession of the truth only by thinking in harmony with the divine mind. If it be true that the conscience is the voice of God in the human soul universally, then how much more must it be true that the moral understand-

ing which is in the Christian man is an inspiration of the Almighty giving the knowledge of His own mind and will. It is in this way that moral knowledge especially advances among men. It was thus, for instance, that Christ's servants, in quite modern times, came to understand the unlawfulness and the wrong of slavery, and they truly preached Christ when they insisted that it was the will of God that slavery should be destroyed. There was a time when slavery was defended on Biblical grounds. The Bible was supposed to favor it. Noah predicted the eternal bondage of Canaan. Abraham was a slave holder. Christ uttered no word of condemnation of the institution. Paul sent back the run-away slave Onesimus and exhorted Christian slaves patiently to remain in their present condition. Does it not follow from all this that slavery is a divine institution? So men once reasoned. But there came a time when such reasoning was no longer accepted. Now no one accepts it. All Christians are agreed that slavery is wrong. Whence, then, came the knowledge of its wrongfulness? From a better understanding of the Bible, it may be answered. But whence comes this better understanding of the Bible? Manifestly it cannot come from any activity of the Bible itself. It must, therefore, come from a new impression of the Spirit of the Lord, awakening new moral sentiments in the Christian mind. And so, now, new moral sentiments are being awakened on sociological and economic subjects.

Until quite recently it was supposed to be right for some men to get all they can of the goods of this world, while others are prevented from getting anything at all. Occasionally a voice may still be heard in the pulpit defending that "dismal doctrine." But the mind of the Church is changing. The truth is coming to make itself felt that all men are brothers, and that this idea of brotherhood must exercise its influence in the conduct of the world's business. And this change is doubtless due to a new manifestation of the mind of Christ. It is sometimes said that the advocates of social reform along lines of equal justice and of humanity, are not Christians, because they do not use the set phrases of traditional theology, and because they maintain



propositions contrary to those which were once maintained by the Church. But one may be a Christian, and even a Christian preacher, without ringing changes on the name of Christ. In fact, one who has the mind of Christ may be far more of a Christian than he who uses the name. One who insists on doing justly, and loving mercy, and walking humbly with God, is a better Israelite than he who insists on sacrifices and burnt offerings.

But, secondly, to preach Christ is to cause Him to be present to the souls of men in the moral power of His glorified personality. It is to bring the souls of those to whom one preaches into vital touch with the spirit of Christ. And in such touch with Christ there is the spring of new moral and spiritual life for men. It was so when He was here in the flesh, nineteen centuries ago. Then the men and women who came into contact with Him became new creatures. He was for them not merely a law, an example, a moral ideal, but a quickening inspiration, a moral dynamic. He said to men not merely, look at Me and see what you ought to be, but He said, look at Me and you shall become what I am. As power went out from Him to heal men's physical diseases, so also power went out from Him to renew, and quicken, and transform their moral nature. There was morally regenerating power in His touch and look. When Zacheus looked into His eyes and Jesus looked into his, then Zacheus became an honest man, which before that he had not power to be. So when Mary Magdalene looked upon Him, and He looked upon her, she became a pure and godly woman. This moral power was in His personality, and passed over from Him to others who came into touch with His spirit, and whose will presented no bar to its operation. Moral power can only reside in personality, not in abstract doctrines, formulas, or propositions. The power to love and the power to repent can only come from a loving and holy personality. And the moral life of God could be fully communicated to the world only through the person of His son.

And what Christ was in the days of His flesh, that He is still,

namely, the source of moral power for the world. And the Church is the sphere, and the ministry the organ for the exercise of that power. It is the office of the Christian preacher, accordingly, not merely to tell men of a Christ who was here nineteen centuries ago, and to point them to His life here as an example of right living, and to His death as a propitiatory sacrifice for sins, but it is the office of the preacher, further, to serve as a medium for bringing men's souls into touch with the spirit of Christ in order that they may be quickened into new spiritual life and growth. And this office he accomplishes alike in the preaching of the word and in the administration of the sacraments ; but the basis for this accomplishment must be in his own moral and Christian personality. One who is not a Christian can, therefore, not be a true preacher of Christ. One whose own sins have not been forgiven, can not be the medium of forgiveness to others. It is only from the body of the believer that streams of living water can flow. The only Christ whom any preacher can bring to men for their salvation, is the Christ within himself. And yet this does not make Christ merely a subjective fancy. No man can preach Christ in any other character than that in which he has apprehended Him in his own heart ; and yet the Christ thus preached will be infinitely more than the preacher's own experience. And when thus preached, out of the fulness of a Christian heart, and yet as the eternal and ever-living Son of God, then Christ will still draw all men, who hear the message, unto Himself, and transform them into His own image, from glory unto glory.

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#### CLERICAL THOUGHT ON SOCIOLOGICAL QUESTIONS.

There is at the present time a great deal of thought devoted to sociological subjects by ministers of the Gospel, as well as by men of other professions. Large numbers of ministers are writing on these subjects ; and their productions are finding their way into books and periodical publications, thus helping to swell the already enormous amount of literature now devoted to the science



of social well-being. Still larger numbers, it may be presumed, are at times preaching sermons on sociological and economic questions, thus helping to form public opinion on these questions. And others, no doubt, who are neither writing nor preaching on these questions, are more or less engaged in the study of them, and are influencing public opinion through private social intercourse with their fellow citizens.

This fact is significant in many respects. It indicates, in the first place, that the scope of the Christian religion and of the Christian ministry is apprehended in a wider sense than has generally been the case heretofore. Christianity is coming to be understood, not merely as an arrangement to get people into heaven when they die, but as a power to make them live righteously and well here and now. Godliness is profitable for the world which now is as well as for that which is to come. Christianity tells men not merely what they are to believe in regard to God, heaven, and a future life; but it tells them how they ought to live here, and affords them the power to do what it requires. Christianity is to its very core an ethical religion. And its ethical determinations have to do not merely with men as individuals, but also with men as members of society. It prescribes social as well as individual duties, and aims at the realization of social as well as individual well-being. The cultivation of sociological thought by the Christian ministry, therefore, is an evidence of a more comprehensive conception of the functions of the ministry than has generally prevailed heretofore. And it is an evidence also of closer agreement with the scientific thought of the time, which lays so much stress upon the influence of environment in the production of individual character and bliss.

But this widespread cultivation of sociological thought, among the ministry as well as among laymen, is an evidence also of a peculiar social condition. There is a pressure, a feeling of uneasiness, in the social world, such as has existed at but few periods in history. The social atmosphere of the age is heavy; and there is a general feeling of uncertainty and anxiety as to the things which are coming upon the earth. This is an age of

stupendous material development. The invention of machinery, the consolidation of industry and the exploitation of labor, have resulted in a portentous increase of wealth. But the distribution of this wealth is so unequal, that it has seriously disturbed the equilibrium of society; and this is the substance of the social problem in our time. On the one hand we have the millionaire, hard, cold, proud and self-satisfied; and on the other hand we have the proletariat, hungry, sullen, discontented and turbulent. The classes and the masses are ever growing farther apart, and viewing each other with increasing suspicion and distrust, if not with positive hatred. And no class of men have better opportunities for learning to understand the condition of the social world than the pastors of the churches have. They see its sufferings, realize its hardships and are familiar with the mutterings of the multitudes who find it ever more and more difficult to maintain their existence. And they see, too, that the "statesmen" and politicians are not doing anything to relieve the distress. These have no remedy. While they talk of the "majesty of the law," they are engaged in circumventing each other; that is all. In these circumstances it is no wonder that the attention of the ministers of religion is drawn to sociological studies. When the times are out of joint, and when the very foundations of society are trembling, it is fitting that not only men of letters and science, but also the teachers of religion should busy themselves with thoughts of the problems confronting the civilization of the age.

Much of the sociological thought with which the age is teeming is doubtless crude and ill-digested. This is especially the case when remedial measures come to be under consideration. It is easier to diagnose the disease than to prescribe the remedy. The plans proposed for curing the ills of society are often wild and fatuous, and, if put into operation, would rather aggravate than cure those ills; though in this respect, it should be said, ministers of the Gospel do not usually show less wisdom than is shown by men of other professions when talking and writing on the same subjects. The economists, legislators and politicians



have, to say the least, not as a rule shown themselves any wiser than the ministers of religion. The remedies proposed by preachers as well as by politicians, it can often be shown, would be no remedies at all. And this fact is sometimes made a cause of reproach to sociological thought in any form. What good, it is said, will it do to talk about the evils which afflict society, unless it is possible to suggest a remedy that will at once cure them? Will not this merely tend to cause men to feel their ills more keenly, and to make them the more impatient in bearing them, while there can be no possible hope of deliverance? Millionairism and pauperism may be symptoms of a diseased social organism. But what remedy is there for the disease? You can not despoil the rich man of his millions; and if you did despoil him and divide his possessions equally among the members of society, the next day there would be inequality again. The body politic may be afflicted with political corruption, with oppression and wrong; but "what are you going to do about it?" as Mr. Tweed once said of the corrupt ring rule of New York City, of which he himself was a most influential factor. But Mr. Tweed lived to find out what could be done about it; and some of us will live to find out what can be done about the social condition which now involves so much unfairness and suffering to large masses of men. To show that this condition is evil, is enough for the present. The remedy will come in due time. To have demonstrated that ring rule, monopoly tyranny, and trust power, and similar phenomena of the modern social world, are not necessarily inherent in the nature of society, and do not correspond with the divine idea of society, is a service which will in time lead to something more. When the wrongfulness of slavery was demonstrated, then the doom of that "divine institution" was sealed.

And it is this service which the intense sociological thought of the present moment is performing for society. That so large a part of the Christian ministry is interested in this sociological thought, is an indication, moreover, that the problems with which society is confronted are coming to be regarded as religious and

moral problems. They are not merely political and economic problems, disconnected entirely from all religious and ethical considerations. The contrary, indeed, may be implied in the phrase which is now somewhat popular, that "the affairs of government must be administered on business principles." If this means that ethical principles are to have no consideration in the conduct of organized society, then it is a vicious rule and should be condemned. Social questions are ethical questions, because society is an ethical organism. The question of taxation, for instance, which has so much to do with the welfare of society, the question of wages, and the question of the treatment of laborers in mills and mines, are not merely questions of dollars and cents. They are moral questions, and the time is coming when they will be so regarded. And the time is coming, too, when the man who is growing rich solely by the exploitation of other people's toil, will not be allowed comfortably to sit in a church with Christian people, or mingle in society with ethically cultured men and women. And when that result shall have been accomplished, then the social problem of our time will have been solved, and the weight which is now resting upon society will be lifted. And to contribute to this result is a performance worthy of the highest calling known among men.



## IX.

### NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

**THE GOSPEL FOR AN AGE OF DOUBT ;** The Yale Lectures On Preaching, 1896. By Henry Van Dyke. The Macmillan Co., N. Y.

The Yale Lectures on Preaching occupy a prominent place on the shelves of many a minister's library. They are eminently entitled to such a place. Better or wiser counsel upon the numerous questions connected with the preaching of "the glorious Gospel of the blessed God" than is contained in the several courses of lectures given now for some successive years on the Lyman Beecher foundation at Yale University, is nowhere to be found. Many of the ablest and most successful divines of different denominations have brought their maturest thought, and richest experience to these lectures and given them for the instruction and helpfulness of their fellow laborers in the ministry of the Church. Pastors desiring to be abreast with the times can ill afford to be without a knowledge of the valuable advice, the vital inspiration, and the rich suggestiveness of these volumes.

This seems particularly true of the contribution to the series which Dr. Van Dyke has made under the title 'The Gospel for an Age of Doubt.' The author is too well and favorably known as preacher, writer and poet, to make it necessary to speak of the moral and spiritual uplift given by his pages; the fine artistic quality of his literary efforts, or the clear, penetrating and comprehensive insight he possesses for discerning the signs of the times on the one hand, and on the other for suggesting the correctives which present aspects of faith and thought and conduct stand in need of in order that life in our day may be brought more nearly to the standard of the Christian ideals.

In these lectures our author has followed in the wake of none of his distinguished predecessors, but has marked out a course bearing the stamp of his own genius. Aiming "to be of help to the circle of men and women who care for the vital problems of faith," he finds no room for what may be called subordinate if not trifling details of manner and form in preaching, details to which other lecturers have given not a little time and attention. It is his conviction that "the force of religion to move and inspire the hearts of men lies not in the forms and modes of preaching, but in the Gospel, the message which it brings to the human soul. The deep question, the question of widest interest is what to preach to the men and women of to-day to cheer them, to uplift them, to lead them back to faith and through faith to a brave, full, noble life."



The earnestness of this conviction, and the seriousness with which it moves him in attempting to point the way to an answer to this question, determine the color and character of every one of the eight lectures which go to make up the greater part of the book. The subject of these several lectures are as follows; An Age of Doubt, The Gospel of a Person, The Unveiling of the Father, The Human Life of God, The Source of Authority, Liberty, Sovereignty, Service. Appended to these chapters there are notes covering more than a hundred and twenty pages, and taken chiefly from recent publications. They are designed to confirm his own view of modern doubt and to show that many men of all classes are moving towards a renewal of their faith.

The first lecture, taking literature as an index of life, shows that ours is an age of earnest, restive, widespread doubt. Its doubt differs greatly, however, from the blatant, bitter and frivolous unbelief of last century. It is sober, sad, despairing, as is evidenced by the wider range of writers from whom he quotes. The expansion of knowledge, the arrogance of science falsely so-called, and the audacious assumptions of Naturalism and Agnosticism have contributed to this doubt. In Germany, France, England, and America hopeful signs are to be seen, however, that skepticism is thinking its way back from its melancholy and painful void to a position where it can confess, with the famous biologist Romanes, that "it is reasonable to be a Christian believer." "The preacher who wishes to speak to this age must read many books in order that he may be in a position to make the best use of what Sir Walter Scott called 'the one Book.'"

The second lecture, an admirable piece of vigorous and lucid writing, shows that the force of the Gospel resides in the person of Christ Jesus, who saves men from sin, and thus comes close to the heart of a doubting age. The third chapter, devoted to the consideration of the Deity of Christ, essays to answer the question wherein the Gospel of the Incarnation of the Son of God is adapted to the needs of this age. It declares the unveiling of the Father in Christ to be the Palladium of Christianity. The complementary truth thus insisted upon is advanced in the next chapter wherein the doctrine of the real manhood of Jesus is developed. It is a highly satisfactory answer to the cry of the human heart for a human Saviour, a Saviour who affords it "a vision of the human life of God." The fifth chapter on the source of religious authority is particularly strong and clear. One can't fail to understand what the author's position is. He knows no authority but that of the Divine-Human Saviour: "Christ is the light of all Scripture, Christ is the master of holy reason, Christ is the sole Lord of the true Church. By His word we test all doctrines, conclusions and commands, on His word we build all faith. This is the source of authority in the kingdom of heaven." Efficient preachers to this age of doubt must neither



forget nor hesitate to appeal always to this authority with untrembling certainty and positive conviction. Unless one can do so in preaching "one would better go out of business entirely."

The three remaining chapters on liberty, sovereignty and service are severally deserving of far more space than can here be given to all of them. Out of the authoritative teaching of Christ "three truths emerge and stand out clear and sharp as mountain peaks against the blue sky, the truth of human liberty, the truth of divine sovereignty, and the truth of universal service. To these three truths we must bear witness unhesitatingly, faithfully and joyfully if our preaching is to be a gospel for this age of doubt." In the discussion of these concluding problems Dr. Van Dyke shows the courage of his convictions. His thought is clearly in advance of many of his denominational brethren in the ministry. But the skill and sweetness with which he advances his arguments are calculated to win acceptance for them rather than to arouse opposition against them. Dr. Murray, Princeton University, several months ago wrote that if any person ever read George Eliot's *Silas Marner* without becoming the better for it, it would be difficult to say how such a person could be made better. If any preacher can read Dr. Van Dyke's *Gospel for an Age of Doubt*, without becoming a better preacher for it, it would be difficult to say how such a person could be made a better preacher!

A. S. W.

CHRISTIAN WORSHIP: Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1897. Pages 338.

This work consists of ten lectures delivered in the Adams chapel of the Union Theological Seminary, New York, in the months of October, November and December of 1896, by representative divines, chosen from seven religious denominations. The subjects of the lectures in the order given in the book are as follows: I. "The Principles of Christian Worship;" by the Rev. Charles Cuthbert Hall, D.D., President of the Faculty of the Union Theological Seminary, New York City. II. "Primitive Christian Liturgies;" by the Rev. A. V. G. Allen, D.D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the Protestant Episcopal Theological School in Cambridge, Mass. III. "The Greek Liturgies;" by the Rev. Egbert C. Smyth, D.D., Professor of Church History in Andover Theological Seminary, Andover, Mass. IV. "The Roman Liturgies;" by the Rev. Charles C. Tiffany, D.D., Archdeacon of New York City. V. "The Lutheran Liturgies;" by Rev. Henry Eyster Jacobs, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Systematic Theology in the Evangelical Lutheran Seminary, Philadelphia, Pa. VI. "The Liturgies of the Reformed Churches;" by the Rev. William Rupp, D.D., Professor of Practical Theology in the Reformed Theological Seminary, Lancaster, Pa. VII. "The Book of Common Prayer;" by the Rev. William R. Huntington, D.D., Rector of Grace Church, New York City. VIII. "The



Book of Common Order and the Directory for Worship ;" by the Rev. Allen Pollock, D.D., principal of the Presbyterian College, Halifax, Nova Scotia. IX. "Worship in Non-Liturgical Churches;" by the Rev. George Dana Boardman, D.D., LL.D, Honorary Pastor of the First Baptist Church, Philadelphia, Pa. X. "The Ideal of Christian Worship;" by the Rev. Thomas S. Hastings, D.D., LL.D., President of the Faculty of the Union Theological Seminary, New York City.

The first lecture, as the title indicates, is introductory to the series that follows. The lecturer defines the term "worship" as applied to the service of the sanctuary. Then follows a treatment of the fundamental elements which enter into a well-ordered congregational service. These elements are the hymn, the Scripture, the belief, the prayer, the oblation, the teaching, and the sacraments. This prepares the way for the consideration of those "broad principles which constitute the real foundations of Christian worship." These are grouped into two classes. The one class consists of the subjective principles, the Will of God, and the intuition of Man, and upon these rests, fundamentally, the institution of Christian worship. The other class comprehends the objective principles underlying the institution. These are "the affirmative use" which "contemplates Christian worship as testimony, comprehending the evangelical facts and uttering the same continuously and effectively, as a propagandism of spiritual light and hope, throughout a world lying in the Evil One;" "the conservative use of Christian worship," by which faith is kept alive "amidst vanishing empires and dissolving philosophies;" amidst persecutions from without, and dissensions within the Church; and, finally, "the educative use of Christian worship" which "makes it a part of sociology."

The lectures that follow are, of course, of an historical and descriptive character. In the main, they all recognize the principles and elements set forth in the first. The reader cannot help being impressed with the unanimity of opinion as to the nature of true worship and the elements which should enter into it. Worship is a thing of growth, just as doctrine; it is rooted in the past and must draw its material from thence while it recognizes present needs and conditions, and adapts itself to them. Some thirty years ago when the Reformed Church in the United States was passing through what is usually called "the liturgical conflict," but which is now beginning to be regarded as a liturgical revival that laid the foundation for the active missionary operations since then in progress, she received little sympathy from some of her sister denominations. The prophecy, then spoken, that other denominations would be confronted with the same problem, in the future, is now going into fulfilment. The cry for change comes from two sides: "In recent years there has been a growing uneasiness with reference to this subject, both in liturgical and unliturgical



churches. The former want more liberty, at least some room for free prayer; the latter want less liberty and more uniformity." In striking confirmation of this deliverance of Dr. Hastings's in the last lecture of the course, is the lecture of Dr. Boardman, who, though representing the unliturgical churches, is decidedly in sympathy with such liturgical usage as shall guard against "mere routine worship" on the one hand, and "possible disasters incident to extemporaneous prayers" on the other, while he would accord the people a large share in the devotional part of the service. In this he is at one with the representatives of most liturgical churches. There must be freedom, flexibility; times, seasons, occasions must be allowed to temper the spirit and form of the service.

It would be a pleasing task to present in detail those points of agreement between the views of those lecturers whose subjects permitted them to express an opinion, especially to call attention to the marked agreement between the lectures of Dr. Pollock and Dr. Hastings and our own Dr. Rupp, but mindful of the admonition to be brief, we can only add, that we prize this splendid little work most highly and express the wish that it may find a place in the library of every minister of our land. Especially is it to be commended to the younger ministers, as it contains a very full and reliable history of the development of Christian worship in its unity and variety, and will prove an efficient and safe guide to those who wish to make a further study of the subject.

A. J. H.

**THE WHENCE AND THE WHITHER OF MAN ; A Brief History of his Origin and Development through Conformity to Environment. Being the Morse Lectures of 1895, by John N. Tyler, Professor of Biology, Amherst College. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1896. Pages, 312. Price, \$1.75.**

In this volume we have an account of the creation of man according to the theory of evolution. According to some the ideas of evolution and of creation are contradictory. If evolution be accepted as a true theory of the origin of the universe, then the doctrine of creation, it is thought, must be given up. Professor Tyler thinks differently. He maintains that the power and wisdom of the Creator are demanded equally, whether we suppose the world to have been made by an act of immediate creation or by a process of evolution. According to the first theory the creative power has been concentrated in one primal act, according to the second it has been distributed over a series of acts. But in either case it is God that is the author of the universe. Evolution is not a power, but a process; and the power which is back of the process is the will of God. In this sense Professor Tyler is an evolutionist, and traces in a very interesting manner the evolution of the civilized man of the nineteenth century from the primitive protoplasm through the various organic forms of the animal world.



It will be said perhaps that this is not consistent evolutionism ; for Huxley and Tyndall, and Spencer are evolutionists, and they dispense with the idea of God in their construction of the theory of the universe. Evolutionism, therefore, must necessarily be atheistic. To such an assumption it would be enough to say that the great majority of evolutionists are Christian believers ; and, it may be added, all scientific thinkers almost without exception are evolutionists. Some of the greatest mathematical astronomers, like Laplace, were atheists too, but that does not prove that all mathematical astronomers must be atheists. Many an astronomer has proved that astronomy is not anti-Christian ; and so Professor Tyler proves in this volume that evolution is not in itself anti-Christian.

There are different theories of evolution, and in all theories there are some open questions. According to some, natural selection is the one great power which has brought about the present variety of animated existence ; while according to others, it is an initial tendency to progression in the primitive idioplasm that accounts for the diversity of living forms. Then there is the difference between the followers of Darwin, or, as Professor Tyler calls them, the Neo-Lamarckians, who hold that properties acquired during the life-time of individuals may be transmitted to their offspring, and the followers of Weismann who maintain the opposite. On these various questions the author sums up his own views in the following paragraphs :

“ Each theory contains important truth. Nägeli’s view of the importance of initial tendencies, inherent in the original living substance, is too often undervalued. My own conviction, at least, is steadily strengthening that, without some such original tendency or aim, evolution would never have reached its present culmination in man. His error lies in emphasizing this factor too exclusively. The fundamental proposition of Weismann’s theory, that heredity is due to germ-plasm, seems to contain important truth. But we need not, therefore, accept his theory of a germ-plasm so isolated and independent as to be beyond control or influence by the habits of the body. The importance of use and disuse, and the transmissibility of their effects, would seem to supply a factor essential to evolution. Weismann has done good service in emphasizing the stability of the germ-plasm. Evolution is always slow, and, for that very reason, sure.”

“ If these conclusions are correct, they have an important practical bearing. Struggle and effort are essential to progress. Not inborn talent alone, but the use which one makes of it, counts in evolution. The effects of use and disuse are cumulative. The hard fought battle of past generations becomes an easy victory in the present, just because of the strength acquired and handed down from the past struggle. Persistent variation toward evil is in time weeded out by natural selection. And, while evil remains



in the world, we are to lay up stores of strength for ourselves and our descendants by sturdily fighting it. But the effects of right living through a hundred generations are not overcome by the criminal life of one or two. Evil surroundings weigh more in producing criminals than heredity, and their children are not irreclaimable," pp. 307-8.

From the last sentence it will be seen that the author lays great stress upon environment. Indeed this idea is expressed on his very title page. It is man's origin and development through *conformity to environment* that is to be described. But in environment there is something more than material existence. There is in it a personal power—a power that is intelligent and moral—a power that works for righteousness; and this makes man a personal, an intelligent and moral being. In Christianity this personal environment comes still nearer to man, and man comes to be touched and impressed by the very life of God. What is Christianity? The author answers, pp. 253-4, "not merely intellectual belief in a creed," "not mere feeling or emotion," but "the true divine idea of it is a *life*." This is what men need, and this is what we are to realize especially in our time. And this is what the world has in Jesus Christ. Christ is a divine fountain of moral life for men, and this comes to them through their environment. Hence Professor Tyler says, with great force, p. 252, "Preach Christ and Him crucified, not merely dead two thousand years ago, but risen and alive for evermore, and with us to the end of the world, the grandest, most heroic, divinest helper who ever stood by a man, one all-powerful to help, and who never forsakes, and every one of your hearers who is not dead to truth will catch the life, and go home and live not alone. *So long as we preach a dead Christ we shall have a dead church, as hopeless as the apostles were before the resurrection.*"

It is thus that an evolutionist can instruct preachers, and tell how they must present the Gospel, if their message is to have its proper effect. Not Christ, a dead sacrifice, but Christ, a living Saviour, is the power of the Gospel that will quicken men into spiritual life. "Our Lord and Master is the connecting link between God and man, through whom God's own Holy Spirit is poured like a mighty flood into the hearts and lives of men, transfiguring them and filling them with the divine power," p. 252. It is thus that an evolutionist can speak. And is not that better theology than much of what comes from quarters in which sermons are preached periodically with a view of annihilating evolution? We heartily commend this book to our readers, who want to know more about the whence and the whither of man.



THE HIGHER CRITICISM OF THE HEXATEUCH; By Charles Augustus Briggs, D.D., Edward Robinson Professor of Biblical Theology in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. New Edition, revised and enlarged. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, Publishers. 1897. Pages, 288. Price, \$1.75.

This work was first published in 1892. In the present edition it has undergone a thorough revision, and has also received numerous additions both in the body of the book and in new appendices. The main body of the work is intended for theological readers generally, and is comparatively free from technical details. In the appendices, however, such details are given for the benefit of Hebrew students, who will find in this volume all that is necessary in order to a thorough comprehension of the present state of criticism of the first six books of the Bible, in the treatment of which the higher criticism has produced its most important results.

As an accurate and accomplished Hebrew scholar Professor Briggs has no superior in this country. He has studied his subject with utmost care and thoroughness, and the conclusions which he reaches are always based upon the best of reasons. It should be observed, however, that in these conclusions he does not stand alone, but is in agreement with the great majority of Old Testament critics both in Europe and America. There is a marked degree of unanimity among the critics, which must go far to convince the ordinary scholar that their conclusions are not groundless assumptions. That the Hexateuch is a composite work consisting of a number of originally independent documents, which were written at different times, and combined into a single work by an editor, or editors, is a proposition which all critics would accept. The great majority would also accept the view that the documents combined in the Hexateuch were at least four, which are usually designated by the letters E, J, D and P; and they would in general agree as to the limits of the documents. As to the time when the documents were composed there would be some difference of opinion, but the majority would adopt the order of succession just indicated.

In the work before us we have a detailed narrative of the history of the Higher Criticism, and an account of the difficulties of the traditional view, which have called this criticism into existence. Any one who has once come to appreciate the difficulties involved in the traditional view of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, can no longer be satisfied to accept that view in an unmodified form. When, for instance, we read in Gen. 12: 6 that Abraham pursued the oriental Kings "as far as Dan," and in Jud. 18: 29 that the city of Dan did not receive that name until long after the time of Moses, it becomes difficult to believe in the Mosaic authorship of Genesis; and this difficulty is increased by each one of the numerous instances of the same kind which occur throughout the Pentateuch. The efforts of commentators,



holding the traditional view, to explain these discrepancies, are generally not satisfactory, and are mutually contradictory. It is sometimes said that the views of the higher critics refute each other; there is, however, as Professor Briggs shows in this volume, far more agreement among the critics than there is among the traditionalists when they undertake to solve the difficulties with which the critics deal.

Some of the critics who support the documentary and developmental theory of the Pentateuch, have but little confidence in its historical character. Among these are, for example, Reuss, Wellhausen, and Kuenen. They are willing to take the Old Testament for history so far as its purely natural elements are concerned, but they are suspicious of the miraculous elements, and will not admit the Bible to be a revelation from God in any sense different from that in which any sacred literature may be said to be such. To this class of critics Professor Briggs does not belong, as the following quotation from the work under notice will prove: "The Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch vindicates its credibility. It strengthens the historical credibility (1) by showing that we have four parallel narratives instead of the single narrative of the traditional theory; and (2) by tracing these narratives to their sources in the more ancient documents buried in them. It traces the development of the original Mosaic legislation in its successive stages of codification in accordance with the historical development of the kingdom of God. It finds minor discrepancies and inaccuracies such as are familiar to students of the Gospels; but these increase the historic credibility of the writings as they show that the writers and compilers were true to their sources of information even when they could not harmonize them in all respects," p. 3.

Professor Briggs gives expression to his idea of the value of the Higher Criticism in the following paragraph: "The deeper study of the unity and variety of the Hexateuchal narratives and laws, as we defend their historicity against Reuss, Kuenen, and Wellhausen, and advance in the apprehension of their sublime harmony, will fructify and enrich the theology of our day, just as deeper study of the unity and variety of the Gospels by the school of Neander, in the defence of them against Straus, Renan, and Baur, has been an unspeakable blessing in the past generation. This having been accomplished, we may look forward to a time when our eyes shall be opened as never before to the magnificent unity of the whole Bible in the midst of its wondrous variety. Then the word of God, as one supernatural divine revelation, will rise into such a position of spiritual power and transcendent influence as shall greatly advance the kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, and hasten the realization of that most blessed hope of both the Old and New Testament, the coming of the Messiah in glory," p. 162.



That, we think, proves at least that all Higher Criticism is not hostile to the idea of the supernatural. Professor Briggs is not excelled by any one in the thoroughness with which he applies the critical method to the study of the Bible, and yet no one holds more distinctly and firmly to the idea of the supernatural in revelation than does he. It may be said, of course, and often has been said, that in this he is not consistent. But whether those who take this view are so much more logical and penetrating than he, while confessedly much less learned, is a question which all will not answer in the same way. We have no hesitation in recommending this volume to all who want to know what the Higher Criticism of the Bible is, and how the critical views can be consistent with orthodox Christianity. Those who desire to have within a small compass the means of thoroughly acquainting themselves with the critical analysis of the Hexateuch, can find nothing better than the volume here brought to their notice.

**THE NEW APOLOGETIC.** Five Lectures on True and False Methods of Meeting Modern Philosophical and Critical Attacks upon the Christian religion. By Milton S. Terry, D.D., LL.D., Professor in the Garrett Biblical Institute, Evanstown, Ill. New York : Eaton & Mains ; Cincinnati : Curts & Jennings. 1897. Page 199. Price, 85 cents.

Apologetic is the science of the defense of Christianity. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this defense turned mainly upon the *authenticity* and *genuineness* of the sacred scriptures, and consisted of *external*, *internal*, and *collateral* evidence. That was the old apologetic. That kind of apologetic will no longer answer now. The whole world of thought has changed during the present century. Everything has become new. We have a new psychology, new philosophy, new exegesis, new biblical theology ; and, so, it is but reasonable that we should also have a new apologetic.

A new apologetic, however, is demanded also from another point of view. The attacks upon Christianity are new. Christianity is not now assailed in the same spirit, and with the same weapons, as two or three generations ago. Professor Terry divides the attacks upon Christianity into three classes, namely, the philosophical, the literary, and those arising from the study of rival religions. Hence a three-fold apology becomes necessary, a philosophical, a literary or critical, and a comparative, to each of which a separate lecture is devoted. But this three-fold apology is only negative. It answers objections and wards off attacks. A positive apology is needed, which shall establish the truth of Christianity. The last lecture of the volume before us is devoted to this subject.

Under the head of the philosophic apology we have discussions of the theories of dualism, monism, and agnosticism. Of course the " conflict of science and religion " also comes in for a due



share of attention. Here the Christian apologist of the present time should learn a lesson from the past. Astronomy and geology were once regarded as foes of religion. Newton's theory of gravitation was condemned because it "made the deity superfluous." The recollection of these circumstances should have prevented modern apologists from engaging in battle with evolution. Evolution, according to Dr. Terry, is not a foe from which Christianity needs to be defended. And neither is literary criticism. The denial of the Solomonic authorship of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, the analysis of the Pentateuch and of Isaiah, and the supposition that the book of Daniel was written in the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, are not matters upon which the truthfulness of Christianity should be staked. The new apologist must not fight the critics. He must find a way in which he can admit the imperfections of the Bible and yet maintain the divinity of his religion.

But the greatest difference between the old apologetic and the new relates to the different manner in which foreign religions are treated. According to the old apologetics all religions are divided into two classes, the *false* and the *true* or the *natural* and the *revealed*. All religions but the Christian are false, and contain no truth at all. They are natural, while Christianity is supernatural, and in its original form at least, as it exists in the Bible, contains no error at all. The new apologetic, on the other hand, is bound to assume that all religions are true and that there is a measure of divine revelation in all. Christianity is the absolute religion, the last and final stage in the process of religious evolution, that is, the process of divine revelation; and all the scattered truths which exist fragmentarily in ethnic religions, exist in their totality in Christianity. The Christian apologist may cheerfully allow that there are elements of truth in all religions, while he will claim that *the* truth is to be found in Christianity alone.

But this leads to the consideration of the positive apology for Christianity. Under this head the author mentions the absoluteness of the Christian religion, its survival of the errors and follies of its adherents, the freedom of thought which it encourages, its missionary tendency, its morally uplifting power, its adaptation to man's spiritual wants, its social effects, and its moral dynamics. These are all facts which make its truthfulness probable. But its demonstration it receives only from the person of its author. Jesus Christ Himself is the final argument for Christianity. Nothing shows the difference between the old apology and the new more clearly than the manner in which miracles are treated. "No man," says Dr. Terry, "now believes in Christ because of the miracles which He wrought two milleniums ago; we rather believe the miracles because we have first come to believe in Christ." Miracles can not be denied to Christ, but they must no



longer be explained as *violations*, or *suspensions* of the laws of nature, or as *deviations* from the ordinary course of nature. The miracles of revelation must be conceived "rather as a continuous manifestation of God, who immediately upholds and rules all things, visible and invisible." The miracles of Christ especially are symbols and types of the redemptive work which He is continually carrying on in the world.

It should be stated in conclusion that the work under notice does not pretend to be a complete treatment of the science of apologetics. It is merely an introduction to that science, laying down the principles according to which the science must in our time be treated; and as such we commend it to those who are interested in the subject.

THE LUTHERAN COMMENTARY, Volume X, Annotations on the Epistles to Timothy, Titus and the Hebrews. By Edward J. Wolf, D.D., Professor of Church History and N. T. Exegesis, Theological Seminary, Gettysburg, Pa., and on Philemon, by Edward T. Horn, D.D., Pastor of St. John's Lutheran Church, Charleston, S. C. Pages 519. Price, \$2.00. Publishers, The Christian Literature Company, New York. 1897.

The idea of a *Lutheran* commentary will be apt to awaken distrust in many minds. A Lutheran Catechism, or a Lutheran Dogmatic, may be thought to be all right; but a *Lutheran commentary!* The Bible read through Lutheran spectacles, and interpreted in the light of Lutheran conceptions! In exegesis confessional and denominational prepossessions should have no place. The light in which the Bible should be interpreted is that which shines in the Bible itself, not that which proceeds from any ecclesiastical confession. The exegete and commentator should entirely forget his ecclesiastical relations, and be mindful only of his obligations to the objective truth of the word of God.

But after all such ecclesiastical independence on the part of a biblical theologian is a position which it is difficult to maintain; and the usual result is that a commentary is colored by the confessional and dogmatic prepossessions of its author. If a Roman Catholic writes a commentary, it will be sure to be a Roman Catholic commentary. And the same will be the case with the work of a Presbyterian, Methodist or Baptist. A Presbyterian will inevitably write a Calvinistic commentary, however much he may flatter himself that he is free from confessional bias; and a Methodist is nothing if not Arminian. Why should it not be so also with a Lutheran? And if he has the honesty and the courage to avow the fact, so much the better for him. The idea of a Lutheran commentary may then after all not involve so much of a contradiction as may at first sight appear.

In the volume before us the evidences of Lutheranism are, however, not very marked. We have not seen any of the preceding volumes of the series; but if they are all like the present one,



then we should say that the denominationalism is to be found rather in the general tone of propriety and orthodoxy, than in any distinctively Lutheran doctrines presented. Dr. Wolf, moreover, tells us in the preface to this volume that he is as much indebted to the Anglicans Ellicott and Westcott, and to the Reformed Van Aostersee and Ebrard, as he is to such pre-eminently Lutheran divines as Huther and Delitzsch. And a somewhat careful examination of the volume has convinced us that this statement is not unfounded, and that the commentary is in fact no less Catholic than commentaries generally are which do not appear under a denominational name.

The plan of this commentary is to furnish results rather than to show how they are reached. There is no display of scientific apparatus, and no review of exegetical opinions. The text adopted is that of the revised English version, the Greek being seldom referred to, except when necessary to illustrate the meaning of the English translation. This fits the commentary for the use of intelligent laymen as well as for that of ministers. The introductions to the various books are brief, giving simply conclusions without burdening the reader with discussions of opposing theories. The author has no doubt as to the genuineness of the *pastoral epistles*, remarking that the difference of style between them and St. Paul's unquestioned epistles can be explained by the difference of matter and the time of composition. Dr. Wolf accepts the hypothesis of the apostle's release from the Roman imprisonment described in the last chapters of the Acts, and supposes that first Timothy and Titus were written subsequently to this event, while second Timothy must have been written during a second imprisonment at Rome. In regard to the authorship and destination of the Epistle to the Hebrews Dr. Wolf accepts the current view of total uncertainty. We do not think, however, that he states the case against the notion of Pauline authorship strongly enough. He says that this notion has as much against it as for it. In our opinion internal evidence makes it *impossible* that Paul could have written this epistle.

The interpretations adopted in this volume are always conservative, and, as we think, generally correct. On some points, of course, we would dissent from the opinions of the commentator. For instance, the rule laid down in 1 Tim. iii. 2 that a "bishop must be the husband of one wife" is explained as referring to second marriages after the death of former wives, while we would suppose it to refer to polygamy or concubinage, which was not uncommon in that age in the Greek and Roman world. In commenting on the Epistle to the Hebrews it seems to us that our author sometimes resorts to forced interpretations in order to save a certain theory of inspiration. So, for instance, when in ix: 4, the golden altar is placed within the holy of holies of the temple, the commentator imagines that this statement is adopted by the



writer because on the day of atonement, when the veil was up, the golden altar was practically within the most holy place, standing directly before the ark. That is saving the writer's knowledge of the arrangement of the temple at the expense of his ability to state it clearly. So also the commentator accounts for the change, in the Septuagint of Ps. xl: 6, of the sentence, "Mine ears hast thou opened," into the sentence "A body didst thou prepare for me," by saying that "both texts teach essentially the same truth, namely, what sacrifices are acceptable to God." We would say that the translation of the Septuagint here presents an accidental error, of which the writer of Hebrews was unconscious. This would make his argument defective in form, while it would, however, not affect its substance. But the Epistle to the Hebrews is not an easy book for the commentator to deal with; and we think that Dr. Wolf has produced a work which must prove of great value for the class of readers for whom it was evidently designed. The same is true also of the commentary by Dr. Horn on the brief but exceedingly beautiful and tender Epistle to Philemon. Besides ministers, this commentary will be helpful to intelligent laymen and Sunday-school teachers, who desire more perfect knowledge of the Bible.

HOMILIES OF SCIENCE. By Dr. Paul Carus. Second Edition. Pages, 317. Price, 35 cents. Paper cover. The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, Ills. 1897.

These *Homilies of Science* first appeared in the *Open Court*, a publication devoted to the "religion of science." They are short articles on a great variety of subjects, such as *revelation, God, nature, freedom, immortality, the soul, ethics, faith, doubt, etc.* They are written in a direct and interesting style, generally profound in thought, and elicit the attention of the intelligent reader, whether he agrees with the views expressed or not.

The religion of science, which it is the purpose of this publication to promote, is something which it is not easy to define. One can easily tell what it is not. It is not the religion of the Church or of any of the creeds of Christendom. Nor is it the religion of any of the ethnic establishments. It is called the religion of science in order to distinguish it from the religions of faith, because it claims to rest upon facts which may be stated with scientific exactness and circumspection. In the preface to this book we are told that it is the religion of humanity, the cosmic religion, the religion of life, and the religion of immortality. It should be stated, however, that by immortality the author does not seem to mean personal immortality, or the extension of personal consciousness beyond the death of the individual.

The only immortality there is for men is the immortality of the species. We live again in our offspring, and the conduct of our life largely shapes the fortunes of our posterity. This is the



source of ethics. And Dr. Carus has a great deal to say on ethical subjects, and generally treats them in a way that is calculated to lead one to hope that he himself is not far from the kingdom of God. Of God, too, he writes much, and makes various efforts to make his conception clear to his readers. God is not nothing; God is not a person; God is not nature; these are a few of his positions. Perhaps the following sentences, on page 93, come nearest to a positive definition of God: "God is nature in so far only as nature serves us as a regulative principle for our actions. God is the cosmos in so far only as its laws represent the ultimate authority of moral conduct." Dr. Carus rejects the theories of atheism, theism, and pantheism, and adopts as the proper designation of his own theory the term *entheism*. Of course he rejects the idea of the personality of God. God is mind, but not a mind—that is, not mind concentrated into the unity of self-consciousness.

We do not believe that Dr. Carus is going to make many converts to the religion of science. We rather hope that he himself will some day be converted back to the religious principles in which he was educated; for he is the son of a clergyman. Meanwhile we commend his book to the attention of thoughtful persons who desire to know something of "the possibilities of speculative thought."

**THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.** By Ch. Piepenbring, Pastor and President of the Reformed Consistory at Strassburg. Translated from the French, by permission of the author, with added references for English readers, by H. G. Mitchell, Professor in Boston University. Pages 361. New York, 46 East 14th Street. Thomas Y. Crowell & Company.

This is a most convenient volume for the study of a great and important science. Biblical Theology, as a distinct science, has thus far been cultivated only by the Germans; and even among the Germans the number of works devoted to the subject is not large. On the Old Testament we have Oehler, in two volumes, accessible also in an English translation. But Oehler is not up to time, and is besides, hard to read. In both of these respects this volume of Piepenbring's is far superior. It embodies the results of the latest critical scholarship both in Germany and in France; and in language and style it is all that any English reader could wish. The French language generally does not present the same difficulties to the English translator which the German presents, as it possesses more of the directness of the English.

M. Piepenbring, as will be observed, is a minister of the Reformed Church, and occupies an important official position in the city in which he lives and labors. But this does not prevent him from being a critical student of the Bible. The work before us, however, is not a work of criticism. The critical work is rather presupposed; and the author in general adopts the views which



are presented by the school of the higher critics. In the treatment of the theology of the Old Testament he adopts the historical method, which enables him to show how the various doctrines were gradually developed in the successive periods of Israelitish history. He makes *three periods*, the first extending from the earliest times to about the beginning of the eighth century, the second from the beginning of the eighth century to the end of the exile, and the third from the exile to about the middle of the second century, B. C. The literature of the Old Testament is distributed to the successive periods according to the views prevalent among the higher critics.

But is not this historical method of studying the Bible, which takes account of the development of ideas and customs in the course of time, admits more or less important divergencies among biblical documents, and allows the possibility of doctrinal and historical errors—is not this method of studying the Bible going to shake the foundations of faith? To this question we can not do better than to give the author's reply, which at once shows both the style and the spirit of the book: "Faith in the orthodox sense of intellectual adherence to a dogmatic system, considered as perfect and infallible, because, as it claims, it is drawn from an infallible source, and rests on its infallible authority—such a faith is evidently impaired beyond recovery by the historical study of the Bible. But is this true faith, faith in the biblical sense? Certainly not. It is the product of Jewish rabbinism and Christian dogmatism. Faith, as the Bible, especially the Old Testament, freed from rabbinical influence, understands it, is not faith in the sacred letter, the written word, but faith in the manifestations of God in history, in His interference in the world with a view to the salvation of humanity, faith in the living word, inspired by the divine spirit in the prophets, faith in the holy mission of these men of God. Now we claim that this faith is not impaired, and could not be, by the historical study of the Bible, because this faith has for its foundation not simple words, but facts, evident and undeniable facts," p. 345.

But space forbids our multiplication of examples of the author's teaching. Enough has, however, been said to give the reader an idea of the character of this book. The book furnishes in a brief compass an answer to the question, what sort of biblical theology is going to come out of the higher criticism, and shows that such theology may be consistent with the highest interests of religion.



# THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW.

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NO. 4.—OCTOBER, 1897.

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## I.

### IRRATIONALITY OF DOUBT.

BY PROFESSOR JACOB COOPER.

By Doubt, as the term will be employed in this paper, is meant that temper of mind which disbelieves before investigating the sources of knowledge. It shows its animus by demanding different proof in one department of inquiry from what it accepts without questioning in another. This is seen especially in requiring evidence for religious doctrines clearer and more forcible than what it is compelled to act upon in the common affairs of life, and thus it shows that the opposition results from hostility rather than insufficiency of proof.

Doubt is used as a generic term, and comprehends all grades of unbelief from the lowest forms of arbitrary distrust to the highest as shown in agnosticism, which distinctly declares that nothing can be known and therefore nothing ought to be believed. The generic term is used for the reason that the temper which leads a man to distrust a fact before he has evidence against it, and especially before he has tried honestly to understand it, will inevitably lead him to reject whatever truths he opposes, no matter how clearly they be proven.

Man's spiritual nature is sustained by knowledge as his body

is by food. The desire to know is native to the soul,\* and exists in direct proportion to the capacity to receive. There must be something to satisfy the appetite in the one case as well as in the other, else it had not been implanted ; and the failure to receive the needful sustenance must prove fatal alike in both. Hence, as no body can be nurtured by a Barmecidal feast, so the spirit must languish if there be nothing on which to feed. In the search for this nourishment two prime conditions are, that it exist somewhere, and can be found provided it be sought in the proper way and place. These are assumed by all who investigate, and no sensible person would make any effort if either of these conditions were wanting. Spencer says : “ Every logical act of the intellect is a predication, is an assertion that something is, and this is what we call belief. \* \* Not only is the invariable existence of a belief our sole warrant for every truth of immediate consciousness, and for every primary generalization of the truths of immediate consciousness—every axiom, but it is the sole warrant for every demonstration.”† The pursuit and employment of knowledge, which are the philosopher’s sole business, take for granted its existence, and that he has powers adequate to its discovery. Otherwise his strength is spent in beating the air ; and instead of being wise, and the guide of his fellow man, he is the most ignorant and absurd of all.

Belief and not doubt, assurance and not uncertainty, courage, not hesitancy, form the temper which is demanded of all who would make progress in knowledge, or be leaders in action. Doubt has no place in the investigation of any science, or the practice of art or handicraft. The inquirer may be careful of his data and guard his methods with vigilance, but he is fully assured that if he persists in the right course some discovery will reward his efforts. The care which he exercises is only the expression of the sense of his own imperfections, and the necessity of improvement by self-culture ; but in no case questions that there is truth in Nature, or that he has the ability to reach it ulti-

\*Aristot. Met. Book I. C. I., πάντες ἄνθρωποι του εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει.

† Herbert Spencer’s Psychology : p. 14 ; Ibid., p. 28.



mately. This effort in the search is a warrant for his belief. While he may distrust his particular method, this implies that there is some one which, if followed, will prove successful. When, therefore, he abandons one way of search because it has proved delusive, the true philosopher merely feels that he has eliminated one useless factor in his calculation; and in getting rid of a surd is, though hitherto unsuccessful, actually that much nearer the true goal. Hence Kepler was quite as confident of the existence of a planetary law at the surrender of each one of the nineteen invalid hypotheses as he was when he demonstrated the validity of the twentieth.

Yet we are constantly told that Doubt is the only correct method of procedure in the march after truth. In proof it is asserted that men are prone to believe without evidence, and so build up baseless systems of religion and philosophy, which the world is ready to accept without questioning. And since it is so much easier to yield assent than to investigate—even for those who are able—while the majority of mankind have neither the ability nor the leisure to test erroneous theories, the sifting process of Doubt becomes imperatively necessary to expose error and elicit the truth. So much is said in praise of “Honest Doubt,” and the thralldom of men’s minds under hoary errors and superstitions, that we might be led to think the only rational course for the human mind is to believe nothing at all, and, as a consequence, do nothing.

Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, is often quoted as founding his Method on Doubt. He says that there came a crisis in his mental history when he began his life work anew by calling in question all his former beliefs and for the time being treating them as if they were false.\* This he tells us he did in order to discover if there were any foundation which could abide all assault, and be universally accepted, on which he could build *de novo*, the structure of his philosophy. But from this very statement of his purpose, it is clear that in his procedure he was not actuated by Doubt, but by the firmest belief. This confi-

\*On Method, Part IV., Principles of Philosophy, I.

dence was shown by giving all possible odds to the adversaries of his method, yet feeling sure that after this surrender his position is still impregnable. Descartes' attitude toward Doubt has been misunderstood or wilfully perverted by all who seek from him support for their unbelief. For underneath this assumed questioning of his former beliefs, he has unshaken faith in the certitude of his mental processes. His temper of mind throughout this ordeal to which he subjected his powers was not uncertainty, but the fullest assurance that after Doubt had done its utmost there was a foundation on which he could forever rest secure. Hence in digging to lay his foundation of *cogito ergo sum* he assumed that far below the shifting surface of speculation and controversy there is a rock of Truth and this he has resolved to reach. Therefore, he could afford to throw aside his cherished theories, and for that time consider his previously acquired wisdom as straw and stubble, because he was absolutely certain that somewhere in the depths of human consciousness there is a foundation which, if it can be reached, will be a place to fix his fulcrum to move the universe of mind. Doubt, therefore, while apparently the actuating spirit of his method, was in truth the farthest from it. He set up a man of straw and knocked it over, and so proved that belief had power to annihilate his own Doubt. So far then from the preliminary process of Descartes giving color to the claims of unbelief, let it now be said, once for all, that it proceeded by a *reductio ad absurdum* to its complete overthrow.

There is a world-wide difference between an overweening confidence that we know everything so infallibly that we cannot be mistaken in anything, and the view of the agnostic that we can know nothing. This tenet was held by Gorgias, Antisthenes and Pyrrho, from whose school of skepticism Hume, Hartmann, Clifford and their followers sucked all the living blood which is in their systems. The first named said with a *naïveté* truly refreshing: "There is nothing in existence; but if there were, it is unknown; and if there were and it could be known, it could not be explained to others."\* Though the Greek Pyrrho gave

\*Gorgias : In Mullach, *Fragmenta Phil. Graec.* I., 302.



the name to the boldest form of agnosticism, yet this doctrine did not take a firm root among his race. For Greek speculation was too thoroughly permeated with common sense, and dwelt too constantly in affirmative assumptions which mean something, to be content with fruitless negations. For the professed nescience of Socrates and his school was merely a foil to lure on the pretentious wisdom of their opponents to display itself that their real ignorance might be the more easily exposed.

But in modern speculation agnosticism has assumed large dimensions. We have now a great crop of philosophers of nescience, who, ignorant of their true paternity, call Hume their father, and labor with signal success to prove that they do not, and cannot, know anything. In the world of chaos which they create they show that knowledge is impossible, since the cosmos was not designed nor made; that there are neither causes nor effects; that there is no connection between volition and action; that there is no mind separate from matter; and if there were, the one could not know or influence the other. Thus knowledge, other than "material consciousness of impressions"—and what that may mean they do not tell us—is for us impossible. But let the agnostic estimate himself at his true value. He ought to know what this is better than any one else. But let him not measure the common sense of the world by the yardstick of his own valuation. Consistency would lead any one who holds this doctrine to do nothing but stifle the yearnings of his spirit to penetrate Nature's secrets, and so repress every effort to grow wiser or extend his mastery. For, on his theory, the labor must be vain, and the soul grow weary by its fruitless exertions. We must not, however, expect consistency of unbelief. For then it must use the reasoning powers to show that there is no mind, and so to establish its position must take away the very ground on which it is compelled to stand when making its supreme effort.

Again: Doubt is the direct reverse of the state of mind which is native to man. As a child he believes everything, and with an irrepressible curiosity reaches out in all directions to gratify the

desire for knowledge. The child's nature is open to the reception of information from every quarter, and with this temper it sets out on its mission of life. It suspects no deception, and never doubts until it experiences with sorrow the untrustworthiness of those who are older and should be its guides. The mind being created in harmony with the universe which gives veracious answers to all who have ears to hear, the child participates with its surroundings in that system which is regulated by truth. Acting on its native impulses, which are in harmony with this principle, it learns more during the first five years of its life than in all that remains, though this be prolonged to old age. For its entire course during this period is guided by insatiate curiosity, and is disturbed by no misgivings as to the truthfulness of Nature. Its bodily senses are fresh and in healthy activity. It reaches out feelers armed with an interrogation point in all directions. Each sense is trusted implicitly, and if its special information is qualified by that of another, the new witness does not prove the falsity of the separate sources of knowledge. The resultant of several forces, though not in the direction of either, yet combines in itself and shows the full effect of each. The child may be deceived by sight at first in regard to the distance of objects, which it reaches out to grasp though they be far removed. But it still trusts its eye while correcting the apparent results of vision by the tests of the other senses. Mill says:\* "There is no appeal from the human faculties generally, but there is an appeal from one human faculty to another; from the judging faculty to those which take cognizance of fact and consciousness." Hence, no number of failures shakes the child's confidence in the veracity of its senses, or begets the absurd notion that nothing can be known. Nay, rather the mind is stimulated to fresh efforts by discovering the necessity of a wider generalization. Nature is found to be boundless in its extent, and each portion so joined to all the rest that no fact can be fully known apart from its relations.† So the mind gradually learns to know itself as the di-

\* Mill's Logic, p. 399, 8th ed.

† Plato, Timæus : 37, A. ἄτε οὖν ἐκ τῆς ταύτου καὶ τῆς πατέρου φύσεως ἐκ τε οὐσίας κ. τ. λ. Leibnitz Op. Phil. Ed. Erdmann, p. 466.



rector sitting at the helm of life, and correlating the forces which the senses supply for investigating the external world. Thus the inquiry goes on, each process correcting itself by a wider induction of facts; but Nature is not charged with our previous mistakes, nor are they made the obstacle to our subsequent progress. Hence, we see it is the constitution of the mind to have perfect confidence in the existence of objective truth, and the integrity of our powers, physical and mental, in its discovery. So long as these powers are in healthy action, that is while we let them work as Nature directs, there is no room to distrust the accuracy of their combined testimony. For when they are put in communication with Nature she reveals her secrets. She is not conquered, it is true, except by obedience. *Natura enim non nisi parendo vincitur*.\* But there need be no uncertainty as to her movements; for when she is properly interrogated her responses are her secrets. Hence, the mind, whether acting on matter external to itself or directed within to its own processes, has no misgivings concerning the existence of truth. It always feels sure that there is a way which leads to this, and that it is endowed by Nature with ability to find this road.

The progress of the individual in childhood is the counterpart of that of the whole race. The child moves forward by the increased strength gained through each preceding step. The belief in the veracity of Nature and its own powers to interpret may not be apparent to itself. Nay, rather, it eats of all the fruits in the garden which are good for food because it is wholly unconscious that there is such a forbidden tree as Doubt. The nature, as yet pure and uncontaminated by distrust, uses its powers without questioning, and finds its confidence abused only through the deceptions practiced upon its sincerity by others who have lost the simplicity of faith.† But when the element of distrust enters it brings discord into the hitherto harmonious action of the mind. This is something foreign, having no right there, and enters the paradise of childlike trust only to mar its beauty

\* Bacon: *Novum Organum*, Lib. I., 3.

† Theognis, 305-308. Ed. Bergk.

and stay its progress in the pursuit of truth. But there still abides, though in most cases unconsciously, the assurance that Belief is the normal state, and where this is heeded it gives peace and insures spiritual growth. For the child discovers that Doubt is confined to the communications with other men, and can have no place either in the responses of the mind when acting upon itself or the external world. That this unconscious action in childhood is the normal process is plain from what the mind does when it begins to speculate on its own modes of action, and so philosophizes consciously. Then the possibility of error is seen to arise from inductions which are false through lack of requisite care in judging from true premises, or such as are imperfect through slight investigation. Here the fact sought for is not made manifest because those leading up to it have not been fully apprehended, or their true significance has been perverted. As the child when he discovered that vision alone could not reveal the distance of an object, and, therefore, he was deceived until the sense of sight was supplemented and corrected by others; so the philosopher learns that his first inductions, which are faulty, must be recast from a wider generalization, one which shall embrace the truth in more of its affiliations.\* At each step up the mountain the prospect becomes wider, the objects more numerous, the distant points more indistinct through the intervening haze; but at the same time all that go to make up the panorama are real and could be discerned if our powers were increased and directed more intensely to each particular, so in the vista of knowledge which meets the gaze as the field of observation widens and furnishes more materials for our reflective powers. The methods of verification are precisely alike. The child corrects one sense by another; the philosopher subjects a notion about which he feels uncertain to the test of another power of the mind correlate to that which had the experience, and so verifies that which he has found, by his broadened view and sharper discrimination, was accepted at first on insufficient grounds. What the child does instinctively and unconsciously the philosopher has now learned to

\* Mill's Logic, p. 232.



do systematically and of set purpose. The method pursued is the same, the result reached alike, and the purposes, conscious or not, identical.

But because the senses deceive us when they are not properly used, or, through lack of careful induction by the reason, false conclusions are often drawn, it is asserted by the skeptical that these sources are radically fallacious and cannot be trusted; that our minds swayed by custom or prejudice decide just as our inclinations tend, and consequently we have no reliable tests of knowledge.\* The doubter points to the errors which have prevailed on the most clear and simple facts as a justification for believing nothing. Plato said long ago: "It is not hard to dispute, *i. e.*, to doubt about a matter."† It is easy to offer objections which are difficult to answer when the adversary desires to be captious and not to elicit the truth. For every truth of whatever sort is connected with all others, either directly or indirectly; both with facts which are known to some extent, but to a much greater with those which are wholly unknown. As the latter must be incalculably more numerous to any mind which possesses less than infinite grasp, it is impossible to see a fact in all its relations. Hence any statement which is not self-evident must be proved by established data, and the evidence of these sought for in the way we arrive at all reasoned truth; that is, by an induction from facts admitted, and a deduction from accepted principles. If the case be of such sort that it cannot be demonstrated, we must determine from a balancing of probabilities. From the nature of the case, therefore, every truth which is in process of proof must be liable to objections, else it would be accepted at once and require no further evidence. Accordingly, he who chooses can always find some objection to everything that does not admit of demonstrative proof. And when an objection can be raised which with our present knowledge is insoluble, it is triumphantly claimed that this is fatal to the truth of that assertion which is obnoxious to this objection. And the irrational

\*Plato, *Phædo*: 90. B. ἐπειδὴν τὴς πιστέυσης \* \* \* μὲνει.

†*Theætetus*, 158. D. τόγε ἀμφισβητησάιν οὐ χαλεπὸν.

course of the doubter consists in laying stress on the one objection, while the multitude of cogent proofs in support go for nothing. For the existence of objections, even to all the clearest truths, except possibly those established through demonstration by means of abstract definitions, is inseparable from the limitations of human thought. Why all truths are not demonstrable or self-evident to us is the same as asking why man is not God. And why they cannot be attained without effort is not for us to inquire, because this is one of the secret things held in reserve by infinite wisdom. It is certain that truth is won, like everything else desirable, by effort and patient search. We may see a reason for this without knowing that it is the cause. Our life is evidently intended for discipline, the building up of character through the exercise of reasonable effort. Hence we get our knowledge for practical life always by separating the probable from the improbable, and accepting the preponderance of evidence as sufficient to claim our assent and guide our conduct.\* And so the labor in building up character, either mental or moral, consists in the search for reasonable proof for our faith and practice; and he who wishes to continue without growth has the easy task of cavil, and thus justify his inactivity. He can show his power by suggesting objections which, if not answered, seem to invalidate the truth he impugns, but which, after a fact has been seen in its essential relations, are found to be wholly trivial. Accordingly the rôle of the objector is the chosen work of weak and wrong-headed men, with a view to bring themselves into a notoriety which they could not attain by any fruitful methods, while they shield their destructive purpose under the guise of free inquiry. Like the enemies of our government during the Civil War, every measure which thwarted their treasonable purpose was declared unconstitutional by those whose avowed object was to dismember the Union guarded by the Constitution; so these enemies of the truth, in their great zeal for its preservation, are perpetually worried lest a man who believes something may ad-

\* Plato, *Phædo*: 85. C. D. τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρώπων λόγων \* \* \* διαπορεῖν ὄναι.



vance arguments in support of his faith which admit of a possible objection. With the pretense of seeking truth alone, and professing to be actuated by uncommon fairness, they declare that they will believe nothing which cannot be demonstrated, and demand proof which is neither possible in the nature of things nor required by fair-minded men in matters of daily concern. While their ostensible purpose is to expose error, the greatest error of all is seen in a perverted temper which is predetermined to disbelieve. For the doubter has changed his nature, has departed from the only rational method of seeking truth. This "freedom from prejudice," as has been well said,\* "is often an unscientific persistence in superficial opinion, and full of unripe conceits." He does not hold his judgment in abeyance, waiting for convincing proof, for he has resolved in advance not to believe and, therefore, will not be convinced. Hence his search is not for evidence, but for objections. It is not enough that he has no faith and wishes none, but he desires that the faith of those who are doing their good work in quiet assurance shall be destroyed.

Opposed to this perverted temper, the believer stands in marked contrast. He finds when he awakens to consciousness in childhood an eager desire to learn, with exhaustless means to gratify his craving. He early discovers that information can be gained on every hand through the avenues of the senses, and the statements of those on whose care his helpless infancy taught him to rely. While he is endowed with a nature to believe everything and trust everybody, he feels himself in complete harmony with his surroundings. His senses and reason are adapted to gain information as plainly as the opening flower to receive the sunshine and the rain. His eye is sunny, as Goethe says, because it was made to see the sun, and it is a pleasant thing to see the light. External nature is mirrored in the internal glass of the soul. The undefiled spirit is prone to believe what is told it by those who are older and wiser than itself. The helplessness of the child, ere consciousness dawned, prepared the way for reli-

\* Ueberweg's *Logic*, Eng. trans., p. 552.

ance on the statements made by those on whose care he was cast, as trustfully as the infant rests upon the supporting arms and cherishing bosom of maternity. For why should there be lack of confidence any more in accepting the statements of those whose province it is to give mental nurture in things above his capacity than in receiving his mother's milk and the loving care of her hands? There never would be if those whose duty it is to instruct the young immortal were always faithful to that trust, which is the first dictate of humanity and the rightful claim of the dependent child. During that period in which the mind is almost wholly receptive there is not the least tendency to doubt except where the wilful falsity of others compels the child to act unnaturally. This is the first awakening of the mind to a real sorrow. And from this irrational distrust we must be converted, and once more have the child's unquestioning faith before we can rightfully interpret the facts of nature or possess the temper fitted to enter the Kingdom of Heaven.\*

But with the advance of years a new source of information opens up. Gradually the mind awakens to a consciousness that it possesses a higher than merely receptive power. Man feels within himself a faculty of combining the mental impressions received through the senses, and by comparison discovers their agreement or differences. This faculty displays itself in two directions. The first logical act that man is fully conscious of or can comprehend is that he can view two judgments together, which are themselves the resultant of two, or perhaps all his bodily senses, tested by the judge sitting in mental chambers. From two of these judgments viewed apart from all others there arises a relation which itself becomes the object of thought. This, while derived from the conceptions compared, becomes a new factor of experience, and is an object of spiritual comprehension as clearly and imperatively when presented before the mind and by the power of attention fixed there, as the material object grasped in the hand, held before the eyes, and apprehended by all the senses. The relations between these two mental im-

\* Matt., xviii., 3.



pressions is just as much a part of man's acquired knowledge as the sensible impressions, and becomes the material for further intellectual modifications. For with this relation derived from the judgment touching these two impressions, the mind can combine another deduced in like manner, and another even any number that can be retained accurately in memory. These it can unite by fixing on any quality in which they agree or are analogous in some features, and continue this process until there is gathered a treasure of these relations. These are by the mind objectified and become the copies of the Platonic ideas, the true realities, which have an eternal existence in the mind of God. Again : From two or more of these ideas which have a common characteristic, the mind can deduce a new and more recondite conception, and combine this with another ; thus embodying a more subtle relation, rising continually to a higher generalization. While busied simply with the information given by the senses, the mind has nothing more than a string or series of impressions, having no connection but that of sequence, and distinguished merely by degrees of intensity. But now the conscious agent begins to acquire a store of reasoned truth. For the comparison of judgments enables the mind to fix upon their agreement or disagreement, and introduces a new factor which is as true and as real as the original judgments from which it was derived. Man finds that there is no limit in nature to this process, and none in fact but his own ability to discern and retain in memory these relations. As in material things when he ascends a hill from which the prospect spreads out before him he is greatly elated with the wealth of beauty in which his senses revel. But as he mounts higher, and from a lofty height looks afar, he discovers that Nature widens without limit, and the sphere of knowledge accordingly, but that he cannot take in this constantly enlarging horizon. His intellectual powers feel their limitations and stagger under their load, even as do his bodily senses in contemplating the boundless wealth of Nature. But he all the time feels sure that beyond the reach of his intellect the universe of abstract truth is quite as rich and varied, and the

secrets it has to whisper as desirable to be known and as true as in the narrower ken which his limited powers have already mastered. He does not suppose that Nature ceases to extend where he is unable to follow. Nor does he suspect that the information which is there contained is not as true and as capable of being known, provided he could examine each part in detail, or had such increased capacity of comprehension as to be able to master it all at once. Were he to doubt the veracity of Nature in a place beyond or above his present grasp simply because it is beyond *his grasp*, he would be false both to his mental constitution and his past experience. His first intellectual step was quickened by impressions made upon his senses, and the result verified by their acting in concert with his mind. The prior elements having been combined in the same way any number of times produced the same result. As in the work of the physicist, every time he unites two elements of a known constitution and in a given way, he gets the same compound; so in the laboratory of the mind the two clearly defined conceptions by being united create another, invariably the same, when the mind unites them in the same manner. Both elements are trustworthy, else the third could not follow as an invariable result. Thus under these high generalizations we compass a wider stretch of abstract truth than the intellect can grasp in its boundless extent and variety of concrete elements. And in order to deal with such universal truths we employ symbols which stand for all that those signify, but are not analyzed and considered in all the details which they embrace. Yet we are compelled by our mental constitution and the necessity for rapid work to rest upon these higher notions with the same unquestioning faith that we had in the elements of which they are composed, and which we could comprehend clearly when they were separately considered.

Thus, what is seen in the intellectual cosmos, and which is near, becomes a voucher for that which is unseen and remote. Both the material and the spiritual rest upon evidence gained in the same way and believed in with equal faith. We cannot deny one any more than the other, nor distrust either without doing



violence both to present consciousness and past experience. For we have been taught incessantly that there is something beyond our powers at any time to reach and investigate.\* But as strength has increased and we fully mastered that which came before us at successive periods, we found that it presented precisely the same features as that which had been observed heretofore. And hence we are equally sure that if we could, through an enlarged capacity, comprehend that which lies beyond our present attainments, we would find the same conditions to hold good in what is as yet incomprehensible; and so on without end. This is our search warrant of Faith, and armed with this we can serenely make our way through an infinity of space and eternity of time.

There is, therefore, no defect in our mental processes, save their limitations, any more than untruthfulness in external nature. Her utterances are true because they are what she actually is, and can be understood by a mind which is equally veracious in its deliverances. But the mind is circumscribed in its action by certain conditions which may be considered inseparable from any intelligence short of omniscience. It is our destiny to know but in part that world in which we are placed, and wield but a small portion of that power with which we are connected. This is certainly not our fault, nor does it make our knowledge false or the powers we can employ useless. Neither is it our misfortune, provided the imperfection be turned to its proper use. If it be employed as an incentive to the discipline of faith, of industry, and of carefulness to avoid mistakes, it becomes a powerful stimulant to improvement, growth and capacity for happiness. We find ourselves on a par with everything about us. For each thing is incomplete in itself, and can be understood perfectly only when viewed in all its relations. Each individual object is a part of

\* See Paulsen's *Metaph*, p. 234. The limit of our wits is not the limit of existence. The day-fly may think when the sun sets and its life ends with the coming of night: Now, all is over; the light is extinguished forever and the whole world is sinking into darkness and death. Man, who has seen so many suns rise and set, ought to have learned enough to believe that the infinite contains possibilities and issues that are hidden from him.

something else ; in one sense complete when viewed in its separate use and purpose ; in another, incomplete, because connected with something beyond which is necessary to its full significance. The part just as truly is connected with the whole, nay, presupposes it, as the whole does the part. The Here and the Now necessitate the Beyond and the Future ; and it is contrary to all dictates of common sense to hold that there is a change of relation at the dividing line, so that what is present with us is true and what is removed in space or future in time is false. We are compelled to think thus because the dividing line which separates the known from the unknown is constantly moving forward. The most advanced thoughts of to-day become the rudiments of tomorrow's lessons. What is now obscure will soon be clear, so that what is deemed the farthest bound of human investigation will be the base of supplies for future learned expeditions. We instinctively feel, and science corroborates the idea, that Nature is boundless in her domain. Stanley may each day diminish the arc marked "Unexplored Region," but the unexplored in the sphere of knowledge spreads out to infinity. And as the dividing line between the known and the unknown is constantly being pushed forward, it would be the height of absurdity to say that what is beyond the reach of present science is not subject to the same laws as that which is on this side, or that it will be mastered by different processes, or, finally, cannot be known. Whatever has been done thus far has been by implicit confidence in the veracious utterances of Nature as apprehended by those who have ears to hear.

As the power of the mind increases and matures through constant activity, it finds that its function is not merely passive in the acquisition of knowledge, nor elaborative in combining the sense impressions by the reasoning process, and from them deducing new conceptions.\* The first data on which it acts seem to be gained exclusively through the senses, and the subsequent de-

\* Kant : *Krit. der rein. ver.* 1. 140. To vindicate this power of the mind was the special aim of Kant in his great work, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*. This author clearly saw that the pure sensationalism of Hume led to Pyrrhonism in philosophy, and made any religion impossible.



ductions, even the most abstruse, to rest ultimately upon them. But after a time the mind perceives itself to be creative and that it contributes from its native stores a full share of material. Doubtless this creative function is in activity much earlier than philosophers have been wont to admit, because of the difficulty there is in tracing the more recondite movements of the mind in childhood. For the elements of thought contributed by the senses are so blended with what the mind furnishes independently that it is difficult to discriminate and assign what belongs to each. The ability to do this successfully involves such power as the child cannot be expected to possess before habits of reflection are well matured. But when the mind is sufficiently advanced to turn inward upon itself, and is taught to study its own processes, it discovers certain truths which cannot be the product of the senses nor be derived from the materials which they furnish.\* This is a fact which can be successfully maintained in opposition to all the sensational philosophers from Lucretius to Büchner and Spencer. In fact, this truth is self-evident to any one who has no theory to support, from even a cursory examination of mental phenomena. For these data of intuition, or first truths, are not in the relations of external nature in such sort as to find their way through to the mind by any of the five gateways of material knowledge, but are already there in the chambers of imagery which the mind constructs for itself.† They are its independent contribution to the process of knowledge without which sensations would have no coherence, and hence no unity, but have a separate impression each for itself. Sensationalism may utter its oracular dictum: "There is not anything in the intellect which was not previously in the senses," and rest upon this as unanswerable. But Leibnitz, with the prerogative of genius, brushes away this fallacious shibboleth as though it were a cobweb by adding, "except the intellect itself." That is, the mind existed as an active, self-originating power before it received any sense impressions. By its native vigor it discerns certain fundamental principles for

\* Kritik, Supp. XIII., Vol. I. Eng., pp. 430-1.

† Kr. d. I. V., I., 432.

its own guidance which are called primary truths—data for thinking—so called because they are necessary conditions of its own action, and tacitly assumed in every process by which the materials of sense are elaborated in discursive thought. Whence these data come may be matter for questioning. Their source, their number, and the period they first appear, have been disputed. They may be like the wind which bloweth where it listeth, and while we perceive the effects, cannot tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth. Plato said they are congenital,\* and, therefore, proved the soul's pre-existence. For, argued he, we possess these ideas now ; we could not get them in this life through the action of our senses ; and certainly there was nothing in the act or circumstances of birth which could furnish them. But it is more rational to hold that they are an integral part of the mind itself, and arise in consciousness as a product of mental growth ; that is, the development of the native powers of the mind through its own exercise.† They arise like the forces in Nature so gradually, their movement is so noiseless that their origin is not noticed until they appear full grown and ready for action. This at least we are certain in regard to them. They underlie all the sciences, and in fact all the processes of the mind. And yet they do not present themselves to us formally until after the mind has arrived at full maturity in most or all of its processes. To some persons they never arise into consciousness and become objects of contemplation ; albeit they underlie the activities of the most uncultured, and are by them necessarily employed in case they think at all. Their number and clearness depend upon the intellectual grasp of each person and as he is aided by culture, but especially by the analytic habit. While the bright child subsumes them in all his thinking, yet if one of these so subsumed were presented to him in the briefest and simplest terms he would scarcely comprehend its meaning. But a time arrives when the mind having become fully conscious of its strength, and viewing subjects in their higher relations, discovers that the Cosmos is the antitype

\* Phædo: 75. B. C. D.

† Kant : K., Vol. II., pp. 140-143; with Supp., XV., XVIII.



of the intellectual nature.\* It awakens to a conception of the unchanging Idea typified in the structure of the rational soul and the works of physical creation, which both in a like manner exhibit themselves as the parts of a system arranged by Intelligence acting through Design. Thus we discover that there is a real "relation between thinking and existence, an agreement between thought and the objects of thought."† This important thought, which is the constant goal toward which every subject of scientific inquiry is struggling, was grasped in *its* integrity, and expressed with *his* felicity by Schleiermacher when he said that "the content of Logic must correspond with the content of Nature." For the several forms of knowledge are necessarily related to the individual forms of existence; and so is system to the sum total of them all, or the orderly concatenation of them all. Kant says: "The forms of thought which belong to us *a priori*, or independently of all experience, are the basis of the apodicticity of knowledge.‡ Now whether these ideas belong to the mind itself, and so are anterior to all experience, and even condition experience as Plato and Kant held, or that they are merely derived from contact with external nature, as Mill and the sensational school teach—this much will be agreed upon by all, that the mind has the power to produce these ideas itself whenever the occasion is given to call them forth, and they are needed to complete its own action. We hold that they arise spontaneously in the mind, and are not conditioned by experience, but necessarily correlated with it, because they are parts of a system of infinite wisdom which embraces both what is subjective and objective to us, in one higher unity. And so when the fulness of man's mental power is reached these first truths or axioms, both arise spontaneously, and are grasped, when presented to other minds, with wonder that they were never seen before. They arise at once without effort to discover them; they are instinctively clear, though their full application may not then, or ever, even, be seen.

\* Plato : *Timaios*, 37 D. Ως δὲ κινηθὲν, κ. τ. λ.

† Ueberweg's *Logic*, p. 533. *Ibid.*, 540.

‡ As quoted by Ueberweg, *Logic*, p. 533.

Their number is not the same to all men, nor to the same person at different times. The bright child would be sorely puzzled at an axiom of the calculus which a Lacroix had enunciated in transparent terms, and which, to his mind, while it conveyed a world of meaning, was self-evident. These truths, while they are universal in application and self-evident as soon as understood, in the extent to which they are applied expand constantly, and increase in number with the discursive power of the mind and the advance in knowledge in any particular science; but most of all with its general growth in every direction. They indicate more than any other data the mastery of the mind over itself.\* For as truth is comprehended in its applications it becomes more and more self-evident, so that what was once difficult, and required the utmost stretch of capacity to master, now seems even rudimentary. To the mind of ordinary ability the Pythagorean problem, the 47th proposition of the 1st Book of Euclid, seems formidable at the first attack, and much weariness is endured in mastering the preliminary steps which lead up to that noble intellectual structure. But after a time the whole truth flashes upon the mind with the suddenness and clearness of lightning. The wonder is: Why was this not all seen before? Yet to Blaise Pascal the case was different. To him Euclid had been a forbidden book, through misplaced parental care. Afterwards, however, when better counsels prevailed, the father placed the book in the hands of the wonderfully gifted boy. He opened it at the first page, which he quickly turned over, with the remark: "This is all clear!" Then he continued to glance at successive pages with the same remark until the whole book had been rapidly turned over. Thus the entire subject of pure geometry was to this extraordinary intellect self-evident, while by ordinary minds it is mastered with difficulty and after the exercise of patience. The highest truths of pure science were native to this master mind, even in childhood, without study or experience. For minds less gifted they arise to consciousness later and in smaller number. But still they are the conditions of all mental

\* Kant : Kritik, I., p. 435, 437.



action, and, whether conscious or unconscious, are a prerequisite to all reasoned truth.

The mind furnishing these categories, and having acquired its materials for knowledge through the impressions of the senses tested by each other, proceeds to elaborate the combined product by the discursive faculty. Again, there is no limitation to its progress save by its limitations as a finite actor. For the exuberant riches of Nature are boundless in two directions. She is infinitely minute, so that a lifetime could be spent, and profitably too, in studying the organisms found in a drop of stagnant water. She is infinitely great, so that no glass of the astronomer and no stretch of the imagination can reach her bounds. The mind itself, limited as it is in power, is practically inexhaustible as a field for investigation. The conditions of man's being are such that he must begin by submitting himself to the laws of Nature operating in matter and spirit before he can work at all. Even then he must labor with industry, care and patience. There is truth for those who will take the pains to search for it. That truth will still exist though one be too indolent to discover it, or too unreasonable to believe its existence. "The objective interdependence between quantities, and between forms, exists in and for itself when not recognized by the subject. On this objective interdependence the physical processes rest, which exist independently of the knowing subject, and condition the possible existence of knowing subjects."\* Man does not constitute the measure of this truth as Protagoras said,† nor do his categories, as taught by Kant, nor his idea, as held by Hegel, cause things to be as they are; but he has the power to discover and apply its measurements of everything so far as he will submit to its conditions. His ignorance or disbelief of the truth surely cannot affect it, though disastrous to himself. He can never know all in any direction, since his powers are finite; while objective nature is boundless. Whatever he has known

\* Ueberweg's Logic, p. 282.

† Plato, Theætetus: 151 E., πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι--τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.

thus far has been gained by placing himself *en rapport* with the objective reality as far as he could. Where he has failed the mistakes were his, while the verities belonging to Nature remained unaffected. What he knew at each successive step depended upon the truthfulness of the preceding; and his proper work has been to interrogate Nature in the right way, and hear exactly what she said in answer. His mistakes have arisen, not from the falsity of that he was trying to learn, its impossibility to be known, or the unfriendliness of some higher power through jealousy of his advance in knowledge, but from the limitations of a finite creature who can have but partial knowledge of anything. All cannot be known, or clear, or reached at once except by Omniscience; and therefore if we would know more than we do already we must believe in that to which we have not yet attained.

Hence it is just as true in philosophy as in religion that faith is a saving power. It is that by which we live and move and have our being in the material world as well as in the sphere of morality. Without this confident assurance that the same laws prevail in the unseen as in that which has already submitted to our experience, everything in nature would be inexplicable to us. For unless we believed in the reign of law throughout all with which we have to do, and that the Cosmos, as its name denotes, is *regulated* by trustworthy principles, no person would be so foolish as to investigate. He surely is irrational who gives his time and labor for that which offers no clew of regularity, or system embodying a definite purpose. But the man of science has unshaken confidence in the trustworthiness of his data in material things, however much he questions the existence of truth or system in things spiritual. Hence the doubter is irrational if he professes to be an agnostic, and inconsistent if he refuses to be governed by the principles of reasoning in one department of investigation which he is compelled to accept in all others.

We have seen that there are first principles which embody the laws of Nature so far as these are understood; that they underlie



all mental activity ; and that they are accepted without question because they are intuitively certain to the understanding. For what seems to all to be true, this we say is true.\* The truths are independent of the reasoning process ; they are the foundation on which it must rest in order to make further progress possible. As Aristotle says,† “ It is absolutely impossible that there should be a demonstration of everything, for this process would proceed to infinity, so that there could be no demonstration whatever.” So there must always be a beginning beyond which we cannot go. We must have something on which to rest in mental action as well as in material things. We could not stand on nothing, even if we could get beyond the limits of the universe to find it. We stand on the earth in childhood and do not question or even think about our basis. Afterwards we learn that the earth itself is held in its place by gravity, which fixes it in its orbit around another point ; and we may carry our investigations until we conclude there is nothing in the universe fixed or stable. Yet the earth is solid and a safe place to stand while we fulfil our day upon it. Even so the mind must have a standing place, and that is the faith which is born with us, and which we cannot put away without doing violence to our nature. We do not stand on nothing any more in the intellectual than the physical domain. So the doubter, even when he doubts, must have recourse to First Principles common to all, to support his position ; unless he escape somewhere away from the reign of law and the prevalence of intelligence, and there create for himself a world “ without form and void,” made after his own likeness.

If it were possible for axiomatic truths to be proven they would not be first, but secondary, principles ; and the reasoning process could be applied to them until something absolutely first, or at least first in relation to the mind which conceived them, was reached. There the mind must end its quest, and accept these as it does the action of its own powers, because these principles and the mental powers are adapted to each other. It is

\*Aristol. Nich. Eth. X., 2, 4.

† Metaph., Book III., 4, 1006.

easy to see why they are accepted without questioning because of this adaptation, as the expression of the facts of nature, to the constitution of the mind. For without being false both to itself and to the constitution of external reality it cannot reject them. Were the mind at liberty to accept or reject axiomatic truths it would be in *equilibrio*, and, therefore, unable to do anything. Were it predisposed to doubt them it would reject all evidence; and hence if it still had the power to act, its movements could only be directed by chance. And if it were false to its constitution in the interpretation of nature, it would be false to everything. But there is a natural instinct of belief as imperative as the desire for food, as instinctive as the vital processes, and this seizes on the data presented, and applying its powers to them makes progress. Thus faith in the domain of pure science, or rather in the fundamentals of all knowledge, is a necessary condition of progress from the elementary and most obvious beginnings to the most recondite investigations of the first philosophy. Without this faith there could be no advance because there could be no beginning from which to start.

It is clear, then, that in matters of pure science the mind could not act on any other principle than belief in facts external to itself and in the veracity of its interpretation of them. For science presupposes an objective reality, to which the subjective knowledge is a counterpart. Both, therefore, must be trustworthy in order to the existence of any knowledge, though the objective would as really exist without being known as if every fact of its constitution were investigated. That the mind may sometimes mistake the facts and err in its application of them to concrete cases is the necessary result of being finite, and, therefore, of knowing but in part. Still, the grasping of a part of each truth gives assurance that the whole exists somewhere, and under proper conditions may be known.

Thus there is a perfect analogy between faith in the intellectual sphere of man's nature and the same factor in relation to his moral and religious character. The intellect, as we have seen, begins by believing what the senses convey to it, and ends by



resting with unshaken confidence in the results of its own processes. The truth of the conclusions demonstrates the truth of the premises from which they are drawn and on which they depend. Faith in man's religious constitution begins in the same way by confiding in its moral intuitions. Without faith in the Unseen, that is in that which is above the present comprehension, there could be no life of the soul. There are certain first truths here just as clear and certain as in philosophy. Man instinctively believes in God, in a creative energy which devised the plan and completed the structure of the universe. For, without postulating an Almighty and Omniscient Power as a starting point, the mind has nothing on which to rest.\* For whatever we see or apprehend by any of the senses must have had some cause. The material world stands before us as an effect which, by the analogy of our experience, must have had an adequate cause; could not create itself, could not impress laws upon its own matter, nor exert any power to enforce them if enacted. The reverse of these negations must be true. For we find ourselves in a world of matter which is regulated, as far as we can follow its movements, by laws and a fixed order. When this regularity cannot be discovered we are still equally certain that it exists. For we have no other recourse than to judge of that which is beyond by that which is within our comprehension.

Again: In all the operations of men we see the application of power, physical or intellectual, employed for a specific purpose. The fact that any person acts without design, has no method in his thought, stamps him as a madman or a fool. Our conduct is the analogue by which we judge other men, and the action of intelligence in the race the warrant for our extension of the same principle to all the Cosmos and to all the beings of which we can form any thought. The principle of anthromorphism, despite the ridicule cast upon it by materialistic philosophers, is the exclusive standard of judgment for us in every department of speculation. So we are compelled to believe that the same truth holds good throughout the universe which we see prevailing in a

\* Kant: *Krit.*, II., 534-536.

part. We believe this because any other view is inconceivable. And "the inconceivability of its negation is the test by which we ascertain whether a given belief invariably exists or not. For our primary beliefs, the fact of their invariable existence, tested by our abortive efforts to cause their non-existence, is the only reason assignable.\* Now it is perfectly absurd to say that one can conceive of a mode of viewing things totally at variance with all our thought processes. This we hold to be conclusive against the arguments by which the system of nature is held to be originated or continued by mechanical causation, undesigned development through survival of the fittest, or through chance. These theories all rest either on paralogisms or wilful sophisms, because they proceed by design to show that there is no design, and so attempt to conceive that which, on their own hypothesis, is inconceivable. Thus, according to Spencer, "a prophet of their own," their case is ruled out of court.

For we have never known anything to be effected without an adequate cause, nor without a distinct purpose, save when its author was mad. Applying this same principle—which we are compelled by our mental constitution and by all experience to admit—to the solution of the great problems of creation, of the government of the world, of man's relations to that power which upholds him, together with the whole order of Nature of which he forms a part, we are forced to believe in a personal moral Governor of the universe. There may be difficulties which we cannot explain in the moral, just as in the physical, department of Nature. But if there were not, if all the phenomena were so simple and easy to be comprehended that we never found any obscurities, these facts would show that this moral system belonged to an order with which we can have nothing to do. For our knowledge in everything pertaining to this life is partial. It begins with elementary principles and continually expands in all directions, but shows no signs of arriving at perfection. And while it is progressive it advances exactly in proportion to our submission to the laws of our mental constitution as they are con-

\* See Mill's *Logic*, p. 194, quoting Spencer's *Principles of Psychology*.



ditioned by those of the material on which we labor. Nature, however, is perfectly inexhaustible, and so to finite comprehension the progress made in knowledge must always be by overcoming difficulties which present themselves at each successive stage. The great work of Butler's *Analogy* is to show that if the two spheres of being are governed by the same Ruler, similar difficulties will naturally be found in each, and yield to investigation conducted according to the principles which prevail in each. But the devotee of science must believe that something which we call the external world exists, that he has powers suited to investigate the phenomena which this exhibits, and that their secrets are yielded to those who diligently apply their powers to the search. Even so he who would know God, the Power which moves the moral and spiritual world, "must believe that He is," and that "those who diligently seek Him" will be rewarded for their search.

Thus the same temper of mind is required in religion that is necessary for successful work in the domain of material nature. This is the normal condition of the healthy mind, the prerequisite for any progress, no matter in what department of knowledge. Hence we see again that nothing but a perversion of his fundamental constitution can lead a man to doubt in either sphere. And there is really no more difficulty in believing the truths of religion, revealed or natural, than the first principles of philosophy. For each department in the last analysis rests upon data which, from the nature of the case, cannot submit to proof. For by regression the mind goes backward until it must rest upon some axiomatic principle as a last resort. As in the building of a house, however deep we dig, there must be a limit to the excavation, and upon the lowest stratum of rock reached the foundation must be begun, and from that the edifice arises. And when the structure is reared until it pierces the clouds, there is an altitude reached at last beyond which it cannot be raised. For the architect is limited by the conditions of his material, which will fall of their own weight if the house towers too high, and by the powers of his machinery to lift them to their place. Besides,

his genius is limited in the application of such materials as he possesses. Just so in the processes of pure reason. We must fix a  $\pi\omicron\tilde{\omega}$  somewhere. Euclid assumes his axioms as self-evident, and constructs definitions which cannot be denied without subverting the intellectual powers. Aristotle had his ten categories, and ultimate facts of generalization which underlie all forms of thought and reasoning. The Critic of Pure Reason assumes Space and Time\* (to which we must add Personality, *i. e.*, the Ego, Relation, Power and Design,) as fundamental postulates for his twelve categories, deemed indispensable by him for all reasoning but not susceptible of proof. The mind requires these data, and as soon as they are presented to the intelligence they are accepted; nay, we cannot reject them without stultifying our powers of thought. They are believed in implicitly, or rather cannot be doubted; and the mind rests upon these as the special prerequisites in the several departments of investigation. Hence there is no question of belief or disbelief, of doubt or confidence. They involve a state of mind prior and more fundamental than either—if that be possible—underlying the very conditions of thought. They are absolutely indispensable to its exercise and presupposed in all mental activity. Hence Mill's labored argument,† in opposition to Spencer and Whewell, to prove that these first truths or axioms are a product of experience, is an evident paralogism. For no number of separate experiences could form a universal principle. Each experience stands by itself, and it is only by the native power of the mind that these could be generalized into one. The general conception is not in the separate experiences, which must remain isolated until the conscious Ego gathers the individual impressions into the *a priori* unity which the mind furnishes as its part of the reasoning process. This Kant calls "the synthetical unity of apperception."‡

Precisely the same argument holds good in our relations to the moral universe. There are certain postulates, such as God, duty,

\*Kritik, II., pp. 21, 27.

†Logic, p. 194, et Seqq.

‡Kritik, Sup., XIV., § 16. See also, § 15.



individual responsibility, sin and deliverance, which are necessary conditions of any system of ethics that embraces all the relations in which the spirit of man stands to the spiritual powers which environ him. Men may differ in the conclusions which they derive from these postulates. They may have clearer and more permanent, or more obscure and fleeting, conceptions of these primary truths of their normal nature. There may be all grades of apprehension from the savage who sees his divinity in his fetish, and whose idea of immortality may be a heaven whose sensual ingredients are the realization of the grossest passions: but still he has those primary notions underlying and necessary to his subsequent thoughts when his spiritual nature is elevated by the teachings of Christianity. For he could not be taught nor elevated unless there was a basis of moral conception as a foundation on which to build. The degraded savage that he is believes in these with unquestioning faith. No doubt or misgiving is ever entertained touching the reality of these fundamental ideas. And as men rise in higher grades of intelligence and moral culture this is evidenced and measured by a more clear and precise conception of these categories of spiritual truth. But the categories of moral thought are as much exalted as the spiritual nature is above the material.\* Not even a St. John or a Paul has fathomed any one of the sublime truths which he uttered, to the depth of its signification. Like everything in creation which mirrors but does not constitute them, they are inexhaustible in their signification, their comprehension and their application. These truths are the embodiment in logical form, fit to be apprehended by the human intellect, of that divine wisdom which is imparted to men in picture form "by parables as they are able to receive it."

The laws of progression, knowledge and development hold good as far as man has tested them. If all could be grasped at once and so be perfectly known, man were already a god. Could he reach infinity of knowledge without effort he would have no dis-

\* See Arist. Nich. Ethic., I., 11, *μονιμώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὐταὶ δοκοῦνται εἶναι.*

cipline nor development of character. These two reasons are satisfactory to any fair-minded man, and quite sufficient to enable him to wait patiently for the revelation of future time and increase of spiritual capacity. Meantime, he performs his duty as he understands it, and finds that his knowledge thereof is ample to occupy all his energies. He finds himself in a world where there is much suffering and sorrow ; but, also, that these are the fruits of infringing those laws meant for the regulation of our conduct. He finds that these when obeyed insure our happiness, but cannot be broken with impunity. They stand as sentinels to warn before transgression ; they remain as executioners to punish when they have been violated. They have the power of an endless life and cannot be eluded or mastered—even as the laws of physical nature—but by obedience. Yet they are placable in that they afford encouragement to the penitent. For while the consequences of transgression do not cease immediately when the offender stops his evil courses, yet patient continuance in well-doing gradually obliterates their baneful results and rehabilitates the transgressor. Though at first view it may appear hard that full forgiveness and complete deliverance do not follow reformation, still, on closer scrutiny, this is seen to be just and wholesome. For if the offence were fully atoned for as soon as it is abandoned and sorrow felt for its commission, then the penal consequences of sin would be small, and, therefore, the warning against it insufficient. More is necessary to prevent men from being reckless. The inevitable connection between a cause and its effect must be seen working here as in all the world ; and that the lasting consequences of wickedness are certified to by Nature's laws, according to which the conduct of reasonable creatures is to be guided and moulded. In this way men can see that rewards and punishment are a part of the scheme of government prevailing throughout the universe under which it is our destiny to live ; but that forgiveness for offences and deliverance from their natural effects are, also, an equally essential part of the scheme. The law will not obstinately insist on its pound of flesh. While the misery of the world is confessedly great, it is not uni-



versal, nor irremediable through a blind mechanical application of law. So far from the universe being constructed according to the view of the pessimist, where all is as bad as it can be, and hence it is needless to interfere, the believer sees that there is a prevailing tendency to deliverance from sin and misery, and to the elevation of the race through obedience to the laws under which it was appointed to live. The laws which bring misery to man do so because they are disregarded. For they are expressly adapted in all their sanctions to secure his happiness, and so far as obeyed do effect this purpose. They insure his power for good, his capacity for enjoyment, and open a field for the realization of all that is best and noblest in his nature. If fully obeyed they might not at once relieve him wholly from misery because they have been violated a long time, leaving their mark of condemnation on his nature both through the effect of the personal corruption and the taint of heredity in his body and spirit. For he is born into the world with a constitution which is the joint product of those spiritual and material forces which made his parents what they were. And as he derived good qualities from them as the result of their obedience to the laws of their being and inherits the advantages of their social position, even so he derives ill qualities and disadvantages from the same source. Each factor arises from the absolutely true and certain sequence between action and character, which uniformity is the warrant for obedience and the sentinel to guard against transgression. But he finds, also, that there is a remedial tendency in the government of the world. Though punishment treads on the heels of the transgressor, following through the third and fourth generation, the salutary and remedial nature of the same law when obeyed extends even through thousands of generations, until ultimately it wears out sin and obliterates its traces. While the law of causality in material things is inexorable, so that no matter or force is lost, yet by the controlling energy of design operating through goodness, the tendency of evil to produce its like is stayed, and the government of the world is manifestly toward restoration. So while the law inflicting penalty for offence is in-

exorable as long as the transgressor persists in violating, it begins to yield when sin is abandoned, and relaxes entirely when virtue and holiness have become the fixed rule of life.

In our daily experience we can see that these principles are valid wherever they are recognized and followed. If a man recklessly persists in doing wrong, he may escape for a time, though the laws governing society call for his punishment. But the culprit is sure sooner or later to be discovered if he persist, and his refuge of cunning, of wealth, or influence, to be overthrown. And, if a man persistently means to do right, to live a life of purity, justice and charity, and thus do all the good in his power, though he may suffer from the evil surroundings in which he was born, or the malice of bad men among whom he is compelled to live, yet in the end his good conduct will be recognized and bear its legitimate fruit. Though in some cases these principles do not work out their proper results, so that the just perish under bad forms of society, and the cry of the oppressed rises apparently unheeded, yet this is seen to be contrary to those laws which regulate social life and control the destinies of the race. For these laws continue to work definite results just so far as their action can be observed. But the doubter would see all at once, or, in default, will know nothing. He points to the presence of sin and misery in the world to show that disorder prevails, and that the universe could not be the work of design, or, at least, of a benevolent Creator. But he ignores the operation of moral laws, which are seen to work with constancy as far as we can trace them in our present stage of progress, yet require time to mature their fruits. As well require the perfected work of a year's revolution of the earth in the season of spring alone, or the whole changes wrought by the great backward movement caused by the precession of the equinoxes, in a single century. When the moral laws are obeyed they tend to bring happiness ; and if retarded by the temporary hindrance of evil, the exception proves the rule just as in laws relating to matter. We know that there is some hidden hindrance to the full accomplishment of their proper tendency, and if we could follow this and see it in all its



bearings, we would discover that in the end its course is uniform. It is one of the strange contradictions in Nature, yet in a higher analysis one of her concords, that uniformity underlies and controls exceptions.\* It is undeniable that so far as we can follow actions through their legitimate consequences, their results are as constant as the uniformity of material nature. Hence, we feel sure that they do not lose their character the moment they pass beyond our sight.

When Le Verrier and Adams determined that, in consequence of some irregularities in the motions of Jupiter and Saturn, there must be another body yet undiscovered which caused these apparent disorders, they thus concluded because they had implicit confidence that the Newtonian laws of gravitation prevailed throughout the planetary system. In natural things they judged the unseen and unknown by what had been already seen and tested. The man of science, because he discovered perturbations among the planets which could not be accounted for by the laws of gravity, did not jump at the conclusions the doubter does from apparent disorders in the moral world, *i. e.*, that its laws are not constant, or only hold good so far as they have been observed. On the contrary, he believed where he could not see, and made even the exception the clew to lead him out of Nature's labyrinth. Precisely so in the laws regulating man's moral character and the rewards of his conduct. While we can trace their action they hold good. We see their tendency interfered with so that it does not do its work. A case arises which we cannot follow in all its bearings because it is removed beyond the sphere of our present knowledge. As the astronomer can calculate the path of the comet whose period is known when it cannot be seen, by reference to that segment of the conic section within his observation, even so the believer in a system of Divine government can tell the consequence of virtue or sin after their sphere of action has been removed from his sight. We do not hesitate to predict that the course of those comets which move in hyperbolas and are said to never return, will, with the advance of science, be found

\* Pascal : *Penseés*, II. 7, Ed. Havet.

to move in a regular orbit which submits to calculation, and that after long ages they will come back in a coördinate and visit this solar system again. And so of the problem of sin, in its origin, the stumbling block of theodicy up to this time. In the fulness of time the discords will be found to be concords in the government of Divine Intelligence. We must not then, from what we know already, conclude that the laws of rewards and punishments cease their action just at the point where, from the conditions of our imperfect powers, we cannot trace them. That were absurd in itself, contrary to our deepest consciousness, and against the entire sum of our experience.

No better proof could be asked to show that Doubt is irrational in the matter of religious teaching than this. The man who in scientific investigations accepts certain first principles as settled, and from these goes forward trusting to the uniformity of nature and the certitude of the reasoning process, at once shifts his position and says: "Nothing can be known because there is nothing fixed and certain in the constitution of his moral nature." To this preposterous assertion ready heed is given by those who will not come to the knowledge of the truth, "who love darkness rather than light because their deeds are evil." And his action, in proceeding contrary to the present tendency of things though he should doubt and be unable to know the final outcome, shows still further his irrationality. For as Kant well says: \* "Although, in the absence of good sentiments, a man may be rid of all moral interest, enough remains even thus to make him fear God and a future life. For nothing is required for this but his inability to plead *certainty* with regard to the *non-existence* of such a being and of a future life."

Thus we see that in every sphere of knowledge and every degree of intelligence from the first dawn in childhood up to the farthest investigations in pure science or the most recondite speculations in philosophy, Belief, and not Doubt, is the character of our mental action. This is alike evident among the untutored savages and the most refined sons of men. It appears

\* Krit., II., 712.



with the first dawning of intelligence in the child, and underlies or is assumed in the profoundest reasonings of matured thought. It thus has the warrant of *semper ubique*, and in actual practice no proof in opposition. The mind moves spontaneously according to this principle, and by unconscious action exhibits its true nature. To doubt, to disbelieve, or by whatever name we call that temper of mind which dominates the agnostic—so far as he is one—has no place in the normal and healthy action of the intellect. If anything can be considered proved by the combined action of mankind in every possible variety of culture progress, age of the human race, in a word by universality, it is that the mind naturally believes in the truths of an external world of matter, of an internal world of spirit, of the mutual influence of these on each other, of the trustworthiness of its own processes in becoming acquainted both with itself and with external nature. It proceeds on the possibility of arriving at a measure of truth sufficient for its uses in every matter pertaining to its present and future welfare; matters which press upon its attention, which will not be put off without some solution, and which, when answered by the best light attainable, give us rest in the present and hope for the future.

## II.

### THE NOTION OF MERIT IN THE HISTORY OF THEOLOGY.\*

BY THE EDITOR.

The English words *merit* and *demerit* are now generally used in a moral sense, signifying the moral quality of an act, or rather of the disposition and character manifested in an act. Merit, accordingly, is moral excellence; demerit is moral turpitude. The words involve a necessary reference to the idea of freedom, which is inseparable from the notion of the moral. This is evident from the fact that they are applied only to the acts and to the character of human beings in possession of their proper faculties. Animals, infants and idiots are neither capable of merit nor of demerit. In this moral sense merit is entirely a personal quality. It is inseparable from personality, and is, therefore, not transferable from one person to another. Nor is it capable of being measured in terms derived from the world of impersonal things and commodities.

But, as used in theological literature, the term *merit* has a sense which, though allied to the moral, is yet essentially different from it. This theological sense, however, is more directly connected with the etymological signification of the word. *Merit, meritum*, is from *merere*, to *deserve*, to *earn wages or reward*; like the soldier who is said to *merit* his stipend, or pay, for which he renders the state an equivalent in service. Merit, then, is the quality of a work by virtue of which it establishes a right to compensation. It is the claim to reward acquired by some voluntary performance or service which is of value to another. He who renders to an-

\* Literature. Harnack's *Dogmengeschichte*, Vol. III. Ritschl's *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, Vol I. Catechism of the Council of Trent. A series of articles by Dr. Herman Schultz, in the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, for 1894, on *Der Sittliche Begriff des Verdienstes und seine Anwendung auf das Verständniss des Werkes Christi*.



other a valuable service which he is under no legal obligation to render, thereby acquires a merit or title to reward, which the other is bound to repay. The primary notion of merit, accordingly, belongs to the sphere of legal and juridical relations. A work is meritorious when it is not obligatory, and when it possesses a measurable value, which may be compared to other values. It involves no merit, for instance, when a father provides for his own children, for this he is bound to do, according to the law of nature; but when a man serves another with food, to whom he is under no obligation, he establishes against that one a legal claim to reward; and this is *merit* in the primary sense of the term. The notion of merit is thus comparable to the notion of wages, which can be measured in terms of money or of other commodities, and which can be transferred from one subject to another.

This idea of merit came into Latin theology, in connection with the notion of satisfaction, from the time of Tertullian onward. It was derived from the practice of the Roman law. It was a principle in Roman law that in certain circumstances a legal obligation could be discharged by a meritorious performance which was not equal to the obligation, but which he to whom the obligation was due was content to accept in lieu of it. This principle prevailed especially in the sphere of private right, while in the sphere of public right its application was more limited. An injury to the person or property of another could be made good either by repairing it or by making satisfaction. This idea was expressed in the maxim: *aut solvere, aut satisfacere*. The debtor must either pay or he must make satisfaction. To make satisfaction, accordingly, was not to pay the penalty of a violated obligation. The penalty came only in case satisfaction failed to be made. And the satisfaction could be made by any meritorious performance which was regulated by law and calculated to content the mind of an injured party. In some cases a mere apology, or the payment of a small fine, would be a sufficient satisfaction. And satisfaction could be made by persons other than the offender. Any service which would have consti-



tuted a claim to merit where no legal obligation existed would become satisfaction for such obligation where it did exist.

This theory of satisfaction by means of meritorious performances early gained entrance into the Church, and was applied especially in the relations of the Christian life of its individual members. It was not at first the work of Christ that was explained by the application of this theory. Christ's work of redemption was not regarded by early Christian thinkers, either Greek or Latin, in the light of a meritorious satisfaction rendered to God. His death was regarded sometimes as an antidote to death, and, especially in connection with the resurrection, as the opening of a new fountain of spiritual life in the human world, and sometimes as a transaction with the devil, whereby the latter was forced to surrender his hold upon human souls; but it was not, previous to the time of Anselm, apprehended as a satisfaction to the law or honor of God. In the sphere of Christian life, however, the idea of satisfaction gained wide prevalence at an early time. Sins committed after baptism were supposed to demand satisfaction in order that they might be forgiven; and it was for this reason, as will be remembered, that Tertullian opposed infant baptism. And the means of satisfaction must be performances which would establish a claim to merit in case no sins had existed. They can, therefore, not be performances of the ordinary duties of life. This thought may be made plain by an illustration. Suppose a man has committed some civil offence against his neighbor, say, by wantonly destroying some property. Now this offence can not be made good by afterwards observing the ordinary duties of morality; for these every man is under obligation to observe every moment. The offender must do something out of the ordinary line of morality in order to make satisfaction. He must pay a fine, or he must do some especially meritorious thing which he would not have been under obligation to do but for his offense.

Now the same legal and juridical relation which holds between the citizens of the Empire was supposed to hold also in the kingdom of God, and even between the Ruler of that kingdom



and His subjects. Suppose, for instance, that in times of persecution Christians sinned by offering sacrifices to the images of the Emperor, or by denying the faith, or by delivering to the flames copies of the Christian Scriptures. This was an offence for which satisfaction must be made. It would not be correct to say that such an offence must necessarily be punished; for the punishment of it might involve the destruction of the offender. But the offender is to be saved; and, therefore, something must take place which is less than the infliction of punishment, and by which the punishment may be warded off; that is to say, satisfaction must be made. Now, such satisfaction can not be made by discharging the ordinary duties of Christian life; for these duties Christians are at all times bound to discharge, and the discharging of them, therefore, pays no debt. The offending Christian, therefore, in order to make satisfaction, must do something that is not obligatory, and something that shall please God as much as the offence has displeased Him. This necessity of satisfaction gave rise to the idea of *penance*, and to the penitential system which still prevails in the Catholic Church. The most meritorious performances for purposes of satisfaction are prayer, fasting, almsgiving, virginity and martyrdom. There is merit in fasting, because fasting is not a universal duty. So it is with virginity. An honest and chaste life in wedlock has no merit; but the voluntary abstention from wedlock, for the pleasure of God, is a meritorious service which God is bound to reward. The degree of merit belonging to such services is measured by their magnitude, and this is determined by the difficulty of their performance and the intensity of love which attends that performance. Such merit may be in excess of that required by an individual for his own salvation, and the benefit of it may then be extended to others. The belief prevailed already in the time of Tertullian that the merits of the martyrs could be thus extended. Tertullian did not share this belief, but it maintained itself nevertheless, and in course of time became the established doctrine of the Church. We thus see how early were established the fundamental tenets of Latin theology, including the doctrines



of *counsels of perfection*, of *supererogatory righteousness* and of *indulgence*. These doctrines all have their basis in the theory of merit which Latin theology inherited from the practice of the Roman law.

Anselm, of Canterbury, in the eleventh century, was the first to apply the theory of meritorious satisfaction to the redeeming work of Christ. He regarded the suffering and death of Christ as a sacrifice to the wounded honor of God, of such infinite value that God is bound thereby to grant the salvation of all those who live according to the law of Christianity. Anselm's theory stands in intimate relation to the ideas of German law and to the development of the penitential system of the Latin Church. To the German law was due the notion of the infinitude of the guilt of human sin, which requires an infinite satisfaction. In German law offences against persons were rated according to the dignity of those offended, while offences against property were judged according to the ability of the offender. Every man had his price fixed by law, and the punishment for homicide varied according to the rank of the person slain. Apply this principle to the relations between God and man, and it follows that sin, which is a violation of the honor of the infinitely great God, must involve infinite guilt, requiring a satisfaction that is greater than all that is not God. Such a satisfaction was the death of Christ, which was meritorious because it was not obligatory, and which was of infinite value because of the connection of the human nature in which it was achieved with the infinite nature of God. The surrender of the infinitely valuable life of the God-man was an offering that pleased God more than he was displeased by the fact of sin. This was its merit, which God was bound to reward. But inasmuch as Christ needed nothing for Himself, being as God in possession of all good, the only way in which He could be rewarded was to transfer His merit to others who needed it and upon whom He was pleased to confer it.

This conception of the transferability of the atoning merit of Christ had long been anticipated in the system of penance which prevailed in the Church. It was an accepted principle that



penance could be performed by one person for another. Just as the wages which one person has earned by his labor may, by his consent, be paid to another, so the merit acquired by penance, if the person having acquired it does not himself need it, may be set to the account of another who does need it. In some of the ecclesiastical constitutions of the time it is ordained that a person may procure for himself the benefit of a seven years' fast, by getting first twelve men to fast each three days, and then seven times one hundred and twenty men to do the same. This conception likewise was in harmony with the principles of Germanic law. According to German law the members of a tribe or clan could make atonement for each other. According to primitive ideas generally the moral unit, the subject of moral desert, is not the individual, but the tribe or clan. One member of a tribe may be held responsible for offences committed by another, or the whole tribe for the offences of an individual, as the whole of Israel was held responsible for the sin of Achan; and so also one can make satisfaction for another, and free him from the consequences of his conduct. Thus the idea of the transferability of merit was current everywhere in the mental world to which Anselm belonged, and it was but natural that he should apply this idea to the explanation of the central mystery of redemption.

Anselm meant to show *the necessity of an atonement*. Hitherto the work of Christ had generally been regarded as a convenient arrangement, but not as the only possible method of redemption. Anselm proposed to demonstrate, even to the understanding of pagans, that God's wounded honor could be satisfied only by such an infinite sacrifice. The necessity of the atonement had its ground, not in the opposition of the divine and human wills which need to be reconciled, but in an opposition of the divine attributes of justice and mercy. The divine justice must be satisfied in order that mercy may be able to perform her office. Anselm's theory, however, does not regard the suffering of Christ as in its nature *penal*. Christ did not suffer the punishment which was due to human sin, and so pay the debt; but He did something that averted that punishment. There was no punishment at all

in the case. God did not punish Christ, and Christ assumed no punishment. God is *satisfied* by the voluntary death of Christ ; which is not a suffering of the divine wrath, but a sacrifice of such transcendent merit, that it can not be compared at all to any measure of sin, and causes God far more pleasure than sin caused displeasure. Anselm's theory, though based upon the juridical conception of merit, is not a theory of substitution, in the strict sense, or of vicarious punishment. Hence also it is not a theory that pledges the actual salvation of individuals, or makes individual effort superfluous. What Christ has accomplished is only a meritorious sacrifice that makes *possible* the salvation of those upon whom its benefits are conferred. The theory, accordingly, leaves room for the Augustinian doctrine of predestination, and for the doctrine of limited atonement as held in later times, as well as for the doctrine of justification by human merit, which was the current doctrine of the Church. The satisfaction of Christ merited for sinners the grace—*gratia prima*, or *gratia gratum faciens*—which enables them to merit the forgiveness of sins and the possession of eternal life. Human salvation, accordingly, is from first to last a work of merit rather than of grace.

This is the prevalent theory of salvation in the theology of the Scholastic age. Individual theologians modified it at different points, but, so far as its essential principle is concerned, it is the same in all. Abelard, for example, denied Anselm's doctrine of satisfaction. He held that the suffering of Christ is a proof of God's love toward us, and a most effective means of awakening in us love to God ; which love then is the source of the merit by which we are justified and saved. Peter Lombard, the Master of Sentences, teaches that no one obtains eternal life without meriting it, and that the chance of doing this is confined to the present life. After death no merit can be acquired. The present life, therefore, is in all cases decisive of eternal destiny. No one, however, can know, in this life, without special revelation, whether or not he possesses merit enough to be saved. But the painful uncertainty thus created can be relieved by one availing himself of the merits of others. Indeed the merit of the whole Church



is at the service of any one who will use it. In Thomas Aquinas there are genuine evangelical conceptions of God's relation to man, which would logically exclude the notion of merit. The inequality between God and the creature excludes any legal relation of right, and leaves room only for a relation of reason and equity. No creature can gain any merit in relation to God which the latter is bound in right to reward. And yet Thomas accepts the doctrine of salvation by merit. He holds that God has so willed and ordained that eternal life can only be gained by means of merit; although merit itself, so far as men are concerned, is possible only as the fruit of grace; while grace, again, is procured by the merit of Christ. Christ's merit alone possesses the character of *meritum de condigno*, that is, merit in its own intrinsic nature and worth; while human merit is only *meritum de congruo*, that is, merit in relation to the good will and pleasure of God. But it is God's pleasure that eternal life should be granted only on account of a *bonum meritum* which bears some proportion to the value of eternal life. Man, says Thomas, can attain the end of his existence only by his own voluntary action. Other creatures reach their end by an activity which is not strictly their own, and hence they can have no claim to reward. But man's acts are his own; and it is fitting, therefore, that he should get something for them—a reward that shall be proportionate to their magnitude, or to the amount of force and love expended in their production. While God, then, can not properly be our debtor, yet He owes it to Himself to pay the merit which we possess, and which we have acquired through the grace which Christ has merited for us.

The above distinction between merits of condignity and merits of congruity was completely effaced in the teaching of Duns Scotus. In fact Duns Scotus' conception of the nature of God and of its relation to the moral idea is inconsistent with the notion of merit in any form. Good is not something that has its ground in the eternal nature of God, but only in His will, which might be otherwise than it is. There is, therefore, nothing in the nature of God that would bind Him to reward the good

deeds of His creatures. And there is nothing that is intrinsically meritorious. The meritorious is only that which is accepted *ad præmium reddendum*—for the purpose of being rewarded. Whatever God wills to be meritorious, that is meritorious without any regard to its intrinsic character. Even the merit of Christ is worth only what it is accepted for—*tantum bonum pro quanto acceptatur*. The atonement is only an arbitrary arrangement. It was only because it so pleased God in the absolute sovereignty of His will that He resolved not to be reconciled to sinners until there should be accomplished on earth a work of obedience that would be more agreeable than sin has been disagreeable. If God had been so disposed, He might have forgiven men their sins and saved them by a mere act of His sovereign will, without any atonement at all. This theory, which at first view seems so unfavorable to the doctrine of merit in any real sense, in fact served, practically, greatly to increase men's confidence in that doctrine. It was easier to believe in the efficacy of acts of penance, such as fasting, almsgiving, making pilgrimages, kissing images and repeating prayers, if men were assured that all morality is without foundation in the nature of things, but has its ground merely in an arbitrary will. If that will chooses to accept such acts as meritorious, and to attach to them inestimable rewards, there is nothing in this to violate any absolute moral order, for in fact there is no such order. And that such is the will of God men were assured by the infallible teaching of Holy Mother Church.

This was the theory of Christianity that was wrought out into the immense system of penance which belonged to the pre-Reformation Church, and which still maintains itself in its essential features in the Roman Catholic Church of our own time. There are four fundamental ideas which enter into this theory of Christianity and give color to the whole conduct of the Christian life. The first is the idea that *the relation between God and man is primarily a legal relation*. The rule of God's judgment in relation to men is believed to be the juridical notion of merit. Men get from God only what they deserve—what they have acquired



a legal claim to by their works. This rule is not overthrown, but rather established, by the doctrine of the Council of Trent, Sess. VI., cap. XVI., that "the bounty of the Lord towards all men is so great that He will have the things which are His own gifts to be their merit." For, while in this way the gifts of God are referred to the divine grace as their ultimate source, still the rule of their distribution among men is the legal notion of desert. A second fundamental idea of the Roman theory is the notion that *the meritorious achievement of the Christian consists of a sum of single transactions, each one of which has its particular worth and counts for so much in the divine judgment.* In the judgment, then, the question will not be what a man is, but what he has done, and how much he has done. It is true that one element of value in a meritorious work is the loving disposition, *charitas*, which prompts it; but, after all, the criterion or ground of judgment is not the disposition, but the work in its independent, isolated form. The aim of Christian endeavor, accordingly, must be, not the formation of character, as an organic whole of moral achievement, but the multiplication of meritorious works whose sum-total shall be sufficient to procure eternal life. A third fundamental idea of this theory is *the distinction in the life of man between a moral and a super-moral sphere, in the latter of which only merit can be won.* In the ordinary life of the world, to which apply the common precepts of morality and religion, there is no room for the achievement of merit. There is no merit in the performance of a duty, whether towards man or God. But there is a realm to which the notion of duty does not extend; it is the sphere of *perfection*, whose precepts are not commands but counsels, *evangelical counsels*. For instance, it is not a duty that a man should take upon himself the monastic vows of poverty, chastity and obedience, or that he should undergo fasts and vigils. These things are not commanded in the moral law; they are only commended by the counsels of the Gospel; hence he who does them does more than God requires of him; and this establishes a merit which God is bound to reward. In proof of this idea appeal is often made to the words of Christ



to the rich young man in the Gospel (Matt. 19:21), "If thou wouldst be perfect, go, sell that thou hast and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven"—a good illustration of the way in which the sound or letter of Scripture may be made to kill the spirit. The fourth idea of the Roman theory, finally, is *the notion of works of supererogation, which may be transferred from one person to another*. If it be true that the fruit of the religious life consists essentially in the multiplication of meritorious works, of which each one possesses its separate value, then it will follow logically enough that it may be possible for one person to acquire more merit than he needs, and that he may dispose of the surplus for the benefit of others. Now the merit of Christ was all supererogatory, and forms the foundation of a treasure which is continually added to by the supererogatory righteousness of the saints, and which is at the disposal of the Church for the benefit of those who merit it, that is, practically those who are able and willing to pay for it. This is the foundation of the theory of *indulgence*, with all its un-Christian practices. Thus from the idea of a legal relation between God and man, involving the notion of merit, to the doctrine of indulgence there is a complete chain of logical sequence.

It was the abuses growing out of the doctrine of indulgence that first aroused the indignation of the Reformers and led them to question the doctrinal and practical infallibility of the Church. And, as the notion of merit formed the logical basis of the doctrine of indulgence, that notion became one of the first objects of attack. The Reformers rejected the notion of merit in its relation to the Christian life. They denied the theory of counsels of perfection and of supererogatory righteousness. They said, men can acquire no merit in relation to God, so as to put God under obligation. The process of salvation cannot be a legal transaction between God and man, but only a divine operation having its source in the free grace of God. Men are saved by grace, not by merit. To the Roman theory of salvation by merit the Reformers objected that this doctrine would leave men forever uncertain of their salvation. If a man's salvation depends upon the multi-



tude of his good works, then he can never be certain that he has done enough, and his salvation must always be in doubt. This consequence the Roman Catholics freely admitted. Certitude of salvation, they said, it is not possible for a man to reach in this life, except by special revelation. Moehler even remarks that he would feel uncomfortable in the presence of a man who should claim to be entirely certain of his salvation, and that he would suspect some diabolical influence to be lurking in such enthusiasm (*Symbolics*, §20). But the Catholics also maintained that the painfulness of such uncertainty could be practically overcome by resorting to the treasury of merit which is in the keeping of the Church. If you are in doubt whether you have done enough to secure your own salvation, you have the privilege of availing yourself of the superabundance of merits of which the Church disposes, and which, if you manage rightly, will follow you even into the intermediate state and will sensibly shorten the process of purgatorial purification. But the Protestants also objected to the Roman theory of salvation by merit, that it is derogatory to the honor of Christ. Luther says that "the word merit is a shameful word and spoils everything in religion." And the Augsburg Confession says, Art. XX.: "He that trusteth by his works to merit grace doth despise the merit and grace of Christ, and seeketh by his own power, without Christ, to come unto the Father." To this, however, the Catholics replied that, instead of depreciating the merits of Christ in this way, we in fact enhance their value; for our merits are but the effect and fruit of the merits of Christ—a proposition to which it was difficult for the Reformers, from their standpoint, to make any effective reply.

The fact is that the Reformers weakened their case, and failed to make a decisive impression upon the Catholic mind, by allowing the principle of merit to be valid in relation to the work of Christ. Thereby they put themselves on the legal and juridical standpoint of their opponents, and simply assumed the appearance of willful opposition to its logical consequences. In fact, the Protestant theory of redemption, instead of radically overcoming the legal doctrine of merit, was itself based upon an ex-



*aggerated apprehension* of that doctrine. For the merit of Christ was now supposed to consist in the full and formal payment of the penalty of human sin. This was no longer the Anselmic theory of *satisfaction*. It was a theory of *vicarious or substitutionary punishment*. The Anselmic theory, having never taken much hold upon Catholic theology, was entirely dead in the time of the Reformation, and the Reformers were hardly aware that on the old basis of merit they were in fact rearing a new theory. According to Calvin, "Christ appeased God by suffering the punishment to which we were exposed \* \* \* the burden of condemnation, from which we have been relieved, was laid upon Christ." (Inst. II., XVII., IV.) And this is what Calvin means by the merit of Christ. "I assume this as granted," he says, "if Christ has satisfied for our sins; if He has sustained the punishment due to us; if He has appeased God by His obedience; in a word, if He has suffered, the just for the unjust—then salvation has been obtained for us by His righteousness, *which is the same as being merited*." (Inst. II., XVII., III.) Ursinus says: "Christ suffered that which we were bound to suffer to all eternity. \* \* \* His suffering is equivalent to everlasting punishment, yea it exceeds it." (Com. Heid. Cat., p. 214.) This is the doctrine of the Heidelberg Catechism in its original German form, as well as of other Reformed confessions.\* And on this point the teaching of the Lutheran Church is at one with that of the Reformed. The Lutheran dogmaticians teach with one voice that Christ *merited* salvation for us because, by His active and passive obedience, He did and suffered all that we were

\* In the English translation of the Catechism this doctrine has been somewhat softened by substituting for the German word *Bezahlung*, *payment*, wherever it occurs, the English word *satisfaction*; which may be explained in an Anselmic sense, although this was not the sense of the authors of the Catechism. This change occurs in questions 1, 12, 13, 14, 16, 40, 42. In all these places we have *Bezahlung* in German, and *satisfaction* in English, while the Latin varies between *solutio* and *satisfactio*. The Tercentenary Edition in this respect follows the common version. The word *Genugthuung*, *satisfaction* occurs indeed in the original language of the Catechism, as in questions 56, 60, and 61; but it is evidently used in the sense of *payment*, and conveys the idea that the merit of Christ consists in His having suffered all the pains and penalties which were due to human sin.



bound to do and suffer. But there is this difference between the Lutheran and Reformed doctrine that the former, agreeably to the theory of the *communicatio idiomatum* of the two natures, insists that the subject of the redeeming merit is not the God-man in respect of His human nature, but in respect of His divine personality. For the Lutheran theologians argued that Christ, as to His human nature, was under the law and owed to God all that He did in the way of active obedience, at least. Therefore, as to His human nature He could not acquire any merit for the benefit of others, and His saving merit must consequently belong to the divine side of His personality. This view involves the conception that God merited something of God, which whoever can may comprehend.

Thus, then, it was the common teaching of the Reformers that the merit of Christ, acquired by His active and passive obedience, was a full equivalent of all that man deserved in the way of punishment, and a fulfillment of all that was required of him in the way of righteousness. Human sin was all imputed to Christ, and he suffered its penalty. His suffering was the execution of the judicial sentence which the divine judgment pronounced upon human sin, and the exhaustion of the divine wrath. It was not merely the offering of a meritorious satisfaction for human debt, but it was the full payment of the debt. The atonement is a juridical transaction between God and Christ, the same as in the theory of Anselm; but the merit of it is conceived as *quantitatively equal* to the damnation deserved by sin, and therefore as absolutely sufficient for the salvation of all men, or, at least, according to one theory, for the salvation of the elect. Justification, therefore, is wholly a juridical process, wherein the merit of Christ is set to the account of the sinner who believes, that is, accepts this arrangement. The merit of Christ needs not to be supplemented by any human merit. And human works can possess no merit; not for the ethical reason that they are all involved in the system of duty to which every man is subject, but for the reason that they are all imperfect and defiled by sin. A sinless being might, perhaps, be able to acquire merit which God would

be bound to recognize, but not so one that is a sinner. Man can do nothing to earn his salvation. As between God and man salvation is entirely a gift of free grace. God, indeed, has been paid for it by the merit of Christ; but man has done nothing to merit it, and can do nothing but accept it as a gift of divine mercy.

On this point of justification and salvation without personal merit the Reformers, according to their custom, appealed to Scripture. They set aside the traditional teaching of the Catholic Church, which had prevailed for ages, and refused to be judged by any authority but the Bible. What, then, does the Bible teach on the subject? In reply to this question it must be admitted that there are numerous passages in the New Testament which seem to imply the idea of merit, or at least of reward. The New Testament adopts the view current at the time in Jewish thought that good works do receive a recompense. In the Synoptic Gospels Jesus repeatedly gives expression to this view. It appears in the Sermon on the Mount. All the beatitudes imply it. Jesus says to those who are persecuted for righteousness' sake, "Great is your reward in heaven." And only those are said to enter into the kingdom of heaven "who do the will of the Father," and whose "righteousness exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees." To sell one's goods and give to the poor is to "have treasure in heaven." All real almsgiving, true praying and right fasting will obtain a recompense from the Heavenly Father. (See Matt. 6: 4, 6, 18.) The cup of cold water given to any one in the name of a disciple will not fail to bring its reward. (Matt. 10: 42.) And the criterion by which men will be approved or condemned in the Day of Judgment will be the works of mercy which they have done or not done to their brethren. (Matt. 25: 31, 46.) We find the same view in the writings of Paul. The Apostle speaks of a "reward" which he expects for his faithful labor in the ministry of the Gospel. (See 1 Cor. 3: 8, 14; 4: 5; 9: 17, 18.) He says, moreover, that we must all appear before the tribunal of Christ, "that each one may receive the things done in the body" (2 Cor. 5: 10); and that "he who soweth



sparingly shall also reap sparingly, and he who soweth bountifully shall also reap bountifully." (2 Cor. 9 : 6.) This same view prevails also in the Epistle of James, where it is said that the endurance of temptation ensures a "crown of life" (1 : 12) ; in the Epistle of Peter, where it is said that God "judgeth according to each man's work" (1 Pet. 1 : 17); and in the Apocalypse, where we are taught that the dead who die in the Lord are blessed "and their works do follow them" (14:13). These and similar passages, it must be admitted, do teach the doctrine that our good works obtain a reward, *in the sense that they somehow condition our blessedness*. This was acknowledged, too, by the Reformers ; but they said, "This reward comes not of merit, but of grace." (Heid. Cat., qu. 63.) That answer had already been given substantially by Duns Scotus, who made all divine reward to depend, not upon the intrinsic worth of human works, but upon the arbitrary pleasure of God ; and there is at least this truth in it that the blessedness of eternal life is not strictly measured by the sum of our works ; but, as we shall see further on, it expresses after all not the whole truth involved in the passages of Scripture quoted.

In opposition to the doctrine of salvation by merit which the Roman Catholic deduces from these passages, the fact is to be noted, in the first place, that this view is wholly contrary to the writings of St. John. According to the Gospel of John men are saved by faith in Jesus Christ. We have here, first of all, that classic sentence which contains the whole Gospel as in a nutshell : "God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on Him should not perish, but have eternal life" (3 : 6). When the Jews asked Jesus what they must do to work the works of God, the latter answered, "This is the work of God, that ye believe on Him whom He hath sent" (6 : 26). The Christian's life-work, upon which his whole salvation depends, then, is but one organic act, namely, the act of faith in Jesus Christ. Not the sum of merit resulting from the addition of a multitude of works, but the one work of faith is the ground or principle of human salvation. And that this is the real teach-

ing of Jesus also in the Synoptic Gospels will appear from the fact that the two representations, under which He most commonly set forth the relation between God and men, totally exclude those legal conditions under which only the possibility of merit could arise. The first is the representation of *fatherhood* and *childhood*. God, in the language of Jesus, is a Father; men are His children. But between father and children there can be no relation of merit. The child can in no circumstances first earn the father's love; and no father deals with a child according to mere rules of law. The second representation under which our Lord sometimes presents the relation of God and man is that of *master* and *servant*. But no servant, in the ancient sense of the term, could acquire any merit in relation to his master. He owed his master all his services; and there was, therefore, no chance for him to put the master under obligation. He was only a *δοῦλος ἀχρεῖος*, an unprofitable servant, when he had done all that he could do; for he had only done his duty. (Luke 17: 10.) His master might reward him for faithful services; but such reward stood only in the free will of the master, and was in no sense forced by the law of merit. And this is a figure of the relation of God and men. God cannot be bound by any human performances. His gifts are gifts of grace, not of legal right and obligation. And that this was the real view of St. Paul also appears when he says that we are saved, "not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to the mercy of God." (Tit. 3; 5.) The same view also underlies St. Paul's great doctrine of justification by faith. The very pith and marrow of that doctrine is the idea that the divine act of pardon is not purchased, but free. It is not of *debt*, but of *grace*.

What, then, is the real teaching of the New Testament in regard to the relation of good works to human salvation? In what sense do such works procure reward? In this sense, we think, that they are conditions of the formation of character, while character is the very essence of salvation or of blessedness. Perfection of character, being what God wants us to be, is the *summum bonum*, the highest good for man; and this is to be achieved



only through moral action or conduct. The doer of good works, therefore, is blessed in his deeds, not because the value of these deeds is measured out to him in moments of bliss according to some legal standard, but because, in the way of reflex action, these deeds help to shape his character and thus determine his capacity for bliss. It is in this way, and in this way only, that men's works do follow them when they die. Every good work which a man may do will impress its stamp upon his character. In this way a man becomes what he does. He who does well becomes good, and he who does ill becomes evil. Thus a man's works will help to fit him for the blessedness of eternal life. They who have never fed the hungry or clothed the naked have never formed the moral disposition that would enable them to be blessed in the eternal kingdom of God, and therefore can not enter that kingdom. Eternal life, then, will not depend so much upon the multitude of good works which a man has done as upon the character which he has formed by means of his moral \* action as a whole. Between good works, as so many separate quantities of merit, and eternal life there can be no commensurability at all. Suppose, for instance, that a certain number of good works—the bestowment of a certain number of dollars in alms—could purchase a certain duration, say, a hundred years, of blessedness in heaven; how many like works, then, would it take to purchase an eternity of blessedness? To ask such a question shows the untenability of the whole conception. It is not the sum of works which a man has done that determines his reward or his condition in eternity, but his disposition and character. It is the worth, not of the works that have been wrought, but of the personality that has been formed, that is the object of reward. And this reward comes not as an external gift or possession, but as an

\* To avoid misunderstanding we remark here that, when not otherwise indicated, we use the word *moral* in a wider sense than that usually expressed by the word *morality*. *Morality*, as generally used, connotes an antithesis to *religion* as well as to *nature*; *moral* or *the moral*, to *nature* or *the natural* only. *The moral* is whatever is accomplished through the agency of reason and will, and therefore includes religion as well as morality. To worship God is as much a moral act as to give alms.

internal condition and state. Like moral action itself, it is dynamic and organic—the organic manifestation of moral life—not something legal and juridical.

But if this be the correct conception of the relation of good works to salvation, it becomes plain at once how impossible must be the notion of a transferability of their effects, or their *merit* in a true moral sense, from one person to another. The wages earned by a day's labor may, if the laborer so decides, be applied to the benefit of another. Here we are in the sphere of material and legal relations, in which merit as an exchangeable and transferable commodity is possible. But the character produced by moral action, and the happiness springing from such character, are not thus transferable. The laborer who allows his wages to go to another, for the purpose of keeping him from starvation, gains a character, a *merit* in the *moral sense*, and a satisfaction, which are all his own, and which cannot be given to another. Scripture, while it uses the term reward in a popular sense to describe the effect of moral action, knows nothing of the idea that the reward earned by one person can be transferred to another person. The title to reward, in the Scriptural sense, is an inseparable quality of the person by whom it has been earned, and can not even be alienated by him. I can not set my virtue, my character, my happiness to the account of another who is totally unlike me. I can, if I am a good man, help another man to become good and happy. I can do this by the exertion of moral power in the way of action or suffering. I can live myself into another's life, and so cause him to become like me. But I can not loan my character and my moral well-being to any one else. Neither can God reward another for what I have done, or for what I am. Every moral subject must be the architect of his own character and fortune. God, of course, must be the eternal ground and presupposition of all moral goodness. No creature could be good but for the grace and for the loving care and discipline of the Creator. Hence also in relation to the Creator no creature can lay any claim to merit at all. And neither can the character which one creature has woven out of



the love of the Creator and out of its own moral action be taken from one and set to the account of another. Every one must work out his own salvation, not by a series of extra-moral or super-moral performances, but by the common means of moral activity for which God creates the will and furnishes the power.

Thus, then, in the doctrine of salvation, that is, the doctrine of the work of grace in man, the theory of merit breaks down at every point. But can we adopt one principle in the doctrine of salvation, and an opposite principle in the doctrine of redemption, that is, the doctrine of the work of grace in Christ? Can we deny the notion of merit in regard to man's relation to God in general, and accept it in regard to the relation of Christ? This is what the Reformers did. They said men are not saved by their own merits at all, but only by the merits of Christ. But in saying this they left the idea of salvation to rest upon the juridical and legal conception upon which their opponents supposed it to rest. Salvation is still of merit—not of *grace*, but of *debt*. Instead of a moral and vital process in man, it is essentially a legal process outside of man; only instead of being carried on directly between God and man, it is carried on between God and Christ in man's behalf. For whether we adopt the Anselmic theory of satisfaction or the sixteenth century theory of penal suffering, in either case we have the notion of merit as the common basis of our theological thinking; and Christianity will become for us essentially a system of law, a *lex nova*, as the Scholastics were wont to say, instead of an order of grace and life. And this manner of thinking has largely prevailed in our orthodox systems of dogmatics until a comparatively recent time. In some it prevails still. And it shows itself especially, in ordinary religious speech, in the way of repeating traditional formulas whose meaning is for the most part no longer understood by those who use them. Such formulas occur in hymns and prayers. " 'Tis by the merits of thy death, the Father smiles again," we have been singing. And we pray to be forgiven, and to be saved, *for the sake of Christ's merits*. Is this consistent with our denial of the theory of merit in the doctrine of salvation?

Is it consistent with the ethical principle of personality, with the Scripture doctrine of divine grace, and with the teaching of the creed concerning the forgiveness of sins? It implies either that salvation is merely a juridical and not an ethical affair, or that moral conditions and qualities are purchasable and transferable things—a conception which is ethically impossible, and which, if clearly understood, would shock the most delicate Christian conscience of our time.

But it may be said that questions of this kind must be settled, not by an appeal to conscience, but by an appeal to Scripture. Without now expressing an opinion as to the validity of this principle, let us ask, then, what does Scripture teach on this subject? Does it teach that the work of redemption is a vital-moral act of grace in humanity, or that it is a meritorious satisfaction to the honor of God, or that it is a penal suffering of the curse of God upon the sins of mankind? In the latter case it would be difficult to see why all mankind should not be saved, and why any conditions at all should be required in order to salvation. If the debt which man owed to God has been fully paid, it is difficult to see why the justice of God would not be bound to admit the salvation of all men. And it is difficult also to understand how men could be required to forgive each other their trespasses as a condition of obtaining forgiveness from God, when in fact God Himself exacts payment before He forgives sin at all. (See Matt. 6 : 14, 15.) To this, however, the reply may be made that any plain teaching of Scripture is not to be invalidated by any logical consequences that may be drawn therefrom. Without endorsing the principle involved in this reply, we ask, then, do the Scriptures plainly teach this doctrine of legal redemption by the merits of Christ? Certainly not in so many words. If this view is in the Bible it is there only by implication. It has been commonly supposed, indeed, that it is implied in the fact that the suffering of Christ is frequently represented in the sacrificial terminology of the Old Testament. Christ, it is said, gave Himself up for us an offering and a sacrifice to God (Eph. 5 : 2); the Church has been purchased with His blood (Acts 20 : 28); and Christians have



been redeemed from the vain manner of their natural life by His precious blood, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot (1 Pet. 1 : 18, 19). But this fact would prove the theory in question only if it could be shown, first, that the New Testament writers used this terminology strictly in its old Testament sense, and, secondly, that that sense was the idea of vicarious punishment. Neither of these conditions can be established. The Old Testament ritual was a shadow only, not an image or definite counterpart of New Testament realities. But the sacrifices of the Old Testament were not representations of penal suffering. The victim was never supposed to suffer, either in fact or in figure, the punishment which was due to the offerer. The element of atonement consisted neither in the pain suffered by the victim nor in its death, but in its blood, or *life*, which was presented before God as a covering of sin. The death of the victim was incidental only to the obtaining of its blood, and with that blood atonement was made. The essence of atonement, then, was in no sense an execution of vicarious punishment.\* And the Christian counterpart of those Old Testament offerings, the atonement made by Christ, may therefore not be regarded as consisting in a payment of the penalty of sin in a legal sense, so as to discharge *ipso facto* the guilt of others.

But if Christ did not suffer to pay the penalty of human sin, wherefore then did He suffer? That, of course, is too large a question to be adequately discussed in this article, which has already grown to more than sufficient length. And, besides, our task, which was simply to show the untenability of the theological notion of *merit*, has been accomplished. We may take up the positive meaning of the vicarious sacrifice in some future article. Meanwhile, for the sake of relative completeness, we present a few additional thoughts on this subject. It is a mistake to suppose that all suffering is penal, just as it is a mistake to suppose that the highest good is pleasure; and the former mistake is

\*See Oehler's *Theology of the Old Testament*, Clark's edition, Edinburgh, Vol. I., pp. 409-419, and Vol. II., pp. 29-60. On this subject all students of Old Testament Theology are now substantially agreed.

probably closely connected with the latter. All human life and progress are conditioned by pain and suffering, quite apart from any possible influence of sin. The pains of birth and the pains of toil are illustrations. In the moral world the same conditions exist and are intensified by the presence of sin. There is here much vicarious suffering; and this is often the means of moral deliverance and progress. The possibility of this is to be found in the law of solidarity which pervades humanity as a whole as well as its smaller groups. In consequence of this law the members of a group may suffer the outward consequences of each other's sins, and such vicarious suffering may have the effect of morally purifying and elevating the community. And it is the best members which usually suffer the most. Such vicarious suffering is not penal, for it possesses none of the elements of punishment. So far as the sufferers at least are concerned, it is neither retributive, reformatory, nor preventive. The missionary who dies at the hands of the savages whom he has come to save is not paying the penalty of their sins, but he is performing an act of love and of moral devotion which may afterwards tell upon the life of those savages and help to make them new men. Love is the regenerating principle in the moral world, and the essence of love is sacrifice. Why this is so we do not know, unless it be because *God is love*. But we do know that the noblest results in human life and history are achieved by the vicarious sufferings which are born of the love of great natures. And we never suppose that between such results and the sufferings by which they are achieved there exists any relation of merit. The hero's suffering, who saves his people on the field of battle, does not constitute a merit by which he purchases from fate the people's welfare. And so the suffering of Christ, who faced all the hatred and endured all the misery of the world's sin, in the fulfillment of His divine mission of love, does not constitute a legal merit by which he purchases from God our redemption, but a moral dynamic, by which He breaks in us the power of sin, brings our will into union with the will of God, and enables us to live a new moral life. Neither is it ever represented as merit in the Scriptures. It is never said



that we are saved for the sake of Christ's merits, or that sins are forgiven for the sake of his merits. There is only one passage in the English version of the New Testament, namely, Eph. 4: 32, in which it is said that sins are forgiven *for Christ's sake*, and this is a mistake that has been corrected in the Revised Version. The original reads: "forgiving each other, as God also *in Christ* forgave you." Christ is here represented, not as the meritorious cause, but as the medium of the divine forgiveness; and Christians are exhorted to follow the example of God, which could hardly be supposed to mean that they are always to insist on satisfaction before forgiving each other any fault.

Still, in a *moral* sense, it is doubtless true that we are forgiven and saved for Christ's sake. In 1 John 2:12 it is said that "sins are forgiven for His name's sake"—a phrase which repeatedly occurs in the Old Testament in regard to the motive of Jehovah's gracious dealings with Israel; where the *name* denotes the revealed nature and character, or the revealed personality of Jehovah Himself. The *name* of Christ, then, as the ground of salvation, is Christ Himself revealed and accepted by faith, or *Christ in the believer*. (Cf. Meyer *in loco*.) Christ, who learned obedience and was made perfect through suffering, is the ground of forgiveness for us, and the author of our salvation. Hence, the relation of His work and suffering to our salvation is not a juridical relation, such as could be expressed by the term merit, but a vital-moral relation. Christ performed no works of supererogation which are now set to our account in a legal way. He, like other men, did no more than His duty, and could do no more. His duty as head of humanity, however, was different from that of any other man; and by the faithful performance of it, and being obedient unto death, He was made perfect as a Son, and became the author of eternal salvation to all that obey Him. He is this, however, not in a legal and juridical sense, but in a moral and dynamic sense. "The atonement," says Fairbairn, "works in the universe as the manifest and embodied judgment of God against sin, but of this judgment as chastening and regenerative rather than judicial and penal." (Place of Christ in Modern Theology, p. 482.)

The legal idea of salvation by merit as a transferable and purchasable commodity has long since been given up in Christian ethics. It offends the Christian conscience, because it violates the Christian idea of personality. The idea that one person can be punished for the sins of another, or that one can be made morally happy by having set to his account the virtue of another, is an impossible idea in modern ethical thought. But the idea that the Christ as the revelation of the divine life, and love and righteousness in personal human form, can be an infinite source of morally regenerating and quickening power for men, is an idea that is consonant not only with the teaching of Scripture, but also with our daily moral experience. And that idea expresses the reality of which the medieval doctrine of merit, which, as we have seen, was not derived from Christian sources, was meant, but utterly failed, to be a true interpretation. To that idea, now, it is the duty of Protestant dogmatics, and especially of the Protestant pulpit in our day, to rise. The doctrine of salvation by merit can no longer be preached to our Christian congregations; the doctrine of salvation by the love and power of the living Christ they will hear gladly.



### III.

## ON THE PRESENT STATE OF GERMAN THEOLOGY.

BY REV. D. B. SCHNEDER.

Of literature on German theology there has in recent years been no dearth. Yet the necessity of observing with discrimination every movement in a stream of Christian thought so influential as the German goes far to justify every renewed study of the subject.

The general motive power which sustains the theological thought of Germany to-day is the same that has always led to forward movements in Christian theology, namely, the faith-life of the theologian and of the Church which he represents. Of this an acquaintance with the personality of the thinkers concerned affords a deepened conviction. But equally true is it that the variety of particular forms which theology has taken in the past has been due to the profound influence of the peculiar conditions under which it took form at any one time. The German theology of the present is in this respect no exception. Of the four different types of theological thought now prevailing in Germany, the reigning one, Ritschlianism, is remarkable both for its decided novelty and for the rapidity of its growth. It will stand out as one of the phenomenal manifestations in the history of Christian doctrine, and that this new form of theological development is to a very large extent the result of the extraordinary conditions of the times is beyond a doubt. To obtain an intelligent idea of the present state of German theology in general, therefore, it is necessary to take these conditions into consideration.

One of the conditions to be taken into account is the state of current philosophy in Germany. German theology has fallen upon a time when philosophy has lost faith in itself. History seldom repeats itself, and any two historical periods, be they ever so

similar, are yet usually characterized by such differences of underlying forces and attending circumstances that comparisons between them are apt to be misleading. And yet when one looks back from these post-Hegelian days of Germany to several other periods in the history of philosophy—the post-Aristotelian days of Greece, for example—the similarity is so striking that reflection on it can not fail to be instructive. As the Greeks of the third century before Christ lived in the shadow of the most gigantic efforts of the Hellenic mind as manifested in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, so the Germans of the nineteenth century after Christ live in the shadow of the sublimest efforts of the modern mind, as these undoubtedly appear in the systems of Kant, Fichte and Hegel. The Greek systems left behind them a profound impression both of their greatness and of their failure, with the result that the Greek mind sank back in weariness upon itself. The great modern philosophers in like manner overawe the world of thought with the greatness of their genius; equally have they, excepting in part Kant, left an overpowering conviction of failure; and the result is that the German mind of to-day, like the Greek mind of over two thousand years ago, has recoiled upon itself, has given up all hope of knowing reality as such, has resigned itself almost completely and finally to the sphere of the phenomenal. One point of comparison more. The post-Aristotelian thinkers, having given up the search for objective truth, devoted themselves to an investigation of practical values—the more earnest Stoics to the study of moral values, the more sensual Epicureans to an inquiry into sense-values. A like disposition modified by changed circumstances prevails to-day. The ruling motive of the present philosophic study of Germany is practical. Philosophy proper, excepting the history of it, is much neglected. Other philosophic disciplines, like the theory of knowledge, psychology, logic and ethics, except when approached under the empirically scientific, as distinguished from the philosophic, impulse, are studied with an eye to their importance for some form of practical life.

When it was remarked above that the great systems of mod-



ern philosophy had left the impression of failure, Kant was partially excepted. Kant's attempt to balance his system by postulating the existence of things-in-themselves has long since been considered a mistake. But the negative side of his "Critique of the Pure Reason" and to some extent the principles of his "Critique of the Practical Reason" have lived, and not only have they lived, but they have ruled the thought of the nineteenth century. Outside of Germany Kant's influence has been profound. The agnosticism of England has its firmest basis in Kant's "Critique of the Pure Reason." And in Germany the post-Hegelian revival of Kantianism has been something phenomenal. The cry of "Back to Kant" has been sounding and resounding through the land. This year, just a century after Kant's retirement from his university chair, there has been started a magazine ( "*Kantstudien*" ) of bulky proportions devoted entirely to the study of Kant and Kant literature, including on its list of editors many of the leading German thinkers, together with several Englishmen and Americans. The large body of men who represent philosophy in the stricter sense on the philosophical faculties of the nineteen universities of Germany are, almost without exception, to-day busied with Kant and more or less governed by him. Some stand upon the position that Kant has said the last word in philosophy, the only duty left to the faithful being to expound him; others endeavor to develop still further his negative conclusions; a few attach themselves to him as modified by Lotze; while still others take him up together with other systems in an eclectic way. And yet all this widespread and diligent occupation with Kant-studies is no contradiction of the fact that German philosophy is in a state of demoralization. It would not even be true to say that this demoralization prevails in spite of Kantianism; much more must it be said that it prevails *because of* Kantianism. One important difference between the reaction of the Greek mind in the post-Aristotelian philosophy and that of the German mind at the present day is, that, while the post-Aristotelian reaction found no respectable philosophic ground to stand upon, the reaction from Hegel has

found not only a ground, but a fortress ready to hand in the form of probably the most rigorously thought-out philosophical work of any age, the "Critique of the Pure Reason." And this fortress became at the same time a prison. That baneful cleavage which Kant made between the subjective and the objective, between nature and spirit, limiting knowledge absolutely by the boundaries of the phenomenal and declaring every attempt to go beyond the phenomenal utterly futile, has stood, and modern thought has submitted to the authority of this position almost as to an axiom. According to this rule men have searched for truth. From this presupposition the general movement of thought has gone forth. The result is as above described—the study of philosophic subjects either from the purely empirical standpoint or with a direct reference to the practical. So far as philosophy is regarded from the empirical standpoint its study in Germany has largely resolved itself into a study of psychology. The man who is looked upon as the ablest German philosopher of to-day, Wundt, is preëminently a physiological psychologist. On the other hand, the practical tendency shows its strength in the very large amount of attention which social and political questions are now receiving at the hands of German philosophic thinkers. The German nationality and German social conditions are to the German mind of to-day magnitudes of intense practical interest and importance. The most popular professor in the University of Berlin is Adolf Wagner, professor of political science and sociology. Wundt in a recent lecture declared that the philosophy of history is the most fruitful field that now invites philosophic research. The empirical, the practical, the useful for the individual and for society—these constitute the subject of Germany's philosophic effort of the present.

By this demoralized state of German philosophy German theology has been profoundly affected. It could not be otherwise. The deeper problems of philosophy and theology are the same, the mode of approaching them only being different. Modern German theology, with the exception of the rationalistic and mediating schools, has indeed insisted upon its absolute independ-



ence of philosophy ; none the less has it been widely and increasingly influenced by this phase of thought-life. Both from the reactionary movement itself which followed Hegel and from the particular form the movement has taken in Kantianism, did this influence come. The first trace of it was the appearance in theology of a decided subjectivism, which, however, must also, in part, be ascribed to Schleiermacher, who came under Kantian influence previous to the post-Hegelian reaction. In the mediating school, which a generation ago was the dominant school of German theology, a subjective starting-point became one of the characteristic features, and with men like Rothe and Beck of this school, the subjective feature assumed controlling importance. Among the conservatives, or, more properly, the confessionalists, the subjective tendency became especially prominent in the Erlangen school. "I, as a Christian, am to myself, as theologian, the immediate subject for the development of my Christian doctrine," was regarded by Hofmann as a self-evident proposition, and Frank in his "System of Christian Certainty" makes subjective experience the measure of religious certainty. Another form of subjectivism appeared in pietism.

Thus, far, however, the subjective tendency was held in safe restraint ; and the extent of its influence was wholesome rather than otherwise in counterbalancing the one-sidedness of traditionalism. It was only in the teachings of Albrecht Ritschl that German theology at last completely fell into the arms of the prevailing disposition of thought. The leading characteristics of the spirit of the time now became the leading characteristics of Christian theology. Ritschl made the written word of the Old and New Testaments the starting point of his theology, but regarded its usefulness rather than its truthfulness of primary importance. He exalted Jesus Christ as the center and fulness of Divine revelation, but held that His whole significance for us lies in what is recorded of Him and His utterances in the New Testament, especially the synoptic gospels. As our present Lord, ruling over us, guiding and comforting us by His Spirit He must not be thought of. The Spirit himself as a personality of the



Godhead is not acknowledged. The idea of atonement is resolved into the idea of a proclamation of the love of God. In reading the record of this revelation through Christ the chief question is: Of what value is it in developing our religious life? What are called the *Werthurtheile* (judgments of value) as distinguished from *Seinsurtheile* (judgments of being) are the determining standards here as well as in reference to every other topic of Christian theology. It is a standpoint from which such subjects as the Bible, prayer and miracles are consistently treated in the freest possible way. The idea of Biblical inspiration is totally set aside. How much or how little of the sacred writings is rejected by the critics is a matter of comparative indifference. Prayer is considered useful, but must not be supposed to influence the action of God. The main point about miracles is the good effect which belief in them has exercised or may yet exercise upon the religious life; their actual occurrence may be denied. The miraculous birth of Christ, His resurrection and His ascension are not essentials of the Christian faith. The chief question concerning the supposed miraculous events of New Testament history is: In what form, whether regarded as natural or supernatural, do they produce the best *effect* upon the Christian community?

It is an extreme state of discomfiture indeed in which the human mind must find itself in order to be able to stand seriously upon such a basis as this, and yet it is precisely the state of mind that has been petrified by the Kantian philosophy. It is not different from saying, as Kant did, that the existence of God, of the soul and of the world can not be proven, but it is good for us to think and live *as if* they existed.

In harmony with Kantianism also is Ritschl's attitude of uncompromising opposition to metaphysics. All metaphysical constructions in theology are not only unreliable and worthless, but positively mischievous. All speculative theology is perverted theology. Every element of Christian thought that bears resemblance to any system of philosophy is a foreign element, and to sift the Christian teaching that has come down to us through the



centuries of all presumably foreign matter is considered one of the chief duties of the present. Hence the greatest Ritschlian work next to Ritschl's own "Doctrine of Justification and the Atonement" is the "History of Dogmas" by Harnack, much the ablest of living Ritschlians, in which work this sifting process is carried through with the rigor and acumen of genius. Hence also it is that the genuine conviction and earnestness of Kaftan make him almost rabid against all philosophical influences in theology in general and against the Logos idea in particular.\* Hence, finally, it is that a very large proportion of Ritschlian literature is occupied with criticisms of previous theological positions, leaving the actually constructive Ritschlianism almost a moiety.† It may be added that it is characteristic of the Ritschlian position that no comprehensive dogmatic work from its standpoint has yet appeared, and that in the dogmatic writings thus far given to the public certain important Christian doctrines have in every case been passed over in silence. The doctrines of the Trinity and of the Person of Christ have been the storm centers of criticism, the presumption being that these are the outgrowths, not of Divine revelation, but of Greek speculation. The doctrines most commonly passed over are those of the Holy Spirit and of the Last Things.

Thus it appears how completely German theology in its Ritschlian form has yielded to the spirit of the time. It betrays the same recoil from the effort to know objective truth, the same hopeless surrender to the subjective, the same shutting up of itself to the empirical and the practical, the same submission to Kantian fetters as exists generally.

The existence of another condition that is exercising its influ-

\* See his *Wahrheit der Christlichen Religion*, p. 39, and throughout the work.

† Take for example Kaftan's *Wahrheit der Christlichen Religion*, of which the first 486 pages are occupied with various theological and philosophical criticisms and reflections, while even the remaining 100 pages of professedly constructive matter contain much that is merely negative. Or take Ritschl's large work itself; almost the same proportions hold there between the historical and the critical on one side and the constructive on the other.

ence upon German theology is implied in what has been already said. It is the prevailing disposition to apply the empirical method to every department of learning. A few words more are needed concerning the influence of this tendency. The disposition to trust alone in the empirical is something that can not be entirely separated from the state of discouragement in the sphere of philosophy referred to above and the accompanying sway of Kantian principles. Indeed one of the fundamental factors that accounts for the present retreat to bald empiricism is Kantianism itself. The declaration of Kant that all effort to go beyond the reach of the sense-perceptions uniformly and necessarily results in failure has gone far to crowd the volume of modern thought into the narrow channel of the one-sidedly empirical, and to cast a coloring of suspicion upon everything that is not open to the test of the bodily senses. And the fact that this concentration upon the empirical has led to such marvellous results in the sphere of natural science constitutes the other factor that goes to explain the immense prestige which enables the empirical method to dominate nearly the whole realm of present research and thought.

The department of theology in which the empirical method has found its immediate and most thorough application is the exegetical. The biblical criticism of Baur and the Tübingen school differs from that of the present day in this important respect: the criticism of the Tübingen school was governed by the Hegelian idea of development. The attempt of Baur and his followers was to trace in the biblical writings such a progress from stage to stage according to the formula of thesis, antithesis and synthesis as would account for the origin of these writings, as well as for Christianity itself, in a purely natural way. Present day criticism, on the other hand, as represented by such men as Wellhausen, Guthe, Stade and Gunkel, of the Old Testament, and Holzmann, Weiszäcker and Jülicher, of the New, aims to be empirical in the strictest sense. It not only casts aside the old Hegelian idea of development as well as the newer evolutionary theory, but seeks to divest itself of every hypothesis and presupposition whatever, and to pursue its inquiries in the pure spirit of



a search for facts. This is the aim—an aim professedly empirical and an aim, moreover, that finds much justification in the fact that past methods of biblical study have been governed far too much by dogmatic prejudices. There is one presupposition of the Tübingen school, however, of which it cannot be said that the critics of the present day have been able to free themselves, namely, the presupposition against the supernatural. The ever-recurring refrain of the advanced critical work of recent production is, that much of the seemingly supernatural can be naturally explained, and that what can not be so explained, either could be so explained if all the facts were known, or the record of it is legendary or symbolical. This presumption in favor of the purely natural has led some of the critics to extremes of interpretation which have justly drawn upon themselves the charge of being imaginary and absurd. Nor have they in all cases succeeded in holding themselves bound by those feelings of conscientiousness, to say nothing of reverence, which is becoming in the search for truth of any kind, and which is, above all, necessary in the study of religious truth. Some of the ablest men in their own and other departments of theology accuse the more advanced critics of a spirit of wantonness in their interpretations of the sacred writings. The lamented Frank shortly before his death wrote: “It seems as if we were now upon the *via dolorosa* where the nails are being driven into the Divine Word in order that it may perish,” adding, however, his confidence that the Word, like its Lord, possesses an indestructible life, and that a resurrection will not fail.

This failure to carry through successfully the empirical method in biblical criticism, whatever undeniably good results have undoubtedly been achieved, strengthens the view that in theology, as well as in other departments of human study, pure empiricism in the accepted sense is impossible. Man is more than intellect, and whether the rest of his being shall exercise an enlightening or a perverting influence upon his intellectual vision, depends upon the question whether his whole being stands in right relation to the three magnitudes of God, self and world, or not.



Nevertheless, the results of recent criticism have of course not been without very great effect. The Ritschlian attitude toward the Bible has been to a large degree determined by this criticism. The extent to which the biblical writings have been called into question, their comparison with other sacred writings and the conflict of view between eminent critics themselves, all has had the effect of making the Ritschlian attitude toward the Bible so extremely flexible as we have above seen it to be. It is held that it is enough that the record presents to us the picture of an ideal Man engaged in establishing the kingdom of God, and that this kingdom has been sustained by that record.

Departments of theology other than the exegetical have, however, also been affected by the prevalence of the empirical method. In the sphere of historical theology this influence is abundantly evident in recent works on the apostolic period and on the history of doctrine. In the sphere of systematic theology the same influence appears. Empirical methods are looked upon as necessarily the most trustworthy and are applied as far as possible. The development idea, which in Hegelian days played so conspicuous a rôle in German theological thought, is now left out of account by the dominant theological school, and is even spurned as having a perverting influence on Christian thought.\*

A third conditioning element that must be taken into account in studying the German theology of the present day is the German Church. One hears so much about the freedom of theological science in Germany that without considerable acquaintance with the subject, it were easy to form the conclusion that the theologians there held themselves in lofty superiority to confessional differences and party controversies. Such, however, is not the case. It is a remarkable fact that after eighty years of church union in Prussia this union itself should still be made the occasion of division and controversy within the Church. The question of the union still keeps alive three parties, two of them, at least, as vigorous as ever. Of these the first may be called

\*See Kaftan's *Wahrheit der christlichen Religion*, pp. 352, 416. Compare Ritschl's *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, Vol. III., pp. 24, 25.



the party of the negative unionists, because they befriend the union out of a spirit of indifference toward the creeds. They support the union for the same reason that Frederick William III. established it, namely, unconcern about the differences between the confessions and an appreciation of the practical advantages of organic unity. Over against this party stands the party of the confessionalists, that is, the party of those who would dissolve the union, revive the confessional consciousness and restore the confessions to their former position of importance and authority. Between these two stands the party of the positive unionists; these, though not indifferent to the confessions, emphasize what is common between them and minimize their differences with a view of strengthening in a positive way the union between the Reformation churches and thus also of mediating between the two other parties.

Taking the different theological tendencies or schools in relation to these church parties, we find the first of the parties mentioned supported by the Ritschlian and rationalistic theologians, the second by the conservatives or confessionalists, and the third by the mediating school. Thus the position of each party has come to have a two-fold significance—in relation to church organization and in relation to theological orthodoxy; and the strife between them is for this reason all the more bitter. Bitterest has the strife been between the negative unionists and the confessionalists, and it can be said that both sides have gained through this very attitude of mutual opposition. A quarter of a century ago the positive unionists, who were represented by the mediating school in theology, were the strongest element in German theology and church; but as the Ritschlian theology arose and grew in strength, as, on the other hand “the confessional consciousness grew” and emphasized its position, the forces of the mediating party were gradually absorbed into one or the other of the polar opposites, until to-day this party of compromise and peace remains a mere handful. But, more than this, each of the great opposing parties has been made more positive and determined by the follies and extravagances of the other.

There is no doubt that one of the principal forces that serves to sustain the Ritschlianism of to-day is the determined and often intemperate opposition of its enemies. The confessionalists advocate an extreme and slavish adherence to the Lutheran creeds; they seek to use the Church machinery against their opponents; they would take away that freedom of university teaching which has so long been the pride of Germany; and they often employ language and devices which are beneath the plane of dignified religious controversy. All this has the effect of keeping many in the Ritschlian camp who, though dissatisfied with their company, yet prefer it to that of the confessionalists; while the Ritschlian leaders are, through the influence of such opposition, made by no means more temperate in their views and less determined to stand by their guns. In other words, the Ritschlianism of to-day is to be found, not aloft in the calm atmosphere of pure scientific inquiry, but down in the dust and clamor of the party arena, and can only be judged aright as seen in that situation.

On the other hand, however, also, the great strength of the confessionalists undoubtedly lies in their attitude of opposition to the reign of a theology which is felt to be a threat to the very life of the Church. Confessionalism in itself is not strong. Since the death of Frank and the retirement of Luthardt there are few able men in the universities whom it can call its own. It is indeed true that the conservative theologians in the universities (as conservatives are counted in Germany) outnumber the radicals. But it is also true that few of the abler ones profess such loyalty to the creeds as would make them confessionalists in the strict sense. Yet because they see in the confessionalist party the best means at hand of preserving the life of the Church from the dangers of Ritschlianism, they give the weight of their influence to this side. Moreover it may be safely doubted whether the body of the Church itself would be so decidedly confessional as it has become in recent years, if it were not for the presence of the Ritschlian danger. Pains have been taken to awaken the Church to a sense of the prevalent evils, and the consequence is that the confessionalist leaders find behind them a powerful Church senti-



ment with the support of which they have been able to control a large number of synods and consistories, to influence the appointment of professors in the universities, and to set in motion a tendency toward churchly authoritativeness which has justly called forth the charge that German Protestantism is at present rapidly becoming Romanistic in its method and spirit.\* The actual situation is, therefore, that the confessional party is strongest in the Church itself, and that its consequent strength in the universities is second only to that of Ritschlianism.

A word must yet be devoted to the mediating and the rationalistic schools of German theology. Incidental reference to both of these has already been made in connection with what was said about the church parties. As was mentioned before, the mediating theologians have been identified with the positive unionists in the Church. They have, therefore, been mediating in double relations—in theology and in the Church. In theology they mediated between traditionalism and rationalism formerly, between confessionalism and Ritschlianism in more recent times. In the Church they have mediated between the confessional party and the confessionally indifferent unionist party. They have tried to show how much the Lutheran and Reformed confessions have in common, and how small the minor differences were as compared with the great differences which separated them both from the Roman Catholic Church. Of theologians of the past, Melanchthon has been their inspiration. They have a noble history, and they had still nobler aims. Such names as those of Nitzsch, Rothe, Julius Müller, Beck and Dorner adorn their past. But the position of the compromiser is always an uncomfortable and thankless one, and it is no wonder that, ground between the upper and nether millstones of the two great parties of present German theology and Church, the *Vermittelungstheologie* has almost died out. Until within the recent past Köstlin of Halle could be called the leader of the lingering remnant. But now he

\*See Harnack's address at Eisenach, *Zur gegenwärtigen Lage des Protestantismus*. The new organ of the Rationalists, *Protestantische Monatshefte*, Makes similar complaints.

has retired, and Reischle, a Ritschlian, is appointed in his place. The venerable Beyschlag, Haupt and a few others are all that remain. Probably the two ablest theologians outside of the Ritschlian circle are Kähler of Halle and Cremer of Greifswald. These were both pupils of Beck, and for a while followers of him; but they have left go of the speculative feature of the mediating theology, though they abide by their position of positive unionists in the Church. Their distinguishing characteristic theologically may be considered their strict adherence to the Bible.

A similar process of decline has befallen the rationalistic school. The few living theologians of this school are the remnants of the old Tübingen school, which once exercised such a wide influence. Its decline runs parallel with the dying of Hegelianism. Until recently, however, the three names of Biedermann, Lipsius and Pfleiderer still gave prominence to the school; but now the first two of these are gone, and only Pfleiderer remains. The *Protestantische Kirchenzeitung*, which for nearly half a century championed the cause of the rationalists, was at the beginning of 1897 reduced to a small monthly. There are, however, in the universities of Jena, Heidelberg, Strassburg and Tübingen a number of lesser lights, who, though they cannot be called descendants of the Tübingen school, yet have more sympathy with the position of that school than with the Ritschlians. As seen above, in church matters the rationalists affiliate with the Ritschlians; but in theology they combat them and are distinct from them.

So far as the features of the present situation justify a forecast of the immediate future, they seem to indicate a gradual disintegration of the Ritschlian school. There are already important and growing differences between the Ritschlian followers, some of them becoming more evangelical, while others are drifting in a negative direction; a right wing and a left wing are forming themselves. To the former tendency belong Hermann, Kaftan and Reischle. Hermann, in the second edition of his *Verkehr mit Gott*, declares in opposition to Ritschl, that the individual believer has direct access to Christ in prayer; that present evil



draws upon itself the Divine displeasure, and that man by nature is in a lost condition. Kaftan seems to be moving in the direction of a fuller acceptance of the Trinity. Reischle strongly emphasizes the continued presence and working of Christ in the church and in the individual believer as essentials of the Christian faith. Exponents of the left wing tendency are Harnack, Otto Ritschl and Troeltsch. There is, as yet, little controversy between the exponents of these two tendencies. But there is a certain restlessness, a certain dissatisfaction with the present situation, a refusal on the part of some to be called Ritschlians, which makes it possible to believe what is averred by independent thinkers, namely, that Ritschlianism has already passed its most flourishing period and is in the beginnings of its decay. Probably, after all, the German mind is too speculative to rest for any length of time in a theology so untheoretical and empirical as the Ritschlian.

#### IV.

### THE IMMIGRANT PROBLEM.

BY JOHN M. SCHICK, D.D.

No question forces itself upon the attention of this nation with steadier persistence than the one raised by the constant coming of foreigners to find homes in the United States. Its present status seems to be that the number of immigrants is greater than the country's capacity for assimilation ; and, when large masses of unassimilated foreigners in the nation are regarded as dangerous to American institutions, there arises the exigency of bringing the number of aliens, coming into the country, into a relation of nearer equality with the nation's ability to absorb such elements. This problem is not one of merely recent recognition. It has, in varying form, occupied the American mind for nearly half a century, and the one apparently acceptable solution, now, seems to be the restriction of immigration. The earlier agitations asked only for restrictive measures touching the naturalization of foreigners and the right of foreign citizens to hold office in the state. It seems to have been thought that, by these means, foreigners would be kept the longer under the influence of American institutions, and would thereby be the more fully prepared for the duties of citizenship and for full incorporation into the body politic. But our agitators have learned that something more than delayed citizenship is needed to make some foreign elements ready for a place in our national life, and public attention is directed to restricting immigration itself, with a view to excluding, entirely, such elements as our political community could not, without harm to itself, absorb.

The policy of excluding undesirable foreigners, under which Chinamen, and all criminals and paupers have already been forbidden admission to this country, has not proved sufficiently ef-



fective in its results ; and the last (the 54th) Congress was called upon to make, what proved to be, a fruitless effort at a further solution of the problem. An intervening veto prevented the bill, as it had passed both the House and the Senate, from becoming a law. The measure, however, serves to call attention to the matter and, in connection with the laws previously enacted, is significant as indicating the trend of public sentiment on this question. For the large vote, by which the measure was carried over the President's veto in the lower branch of Congress, demonstrates the great popularity of the plan embodied in the vetoed bill. This plan proposed to go a step farther in the direction of exclusion, by raising another barrier in the way of the stranger looking for a home. An intellectual test was to have been presented, and only such immigrants were to have been admitted as were, at least, so far removed from illiteracy as to be able to read a selection from the constitution of the United States. From which it seems that our statesmen, after most careful consideration, could find no better way of dealing with the multitudes of foreigners coming to this country than to close our gates a little more closely against them by enlarging the inadmissible class.

This tendency towards excluding foreigners is in marked contrast with the former usage of the United States, by which the homeless, the oppressed, the liberty loving of all the world were welcomed to share our freedom and to occupy our territory. But there will be little difficulty in finding a reason for the change in the greatly altered conditions, both in the country and in the immigrants.

Formerly, wide, unoccupied territories were fairly begging for settlers ; new industries were inviting both labor and capital ; growing commerce offered promising opportunities to all investors ; these, with civil and religious liberty to make them particularly enticing, combined to open here a desirable refuge for the oppressed of every land, who might wish to have a home, earn a livelihood, and prosper in a nation that proclaimed itself free. These advantages an oppressed and overcrowded world seized in such numbers as almost makes the new world old. Prairies that

were empty are now filled with busy people ; pathless forests have given place to thronged thoroughfares ; barren wilds have become thrifty farms ; and wastes, long desolate, have been turned into crowded cities. Industries prosper and homes abound where only stillness reigned and wild beasts had their lairs. These very changes invite other classes of immigrants, and compel the nation to exercise a care in welcoming them. Industries, no longer in their infancy, are full of workmen, who, whether native or foreign, look askance at any stranger, who may come to share their toil, and, as they look at it, to take their job, or, perhaps, reduce their wages. Commerce in its growth has developed business ability, and the American merchant, now crowded in his own market, is unable to welcome, as once he did, a possible rival in the foreigner, who comes to develop and divide his trade. Laborers, mechanics, artisans of every sort feel the effect of similar conditions. All find themselves hindered in their business, if not actually defeated in their enterprises and work by the omnipresent foreigners, to such an extent as to make them seek protection against almost certain calamity by restricting immigration.

But equally great is the change to be noted in the immigrant. He, too, is a different personality from the earlier pioneers. He comes, impelled by a different motive, and bears a modified character. Religious oppression has ceased to drive the best sons of Europe away from home, to build, in a strange land, the altars at which they may worship their God, as they believe well pleasing in His sight ; political oppression rarely, now, forces the old world's heroes into the new, to seek a home where civil bondage is supposed to be impossible. The news of American wages, higher than those paid at home, has gone abroad ; descriptions of American environments and advantages, better than workmen in other countries usually enjoy, have been read in Europe, and the less favored sons of other lands, having heard of the good things to be had for the coming, have come seeking to improve their temporal conditions. They have not come expecting a hardship, which, for freedom's sake, they are ready to endure ; but, rather,



a greater degree of ease and comfort, for the sake of which they are willing to forego the accustomed associations of their native land. And, whilst many and honorable exceptions to this statement may be pointed out, the generally predominating impulse to change of nationality, now, finds its origin in pecuniary motives, as may be demonstrated by the fact that immigration increases and decreases as this country's reputation abroad for prosperity is good or bad.

Hence, too, the tide of immigration, which once flowed westward, where the unsettled portions of the country invited the pioneer to win a home by making it, has changed its course, and, breaking into streams, it now flows toward our cities. American industries, protected from foreign competition, afforded opportunities for more lucrative employment in the East, and the immigrants seem to have found it out. Instead of scattering themselves over western territories, they now crowd into the cities and shops of the East, where they give the American workmen home competition for foreign. The extent of this change in the migration of foreigners to this country is indicated in the following statement: Of the 243,267 immigrants, arriving at the ports of the United States for the year ending June 30, 1896, 224,650, or nearly two-thirds, indicated the three eastern states of New York, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts as their destination, and only 66,020 of the whole number went into the Northwest, meaning by that term all of the United States north and west of the Ohio river. And then about one-third of this latter number were going to Illinois, with its great city of Chicago, so that the portion of our country offering cheap homes to laborers got but a very insignificant part of the foreign accession to the nation's population.

Now, if, in connection with the foregoing, one keeps in mind the fact that but few of the immigrants now coming have political, and none at all have religious grievances, of which they complain, or from which they seek to be freed, it will not be difficult to draw as strong a contrast between the earlier and later immigrant as may be seen in the earlier and later character of the country itself.

But, led by whatever motive, possessed of whatever character, the immigrant is here, and he is keeping up his coming at the average rate of a thousand a day. With him, as he comes, and, as he is when he comes, the country must deal, and both influence him and be influenced by him. The State has, indeed, undertaken the problem, in some sort, by its naturalization and immigrant laws. But, so far, the results of its efforts can hardly be called gratifying. Throughout the country may be found representatives of the prohibited classes, and the reports of the government's custom house service indicate that the laws cannot be particularly rigidly or offensively administered against the excluded classes of immigrants. To illustrate, under the law excluding paupers, some two thousand were last year debarred from our ports. But, during the same period, a population of fifty thousand from a single country was admitted, which brought, in total wealth, an average of less than ten dollars for each adult, counting nothing at all for the entire membership under twenty years of age. Certainly numbers of them must have had very narrow margins between them and the condition which would have rendered them inadmissible. With too much elasticity, in the application of restrictive measures, even if restriction of immigration can be accepted as the best policy in the premises, must come a serious doubt whether these can prove efficient to avert the dangers which some earnest economists are fearing.

Now, it is understood, that nearly all these immigrants differ from us (and, it may be remarked, from one another) in thought, customs, religious practices—everything. The differences vary with their nationality, and it would be hard to find any common bond to bind them into a community. This bond is to be established after they are here. They have generally come from monarchies, often with false notions of freedom and public relations, and are consequently scarcely able to grasp the American ideas of personal, social, political or religious life and habits. Few have any desire to grasp these, and still less seem ready to adopt them. Mostly they prefer the customs with which they are



familiar, and naturally cling to those of their old homes. This makes the process of assimilation a very slow one, and it is here that many are led in their impatience to rail at the foreigner when real patriotism should suggest some effort at correcting the threatening character of the situation. For it is not to be doubted that, under proper influences, the very change we think so desirable could be effected. As a matter of fact, very large numbers of foreigners have become, and do yet become, thoroughly American, and form, in part, the best elements of our national body. The line of some of our very best citizens back to a foreign parentage is very much shorter than the line of native ancestors which some of our very worst fellow countrymen can claim. And if any considerable part of our immigrant population can be so completely Americanized, there is encouragement to believe the same for others if the proper conditions are at hand.

There will, in fact, be no difficulty in the way of agreeing that the real question, with all its perplexities, is really not one of the numbers or nationality of the immigrants, but wholly one of their spirit and morals. Every act of Congress restricting immigration has actually been taken to reach the character of the excluded; and the bill which suggested this article was passed because the illiterate are generally supposed to be more open to pernicious influences than the more highly educated people of the same communities. But morals can never be reached by legislation in such a way as to let in only good immigrants and shut out all the bad ones. Here the State as an organization must fail; and here, also, the Church of Christ can find its place of usefulness to the State in helping to solve the immigration problem.

The Church, although it is independent of the State, has peculiar obligations to the nation in which it is established. These grow out of the life and character of the Church itself, and not out of any relation the Church sustains to the State as such, other than that which exists, in a country like ours, where the best part of the State is generally made up of citizens, who are members of the Church. For, every immigrant coming to the State as a future citizen, comes also to the Church as a possible son to be



converted and saved, if he be out of Christ ; or to be edified and strengthened, if he be a believer. The efforts of the Church will naturally differ from those of the State, as the purposes of its endeavors are different. The State can only deal with men as they are, and seek, when necessary, to restrain the immoral ; but the Church, keeping in mind the conversion of those addressed by the Gospel, essays the transformation of all who come under its influence. The former attempts by law to restrict or suppress the bad, whilst the latter, through the Gospel, aims at regeneration and correction. The Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ necessarily elevates the character, improves the habits, amends the customs of all who are animated with its quickening energy. This cannot, in any true sense, be affirmed of any agency at the command of the State, which at most may compel compliance with a given requirement, but can never change an appetency. The habits of Chinamen, for instance, made them obnoxious to many far western Americans ; but neither the laws, by which they are excluded from our territory, nor the animosity through which, in the days of the anti-Chinese agitations, American mobs hounded them through the streets of western cities, has ever compelled a celestial to reform a single degrading habit. Constraint is not really remedial, and for this reason the State cannot, with any form of coercion it may attempt, correct the habits of any foreigners, nor make one of them adopt or respect the customs of this country. The one corrective power comes in the Gospel, and this American Christianity is under obligation to God and the nation to exercise in active, personal piety.

The Church, it is true, endeavors to reach all men and not only foreigners. It can make no discrimination between natives and immigrants, but strives to awaken, in all it addresses, a personal longing for a higher, better life. But this makes its efforts all the more effective. For both classes spoken of are here placed in better relation for mutual intercourse. On the one hand, the assimilating power of our citizens will, by their own better life, be increased ; and, on the other, the life and habits of the foreign element will be so improved as to make its embodi-



ment into our national life easier. The Church will keep both bound in a common fellowship of personal responsibility to God for their actions. The life of grace generated by the Gospel in both alike, will affect their practice and develop mutual confidence; and, if it will not actually awaken, in the foreigner, a desire to adopt the institutions of his American brother, it will, at least, afford American Christians a particularly favorable opportunity to exemplify, in their own lives, those American ideas and customs which we so much desire our immigrant population to adopt. The advantage of this interrelation will be appreciated in proportion as we are able to acknowledge that it is certainly unreasonable, on our part, for us to expect a foreigner to conform to our customs, and to adopt new and untried habits before these have been approved by his conscience or judgment.

There is, without doubt, room for important changes, in both the habits and customs of our immigrant population. Too many instances have been shown, in which they have regarded their civil rights as merchantable, and American politicians have, usually, purchased them. It has been pointed out that their socialistic, anti-republican tendencies, agitations, and organizations, are dangerous to the commonwealth, and in these not a few Americans have participated. It is charged that they are even more than willing to engage in the manufacture, sale, and use of intoxicating liquors both under the laws which American legislatures have enacted, and in violation of law, at which American officials have seemed to wink. We are also warned that they are, both for pleasure and for profit, destroying our American Sabbath, by introducing continental laxity in its observance here. Other dangerous traits have been discovered in our alien citizens, but these will suffice to demonstrate the necessity for some remedy to cure the social malady pressing us from our relation to the foreign element affecting American life. An illustrative example is selected for consideration, and the remedial course suggested for it will indicate the truly effective mode of correcting all the dangerous situations confronting the nation.

The immigrant is charged, above everything, with disregard

for the American Sabbath, and, whilst very many foreigners are to be counted among the most faithful observers of the Lord's Day in this country, it must be acknowledged that, for large numbers of foreigners, the charge is too true. Yet, so long as our native citizens participate as they do in this desecration, they should not very loudly decry a foreigner, with no Sabbatical pretensions, for refusing to yield an enforced observance. The American Sunday, under existing circumstances, is, for the foreigner, an institution of hypocrisy. He sees American Christianity itself disregard the sanctity of the day it affects to observe; he knows that American capital, much of it in Christian hands, runs Sunday trains, and compels both native and foreign laborers to man them; he has felt the power of American operators to force their employees to fill and draw their furnaces and coke ovens seven days a week; he has learned that both owners and patrons of telegraph companies with convenient Sunday service, and of the Sunday newspaper with its sensational specialties, are, many of them, Christian Americans; and when all these reverently applaud their minister for portraying the danger to the Sabbath, the great American institution, from the foreigner's disregard for the day, he seems to more than half feel that he, in his own way, is better than American pretenders. He is even boastful of his integrity as, at least, making no pretension.

The remedy must come from American Christianity, which, as it loves the sanctity of the day, is in a position to make its observance a more significant indication of piety. A general participation in the worship of the sanctuary on the Lord's day, will demonstrate, as no other agency can, the value of its rest and services, in the elevation of character, for the improvement of man.

Here, and wherever the habits of immigrants need correcting, help must come from the Church through the Gospel, and the Church is bound by most patriotic obligations to exemplify in its life the helpful power of the Gospel of Christ to heal the nation, by giving it Christian citizens, who are such in fact and not only in name.



The means by which the American Church can help the immigrant, particularly, is to give him, in addition to the Gospel lived in such a way as to commend our Christian life to him, this same Gospel preached in a language that he can understand, and by a minister in whom he has confidence. The object, of course, will be the higher religious life of the immigrant, and his personal growth in grace through Christ, but as true Christians are never bad citizens, the effect of the course indicated is easily apparent.

It will not do to say, here, that this is a land of gospels, and that the immigrant should learn English. It must be remembered that it is we who are wanting to win the immigrant as he comes. He is satisfied, almost too well satisfied, with himself and his customs. He will learn English too. But, if the Church waits with the Gospel, till the foreigner has learned our language, it will find, that, by that time, he will have acquired other Americanisms, which, most likely, will weaken the influence of the Gospel over him, for some time. The bad agencies approach the immigrant in his own tongue, and frequently in his own peculiar dialect. They meet him early, when he welcomes any interest shown in him, and, before the Church has commenced to exert its influence, the poor being has been started in the wrong direction. The fact that he seems so open to the approach of false friends, indicates to the Church the way to his confidence. The Church must meet and follow the immigrant with the Gospel, in his own tongue, and from a minister of his own nationality, and, before false leaders shall be able to hinder the work of grace, save him for God and the nation. The great host of pious foreigners, thoroughly Americanized, and intensely patriotic citizens, found in the membership of churches, using foreign languages, established by foreigners themselves, without American assistance, and often in the face of strong American opposition, points to the magnificent possibilities for usefulness, within reach of the American Church.

With the Gospel in his own language the immigrant must be accorded the opportunity of hearing it. Bad habits are soon developed in any one outside of the reach of the hallowing influences

of the sanctuary. Hence true patriotism demands for the immigrant freedom to worship God, and forbids any power to keep him working when he would wish to be engaged in the service of God.

Besides the Gospel in his own native language, and freedom to hear it preached, he should enjoy toleration on points of difference. Charity is to be exercised toward such practices as may grow out of national peculiarities, church customs and even personal notions of education, and habits of abstinence or indulgence. This forbearance will not be any endorsement of habits and customs which we condemn in ourselves, but rather a fraternal concession, until we, as Americans, succeed in showing that the usages of this country are more helpful, in the spiritual and temporal growth of the people, than those of which we complain. Censorship is avoided in order to win alien brethren to practices we believe to be less dangerous than their own. We can be tolerant because we have faith in our Christianity with its Gospel truly preached and honestly lived, as fully able to win all men to Christ and the better life.

The aim of all such effort by the Church is only the best interests of all addressed. The only right motive is the salvation of both the immigrant and native brethren. But the whole American Church is, by the peculiar needs of our immigrant population, challenged to have an active part in the necessary work. The denominations to which the immigrants belong may be too weak to undertake the great work on their hands. The whole Church has a truly patriotic duty here, and a selfish denominationalism will seriously hinder the progress of an important work. It may even become necessary, in the effort to give the Gospel to the strangers within our gates for the good of the nation, to aid in establishing churches, differing from us in language, customs, peculiarities, doctrines even. For the element of danger in the situation confronting this nation will not be eliminated from our body politic until larger numbers of our population, both native and foreign, are lifted into that divine life of which Christ is the head. In no crisis of American history has the Church of Jesus Christ



been found wanting when the nation needed its help ; and in the solution of this great problem it will, without a doubt, continue to efficiently use the only potent agency for the saving of the nations by preaching the Gospel through which alone individuals and nations are transformed into sons of God.

This course may not find many hearty advocates among sociologists. But when our nation is constantly confessing by the laws enacted that it is unable to safely absorb the body of immigrants coming to us annually ; and when past efforts at restriction have not as yet made the presence of foreigners in this country any less a menace to American institutions ; and particularly when our statesmen seem to be at a loss to know what next to do, it will not be amiss to draw attention to the possible efficiency of that one agency which in all our past history has gathered into its fold foreigners of every class and country, and united them in the bonds of a Christian fellowship, which has always made them a blessing and never a danger to our national life.

## V.

### VICARIOUS AND EXEMPLARY BOTH.

BY REV. HENRY S. GEKELER.

Heresy is usually lopsidedness. Truth is a diamond with many facets. The heretic is the man who sees but one facet. He may see exactly. He may describe what he sees accurately. What he sees may be well worth seeing and describing. But he sees one phase of truth alone, isolated and out of relation. The very intensity with which he beholds and enjoys may lead him to deny that other phases exist. He then becomes a schismatic. He separates complementary portions of the truth.

A diamond would be defaced and mutilated were one facet to be cut away from the remainder. Its value depends upon the sum total of all its parts. Through every facet it drinks in great draughts of light which it reflects and refracts until it blazes upon your finger, the quintessence of sunshine.

Nay, truth is no mineral. For purposes of illustration the Master likened the kingdom of heaven unto a pearl of great price. But his prose sayings were at times more beautiful than his illustrations. For instance, "I am the way, the truth and the life." Truth is personal and vital. When you cut and separate it, it bleeds. There is altogether too much vivisection in theology.

The passion of our Lord is a fact that men are wont to treat in this fashion. Jesus is our great Example, in his suffering as in every feature of his earthly experience. So says one party, and thinks to enhance that factor of the truth by denying that his passion purchased our redemption. And if we will be honest, we must confess that there are others who, while recognizing that we are "bought with a price," have so little to say of the Suffering Servant as our Example, that it amounts to a virtual denial of the fact.



There is a better way. Peter in his first epistle (2: 18-25) beautifully combines these two features of Christ's portrait. "Christ also suffered for us leaving us an example," is the heart of the passage.

It might be claimed that the scope of the phrase, "for us," is exhausted by the second member of the sentence, "leaving us an example." We are not left to deduce the vicariousness of the Passion from the phrase, "for us." The doctrine of the propitiatory sacrifice is not a huge inverted pyramid standing on such a slight support. The great Church of Christ has not been left all these centuries in uncertainty as to this doctrine, until a few Greek professors had nicely balanced all the fine shades of meaning to be tortured out of a Greek preposition. We could well afford to ignore the results of a mere hair-splitting criticism, while we walk about the walls and note the massive bulwarks of the temple of truth.

The critical faculty need not be very acute to appreciate the force and bearing upon this doctrine of the words: "Who his own self bare our sins in his body on the tree, that we being dead unto sins, should live unto righteousness; by whose stripes ye are healed." Peter has not a philosophic cast of mind like Paul. The latter would fill up an entire chapter tracing back such an important dogma to its remotest sources and then on to its ultimate consequences. Peter sketches it in a few bold strokes, somewhat as a modern impressionist masses the thousand details of a landscape by a few flips and splashes of his brush. Peter is satisfied if he has left the truth "writ large" in mind and heart.

Let us gather up the few elements he suggests: 1. Christ suffered; 2. He did no sin; 3. He bare our sins; 4. The purpose, that we might be dead unto sins but alive unto righteousness; 5. He has succeeded in his purposes in your case: for ye are returned unto the Shepherd and Bishop of your souls.

Let it suffice to stress only the last of these elements. Peter is admonishing those to follow Christ's example who have already come to Him. Elsewhere in this same epistle (3:18) he says: "Christ also hath once suffered for sin, the just for the unjust,

that he might bring us to God." Reconciliation precedes imitation. Those who are healed and have already returned, are to use Christ's passion as a copy.

Peter must repent of his denial, and own his Lord as often as he had denied, the old boastfulness all drowned in bitter tears, before the threefold command, "Feed my sheep," and the final "Follow thou me," are spoken. More than any repentance of Peter or sober professions of love, something more was needed to bury the old Simon and enable Peter to "walk in newness of life." His Lord must lay down his life for the sheep. "Friends" he had recognized Peter and his companions to be. He must bring the supreme sacrifice of friendship. The cross, the tomb, the resurrection are all necessary, if Peter's following of his Lord is to be more successful than it had been before. I am sure Peter had all this graven upon his memory too deeply ever to forget it. What he needed, though an undoubted disciple, unreconciled sinners certainly cannot do without. To point to Jesus as the great Exemplar, and at the same time to deny or ignore the offense of the cross, is a kind of "foolishness of preaching" of which Peter and his fellow apostles were not guilty.

Another reason why the vicarious should not be separated from the exemplary in Christ's passion is that we are to imitate Him! That upon first thought is a task to give us pause. And we are to imitate Him in his suffering and death of all parts of his experience! We fairly stagger at the prospect. If ever man is conscious of his impotence, it must be here. "Give me power," we shall pray, if we pray at all. And power is granted, as we have seen in the previous paragraph, the power of a divine redemption, Christ's power to lay down His life and His power to take it again. This power must become subjective.

Let me not despise human motives, human affections and volitions, set aflame from heaven. The writer would be the last to deny the motive power of a fair ideal, even when it is looked upon in an external and mechanical way. The passion of Christ has impressed itself upon history and civilization. It has enriched the race, even apart from men's personal and believing acceptance



of Jesus Christ as the ultimate revelation of divine mercy. "When he was reviled, he reviled not again; when he suffered, he threatened not; but committed himself to him that judgeth righteously." Who can behold that picture and remain untouched? None will accuse Rousseau of being an evangelical believer in Jesus. He it was who said: "If the death of Socrates be that of a sage, the life and death of Jesus are those of a God." Some power such an ideal must wield in every heart that apprehends it never so dimly.

But who can measure the augmented force of that ideal, when from being distant and cold and faint from distance, it is brought so near that a grateful love embraces its feet? When from being a mere fact of history, that noble figure enters into our personal experience? When the fact becomes to us a person? When we no longer think of the ideal of life as "it," but HIM? Something of this sort occurs when we take the fact of Christ's passion as being vicarious, and crowd this big thought into the phrase, "Christ also suffered for us." I will not resort to the legerdemain of the mere linguist and try to press a whole system of theology out of one poor Greek preposition, but it is only sane interpretation that seeks to understand a word or phrase from its setting. Christ suffered for us. Here is what "for us" means: "Ye were not redeemed with corruptible things as silver and gold \* \* \* but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot." Now reread the verse: "Christ also suffered for us, leaving us an example, that we should follow in his steps." "Example" fairly glows with this light concentrated upon it. To make the most of Christ's example, we dare not ignore the fundamental fact that he suffered for us, "the just for the unjust."

It might seem gratuitous to suggest to readers who are familiar with the structure of the Heidelberg Catechism, how the interpretation here given fits into that beautiful scheme of Christian teaching. The reader need not be told what a comfort and inspiration it is to the believer that "he is not his own, but belongs to his faithful Saviour Jesus Christ," His, because purchased

with His precious blood. Nor does the reader need to be reminded how this keynote reverberates throughout the third part of the Catechism, where the believer is taught how to show by Christian service his gratitude for such deliverance. "Made nigh by the blood of Christ," how much easier to follow Him than when "afar off"!

This passion of Christ is to be imitated. And it is to be imitated in its vicariousness. In how far our sufferings may be vicarious, is a question with which theologians have not concerned themselves to any great extent. If the thought has ever come to many of them, it has been impatiently brushed aside, labelled "mysticism," and ever after ignored. As though it were any more mystical than the vital union which subsists between a believer and his Lord. If mediatorial functions are entirely foreign to human nature, than the whole subject is closed. But the great Mediator between God and men is "the *Man* Christ Jesus." And our partaking of Christ makes us priests through him. Peter says we are "partakers of Christ's sufferings," and by that he refers to sufferings which Christians actually endure, and not to what Christ endured for them. What do our priestly activities involve? The Heidelberg Catechism says that as priest I "present myself a living sacrifice of thankfulness to him." Does that exhaust the subject? Can I present myself a sacrifice FOR anyone? is the question raised. Can I imitate the great Example, as vicarious sufferer?

Anyone who reads the paragraph under consideration in Peter's epistle, must be struck with its reminders of the Suffering Servant of Jehovah in the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. A finer description of vicarious suffering does not exist in the Old Testament. There are hosts of scholars that see the holy remnant of Israel there portrayed, who, during the Babylonian captivity, saved their people by their sufferings. These scholars are not necessarily destructive critics. They find these words particularly applicable to the priesthood of Christ, for he has filled out the prophecy as the best portion of Israel never did and never could. To these reverent thinkers it is no sacrilege to ascribe in some



measure to God's people what can be superlatively ascribed alone to the Only Begotten Son. We may be saviors, though it may never enter our mind to write the word with a capital, except when applied unto the Saviour of the world.

We must, of course, exercise discrimination in defining what we mean by vicarious suffering. To speak of our suffering as a propitiation for the sins of men, would never occur to the writer. We dare not forget the spotless purity of the Son of Man, nor his unique personality as the God-Man. These two facts alone must forever exalt Jesus Christ as the "Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world." Therefore faith must ever be pointed to Him as the Great High Priest, and we must never divert the glory of our salvation from Him to His Church, nor to the ministry, nor to the individual Christian.

What is the essence of vicarious sacrifice? We believe it is love. And love is self-sacrificing, if it is love at all. The love that lifts burdens from others' shoulders, the love that finds its blessedness in giving rather than in receiving, the love that will shield others at its own peril, is vicarious. Such love has been in the world ever since God breathed into the first man the breath of life, and man became a living soul, created in the image and after the likeness of God. Every true mother who has ever lived has suffered vicariously. Every pure minded patriot who has given painful thought or poured out his life for his fatherland, has been a vicarious sufferer. Every true Christian who exposes himself to alienation from friends and persecution from enemies in zeal to win men from a life of shame, is a vicarious sufferer and reflects the glory of his Lord. To assert that we may follow in His footsteps who suffered for us, leaving us an example, is affirming a truism.

The paragraph under particular consideration deals with the duties of household servants. And yet the underlying principles are of universal application. A more careful investigation of them, therefore, should not be without profit.

Servants are to be subject to their masters, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward. They are to suffer

wrongfully, undeservedly, and they should not retaliate. While it can be said only of Christ that "He did no sin," still He can be imitated in so far as servants may be innocent of offence, and yet suffer by reason of their innocence. The same thought recurs in a different connection (4:13-16). As evil-doers they are not to suffer. But if they suffer as Christians, let them glorify God, let them rejoice that they are partakers of Christ's sufferings.

A number of reasons are given in the epistle why wrong should be borne patiently. By well-doing they are to put to silence the ignorance of foolish men (2:15). They may put to shame those who revile their good manner of life in Christ (3:16). But noblest of all motives for patient endurance (2:12): "Wherein they speak against you as evil-doers, they may by your good works which they behold, glorify God in the day of visitation." By thus suffering in patience to win their enemies for Christ, they are only doing for others what Christ has done for them (3:17, 18). "It is better, if the will of God so will, that ye suffer for well-doing than for evil-doing. Because Christ also suffered for sins once, the righteous for the unrighteous, that he might bring us to God."

Our interest in the thought of imitating the vicarious sufferings of Christ, is less theological than practical. There is danger that the Church will founder upon the luxurious, easy-going Christianity that all but prevails. If any man will follow Christ, let him take up his cross and follow Him. Let him deny himself. Which means something quite different from the effeminate indulgence in every carnal desire, that is so commonly witnessed in the ranks of professed disciples. The Christ-spirit, self-sacrifice in disciples, will do more to save the world than tomes of theological discussion; than all the magnificence of art in music and architecture; than the latest improved methods of soulless ecclesiastical activity. Gilded crosses upon altar or church spire are only mockery, if the cross vanishes from the life and experience of the Church. The argument of a Christ-filled life has perennial attractiveness. Could we but retranslate into terms intelligible to our own time the Gospel of Him "who loved us



and gave Himself for us," we might hope to succeed as soul-winners. The Gospel is not mere words ; it is life. We must present specimens of that life to the world, as well as descriptions of it. Our love of sinning men that goes the length of willingness to suffer in order to save them, will be no slight means of bringing conviction to their mind that the love of God in Christ is real. This price we must bring if we would succeed.

## VI.

### THE PRAYER OF MEMORIAL IN OUR COMMUNION SERVICE.\*

BY REV. J. F. DE LONG.

By this is meant the prayer following immediately after the prayer for the consecration of the elements. In our Order of Worship it is as follows: "And be pleased now, O most merciful Father, graciously to receive at our hands this memorial of the blessed sacrifice of Thy Son; in union with which we here offer and present unto Thee, O Lord, the reasonable sacrifice of our own persons; consecrating ourselves, in soul and body, property and life to Thy most blessed service and praise. Look upon us through the mediation of our great High Priest. Make us accepted in the Beloved; and let His name be as a pure and holy incense through which all our worship may come up before Thee, as the odor of a sweet smell, a sacrifice acceptable, well pleasing to God. Amen."

This prayer has sometimes been called the "Prayer of Memorial;" sometimes, also, the "Prayer of Oblation," and in more recent times, perhaps most frequently, the "Prayer of Commemorative Oblation." The appropriateness and significance of these titles will become clearer as we consider the history and nature of the prayer itself.

As to its substance, this Prayer of Memorial must be accounted one of the oldest prayers in the history of Christian liturgies. It can scarcely be too much to say that it represents a usage which goes back to the Apostolic age, and carries with it, in a measure at least, the sanction of Apostolic authority. Not all parts of the early liturgies are of equal antiquity. Some parts have quite a late origin. Others must come quite from the be-

\* A Paper read before the Ministerial Association of the Reformed Church in the Lehigh Valley.



ginning. The oldest part of these liturgies is that which clusters immediately around the consecration and distribution of the elements. If, in our Order of Worship, or in our Directory of Worship, you begin with the prayer of thanksgiving preceding the consecration of the elements and end with this prayer of memorial, adding thereto as a conclusion the Lord's Prayer, you have a Communion Service which is substantially the same in all early Christian liturgies, and which such princes of liturgiology as Dr. Daniel, of Germany, Dr. Neale, of England, and others do not hesitate to pronounce Apostolic. From Gaul to Ethiopia, from the Spanish Peninsula to the coast of Malabar—wherever the Gospel was preached and the Holy Eucharist celebrated, in both orthodox and heterodox churches—this part of the service was essentially the same, differing only in phraseology and fulness of statement. Such unity it would seem to be very hard, if not altogether impossible, satisfactorily to account for otherwise than on the supposition that this part of the Communion Service clustering immediately around the consecration and distribution of the elements, is a form of service according to which the Apostles themselves administered this sacrament, and which, then, communicated itself or was carried in the way of free imitation and reproduction wherever the Christian Church was established.

As an illustration by which you may perceive how close is this unity in this part of these services I will quote this Prayer of Memorial as found in some of the principal liturgies of the early Church. Let us take, first, the liturgy of St. Clement. This is supposed to have been written out in its present form by some bishop in the third or fourth century, but never to have been in actual use in any particular church, and, therefore, not so likely to have undergone subsequent changes and additions. The prayer follows immediately after the recitation of the words of institution in the consecration of the elements. This is its uniform place in all liturgies. It also connects itself directly with the words: "This do in remembrance of me," and is intended as a fulfilment of the command contained in those words. This prayer is as follows:

“Wherefore having in remembrance His Passion, Death, Resurrection from the Dead, His return to Heaven and His future second appearing when He shall come with glory and power to judge the quick and the dead and to render to every man according to the deeds done in the body; we offer to Thee, our King and God, according to His institution, this bread and this cup, giving thanks to Thee through Him, etc.”\*

You will notice in this prayer the two acts of commemoration and oblation and also that the whole transaction is represented as something which is done in accordance with our Lord’s own appointment and command.

Next let us take this prayer as found in the liturgy of St. James—the liturgy originally used in the Church of Jerusalem and the parent of by far the largest family of early Christian liturgies.

“We, therefore, also sinners, remembering His life-giving passion, His salutary cross, His death, resurrection from the dead on the third day, His ascension to Heaven and session at the right hand of Thee, His God and Father, and His glorious and terrible coming again, when He shall come with glory to judge the quick and the dead, and to render to every man according to his works, offer to Thee, O Lord, this tremendous and unbloody sacrifice, beseeching Thee that Thou deal not with us after our sins, etc.”

This prayer differs from the other in nothing except that it is a little more rhetorical and contains a somewhat fuller statement of facts.

Next let us take the prayer as found in the liturgy of St. Mark—the liturgy used in the Church of Alexandria, and the parent of the Alexandrian family of liturgies used in the churches throughout Egypt and parts of Africa. In this the prayer is as follows:

“O Almighty Lord and Master, King of heaven, we, announcing the death of Thine only-begotten Son, our Lord and God and Saviour Jesus Christ, and confessing His blessed resurrection

\*This prayer and the two following are taken from Dr. Neale’s translation of the Primitive Liturgies.



from the dead on the third day, confess also His ascension into heaven and His session at Thy right hand, His God and Father, looking also, for His second fearful and dreadful coming, when He shall come to judge the quick and the dead in righteousness and to render to every man according to the deeds done in the body ; O Lord our God, we have set before Thee Thine own of Thine own gifts, etc.”

Let me yet quote the same prayer as found in the Mozarabic liturgy—the liturgy of the early Church of Spain :

“O Lord, we make this commemoration of Thy Son, our Saviour, Jesus Christ, who, coming to us, took our nature upon Him, and for the redemption of men whom He had created, endured the sufferings of the cross. \* \* \* \* Through Him, therefore, we beseech Thee, O supreme Father, graciously to receive at our hands this sacrifice of Thy propitiation, which we offer unto Thee, and that Thou, looking down from Thy heavenly throne with reconciled countenance, wouldst bless,”\* etc.

These are only a few samples. The same prayer is found, always at the same place in the service, in all early Christian liturgies, with no important exception ; differing from these which I have quoted no more than these differ from one another. It is found alike in orthodox, Nestorian, Monophysite, and all other churches, showing that prior to those great Christological controversies—prior to the divisions and animosities to which those controversies gave rise—this prayer already prevailed in all the churches. For of this we may be well assured that if it had arisen after those controversies, and had arisen in one branch of the Church, the other branches would not have adopted it from this, but would rather have strenuously opposed its introduction as an unwarranted and heretical innovation.

Now this universal prevalence of this prayer at so early a period in the Church it would seem impossible satisfactorily to account for, unless we assume, with Drs. Daniel, Neale and others, that it represents a usage which comes from the Apostolic age and

\* Translated by the writer from Leslie's Latin edition of the Mozarabic Liturgy.

was supposed to carry with it, in a measure at least, the authority of Apostolic sanction.

To complete this historical outline and bring it down to the present, I will yet quote this same prayer of memorial as found in the Roman mass, in the English Book of Common Prayer and in our Provisional Liturgy.

The oldest sacramentary of the Roman Church now extant is that of Pope Gelasius, who died in the year 496. In this Gelasian sacramentary this prayer is found in almost exactly the same form as that now in use in the Roman mass. Like all other early liturgies, it has the two elements of commemoration and oblation. It is worthy of note, however, that the element of commemoration is much briefer and receives less emphasis, and that there is a manifest effort to magnify the idea of sacrifice. The sacredness of the host is dwelt upon and spoken of in most exalted terms. Time forbids an analysis of this prayer of the Roman Church, but I would say in passing, that if its language is interpreted, as certainly it ought to be, in accordance with the highly poetic and fervent style so common in early liturgies, this prayer is far from teaching the modern dogma of the Roman mass; nevertheless it is equally clear that the peculiar ideas of the Lord's Supper which have since developed themselves in the Roman Church were then already at work in her bosom. I quote the prayer as now used in the Roman mass, which, as said, is almost word for word the same as that found in the sacramentary of Gelasius.

“Wherefore, O Lord, we, Thy servants, as also Thy people, calling to mind the blessed passion of the same Christ, Thy Son, our Lord, His resurrection from hell and glorious ascension into heaven, offer unto Thy most excellent Majesty, of Thy gifts and grants, a pure host, a holy host, an immaculate host, the holy bread of eternal life and the chalice of everlasting salvation; upon which vouchsafe to look with a propitious and serene countenance and to accept them as Thou wast pleased to accept the gifts of Thy just servant Abel and the sacrifice of our patriarch Abraham, and that which the high-priest Melchisedeck offered to Thee, a



holy sacrifice, an immaculate host. We most humbly beseech Thee, Almighty God, command these things to be carried by the hand of Thy angel to Thy altar on high, in sight of Thy divine majesty, that as many of us as by participation at this altar shall receive the most sacred body and blood of Thy Son may be filled with all heavenly benediction and grace through Jesus Christ, our Lord. Amen." Such is this prayer of memorial as it developed itself in the Church of Rome.

The first Protestant version of this prayer is found in the first liturgy of Edward the Sixth of England, published in 1549. We note the return of these English Reformers to the much simpler form and idea of the early Church.

"Wherefore, O Lord and Heavenly Father, according to the institution of thy dearly beloved Son, Jesus Christ, we, Thy humble servants, do celebrate and make here before Thy divine Majesty, with these, Thy holy gifts, the memorial which Thy Son hath willed us to make, having in remembrance His blessed passion, mighty resurrection and glorious ascension, rendering unto Thee most hearty thanks for the innumerable benefits procured unto us by the same, entirely desiring Thy Fatherly goodness mercifully to accept our sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, most humbly beseeching Thee that by the merits," etc.

This prayer was dropped out of the Book of Common Prayer at its second revision in 1552, and is not found in the communion service of the Church of England to-day. It was afterwards introduced into the Scottish Book of Common Prayer, and has also been introduced into the Prayer Book of the American Episcopal Church, though in somewhat modified form.

Now, to wind up this historical survey, let me yet quote this same prayer of memorial as found in our Provisional Liturgy. This is the latest product of the Christian Church in its effort to embody the idea underlying this prayer in appropriate liturgical form; and, if I am a competent judge at all, it is also its best and noblest product. In no other liturgy, ancient or modern, is the fundamental thought of this prayer so well apprehended, and set forth in a way so direct and forceful and with so much unction

and fervor. Of this prayer in the Provisional Liturgy, the prayer in the Order of Worship is an abbreviation. In the Directory of Worship there seems to be a failure to grasp the fundamental thought of the prayer, and its form becomes somewhat ambiguous and less perfect. The prayer is as follows :

“ And be pleased, now, O most merciful Father, graciously to receive at our hands this memorial of the blessed sacrifice of Thy Son, which we, Thy servants, thus bring before Thy divine Majesty, according to His own appointment and command, showing forth His passion and Death, rejoicing in His glorious resurrection and ascension, and waiting for the blessed hope of His appearing and coming again. We are not worthy in ourselves to offer unto Thee any worship or service. Wherewith shall we, sinners of the dust, come before the Lord, or bow ourselves before the most high God? We bring unto Thee, O holy and righteous Father, the infinite merits of Jesus Christ, Thine adorable, true and only Son, in whom Thou hast declared Thyself to be well pleased, and through the offering of whose body once for all full satisfaction has been made for the sins of the world. Have respect unto this glorious sacrifice, we beseech Thee, in union with which we here offer and present unto Thee, O Lord, the reasonable sacrifice of our own persons ; consecrating ourselves on the altar of the Gospel in soul and body, property and life to Thy most blessed service and praise. Look upon us through the meditation of our great High Priest. Make us accepted in the Beloved ; and let His name be as a pure and holy incense, through which all our worship may come up before Thee, as the odor of a sweet smell, a sacrifice acceptable, well-pleasing to God. Amen.”

This brief historical sketch will suffice to show that this Prayer of Memorial is not a new thing in the communion service of the Christian Church, invented and devised out of the fertile brain of our liturgical committee. It is true the Prayer is found in very few of our Protestant liturgies. Luther, familiar only with the corrupt and idolatrous form in which he found it in the Roman mass, cast it aside altogether ; and I know of no Lutheran



liturgy into which it has been introduced. Zwingli, Calvin and the Reformed liturgies generally did the same. But I hope to show presently that in so doing the Reformers acted unwisely, and impoverished the communion service by depriving it of what constitutes an important action in a complete celebration of this sacrament. This defect is remedied in the liturgy of our Reformed Church in the United States. The Christian Church has produced few, if any, liturgies which rest upon a broader and more profound study of the history and nature of Christian worship than does our Provisional liturgy; and I think the future will vindicate the wisdom of the course pursued by our Church in refusing in the preparation of its liturgy to be held down slavishly to the narrow limits of any one period of the Church's history, even though it be the period of the noble Reformers in the sixteenth century.

Now what is its meaning? You will recall what I stated before that in all ancient liturgies this prayer follows immediately after the recital of the words of institution in the consecratory service and is intended as a fulfilment of the command contained in the latter part of those words, viz., this do in remembrance of Me. In this prayer, the Christian congregation is supposed to make that memorial which our Saviour in those words enjoined upon His church to make. This is plainly implied in all the liturgies and in many of them explicitly stated.

In the next place, you will notice that the commemoration thus made is a commemoration before God and not before men. The tendency of theologic thought in more modern times has been to magnify the importance of this sacrament as a grace-bearing ordinance and to make but little account of it as a commemoration; and in so far as this latter has been made account of at all, it has been almost altogether as a commemoration before men. The Saviour's command to do this in remembrance of Him has been taken to mean simply that this holy sacrament was instituted by Him as a solemn rite in which the congregation might be continually reminded, or might continually remind itself, of the atoning sufferings and death of Christ on our behalf and be moved

thereby to increased faith and Christian activity. Thus regarded the celebration of this Holy Eucharist becomes, so far as this side of it is concerned, nothing more than an acted or symbolical sermon—a new and impressive mode of preaching the Gospel—something belonging to the homiletical rather than to the liturgical part of the service.

But it is at once clear that these early liturgies give to this command a broader and higher interpretation. For the commemoration here made in fulfilment of that command is not in the form of an address to the people, but in the form of a solemn prayer and appeal to God. They regard this sacrament as a memorial before God, using the word memorial in a sense somewhat similar to that in which we use the word when we speak of presenting a memorial before Congress or some other legislative body, viz., in the sense of a formal representation of facts accompanied with and supporting an appeal. They assume that our Saviour instituted this sacrament to be a solemn ecclesiastical rite in which His Church might draw nigh unto God and most effectually commemorate and plead before Him the atoning sufferings and death of Christ as the only true ground of our approach into the Divine presence, our only just hope of forgiveness and acceptance before the Divine throne.

It is said that when Themistocles was banished from Athens he first fled to the neighboring states, seeking the right of asylum at their several courts without success. At last, driven by his dire necessity, he resolved to throw himself upon the mercy of Admetus, king of the Molossi, an old and bitter foe of himself and Athens. When he came into the presence of Admetus, he saw the king's little son playing on the floor of the royal chamber. Hastily catching up the child and holding him on his arm, he dropped on his knees before the king, and, in the name of his little son, prayed of the king the privilege of refuge and protection at his court. The king, touched by the gracious act, forgave his old enemy and granted him the refuge and protection prayed for.

This little incident in the life of Themistocles well illustrates the nature and design of this sacrament as set forth in this



prayer. For even so here the Church. Conscious to herself of her unworthiness and unfitness to appear before the Most High God in her own name, she draws nigh unto Him in the name of His Son, our great High Priest and Mediator; and, holding up before the eternal Father, as it were, one by one those great redemptive events, whereby our Lord made atonement for all sin, beseeches Him to “have respect unto this glorious sacrifice,” to “look upon us *through the mediation of our great High Priest*, to make us accepted *in the Beloved*, and to let *His name* be as a pure and holy incense *through* which all our worship may come up before Thee as the odor of a sweet smell, a sacrifice acceptable, well-pleasing unto God.” “Wherewith,” says the prophet, “shall I come before the Lord or bow myself before the Most High God? Shall I come before Him with burnt-offerings, with calves a year old? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams and ten thousands of rivers of oil? Shall I give my first born for my transgression—the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?” This has been the anxious cry of sin-burdened humanity through the ages; and this anxious cry is met and answered by the Christian Church according to the instruction of her divine Lord in this prayer of memorial which she gives into the hearts and upon the lips of her people as they are about entering through this holy sacrament into the inmost sanctuary of the Divine Presence.

Such is the general idea and purpose of this prayer. It is not a prayer or sacrifice of thanksgiving and praise which, in our communion service, as in nearly all early liturgies, precedes the consecration of the elements; nor yet of supplication which very properly follows this Prayer of Memorial as resting upon it. Even the idea of personal consecration in property and life to the service and praise of God is here secondary, and finds its proper place in this prayer mainly for the reason that such personal consecration is to be *in union with* the sacrifice of Christ on the cross, being dependent on such “union” therewith for its sanctification and divine acceptance. An exact parallel to this prayer in this particular is found in Heb. 13:15 where, as commentators tell

us, the first two words carry the emphasis of the whole sentence “*Through Him*, then, *i. e.*, Christ, let us offer up a sacrifice of praise to God continually, that is, the fruit of lips which make confession to His name.”

It is, of course, not assumed that such pleading of our redemption in Christ is limited to the Holy Communion. On the contrary, it underlies all our Christian worship, both public and private. In our other services, we are wont to close every collect with a brief petition pleading the merits of Christ. In our Communion service, however, this is not the case; but in place thereof, we have this Prayer of Memorial in which this idea is very fitly lifted into greater and more solemn prominence, magnified and exalted into a separate and distinct part of the sacramental action.

And it needs especially to be borne in mind that, according to these early liturgies, this Prayer of Memorial is an essential part of the proper celebration of this Holy Sacrament. For this purpose this sacrament was instituted. Nothing less than this was meant when our Saviour said to His disciples: “This do in remembrance of Me.” It was to be a Memorial not only before men, but also and preëminently before God. This was unmistakably the belief of the early Christian Church.

Now is this view correct? With what proofs and evidences may it be supported? First would not this view seem probable from the nature of the case? This approach to and worship of God in the name of the Son, and on the basis of His mediation, was the one thing new and distinctive of the Christian Church, distinguishing its worship from the worship of all other religions both Jewish and pagan. This was that *new and living way into the holiest* of all now first opened unto men through the veil, that is to say his flesh. And would it not seem probable in the nature of the case that a fact so new, so distinctive and so fundamental in the worship of the Christian Church, would receive recognition and room in this sacrament in which all its worship culminates as its crowning act and in which the believing congregation makes its nearest possible approach into the Divine Presence? When in the old dispensation, the High Priest once a



year entered into the most Holy Place, he was clothed in sacred vestments and carried before him in golden censor the atoning blood of the lamb slain, pleadingly waving it toward the mercy-seat as the only ground on which he, himself a sinner and the representative of sinners, ventured to draw nigh; and is it at all probable that in the new dispensation this Holy Sacrament, which far more than any Mosaic rite is an entrance into the most Holy Place, can be worthily celebrated, or was instituted of its divine Founder to be celebrated, without commemorating and pleading before God in the most solemn way that mediation of our great High Priest on which all such approach into the Divine Presence must rest and by which alone it is made lawful and possible? Nay, the very conception of this sacrament as an approach into nearest fellowship with God makes this view of the early Church as expressed in a universal liturgical custom exceedingly probable.

The view adopted by these early liturgies is also favored by the language chosen by our Lord to convey his instruction—"This do in remembrance of me." In the original it is: *τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν*—this do for my memorial. Particular attention is due to the word *ἀναμνησιν* translated "remembrance." This word occurs elsewhere in Holy Scripture only five times—once in the New Testament and four times in the Septuagint, but in every instance the word signifies a remembrance or commemoration in the form of a prayer before God. In the New Testament the only other place where it occurs is in Heb. 10 : 3. Here reference is made to the remembrance of sins. But what remembrance? Why, the most solemn public recital and confession of these sins before God by the High Priest in connection with the yearly sacrifices of bulls and goats on the great Day of Atonement. It was a remembrance or memorial not before men, but for men before God. In the Septuagint the word is used twice in the heading of Psalms—38 and 70—but in both instances with special reference to remembering and pleading before God. It is also used twice in the sacred text itself, viz., in Num. 10 : 10 and in Lev. 24 : 7. The passage in Numbers reads as follows: "Also in the day of your gladness and in your solemn days and in the

beginnings of your months, you shall blow with the trumpets over your burnt offerings and over the sacrifices of your peace offerings, that they may be to you for a *memorial before your God.*" The passage in Leviticus has reference to the shew-bread. "Thou shalt put pure frankincense upon each row that it may be to the bread for a memorial, even an offering made by fire unto the Lord. Every Sabbath day he shall set it in order before the Lord continually ; it is in behalf of the Children of Israel an everlasting covenant." This frankincense was to be a memorial before God of the great national offering or sacrifice of the Passover lamb, reminding Jehovah and pleading before Him the covenant of mercy resting thereon; or, perhaps better, a memorial pointing forward typically to the "Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world," and pleading its infinite merits before Jehovah for mercy and deliverance.

Such is the signification of the word *αναμνησκω* whenever it is elsewhere used in Holy Scripture, and such is in great probability also the sense in which it is used in this command of our Saviour. At any rate it would be very questionable exegesis to rule out of this command as not being included in it the only sense of this word elsewhere recognized in Scripture and limit its use to a sense which is nowhere else given to it in the entire Word of God.

Then the last but by no means least support of this view is that which I have already presented, viz., the universal sentiment of the early Christian Church as expressed in its liturgies. As already stated, Dr. Daniel, of Germany, and Dr. Neale, of England (than whom Protestantism has certainly produced no greater liturgical scholars), as well as others, do not hesitate to say that this prayer represents a usage which goes back to the Apostolic age. That it was changed and modified from time to time so as to bring it into harmony with the varied sacramental views prevailing in the several periods of the Church's history, they do, of course, not deny ; but claim that, as to its general idea, it represents a usage which must have prevailed as an essential part of the celebration of this holy sacrament from the beginning.



These several reasons would seem to make a strong argument in support of the general idea underlying this prayer, viz., that our Lord instituted this sacrament for this purpose among others that it might be a solemn rite in which His Church might publicly and in the most solemn way commemorate and plead before the Father the whole economy of our redemption in Christ, and set it, as it were, "in reconciling power between the holy God and our sinful souls."

In conclusion, now, we are yet confronted with one important question which has been the occasion of much controversy in the Church, viz., this, is this simply a prayer or is it a sacrifice?

The answer of the Roman Church to this question is well known. Said Church claims that in the priestly consecration the elements of bread and wine are as to their essence changed into the very body and blood of Christ, which the officiating priest in this prayer or act of oblation now offers unto the Father as an atonement for his own sins and the sins of the people; and, inasmuch as we must assume the body and blood of His own Son to be something of infinite worth in sight of the Father, the offering thereof in this sacrament, it is claimed, has an expiatory value *per se*, and procures forgiveness of sin not only for those present and partaking, but also for those absent in Hades and elsewhere. This is the Roman doctrine. Our church, on the other hand, teaches that it is in no sense a repetition of the sacrifice of Christ on the Cross, but only a memorial of that blessed sacrifice; that it has no atoning value of its own, but is only an appropriation by faith of the redemption accomplished in Christ and a solemn pleading of the same before God on our behalf. In short, this prayer in our Communion service is not Roman, but strictly Protestant.

But we may go further and say, it is also not Lutheran nor Anglican, but strictly Reformed and Calvinistic. The difference in Eucharistic doctrine between those churches and the Reformed is well known. Those Churches bring the sacramental presence of Christ into closer *local* union with the bread and wine, making these elements the outward form in which the supernatural

presence is enshrined, exhibited and conveyed unto the communicant. The Reformed, while making just as much of the reality of the Eucharistic presence, has always disallowed this localizing thereof within the consecrated elements on the altar; and has affirmed this presence to be in the transaction as a whole. Says the Lutheran: "The body and blood of Christ are *in, with* and *under* the bread and the wine." The Anglican says: "The bread and the wine become by consecration really and sacramentally (though in an inconceivable manner which cannot be explained by earthly similitudes and illustrations) the body and blood of Christ." But the Reformed says (Gerhart's Dog., Vol. 2, page 604): "The union is not in the bread on the altar nor in the cup, but in the festival, in the transaction."

Now, how closely this Prayer of Memorial in our Communion Service conforms to the Reformed type of Eucharistic teaching as over against these other churches, becomes strikingly manifest when we compare it with the same prayer in the American Episcopal Book of Common Prayer. The latter uses language as follows: "We, Thy humble servants, do celebrate and make here before Thy divine Majesty *with these Thy holy gifts which we now offer unto Thee*, the memorial which Thy Son hath willed us to make." Greater prominence is here given to the natural symbols of bread and wine. They are *offered* unto the Lord. A "verbal oblation" is made of them. The memorial is made "*with these Thy holy gifts which we now offer unto Thee.*" All this is beautiful, and rightly understood contains nothing to which any Reformed would need to object. Nevertheless the reader will notice that the outward elements are here invested with a somewhat larger function; and its language is more suggestive of an outward ceremonial rite in which the broken body and shed blood of Christ are, as it were, held up before the Father under the form of the consecrated bread and wine. Ideas which it would be difficult to harmonize with Protestant principles might find and have found easy shelter under this Prayer of Memorial in the Episcopal Book of Common Prayer. Our Liturgy is more guarded, gives no special prominence nor



even makes any special reference to the elements on the altar, assumes the whole sacramental action to be the memorial, and is conceived more in the ethico-spiritual form of a simple prayer.

But while it is thus not in any real sense a sacrifice or oblation of the body and blood of Christ, but remains simply a prayer, it is, nevertheless, no *ordinary* prayer, but a prayer extraordinary resulting from the extraordinary character of the sacrament itself. Two facts need here to be borne in mind. The first is that our participation in the merits of Christ—our right and privilege of pleading His name before the Father—is conditioned upon our living union with Christ by the Holy Ghost through faith, and is in proportion to the reality and perfection of this union with Him. Community of goods rests upon community of life. In the family there is no mine or thine, but all things are common because husband, wife and child are one flesh. This is so in nature ; it is equally so in grace. “There is, therefore, now no condemnation to them that are *in* Christ Jesus” (Rom. 8 : 1). If ye abide *in me* and my words abide *in you*, ye shall ask what ye will and it shall be done unto you (John 15: 7). Only those in Christ are partakers of his benefits. And so the merits of Christ become ours to plead before the Father on our behalf by virtue of our living union with Christ, and the power and efficacy of our prayer and pleadings are in proportion to the reality, depth and perfection of this union with Him. The other fact which needs to be remembered is that this sacrament is pre-eminently the sacrament of union and communion with our Lord. Here He has promised an especial presence and communion with His people. They shall eat His flesh and drink His blood. The congregation, too, prepares itself with special self-examination, repentance and faith. “It is the inmost sanctuary of our whole Christian worship.” This the Church has always felt and always acted upon. Here she brings and has always brought her lowliest confessions, her deepest desires, her highest praises, her most grateful thanksgivings. And in virtue of this extraordinary union and communion of the Church with her Lord in this sacrament, this prayer of memorial, this solemn commemoration and

pleading of our redemption in Christ, His Son, before the Father, whilst remaining simply a prayer, becomes nevertheless, something more than an *ordinary* prayer—becomes a prayer *extraordinary* in accordance with the extraordinary character of this Holy Sacrament itself.



## VII.

### EDITORIAL NOTES.

#### INFANT SALVATION.

In the successive numbers of *Christian Literature*, from March to August inclusive, there has appeared a series of interesting articles from the pen of Dr. B. B. Warfield, of Princeton, on the "Development of the Doctrine of Infant Salvation." What Dr. Warfield, according to his own statement, proposes to do in these articles is not to unravel the history of *opinion* on this subject, but to trace the development of *doctrine*. The conclusion of this development Dr. Warfield finds in the theory of the universal election and salvation of infants dying as such. All infants dying in infancy must be supposed to be included in the gracious decree of election, and therefore saved. This is for Dr. Warfield the end of the whole matter. Now, if by *doctrine*, as distinguished from *opinion*, be understood an authoritative expression of the faith of the Church, or of any considerable part of it, then we think that Dr. Warfield is mistaken as to the nature of his conclusion. There is no confession, Catholic or Protestant, as Dr. Warfield himself has admitted, that teaches the universal salvation of infants. That theory rests only upon the opinions of individual theologians, some of whom maintain it tentatively and falteringly, while the majority are totally opposed to it.

The question as to the fate of dying infants is one that is always interesting, and one that is by no means free from difficulties. The natural feeling of humanity would incline us to take the most hopeful view of their condition; and yet in doing so we are confronted by problems to which it is anything but easy to find satisfactory solutions. Hence the history of theological thought has developed a variety of opinions or theories, none of which has as yet become the accepted doctrine of the Church, or even of

any significant branch of it. The common feeling of Protestant Christians at the present time is doubtless in favor of the notion of universal salvation. And this, it must be confessed, is a most creditable feeling; it does more honor to the heart of humanity, certainly, than does the notion of "infants in hell not a span long." And yet to prove the correctness of this feeling would be a task more difficult than many may imagine; and the result would after all be only the establishment of an opinion or theory.

Let us briefly review some of the most prominent theories that have been held on this subject. There is, in the first place, the theory of *annihilation*. According to this, death is the end of existence for all infants dying before the development of self-conscious personality. The undeveloped soul of the infant is not immortal. It only becomes immortal by the development of a moral personality that has apprehended itself and is capable of being an object to itself. The soul that has never found itself, and has never become objective to itself, can not maintain its existence after the dissolution of the body which was intended to serve as the organ of its realization. Hence the baby, dying before it has learned to think "that this is I," has no existence after death. This theory has never been held by many Christian people. Dr. Warfield states that in the ancient Church it was held by one Hierax, who had some followers. But it gained no favor. In more recent times it was held by the genial theologian and philosopher Richard Rothe, whose theory of personality, as essentially a moral development out of a material animal soul, logically demanded it. But to such logic few will ever assent. No father or mother will ever be able to think of the soul of a departing child as being dissipated into nothing; and we may, therefore, feel assured that the Eternal Father Himself could not tolerate the thought of annihilation. Every infant soul is a realization of a distinct idea begotten of eternal love, and must, therefore, be in itself eternal.

We have, secondly, the theory that *all baptized infants, and only such, are saved*. This is the doctrine of the Catholic Church, as well as of some Protestant Confessions, especially those belong-



ing to the Lutheran and Anglican communions. The underlying presupposition is the doctrine of hereditary or racial sin and guilt, making all mankind, infants, of course, included, liable to the punishment of eternal death. All men are born, not merely in a state of depravity, but in a state of condemnation, and under divine wrath. Out of this condition they can only be saved by God's grace, and the necessary channel of that grace is baptism. Hence those who are baptized are saved, while those who are not baptized are damned. This view was held by St. Augustine, *pater durus infantum*; and this in spite of his theory of absolute predestination of all souls either to life or death—a theory which logically is not favorable to a high sacramental doctrine. And after Augustine it was generally adopted by the leading theologians of the Catholic Church, and has maintained itself even down to the present time.

The severity of this doctrine, however, was modified in two ways. It was modified, first, by softening the idea of *damnation*. Lost infants are, of course, supposed to be in hell, but their punishment is believed to be of the lightest kind. In fact it is so light that it is punishment rather in name than in reality. A distinction is made between *pœna damni* and *pœna sensus*, or punishment of loss and punishment of sense. The former is merely negative, consisting in the privation of the beatific vision, but without any sense of pain. And it is only this negative kind of punishment that falls to the lot of unbaptized infants. This conception accords well with the notion that infants dying as such will always remain infants, and will never pass through any process of intellectual and moral development. If the subjective condition of an infant soul never changes after death, then it is indeed difficult to understand how any infant could be said to be punished at all. A damned infant remaining forever unconscious could be no more unhappy than a damned tree. But if this be the condition of infant life after death, then a saved infant can not be happy either. If what is meant by infant salvation were merely getting infant souls into heaven, without any change in those souls themselves, then for them at least salvation would

be of little benefit. They would be like the flowers with which we decorate our houses, serving indeed to make the houses cheerful, but not themselves feeling the happiness which they help to diffuse.

But the severity of the medieval doctrine was softened somewhat also by an extension of the notion of baptism. To enjoy the benefits of baptism it was not regarded necessary always to have received the external rite. For instance, in the case of an adult, martyrdom might supply the place of baptism. And so also might the *intention* of being baptized in circumstances in which the actual reception of the sacrament was impossible. For instance, a person might intend to be baptized to-morrow, but die of apoplexy to-day. In such case his *intention* would be as good as the execution of the rite itself. Now in the case of infant baptism the notion of intention must be transferred to the minds of the parents or sponsors. The intention of Christian parents to have their children baptized, would avail for their salvation, in case they should suddenly die before such intention could be carried into execution. And the intention of sponsors, and even the intention of the Church, might be supposed to be attended by similar effects. But if this were so, where might the efficacy of such intention be supposed to stop? Might not the Church be supposed, implicitly at least, if not explicitly, to intend the baptism of all infants, of pagans as well as of Christians, and would not this work the salvation of all? Thoughts like these were not wanting in the active minds of middle age theologians. And in this way the severity of the theological system was modified, and the claims of the Christian heart were vindicated to some extent against the pretensions of the intellect. That from a rational point of view there was much in this manner of thinking that could not stand the test of criticism, is doubtless true. For instance, we can not at all think that God is so helplessly tied to the institutions of the Church as this theory implies. Nevertheless the difficulties of the theory are, in our opinion, no greater than are those of the one next to be mentioned.

The third theory which we shall notice is that *which attributes*



*salvation simply and purely to an absolute divine decree of election.* Elect infants are saved in consequence of the sovereign purpose of God; and if there are any infants who are not elect, they are damned. Here the instrumental cause of salvation is not in baptism, or in the Church, but simply in the omnipotent fiat of the divine will. The natural condition of mankind here is supposed to be the same as in the Catholic theory. By nature and at their birth all infants are lost and guilty sinners; and they can only be saved by the sole agency of divine grace. But the conception of the office of the Church and of the means of grace in relation to this work of salvation has been changed. The immediate ground of salvation itself is union with Christ; but Dr. Warfield tells us that, according to the theory with which we are now concerned, "men are not constituted members of Christ through the Church; but members of the Church through Christ: they are not made members of Christ by baptism which the Church gives, but by faith which is the gift of God; and baptism is the Church's recognition of this inner fact." This is the theory of the relation of the Church to divine grace which Dr. Warfield believes to be the doctrine of the Reformed Church. On this point we are convinced that he is mistaken. Even Calvin holds a higher view of the Church and of the sacraments, although this may not be consistent with his theory of predestination. It must be confessed, indeed, that the theory presented above accords best with the doctrine of unconditional predestination, and that it has had currency in some schools of Reformed theology. According to this theory the work of grace is not one that is accomplished through the outward means of grace, but through the direct agency of the divine will, which works faith. Men are not saved because they are in the visible Church, but they are saved, if saved at all, because they are elect.

Who, then, are elect? In answer to this question, Dr. Warfield, in the articles referred to, enumerates the signs of election according to different authorities; for on this subject there is not unanimity of opinion. Some have made these signs to be faith, others faith and the promises of the Gospel, others again some-

thing else. As far as the relation of the question to infants is concerned, three different views have been held. There is, first, the view that the decree of the election is as absolute and inscrutable in regard to infants dying as such, as it is in regard to those who live to years of maturity. Among the latter some are elect while others are reprobate; and so it is most likely also among the former. This was probably the opinion of Calvin and of Beza, and we think it is the doctrine also of the Westminster Confession. Whatever may be said to the contrary, we believe that when the Confession speaks of "elect infants dying in infancy" being saved, this implies that there are also non-elect infants dying in infancy who are not saved. This at any rate was the opinion of the majority of the members of the Westminster assembly, as is admitted by Dr. Schaff. Then, secondly, there is the view that *the children of Christian parents* dying in infancy are all elect and, therefore, saved. This is the doctrine of the Synod of Dort. "Godly parents," it says, "have no reason to doubt of the election and salvation of their children whom it pleases God to call out of this life in their infancy." This may not *necessarily* mean that of the dying infants of others than godly parents, some at least must be believed to be non-elect; but there can be no question that this was the meaning of the fathers of Dort.

But there is, finally, the view that all infants dying in infancy are certainly elect and, therefore, saved. Dying in infancy is here supposed to be the most infallible sign of election. This view is not contained in any Calvinistic Confession; but we suppose that it is held by the largest number of Calvinistic divines at the present time, who have not radically modified the Calvinistic doctrine of divine sovereignty. But granting the theory of unconditional foreordination either to life or death, which this view presupposes, how do these divines know that all dying infants are elect? Who has told them so? If they answer, the Bible, then we would like to know the chapter and verse in which this momentous doctrine is disclosed. If they answer that it is against the whole tenor of the Bible to believe that there are



among dying infants reprobates who are damned for no fault of their own, we cordially agree with them; but we hold that it is equally against the tenor of the Bible to believe that there are any reprobates at all who are made such only by the divine preterition. If we could believe that God had foreordained one soul to damnation for His own glory, then we could believe anything of Him, but could have no more interest in theology.

But this leads us to mention, fourthly, the Arminian or modern Methodist theory, which infers the universal salvation of infants from the universality of the divine love and the universality of the Christian atonement. The absolute effect of the atonement, however, is limited to original sin. The guilt of hereditary or racial sin is unconditionally cancelled by the sacrifice of Christ. Hence all men are born at once in a state of sin and in a state of salvation. The new-born infant is a sinner because it is born of sinful parents and with a depraved nature; but it is a saved sinner, because the condemnation resting upon the race is removed by the one oblation of Christ. Hence dying in infancy, it goes to heaven and is saved; if, however, it lives in this world, it will be exposed to so many temptations, that it will inevitably contract new guilt, and incur the danger of being lost. It is, therefore, an immense advantage to be permitted to die in infancy; and the question may be asked, why are not all men permitted to die at this period of their existence, when their salvation would be sure? To this the reply might be made that, if the race is to be continued, some must of necessity be ordained to spend a longer time amidst the dangers of this world, and so to be exposed to the peril of perdition. And if inquiry were made concerning the principle on which some persons are exposed to this risk rather than others, we should be brought back in the end to the doctrine of unconditional predestination. We, therefore, agree with Dr. Warfield that the theory of universal infant salvation irrespective of their own choice is a contradiction of the Arminian doctrine of salvation through the exercise of personal free agency. But there is another difficulty with this theory. Seeing that all persons who grow to maturity in this world, fall

into new sin in spite of their having commenced life without guilt, what certainty is there that those who die in infancy will not, if they afterwards pass through any process of development at all, fall into sin likewise? Should it be said that in death, or after death, their nature is so changed by divine grace that they cannot sin, then the question would present itself, why, if this can be done for those who die, it may not be done also for those who live, so as to make sin impossible for them, too. How the ways of God with men could be vindicated against the charge of arbitrariness on these principles, it is hard to see.

But there is one criticism which is alike applicable to all these theories, and that is that *they are thoroughly unethical*. Salvation, as conceived in these theories, is something merely negative, passive—it is merely a cancellation of guilt and a translation into heaven, instead of a positive work of grace achieved in a moral way, that is, through the operation of reason and will, in the persons saved. The result of salvation, in this view, is not character, but merely outward destiny or lot. Or if it should be alleged that those who are saved are, in the moment of death, regenerated and sanctified by an omnipotent operation of the divine will, the obvious reply would be, first, that this would turn the process of salvation into a mere process of nature or magic, and, secondly, that, if this were possible in the case of some, there is no reason why it should not be possible in the case of all. If God by a mere fiat of will, or by an exercise of irresistible grace, could sanctify and make sinless a dying infant, why can He not also sanctify and make sinless a living infant, and so banish sin from this world as well as from heaven? Any attempted answer to such questions, we think, would in the end lead back to the odious theory of unconditional predestination. We could only say that things are as they are, and turn out as they do, because God so wills. But that is Mohammedanism, and not Christianity.

We have, therefore, finally, a fifth theory of infant salvation, which may be called the *moral theory*. This affirms that infant salvation takes place under the same moral conditions as the salvation of adults. Salvation universally implies faith, self-deter-



mination, free choice, moral development, and as a result *character*. Sacraments, Church relations, Christian institutions, together with the invisible agency of the Holy Spirit which all these imply, can only serve as a stimulating environment pressing upon the soul from without and calling into exercise its own spiritual energies. Men must themselves work out their own salvation, at the same time that God is working in them to the same end. To apply this conception, now, to dying infants means, of course, to extend the possibility of salvation, or of probation and moral discipline, into the spirit world beyond death. The dying infant, it must be assumed, will not always remain an unconscious infant, but will pass through a process of intellectual and moral development, which will be essentially the same as that which it would have passed through if it had lived to maturity in this world. It is usual, when speaking of infant salvation, to put infants in the same class with imbeciles and idiots, as, for instance, the Westminster Confession does. But surely it will not be supposed that a saved idiot will always be an idiot. But if not, what reason is there to suppose that the saved infant will always be an infant? Surely unconscious infancy is not the divine end of any human existence. But if we suppose the possibility of moral development to extend beyond death, and if we suppose that God is love indeed, who desires and seeks the salvation of all men, then we can easily conceive the possibility of the salvation of all infants by a moral process that is essentially the same as the process of salvation in this world; a moral process, moreover, in which there will continue to be felt, especially if they are good, the moral conditions already established in this life, such as the law of heredity, and the influence of Christian environment and institutions; so that birth of Christian parents and Christian baptism may after all be influential factors in the development of character in the spirit world as well as in this world.

The objection to this theory will be that it does not *guarantee* the actual salvation of *all* infants. It assures us, indeed, that no infant is damned at death. But if the fate of a departing infant will depend ultimately upon the decision of its own will in rela-

tion to divine grace, we cannot be certain, here and now, that every infant will be eternally saved. This must, of course, be admitted. The salvation of the dying infant must be supposed to be liable to as much contingency as the salvation of the living one, but to no more. Parents can not be absolutely sure of the salvation of their living children; or, at least, they cannot be absolutely sure that the result of their life in this world will be the growth of a harmonious Christian character. Christian parents can only discharge their Christian duties towards their children, and with fidelity labor for their salvation, in the hope that their labor will not be in vain. But the ultimate issue must depend upon the will of the children themselves. There is only this difference between living children and those who are no longer living, that for the salvation of the latter parents can do nothing more, except pray, although there is a difference of opinion as to the propriety of that. Having given them to the Lord in baptism, which must not be supposed to be an idle ceremony, either in the case of the living or of the dying, and having treated them with tender and loving care, parents have done all that they can do for their departing children. The Christian training which they can give to their living children, they can no longer give to the dead. But may they not trust that the place of their own care and training will be supplied by the loving service of beings holier and wiser than they, who will not even make the mistakes which they themselves would have been likely to make? So, then, the salvation of dying infants, if not more sure, is at least not less sure than is that of the living. But whatever difficulties or uncertainties there may be connected with this theory, it at least relieves our conception of God of those elements of hardness and arbitrariness which cling to the idea of God in every theory of absolute predestination. This we know, at least, that God is love, and that, if any soul ever perish, it will only be after all the resources of infinite love and infinite wisdom shall have been exhausted in the effort of its salvation.



### OUR SESQUI-CENTENNIAL CELEBRATION AND ITS RESULTS.

During the present year our Church has been celebrating the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of her organized existence in this country. The occasion has doubtless been one of much interest and profit wherever it has been properly observed. It has afforded an opportunity for studying the origin of our Church, reviewing her history, and becoming better acquainted with her genius and character. At the various commemorative services which have been held by Synods, Classes and congregations, the past trials and triumphs of the Church have no doubt been duly recounted. The story of the suffering and heroism of our Reformed ancestors, in Europe and America, has again been told in the ears of their children. The labor and sacrifice which it cost to establish the Reformed Church in this western world and to lay the foundations of her institutions, have been properly reviewed; and many a heart has doubtless been stirred to emotions of gratitude and to new zeal by the story of the deeds of our noble ancestors. Then, too, the genius of our Church has no doubt been thoroughly studied. Her doctrines and customs have been discussed for the edification of her members. In a word, we have, in the language of the Psalmist, been walking about our Reformed Zion, marking her bulwarks, telling her towers, considering her palaces, and rejoicing in our goodly heritage. Or, where this has not been done, it will still be done during the remainder of the year.

All this is eminently proper and right. Such celebrations are good, and calculated to do much good to those who engage in them. They serve to make us mindful of our mercies, to increase our gratitude, and to deepen our piety. But surely we ought not to be satisfied to accept this celebration merely as the event of a single year, without any further influence or value. The spirit and life awakened by this celebration ought to become manifest in permanent results. Its fruits ought to appear in the future development of the Church; and the whole celebration ought to be conducted with a view to that end. No such celebration ought to exhaust itself in the mere temporary display of

flowers, and eloquence, and ecclesiastical fireworks. Nor should we be satisfied with the collection of a few thousand dollars during this jubilee year. The raising of money should never be the immediate end of such a celebration. If it is made to be such, then it will most likely fail. The immediate end to be aimed at should be the awakening of such new spiritual life in the Church as will manifest itself not only in larger gifts of money, but in new energy and zeal in behalf of the Church in the hearts of all her children.

We propose, in these notes, to dwell especially upon two results which, we think, this sesqui-centennial celebration ought to accomplish. In the first place, it ought to serve to arouse in our ministers and people *a more intelligent and devoted loyalty to the Church*. And by Church here we do not mean the Church universal, but the Reformed Church—our *own* Church. We are not ashamed to acknowledge that we cherish a decidedly denominational feeling and spirit. As things now are in the Christian world, no one can really love the Church universal, without loving the denomination of which he is a member. We may hold that this state of things is abnormal, but that does not change the fact; and we shall never contribute much to the unification of Christendom by professing devotion to the Church Catholic, and refusing to be interested in the Church to which, in the providence of God, we belong. “He who does not love his brother whom he has *seen*, how can he love God whom he has not seen?” We mean to say, then, that this celebration ought to clarify and intensify our ecclesiastical self-consciousness, and make us more strongly and thoroughly Reformed. The study of our history as a denomination, of our doctrines, of our government, of our cultus, and customs, which should be the chief burden of the celebrations of this sesqui-centennial year, ought to serve to deepen and strengthen our Reformed self-consciousness, and cause us to love and respect our Reformed Church more than ever before. We should learn to understand ourselves as an American Christian denomination, and to be true to ourselves and to our historical position.



This does not mean any repristination of our past history. That is impossible. We could not, if we would, bring back any past period of that history which has made us to be what we now are, and rehabilitate it in this age and country. The fathers, who are dead, can not be made to live again in this world, nor can their circumstances and conditions be reproduced. The same is true of their theological opinions and doctrines. These all had their limitations in the conditions of their age, and were true only in those conditions. Nor is it in the genius of the Reformed Church to be slavishly bound to the forms of past life. She believes that she has the life of the past; but for the ultimate form of this she looks to the future, not to the past. And, besides, where should we begin, if we were disposed to bring back the past as the absolute norm of our present thinking and acting? To which of the Reformers should we give the preference, if we were disposed to select one of them for our pope? It so happens that the Reformed Church has had, not only one father according to the flesh, but many; and she honors them all, though she allows no one to enslave her living mind. The Reformed Church, accordingly, is a Church of freedom and progress; and that means that she is necessarily also a Church of toleration and charity. It is her spirit to be *inclusive*, not *exclusive*. It was Zwingli who, in spite of a difference of theological opinion, offered the hand of Christian fellowship to Luther, and it was Luther who rejected it. And in this respect the Reformed Church follows Zwingli and not Luther. Calvin burned Servetus as a heretic, and we excuse him because he acted in the spirit of the times; but we do not propose to imitate Calvin, either literally or metaphorically, in dealing with differences of theological thought. It is not, then, the theological opinions of the fathers so much as the living Church and the living faith which we have inherited from the fathers, that claim our devotion and our loyalty. We want to be true to the Church and the faith which the fathers loved and served with their blood and treasure, although we may not repeat the Catechism and the Liturgy just in the language which our fathers used.

Nor does such devotion to our own Church mean bigotry in relation to other denominations. It does not mean that we should fancy ours to be the only true Church, and that we should deny the quality of Christian to other denominations because they are not exactly like us. On the contrary, we may respect and love the members of other denominations as Christian brethren; and we believe that we ought to do this. Some of these denominations are much larger than ours, and have done perhaps more than we have done for the salvation of the world. They have planted literary, theological and benevolent institutions throughout this land, and have done very much for the cause of education and for other humane and Christian enterprises. For all this we may honor them, at the same time that we love our own Church the more. And we may honor the customs, and respect the creeds, and confessions and theological systems of other denominations, at the same time that we prefer our own. Our loyalty to our own Church does not prevent us from doing all this; just as a man's loyalty to his own family does not prevent him from recognizing the worth and respecting the rights of other families around him.

But loyalty to our Church means intelligent respect for it, and ardent attachment to it that is not easily relaxed or broken. In this respect we fear that we have sometimes been wanting. Our people, and some of our ministers, too, have sometimes betrayed a feeling of indifference towards their spiritual mother, and manifested a disposition to regard other ecclesiastical communions with more favor than their own. They resemble a young man who is ashamed of the mother who nursed him, because she is not as brilliantly arrayed as some of the fine ladies whom he has seen in society. In consequence of this fact many have not found it difficult to find spiritual homes in other denominations; and this has been a source of weakness to us. The Reformed Church in the United States might be many times larger than she is, if it had not been for the losses incurred in consequence of this laxness of denominational feeling. Indeed our very large-heartedness and liberality have sometimes been a source of weak-



ness and loss. We acknowledge the Christian character of other denominations. We do not deny that immersion is baptism, or that people may be converted at the anxious bench, or that episcopacy is a valid form of the Christian ministry. Indeed, we might almost say that the peculiarity of the Reformed Church is that *she has no peculiarity*. We believe in baptism as much as the Baptists do, in conversion as much as the Methodists, in an authorized ministry as much as the Episcopalians, in orthodoxy as much as the Lutherans, and in freedom as much as the Congregationalists; but we do not inscribe any one of these interests upon our denominational banner, and say, this is the peculiarity of our Church. And now this very breadth and catholicity have sometimes tended to cool the affections of our people and lead them into the folds of other denominations. They have felt that their Reformed feeling and training would easily enable them to be Episcopalians, Methodists, or Baptists; and so they have parted with their Reformed liberty, and joined themselves to communions that are far less generous and broad. Sometimes such transitions have been influenced by considerations of wealth and fashion or of social and business advantages. The Reformed Church has never been an aristocratic Church; and so it has come to pass that, while in some of the denominations there are millionaires whose antecedents were Reformed, there are now no millionaires in the Reformed Church; a circumstance which we think is not at all to be deplored. In the present conditions of American Christianity a change of Church relations is, indeed, not a very serious thing, and may sometimes become altogether right and proper. But when it occurs merely from worldly considerations, or from sordid motives such as have just been referred to, or from conceited ignorance and pride, then it is neither honorable nor moral, and deserves the contempt of good men. In the years that are past some have gone out from us—we say it mournfully—in a manner and in circumstances that have reflected no credit upon them. But it is to be hoped that all that is now ended, and that the intelligence and loyalty of our ministers and people will hereafter be of such high order as to

make such occurrences impossible. If an opportunity to do the will of God and labor for His glory be desired, we are sure that that may be found in the Reformed Church as abundantly as in any other.

But, secondly, this sesqui-centennial celebration, we think, ought to *serve greatly to intensify the practical energy of our Church in extending her borders in this country.* It ought to exercise an influence upon our home missionary operations, that shall continue to be felt for years to come. The progress which our Church has made in the past has, indeed, been highly gratifying, in spite of all adverse conditions. This has especially been the case during the last three quarters of the present century, or since the foundation of our first literary and theological institutions. Previous to that time, owing to the want of a properly qualified ministry, but little progress was made. That was, indeed, a dreary period in the history of our Church, extending from 1747 to 1825, during which the very existence of the denomination was a matter of uncertainty, and during which it would probably have gone to pieces had not the prevalence of the German language effectually separated our ministers and people from the surrounding English Churches. But since the founding of our institutions there has been marked and steady progress. Between 1825 and 1896 the number of ministers increased from 80 to 961, and the number of members grew in equal proportions. Since the establishment of the General Synod in 1863 the average annual increase of communicant members has been four per cent., which is at least equal to that of any other denomination. This is a fact for which we have great reason to be thankful, and which has doubtless been brought to the attention of our people during this jubilee year.

But we must not be satisfied with the growth which has been reached in the past. We should now direct all our energies towards a wider extension of our Church in this country. There is still room for such extension. The land is by no means all taken up. Only one-third of the population of the United States are communicant members of any branch of the Christian Church. That implies that probably one-half of this population is without



any Church relations. Here, then, there is ample room for most energetic missionary work by all the denominations in the country; and the future peace and prosperity of the country will depend very much upon the manner and speed of this missionary work. Now there is nothing in the character of our unchurched population, and there is nothing in the character of the Reformed Church, that could prevent her from entering upon any part of the missionary field lying within the country. The unchurched of all nationalities are as much within her reach as they are within the reach of any other Christian body. There was a time when it was thought that the Reformed Church was not fit to do missionary work except among the Germans; and the first question asked concerning any new field always was, whether there were Germans enough there to justify our going into it. Now we trust that delusion has been dispelled. The field is the world, for us as well as for others. It is true, however, that the German population of the country offers a missionary field of peculiar attractiveness and promise to our Church.

As a Church of German origin, and being better acquainted, than the English Churches can be, with German habits and German ways of thought and feeling, our Church is doubtless especially fitted and called for missionary work in the German field; and owing to certain well-known but unfortunate circumstances which it is hoped may soon cease to exist, this field has of late years not been so generously cultivated as it should have been. But while we thus acknowledge our obligation to the Germans, we must nevertheless recognize the fact that we are not bound to the Germans exclusively. Wherever there are men of any nationality living without the Christian means of grace, there it is our duty to go and preach the Gospel. And considering the circumstance that much of the population that is now outside of the Church was once connected with one or other of the existing denominations and could not be held by them, is it not perhaps our peculiar duty to try our hands and see what we can do? If revivalism and the doctrines of a hard and repulsive Puritanism do not succeed in converting the masses, may not the Christo-

logical, sacramental and educational doctrines which we preach, and the warm and genial methods of Christian cultus which are peculiar to our Church, succeed better! Who knows but that we have been brought into the kingdom for such a time as this, and that, though we be small among the thousands of Israel, we may nevertheless be called to do great things in the evangelization of this country? In the years gone by some of us had a fancy that our Church might be called to be the theological teacher of the other Churches of this land; but if we have such a calling, we are sure that we can fulfill it only by reaching the people in large and ever increasing numbers. To use a phrase that will be familiar to those who are acquainted with our theology, our work in the future must be *extensive* as well as *intensive*.

And this work we must do in order to ensure the permanent existence of our Church. If we fail in this, we shall sink into the proportions of an insignificant sect, that will have no business very long to cumber the ground. And this is one of the lessons which we ought to learn well during this sesqui-centennial year. Our Church can not long succeed in merely maintaining her present size and borders. In certain localities in Pennsylvania and Maryland, and perhaps in a few spots of Ohio, she might always be influential without much increasing her membership as a whole; but beyond these limits her very existence in the future will depend upon her greatly lengthening her cords and strengthening her stakes. This will be the case everywhere throughout the great West. The few scattered congregations now existing in that wide territory must soon be supported by the organization of many new ones, or they must themselves be swallowed up by the surrounding denominations. In their present isolated position they will be too lonely to maintain themselves very long. So will it be also in the large cities. No one lone congregation of any denomination can long maintain itself in a city of more than one hundred thousand inhabitants. There are cities in which we now have one or two congregations, and in which we must either have a score in less than a score of years, or we shall have none at all. Energetic home missionary work, then, is for us preëmi-



nently the duty of the hour ; and from the performance of this duty no consideration whatever should be able to divert us. We can be of much account for the work of foreign missions, and for the future development of Christianity in our own country only by strengthening and making sure our own existence here. If, for instance, we had three or four times the numerical strength which we possess, we might exercise an influence over the Sunday school movement, the young people's movement, and many another interest of our common Christianity, of which we may not now dare to think. But our very existence will depend upon our preaching the Gospel to the poor ; and if we do not learn this lesson soon, then we are sure there will be no celebration for our Church one hundred and fifty years hence. This jubilee year should have been marked by the establishment of at least a score of new missions in different parts of our country. We understand that there has not been one. That is a sad thing to reflect on. But we hope that the heart of the Church will be so stirred by the services and reflections of this year, that the celebration may be the dawn of a new era in our home missionary work.

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#### THE REVIEW HEREAFTER.

We take pleasure in announcing to our readers that the REVIEW will continue hereafter to be published under its present management. Its size will be somewhat increased. Each number will contain an average of 144 pages, instead of 136 as heretofore. The price will remain the same. We cordially bespeak the interest and coöperation of our readers, both in securing new subscribers, and in furnishing *fresh* and *timely* articles for our pages. No pains will be spared, on the part of editor, printer, and publishers, to make the REVIEW interesting and profitable to its readers.

## VIII.

### NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

CHRISTIAN INSTINCTS AND MODERN DOUBT: Essays and Addresses in Aid of a Reasonable, Satisfying and Consolatory Religion. By the Rev. Alexander H. Craufurd, M.A. Thomas Whitaker: New York. 1897.

An earlier volume, "Enigmas of the Spiritual Life," published a few years ago, introduced this author to the American public. Those who have read it will be sure to recall with what vigor of thought and incisiveness of style he there discussed some of the problems which in our time are pressing most urgently for solution. In the present volume, brilliant throughout like the first, he proposes to supplement to some extent the previous discussion. His aim is "to give some real and adequate guidance to honest religious inquirers" who are ready to welcome help in this age of doubt.

The qualifications which he regards himself as possessing for the accomplishment of his purpose are spoken of in different places. "Perhaps," he says, "the fact that I have personally suffered much from the most harassing and persistent doubts and misgivings may help to make me more sympathetic and useful as a minister to minds diseased and tormented by the agonies of spiritual unrest, perplexity and sorrow." In the most mournful of modern novels, as he characterizes "The Story of an African Farm," he finds the voice of hidden spiritual grief and abiding bewilderment issuing from an intellect which has abandoned Christian Theism. "It is chiefly," he adds, "with the hope of saving some few perplexed spirits from suffering a similar loss that I have written this work."

Everywhere his pages declare a mind fearlessly frank and honest. He is willing to give the most attentive and thorough-going hearing to Agnostics, Secularists and Unitarians, as well as to the various parties in the Church whose errors and shortcomings he subjects to caustic review. Often he seems to allow at first a great deal more than those whose views or position he controverts or criticises might themselves claim, only, however, afterwards to point out defects so radical and great as wholly to invalidate or render worthless in the comparison that which had previously been granted. This method is employed with peculiarly striking effect in his review of Roman Catholic claims, and then of the ritualistic wing, "the high-and-dry party," as he calls it, of the Anglican communion. With reference to the latter he grants that it has performed some valuable work for religion. "Its



leaders certainly delivered us from the dreary slovenliness that often characterized Anglican religious services in earlier times. They also studied history to some extent and made more real the old doctrine of the communion of saints. They lessened the loneliness of the spiritual life, delivered their followers from the bondage of Sabbatarianism, made religion less dismal, inculcated the duty of cheerfulness, made life serious and solemn, and in great measure emancipated it from the gloom of Puritanism."

But compare now with the foregoing "the absurd doctrines" which this party teaches: "Beset by Rome on one side, and by reason on the other, they sought to vindicate for themselves the rights and privileges of Apostolical succession. They taught semi-materialistic views as to the presence of Christ in the Eucharist. And they regarded as quite essential to Christianity belief in their ludicrous fiction of baptismal regeneration, a fiction than which it would be difficult to find anything more palpably absurd in all the various superstitions of Paganism. Divines of this school also invested their priests with most of the semi-magical powers claimed by the Church of Rome. This high-and-dry religion deified moderation, correctness and good taste. Its true motto was, "By precedent are ye saved through conformity, not by enthusiasm, lest any man should be original."

The book, containing 356 pages, is made up of five separate essays or addresses. The first has for its subject "Some Advice to Agnostics," and its character is sufficiently indicated by the text standing at its beginning, quoted from Acts 27: 20 and 44. The subject of the second is "St. Paul on the Third Heaven: A Glimpse of the Religion of the Future." It contains the author's arguments for a great universal Church, coextensive with all human nobleness and goodness. Into that Church would be admitted not those who can say a creed, but all those that *love* the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity. The third chapter has "Watchman, What of the Night?" for its title. In it there is an admirable discussion of the doctrine of Theoristic Evolution and of the problem of pain. The fourth chapter discusses "The Unwisdom of Secularism," and has for its text "But seek ye first the Kingdom of God, etc." It is a strong and manly vindication of Christian principle and life, as against that of modern Secularists. The last essay, on "The Present State of Religious Thought in Great Britain," extends through more than 200 pages of the volume, and will richly repay the careful reading of the student. It contains a masterly survey of the religious, the philosophical, the scientific elements ruling in English thought. It points out the fact that science now is less hostile to religion than it formerly was, and recognizes the services of the late G. J. Romanes and Professor Fiske, of our country, in bringing about the change. The true nature of modern doubt and despair is set forth, and Emerson, Robert Browning and Dr. James Martineau held up as the best helpers to escape from it. The helpfulness of the churches



is also discussed. This one essay is worth many times the cost of the book to any one who will give his thoughtful attention to it.

A. S. W.

IMMORTALITY AND THE NEW THEODICY. By George A. Gordon, Minister of the Old South Church, Boston. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Company.

This little volume of 130 pages is the first fruits of the Ingersoll Lectureship, established in Harvard University, through a bequest from Miss Caroline Haskill Ingersoll. The terms of the will stipulate that one lecture shall be delivered each year on "The Immortality of Man." The honor of delivering the first lecture came to Dr. Gordon. He states that his discussion rests upon purely rational grounds, and that while he cannot write as if Christianity had never been he has still set for himself a philosophical endeavor, and has therefore omitted from his argument the ultimate basis of Christian belief in the future life, the resurrection of Jesus Christ.

Faith in immortality has once more become a problem created by the facts which science has brought to light in reference to the intimate relation which exists between brain activity and all mental, moral and spiritual phenomena in man. We must in some way be able to show that personality survives the shock of physical dissolution. But this cannot be done from the standpoint of science. That which death does not put an end to when an individual passes away eludes all scientific examination. The presumption of science is in favor of the position that death ends all. "It is admitted that the Creative Power may be able to secure the survival of the soul after the brain has become fixed in death, but the difficulty of so thinking is held to be so great that the only reasonable conclusion is its practical impossibility."

The author, therefore, turns away from science and seeks his premise for belief in immortality from philosophy, and states that the belief stands or falls with the moral idea of the universe. Assuming the moral perfection of the Creator, the reasonableness of the universe and the worth of human life, it follows as a necessary consequence. "The freshest discussion of the immortality of man must consider it," he tells us, "with reference to what may be termed the new theodicy; that is, that upon the faith that God exists a morally perfect being," whose absolute goodness and genuine interest in all men is beyond question. The first form of limitation upon the moral interest of God in mankind which he sets aside is the Hebrew idea of the remnant, and with it the theological doctrine of election, a doctrine which he says destroys the grand premise for belief in the immortality of man, because it makes the moral conception of God empty and incredible. The second form of limitation upon God's interest in man which he rejects is that



which restricts the opportunity of salvation to this life only. This limitation he says is logically the same as to declare that one can cut out a circle in space within which the law of gravitation operates, while beyond it there is no gravitation—nothing except chaos and utter contradiction. With these and all other limitations removed, he is prepared to recognize the great truth that the sublimest beatitude of God Himself would seem to be the eternal passion to make righteousness sovereign over all His moral creatures' through His Son Jesus Christ our Lord.

The first positive reason which he assigns for faith in personal immortality is the witness which God Himself has placed within man. The devout soul hears a voice within whispering that there is life beyond the grave. Man has by nature the instinct of immortality. The second is man's kinship with the infinite, the third the truth of the ideal and man's answering capacity, and the last the fact that human life, in its enduring moral need, is of permanent concern to the Most High.

The book has a healthy tone and is strongly written. The newest and freshest chapter is the one on Determinism and Freedom, in which he shows how the two ideas can be reconciled. The greatest defect of the volume is its assumption that "sensuous concomitant of the spirit" which constitutes man's medium of expression in this world is all that is involved in the idea of the body. He overlooks the fact that there is a spiritual body as well as a natural body, and thus fails to appreciate the significance of the resurrection of the dead.

C. S. G.

**PHILIP JACOB SPENER AND HIS WORK AND AUGUSTUS HERMAN FRANKE AND HIS WORK.** By Marie E. Richard. Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication Society. 1897. Price, 40 cents.

Of Philip Jacob Spener it has been said that among the theologians of the Lutheran Church of the seventeenth century he was the purest and most spotless in character and the most successful in his work. Augustus Herman Franke was a disciple of Spener and has the honor of founding the first orphan asylum or home. Both Spener and Franke made a marked impression on the religious life of their time. The little volume before us, which belongs to the "Lutheran Hand-book Series," is made up of sketches of the life and work of these two men. Both sketches are interesting and instructive. They give just such information as is most desirable and profitable for the general reader. It would be well if the book could find a place in every Sunday-school and in every family library where the English language is spoken.

J. M. T.

**THE COUNTRY CHARGE.** By Marie E. Richards. Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication Society. Price, 75 cents.

This is a well-written and an interesting volume. It is also religiously instructive and inspiring. Those who take it up to



read it will not be likely to lay it aside before they have finished it, and they can scarcely fail to be impressed by the beauty and attractiveness of Christianity as manifested in the life of its hero. The work is dedicated to the divinity students of Seminary Ridge, Gettysburg. All divinity students, however, may find instruction in its pages. It is a work which is also very suitable for the Sunday-school library. The only fault we have to find with the story is its tragical and abrupt ending. While good and faithful men have frequently occasion to sacrifice their lives for the sake of Christ, yet it is far from being always necessary for them to do so. It seems, therefore, to us improper to make the impression that such is the case.

J. M. T.

**PHILIPPIAN STUDIES :** Lessons in Faith and Love from St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians. By H. C. G. Moule, D.D., Principal of Ridley Hall, and formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 51 East Tenth Street. 1897. Price, \$1.50.

This is a work of superior merit. Its object is more especially edification, and to this purpose it is admirably adapted. It is not a critical commentary, but it, nevertheless, fully and clearly sets forth the meaning and the theological and practical bearing of the Epistle which it makes the subject of study. We know, indeed, of no other work treating of this Epistle which is so well suited to the wants of the general reader. In it there is nothing to perplex or confuse, but everything necessary to a proper apprehension of the truths set forth by the Apostle. The book is divided into twelve chapters. Of these the first is introductory. The others respectively treat of the Intimacy of Human Hearts in Christ (Phil. I., 1-11), the Apostle's Position and Circumstances (Phil. I., 12-20), the Christian's Peace and the Christian's Consistency (Phil. I., 21-30), Unity in Self-forgetfulness: the Example of the Lord (Phil. II., 1-11), the Lord's Power in the Disciple's Life (Phil. II., 12-18), Timotheus and Epaproditus (Phil. II., 19-30), Joy in the Lord and Its Preserving Influence: "That I May Know Him" (Phil. III., 1-11), Christian Standing and Christian Progress (Phil. III., 12-16), the Blessed Hope and Its Powers (Phil. III., 17-21), Purity and Peace in the Present Lord (Phil. IV., 1-9), and the Collection for St. Paul: the Farewell (Phil. IV., 10-23). Each chapter, excepting the first, which treats of the Epistle in a general way, begins with the verses considered, so set forth as to clearly show their meaning, and closes with an interesting and instructive exposition of them. No one who carefully reads these chapters or studies—for each chapter forms a distinct study—can fail to be spiritually profited by them. We heartily commend the work to all who are interested in the study of Sacred Scripture.

J. M. T.



THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANCIENT INDIA. By Richard Garbe, Professor of the University of Tübingen. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1897. Pages, 89. Paper Binding. Price, 25 cents.

India is not merely a land of mystery and wonder, but a land also of culture and of high thinking. Philosophy flourished there at least before the time of Homer; and the same problems which afterwards engaged the minds of Grecian philosophers, and which engage the minds of modern thinkers, had ages before occupied the attention of Indian sages. To this ancient philosophy of India the little volume before us forms a very good introduction. The treatise consists of three parts; the first being a brief outline of the history of Indian philosophy; the second treating of the connection between Greek and Indian Philosophy, and the third discussing Hindu Monism.

Six great systems of philosophy flourished in India during the millennium before Christ, in which the problems of existence are discussed with an acuteness and wealth of illustration that have never been excelled. And the influence of the mental life of the Hindus, in those far-off times, affected the thinking of the Greeks, and through them the thinking of the modern world. The Ionic doctrine of *elements*, the Eleatic idea of the *unity of existence*, the Heraclitic conception of *becoming*, and the Pythagorean theory of *numbers* as the principle of existence, according to our author, had their origin in the speculations of the Hindu philosophers. Not that the connection between India and Greece in the earliest times is supposed to have been direct. Our author rather suspects that the earliest Greek thinkers became acquainted with Hindu thought through Persian sources, and he suggests that the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers may have had its origin in a misunderstanding of a Hindu word. That word is *Samkhya*, *number*, which forms the name of a Hindu system of philosophy, because that system was believed to contain a complete *enumeration*, or *number*, of the principles of existence. Misunderstanding this application of the term, Pythagoras made *number* itself the principle of the universe; and countless philosophers have since wasted their energies in trying to understand what he could have meant. The doctrine of metempsychosis also came into Greece, not from Egypt, where it did not prevail, but from India, where it originated in the effort to explain the phenomenon of apparently innocent suffering. The Hindu believed that suffering must always be a punishment of sin; but he saw men suffering who seemed not to have been guilty of any sins in this life; hence he inferred that they must be suffering for the sins committed in another life. We mention but one more idea for which Professor Garbe supposes Greece to have been indebted to India, and that is the idea of the *Logos*, which was current in the Stoic philosophy as denoting the rational law and order of the universe, borrowed from this source by Philo and the Hellenists, and appropriated by the author of our fourth Gospel. The correspond-



ing Hindu term is *Vāch*, *voice*, *word*, which appears as the consort of Prajâpati, the Creator, who, in union with it, or *her*, for the word is feminine, accomplishes his creation. We have reproduced these few ideas from the work before us merely in order to give the reader a taste of the interest attaching to it.

ANNOTATIONS ON THE GENERAL EPISTLES OF JAMES, PETER, JOHN AND JUDE.  
By Revere F. Weidner, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Systematic Theology in the Chicago Lutheran Theological Seminary. New York: Christian Literature Company. 1897. Pages, 380. Price, \$2.00.

This forms the eleventh volume of the Lutheran Commentary, which was noticed in the July number of this REVIEW. The general character of the volume is similar to that of the one preceding it. The design of this Commentary seems to be to afford busy pastors and intelligent members of the Church a convenient help to the understanding of the sacred Scriptures. And that design is well met in these volumes. There is no display of scientific apparatus, and there are no interminable discussions of critical questions. Yet the work is scholarly, and, leaning largely on the more comprehensive commentaries, furnishes just such notes as the general reader of the Bible will want in order to a correct understanding. It is, of course, intended to circulate mainly in the Lutheran Church, and is prepared with reference to Lutheran readers. We think, too, that the volume now before us is somewhat *more Lutheran* than the volume previously noticed. Professor Weidner is a Lutheran who is not afraid to avow his attachment to the Church of the great Reformer of Germany, although he thinks Luther was wrong in his depreciatory judgment of the Epistle of James and of the Apocalypse, and in his free handling of certain portions of the New Testament.

Besides a brief general introduction to the General Epistles, each of these Epistles is prefaced by a short special introduction, discussing the questions of the canonicity, authenticity, designation, and time and place of composition. Professor Weidner has no doubt of the authenticity or genuineness of all these Epistles, not even excepting the Second of Peter and the Second and Third of John. He mentions dissenting opinions, but follows the authorities which uphold the traditional views on these questions, and he generally does this in a tone which implies that he has not the highest kind of respect for opposite opinions. He easily gets over difficulties, and leaves the reader in no doubt as to the conclusions which he ought to hold. His treatment of the difficult question of the relation between the Second Epistle of Peter and the Epistle of Jude is an illustration in point. After giving the various views that have been held on the subject, he concludes that there is no relation of dependence between these Epistles at all and that the similarities can be easily accounted for on the ground that the errors against which both Epistles were aimed were of the same general character, and that the per-



sons addressed had received the same kind of instruction and were familiar with the same traditions. As to *dates*, Professor Weidner agrees with many modern commentators in supposing that the Epistle of James forms the earliest part of New Testament literature, having been written before 50 A. D., while First and Second Peter were written in 63 or 64 A. D., the former at Babylon, the latter at Rome, and the First Epistle of John in the last decade of the first century at Ephesus. The Second and Third Epistles of John are said to have most probably been written a short "time after the first."

From such examination as we have been able to give this volume we are led to conclude that the notes are generally judicious and in harmony with the best exegetical results, though we can not always agree with the opinions expressed. The interpreter of these Epistles is confronted by some difficult problems. There is, for instance, the question as to St. James' view of justification in relation to that of St. Paul. If the early date of the Epistle of James is correct, and we are inclined to believe that it is, it follows that James could have had no reference to the doctrine of Paul. But then what caused his polemic? Professor Weidner answers that it was the presence in the Church of a class of persons whose Christianity consisted in a mere lifeless profession of orthodoxy; and that by justification he meant *being declared righteous in the Day of Judgment*, while Paul meant *the forgiveness of sin at the beginning of faith*. Hence there is no essential difference between the two apostles. Their several lines of argument neither cross nor touch each other. Another difficult problem is presented to the interpreter by the passage in I. Pet. 3:18-20, of which we do not think that Dr. Weidner's solution is a happy one. We can not, of course, go into the details of his exegesis here. But his conclusion is that Christ made two descents into Hades, the one at the moment of His death, referred to Acts 2:27, and belonging to his humiliation, the other after His being quickened in the spirit, which was virtually His resurrection, and this belonged to His exaltation. On this second trip into Hades Christ preached to the souls in prison—the spirits of wicked men and angels—in the lowest realms of Hades. From thence He passed up into a higher realm, *Paradise* or *Abraham's bosom*, where He preached the Gospel to the pious dead, referred to 4:6. The preaching to the spirits in prison was not a preaching of the Gospel at all, but merely a manifestation of His glory and power by the Saviour to the damned. What end such preaching could serve, the commentator does not tell us. The only proof which he brings forward in favor of this view is that the word for *preaching* in the passage is *κηρύσσειν*, which denotes the act of a herald making proclamation of some decree or fact. But the commentator seems to forget that throughout the New Testament *κηρύσσειν* is always used in relation to preaching the Gospel, and it would be strange if it were not used in this sense here.



In connection with his interpretation of this passage Professor Weidner presents a somewhat extended excursus on the subject of probation after death. He holds that the inference drawn from this passage in favor of the doctrine, now held by many of the most pious and learned theologians, of an extension of the possibility of salvation beyond death, is altogether unwarranted. Nor is there any particle of reason for such a doctrine in any part or passage of Scripture. In fact, the whole doctrine is merely a web of sophistry woven by a set of minds that are not willing to be ruled by the Word of God. This is rather hard on such eminent theologians as Dorner, Lange, Ebrard, Martensen, Farrar, Maurice, Kingsley and a host of others, whose learning and piety are certainly equal—but comparisons are odious, and we forbear. Professor Weidner insists strongly that the present life is in all cases decisive of eternal destiny, and interprets Scripture in harmony with this view. That this view would subject the great majority of mankind to eternal damnation, unless we should suppose them to be saved in some unknown, unorthodox way, seems to give no trouble to the theologian who is sure, first, of the infallibility of his dogmas, and, secondly, of their being taught in Scripture.

We have given this instance merely to show Professor Weidner's tendency as an exegete. While his work is generally good, and valuable doubtless to the class of readers for whom it is especially intended, we think that in some cases it is unduly influenced by his dogmatic prepossessions. The true exegete must be strongly resolved to be influenced by nothing at all but the mind of his author in arriving at his conclusions. The business of the exegete is not to educe from the Bible the dogmatic or confessional system of some particular church, but to educe the sense of the sacred writers. If we truly get at the mind of the Spirit that is embodied in Scripture we shall not need to be afraid of any consequences.

SESQUI-CENTENNIAL SERVICES OF THE EVANGELICAL REFORMED CHURCH, Frederick, Maryland, May 9, 14 and 16, 1897. Rev. E. R. Eschbach, D.D., Pastor. Frederick, Md.: Great Southern Printing and Manufacturing Company, Printers and Publishers. 1897.

This neat pamphlet of 91 pages is a fitting contribution by the Reformed Church of Frederick, Md., and by the members of the Maryland Classis to the literature of the sesqui-centennial anniversary of the organization of the Coetus, or mother synod, of the Reformed Church in the United States. It consists of addresses delivered at Frederick, Md., and elsewhere, by different members of the Classis of Maryland. In the first address Rev. E. R. Eschbach, D.D., speaks of "The Historical Position of the Reformed Church." The second is an "Address of Welcome," by Jacob Rohrbach, Esq. The third address is an eloquent tribute to "Our Reformed Ancestry," by Rev. Cyrus Cort, D.D. "The 150th



Anniversary of the Work of Rev. Michael Schlatter, the Pioneer Missionary of the Reformed Church in Maryland," is the subject of the fourth address, delivered by Rev. George M. Zacharias. In the fifth address Rev. T. F. Hoffmeier discusses the "Characteristics of the Germans and Their Relations to the Reformed Church in the United States." The subject of the next address, delivered by Rev. S. M. Hench, is the "Present Condition and Future Prospects of the Reformed Church in this Country." The last address, by Rev. Isaac M. Motter, is on "The Imperative Need of a Large and Available Church Building Fund, with which to Aid in Securing Proper Locations in Large and Growing Cities." The addresses collected in this pamphlet are all of a high order of excellence, and contain much interesting information for the members of the Reformed Church. We notice that Dr. Cort's address is published also in separate form.

**CHAMPIONS OF CHRISTIANITY.** By Silas Farmer, author of "History of Detroit and Michigan." New York: Eaton & Mains. Pages, 139. Price, 60 cents. 1897.

This volume contains short biographical sketches of a considerable number of distinguished defenders of the Christian faith, belonging to the governmental, social, industrial, artistic, literary and scientific world. Among the names mentioned we have Washington, Gladstone, Garibaldi, Grant, Howard, Webster, Galileo, Herschel, etc. Those who are particularly interested in apologetics, and concerned to know what has been said about Christianity by eminent men, will be interested in the contents of this little volume. Garibaldi is usually credited with having been something of a free thinker in religion; but the following is from an address delivered by him to the Hungarian Hussars in Naples, on a certain occasion: "I am a Christian, and I speak to Christians. I am a good Christian, and I speak to good Christians. I love and venerate the religion of Christ, because Christ came into the world to deliver humanity from slavery, for which God has not created it."

**THREE INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT.** By F. Max Müller, with an Appendix containing a Correspondence on *Thought Without Words*. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. Pages, 123. Paper Binding. Price, 25 cents.

**THREE LECTURES ON THE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE.** Delivered at the Oxford University Extension Meeting, with a Supplement on *My Predecessors*, by F. Max Müller. Second Edition. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company. Pages, 112. Paper Binding. Price, 25 cents.

Anything written or spoken by Professor Max Müller on the subject of language never fails to be interesting. Having devoted half a century to the study of language; having been the translator of the Vedas, and having repeatedly gone over the whole ground of Aryan speech, Professor Max Müller is an authority



on all questions connected with the science of language. Some of the questions discussed in the lectures composing the two little volumes mentioned above relate to the origin of language, the classification of language, and the connection between language and thought.

The science of language, according to Max Müller, is a physical science. Language is a natural product of the human mind, growing out of its primitive constitution under the stimulating influence of its external environment, according to fixed and necessary laws. There is, therefore, nothing irrational or accidental in language. The irregularities in declensions and conjugations, and the exceptions to the rules of syntax, can all be explained and made intelligible. The 250,000 words contained in a modern English dictionary can all be traced back to less than 500 roots. These roots are the primary elements of human speech, and are common to all the Aryan tongues. And these roots are neither sensations nor percepts, but concepts, or general thoughts. Such thoughts the animal is incapable of forming and, therefore, also it is incapable of speech. Animals can communicate their feelings and their perceptions by cries and gestures, but they cannot communicate thought, because they have no thought to communicate. Human language, therefore, cannot be evolved by a mere process of transformation from the sounds expressed by animals. And Professor Müller accordingly accepts the evolution theory only with considerable modification.

One of the most interesting questions discussed in these lectures is that concerning the relation of language to thought. We are accustomed to think that thought is possible without language, and that there is no necessary relation between thoughts and words. We say sometimes that language is but a crude vehicle of thought, as if thought were something much more refined than language, and capable of existing without language. We speak of certain controversies as mere logomachies or word-fights, as if there could be a difference of expression without a difference of meaning. But Professor Müller maintains *the identity of thought and language*. This is one of the principles for which he contends in these lectures, and which he has defended in large volumes of his writings. Language, according to this theory, is not the *product* of thought; on the contrary, it *is* thought. Thought does not come first and language afterwards. Language is thought, and thought is language, and where there is no language there is no thought. Where there is confusion of language there is also confusion of knowledge, and an inability to express thought clearly means inability to think clearly. But by identity of thought and language Max Müller does not mean absolute *sameness*. What he means is indivisible unity. Thought and word can be distinguished, but not separated. If a word be defined as *significant sound*, we may think first of the signification and then of the sound; but sound and signification can never



exist apart. We might compare the relation existing between thought and word to the relation between soul and body, were it not that the soul is supposed to be able to exist apart from the body. No thought can exist apart from the word in which it is embodied. The word is the necessary form of thought, whether really uttered by the voice or not. This theory has important bearings upon philosophy and logic, as well as upon the science of language. The old dispute between nominalism and realism is involved in the principle which is discussed in these lectures. And those who are interested in the subject will find these lectures both interesting and profitable reading.

**THE GROWING REVELATION.** By Amory H. Bradford. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1897. Pages, 254. Price, \$1.50.

Dr. Bradford is known to the intelligent public as an author and thinker of no mean capacity. His volume on "*Heredity and Christian Problems*," published a few years ago, and noticed at the time in this REVIEW, at once showed him to be a man who has formed clear opinions on a variety of interesting topics, and is able to express them in a clear and interesting style. But Dr. Bradford is a preacher also; and the volume now before us is a collection of discourses delivered to the church in New Jersey of which he is pastor, and elsewhere. There are fourteen discourses in the collection, and these are preceded by a prologue and followed by an epilogue. The subjects of the discourses are, in part, as follows: "*The Vision of God*," "*Interpretation of God by His Fatherhood*," "*The Voice of the Cross*," "*Faith for Our Time*," "*The Coming Church*," "*The Growing Revelation*," "*The Growing Revelation of Christ*," "*Christ and the Creeds*."

Divine revelation, according to Dr. Bradford, is a progressive manifestation of the life of God in humanity. The medium of this revelation is Christ. But it was not finished with the appearance of Christ in the flesh. The ages since the ascension of Christ have served to make Christ better known to the world than He was at the beginning. There is a growing revelation of Christ in theology. The theology of Christ Himself consists mainly in three great conceptions. These are *fatherhood*, *service*, *sacrifice*, and these ideas are coming into clearer light in modern theology than they were before. There is a growing revelation of Christ also in politics. Christ is humanizing the theories of the State; and "the nation is no longer regarded as a mass of unrelated individuals bound together by laws, but is seen to have organic life, and to be ordained to a service as divine as that of the Christ." There is a growing revelation of Christ in political economy. The agitation which is now taking place in the social world, and the pressure for better economic conditions for the masses, are manifestations of the Spirit of Christ. And, finally, there is a growing revelation of Christ in the Church. Christ is always in the Church, but the Church of the future will be a more complete



revelation of Christ than the Church of the past has been. And "in its fulness this revelation will be the realization in humanity of the life, the teaching and the sacrifice of the Christ, who is the perfect revelation of God to man, and of man to himself."

From the above it will be seen that Dr. Bradford is not a traditionalist in theology. He believes theology to be progressive; and the theology of to-day to be a clearer reflection of Christ than any previous theology. Of the theology of to-day he says: "It is not chiefly occupied with speculations concerning the person of Christ; it is more anxious to know what He taught than who He was; it believes Him to have been in a unique sense divine, because He satisfies that which is nearest divine in man; it is not so anxious to know who wrote the Bible as to know what the Bible makes of those who read it; it believes in the divine in man, therefore is humanitarian; it believes in the omnipotence of love, therefore does not believe that God can forever be defeated." These sentiments are from the prologue, from which many similar sentiments could be quoted, and which may be regarded as in some sense summing up Dr. Bradford's creed.


EQUALITY. By Edward Bellamy. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 1897. Pages, 412. Price, \$1.00.

This is a sociological novel, and forms a continuation of the story of the author's former work entitled *Looking Backward*. It will be remembered by those who read that work that as a production of art it amounts to very little. Its main interest lies in the representation of the new condition of society which, according to the author, will prevail in the twentieth century. In this respect the present volume resembles its predecessor. The book is strongly written, in clear, forcible English that arrests and keeps alive the attention. The story has but little interest, and seems in fact to be intended merely as a foil for setting off the author's theory of *economic nationalism*.

All readers will not agree with Mr. Bellamy that the present unequal distribution of wealth and the present social distress are the *necessary* outcome of the system of private capital and private industry. Nevertheless, but few will rise from the perusal of his pages without a burning sense of indignation against the "lords of Mammon," who are so eminently profiting by this system. The majority of Mr. Bellamy's readers will probably agree with him that there is something terribly wrong in the present working of the social machine. When, however, he presents the new social theory of *nationalism* as a deliverance from all social ills, many will shake their heads in doubt. In the new society the government is to control all capital and manage all industry. Where will it be possible to find officials *wise* enough, even supposing they were *honest* enough, to manage such a job?























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